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PART XV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF THIBET.

RECEIVED IN
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POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

1912.

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107	India Office ...	...	June 18, 1912	Situation in Thibet. Efforts of Thibetans to induce Laden La to go to Lhassa to arrange a peace. Surrender of arms by Chinese might be negotiated, but only in the presence of a British officer. Transmits three telegrams from trade agent at Gyantse. Laden La ordered to return at once	95
108	Sir J. Jordan ...	133 Tel.	18,	Despatch of military expedition to Thibet. Reports departure from Chengtu of 700 men, object of expedition, and total force...	96
109	India Office ...	...	18,	Kashgar. Revolutionary movement in Sin-Chiang province. Transmits letter of 6th April from Consul-General Macartney reporting on situation. Suggests that thanks of His Majesty's Government be tendered to Russian consular officers at Kashgar, Ili, and Urumtchi	97
110	„ „ ...	...	19,	Situation in Thibet. Thibetan offer of safe conduct on condition of surrendering arms and travelling viâ India refused by Chinese unless guaranteed by British trade agent. Laden La consequently asks permission to proceed to Lhassa as mediator. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India	98
111	„ „ ...	...	19,	North-east frontier. Proposal of military authorities to send Captain Pritchard and surveyors to explore north-east salient of Burma frontier. Transmits telegram from Viceroy approving, and requesting sanction	99
112	Sir J. Jordan ...	136 Tel.	19,	Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Consul at Chengtu reports that Yünnan and Szechuan contingents have been ordered to join at Batang and that the two provinces are to select a joint commander-in-chief	100
113	To Sir J. Jordan ...	96 Tel.	20,	Proposed Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Should warn Yuan Shih-kai as suggested in his telegram No. 127, adding that we have no objection to Chinese garrison at Lhassa returning to China viâ India. Question of Nepal and Bhutan to be considered as closed and Nepal to be advised to discontinue sending quinquennial mission	100
114	„ „ ...	97 Tel.	20,	Powers of Chinese Resident at Lhassa and number of Chinese troops in Thibet. Enquires whether it would be possible to come to an arrangement with China as to	100
115	India Office ...	...	20,	Fighting in Thibet. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India reporting occupation of village and monastery of Dip by Chinese and despatch of Thibetan soldiers to evict them	100
116	To India Office ...	...	20,	Proposed farewell message to Dalai Lama. Concurs in amendment proposed in No. 104, but, in view of article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Convention, suggests omission of certain words	101
117	India Office ...	...	21,	Proposed Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Transmits copy of telegram dated 19th June to Viceroy asking if the possibility of prohibiting export of rice from India to Thibet had been considered by him	101

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
118	India Office ...	...	June 22, 1912	Proposed Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Points out consequences. Any further attempt to incorporate Thibet as a province of China should be strenuously opposed. Transmits telegram from trade agent at Gyantse as to position of Chinese at Dip and at Lhassa. Refers to No. 108	101
119	Sir J. Jordan ...	141 Tel.	22,	Proposed Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Refers to No. 113. Will interview President to-morrow. Requests early instructions with reference to telegram from Viceroy of 21st June (see No. 118)...	102
120	„ „ ...	142 Tel.	23,	Proposed Chinese military expedition to Thibet. Reports interview with President. Latter explains object of the expedition and disclaims idea of incorporating Thibet as an integral part of China. Departure of the Chinese garrison from Lhassa would remove all excuse for the expedition. Facilities should therefore be given by the Government of India. Refers to No. 113 (see No. 132)...	102
121	„ „ ...	143 Tel.	24,	Occupation of Lamaya by Thibetans and retreat of Chinese troops to Litang. Consul-general at Chengtu reports. Refers to No. 112	103
122	India Office ...	...	24,	Proposed Chinese expedition to Thibet. Transmits telegram from Viceroy stating reasons why the idea of prohibiting the export of rice to Thibet as a means of checking the Chinese advance was discarded. Suggests lines on which our action should proceed for the present ...	103
123	To India Office ...	...	24,	Question of exchange of mails between India and Thibet. Sir E. Grey thinks that the reply suggested in the India Office letter of the 14th June might be liable to misconstruction. He proposes, therefore, merely to inform the Chinese Government that owing to the disturbed state of Thibet His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion, but reserve the right to reopen question hereafter (see No. 136)	104
124	India Office ...	...	22,	Proposed farewell message to Dalai Lama. The sentence relating to the exchange of letters between the Viceroy and the Dalai Lama will be omitted as suggested in No. 116. Points out, however, that the right of communicating direct with the Thibetan Government has been held to be established implicitly by the Anglo-Thibetan Treaty of 1904. Transmits copy of telegraphic instructions sent to Viceroy	104
125	„ „ ..	...	24,	Departure of Dalai Lama from Kalimpong for Thibet. Transmits telegram from Viceroy reporting	105
126	Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff	...	25,	Memorandum describing situation in Thibet and furnishing copy of the message of advice and farewell which the Government of India have been authorised to communicate to the Dalai Lama	105

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
127	Sir J. Jordan ...	247	June 6, 1912	Attitude of Chinese Government towards Thibet. Reports an interview with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at which he protested against this attitude, and pointed out that the Presidential Order of 21st April (see No. 67) was at variance with undertakings given by China. Will await reply to his telegram No. 117 before pressing the matter further (see No. 77) ...	105
128	„ „ ...	146▲ Tel.	26,	Powers of Chinese Resident at Lhassa and number of Chinese troops in Thibet. Thinks arrangement referred to in No. 128 possible later on, but premature to propose it at present. President is aware that settlement could easily be reached if the military expedition were stopped, and will endeavour to check enthusiasm of Szechuan, but his authority is far from decisive in such matters (see No. 132)	106
129	To Sir C. MacDonald	107	26,	State of affairs in Thibet and the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government. Reports conversation with Japanese Ambassador concerning article in the "Manchu Nichi Nichi Shimbun" enclosed in No. 147 to Foreign Office of 25th May...	106
130	India Office ...	...	26,	Mr. Rose's proposal for settlement of frontier questions with Chinese. Acknowledges No. 100. Agrees that Mr. Rose's suggestion must be abandoned	107
131	Sir J. Jordan ...	147 Tel.	28,	Message from President of the Republic to Chinese Resident at Lhassa requesting him to report on state of affairs in Thibet. Chinese Government, having no means of telegraphing except through British agency, have requested him to have the above message transmitted through the Viceroy of India. Refers to No. 114 and trusts action will be approved (see No. 157)	107
132	To Sir J. Jordan ...	105 Tel.	29,	Proposed Chinese expedition to Thibet and the question of procuring the safe withdrawal of the Chinese garrison. Directs him to continue to press Chinese Government not to despatch any force across the frontier, and explains why His Majesty's Government have decided not to intervene in the matter of the withdrawal of the garrison, though it will be permitted to return to China viâ India. Refers to Nos. 120 and 128	108
133	To India Office ...	...	July 1,	Desire of President of Chinese Republic to communicate with the commandant of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India. Transmits telegram from Sir J. Jordan (No. 131) and requests to be informed of views of India Office (see No. 137)	108
134	India Office ...	...	2,	Arrival of the Dalai Lama at Yatung. Transmits telegram from Viceroy reporting	108
135	„ „ ...	...	2,	Dalai and Tashi Lamas. Transmits copy of correspondence with the political officer at Sikkim and British trade agent at Gyantse. Mr. Gould should be told to inform Tashi Lama that the Government of India cannot intervene in the internal administration of Thibet	109

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
136	India Office ...	...	July 3, 1912	Exchange of mails between India and Thibet. Concurs in proposed reply to Chinese Government. Refers to No. 123	110
137	„ „ ...	...	4,	Desire of President Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with commandant of Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India. Refers to No. 133. Lord Crewe sees no objection to comply with request in this instance, but suggests that Yuan be informed that in no circumstances will facilities be afforded hereafter for communicating with Thibet viâ India ...	110
138	„ „ ...	...	4,	Return of Chinese troops from Thibet to China. Transmits message received from Dalai Lama requesting Viceroy to allow a British representative to accompany him to Lhassa to superintend surrender of arms and see that everything is properly conducted. Viceroy proposes to decline this request (see No. 142)	110
139	„ „ ...	...	5,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram from Viceroy reporting that both Chinese and Thibetans are tired of fighting and desire peace, and that Haji Ghulam Muhammed had been informed by Chinese authorities that they desired the presence of a British officer to witness terms of settlement as an intermediary. Chinese are buoyed up by secret information of advance of 2,000 Chinese from Szechuan ...	111
140	To Sir J. Jordan ...	194	6,	Question of exchange of mails between India and Thibet. Replies to No. 84. As detailed answer to the Wai-chiao Pu undesirable, he should refuse to continue discussion, reserving right to reopen question later (see No. 174)	111
141	To India Office ...	...	6,	Desire of President Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with commandant of Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India. Refers to No. 137. Danger that Thibetans might think His Majesty's Government were acting with Chinese against Dalai Lama. Suggests that Indian Government should be consulted before His Majesty's Minister at Peking is instructed (see Nos. 144 and 149)	112
142	India Office ...	...	8,	Return of Chinese troops from Thibet to China. Transmits telegram to Viceroy of India approving his proposed reply to Dalai Lama (see No. 138)	112
143	„ „ ...	...	9,	Return of Dalai Lama to Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 8th July from Viceroy of India reporting Dalai Lama's departure from Yatung and his good reception in Chumbi Valley (see No. 134)	112
144	„ „ ...	...	9,	Desire of Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with commandant of Chinese garrison at Lhassa through Government of India. Transmits telegram of 6th July to Viceroy of India requesting his views as to danger that Thibetans may suspect us of combining with Chinese (see Nos. 141 and 149)	113

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
145	India Office ...	...	July 9, 1912	Arrival of Dorjieff at Phari. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India reporting. Dorjieff denies having authority from Russian Government	113
146	„ „ ...	...	9,	Dalai and Tashi Lamas. Transmits telegram from British trade agent at Gyantse to political officer in Sikkim reporting Tashi Lama's intention to meet Dalai Lama, and his anxiety as to intentions of latter, and as to his own probable reception in India if no understanding is reached. Trade agent's replies to enquiries on last two points	114
147	To India Office ...	...	10,	Farewell message to Dalai Lama. Acknowledges No. 124. Does not agree that right of exchanging friendly letters between the Viceroy of India and the Dalai Lama has been established (see No. 163*) ...	114
148	India Office ...	...	10,	Dalai and Tashi Lamas. Transmits telegram of 10th July from Viceroy of India reporting that Tashi Lama has asked British trade agent at Gyantse to act as intermediary, and observing that, in that case, no responsibility should be taken regarding fulfilment of any arrangement reached (see No. 158)...	115
149	„ ...	...	11,	Chinese and Thibetans at Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 10th July from Viceroy of India reporting that, according to message sent to Peking, Thibetans guarantee safety of Chinese garrison at Lhassa if they surrender arms and quit Thibet. With regard to No. 144, Viceroy considers that as garrison can communicate with China direct, it is unnecessary to forward Yuan's message (see No. 157)...	115
150	Sir J. Jordan ...	269	June 26,	Proposed Chinese expedition to Thibet. Refers to No. 120. Transmits memorandum of his interview with President. Latter sincere in disclaiming idea of incorporating Thibet in China, but will not, and probably cannot, undertake to prevent troops crossing frontier. Difficulty of settlement in that event. Dangerous aggressive spirit in frontier provinces. Withdrawal of Lhassa garrison should be facilitated	116
151	„ „ ...	271	28,	Chinese policy in Thibet. Transmits memorandum by Major Robertson reporting that Wen Tsung Yao, late Assistant Resident at Lhassa, condemns alienation of Thibetans by Chinese. Criticisms by military attaché at Peking of Wen Tsung Yao's statements as to inferiority of Thibetan to Chinese troops	119
152	India Office ...	...	July 11,	Political status of Thibet. Proposes communication to Chinese Government of statement of British policy recognising Chinese "suzerain rights" in, but not sovereignty over, Thibet, denying right of China to intervene actively in Thibetan internal affairs, demurring to conduct of Chinese officials in Thibet and to Presidential Order (enclosed in No. 67) relative to treatment of Thibet as a Chinese province, objecting to maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops in Thibet, and pressing for a written agree-	

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				ment on above lines, communication between China and Thibet, viâ India, being meanwhile closed (see Nos. 160 and 173)	121
153	India Office ...	...	July 12, 1912	Desire of Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with Chinese garrison at Lhassa through Government of India. Transmits enclosures in Nos. 144 and 149 on above subject. Viceroy considers it unnecessary to forward message	122
154	„ „ ...	...	13,	Closing of Thibetan frontier to Chinese. Proposal of Viceroy of India to refuse passes to Chinese officials approved. Transmits correspondence with Viceroy (see No. 113)	123
155	Sir J. Jordan ...	154 Tel.	15,	Military operations. Refers to No. 121. Consul-general at Chengtu reports arrival of first Chengtu detachment at Tachienlu, departure of Governor of Szechuan with 1,800 men, and reported recapture of Litang by Chinese	123
156	India Office ...	...	16,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram of 15th July from Viceroy of India. Dalai and Tashi Lamas to meet at Ralung. Former has informed Len Amban that he could only make peace before British witness. Statement by Dorjieff of his intention to go with Dalai Lama to Samding and of his pleasure at attitude of British Government (see Nos. 145 and 148)	123
157	To Sir J. Jordan ...	113 Tel.	16,	Desire of Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with Chinese garrison at Lhassa through Government of India. Refers to Nos. 131 and 149. Request to be refused ...	124
158	India Office ...	...	17,	Dalai and Tashi Lamas. Transmits telegram of 12th July to Viceroy of India instructing him to refuse Tashi Lama's request that trade agent at Gyantse should act as intermediary (see No. 148)	124
159	„ „ ...	...	18,	Return of Dalai Lama to Thibet. Transmits telegram of 16th July from Viceroy of India reporting Lama having passed through Gyantse and his interviews with trade agent there. Warning given him against intrigues with foreign Powers and as to the presence of Dorjieff. His friendly language, and appointment of Laden La as an honorary official (see No. 165) ...	125
160	To Sir J. Jordan ...	205	19,	Proposed communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Transmits No. 152 and requests him to state his views by telegraph (see No. 169)	126
161	To India Office ...	...	19,	Status of Thibet. Informs of action in No. 160	126
162	To Sir C. MacDonald	126	24,	Status of Thibet Japanese Ambassador enquires as to British attitude. Sir E. Grey explains that, while avoiding interference, His Majesty's Government would press view that Thibet should be autonomous under Chinese suzerainty	126

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
163	Question asked in the House of Commons (Maj. Archer-Shee)	...	July 25, 1912	*Status quo* in Thibet. What steps are being taken to maintain? Informed that His Majesty's Minister at Peking has protested against any change at variance with Anglo-Thibetan treaties and with Chinese assurances	126
163*	India Office ...	...	26,	Right of communication between Governments of India and Thibet. Acknowledges No. 147. Argues that, on non-fulfilment by Thibet of agreement of 7th September, 1904, His Majesty's Government would be free to communicate direct with that of Thibet. Refers specifically to suspicious presence of Dorjieff in Thibet and to article of convention forbidding admission of an agent of a foreign Power (see No. 252)	127*
164	„ „ ...	...	29,	Thibet and Nepal. Transmits telegram of 27th July from Viceroy of India reporting that Prime Minister of Nepal is disturbed at proposed Chinese expedition and speaks of the exaction of compensation for damage to Nepalese interests. Resident, Nepal, understands this to include occupation of district near Kirong. Prime Minister informed of efforts to stop expedition and that it is undesirable to raise question of compensation	127
165	„ „ ...	...	29,	Tashi Lama and the situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram of 22nd July from Viceroy of India reporting success of meeting at Ralung and Tashi Lama's belief that, in view of reported Chinese successes at Lhassa, Dalai Lama may again appeal to British Government, and that Dorjieff will not long be tolerated in Lhassa (see Nos. 159 and 167)	127
166	Sir J. Jordan ...	164 Tel.	30,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. His Majesty's consul-general at Yünnan reports departure of troops	128
167	India Office ...	...	Aug. 3,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram of 2nd August from Viceroy of India as to. Dalai Lama has informed trade agent at Gyantse that he has ordered Dorjieff to leave Thibet. Thibetan National Assembly summoned. Suspicious Japanese, Yasojiro Yajima, will be examined on his return to India (see No. 165)	128
168	„ „ ...	...	6,	Fighting at Lhassa. Transmits telegrams of 5th August from Viceroy of India reporting information received by trade agent at Yatung as to. Chinese holding their own. Fighting expected to last another year if no peace proclaimed. Resident, Nepal, reports agreement reached as to surrender of arms by Chinese garrison and their departure. Lal Bahadur instructed to take no further part in negotiations unless safety of garrison guaranteed by responsible Thibetan official	129
169	Sir J. Jordan ...	170 Tel.	9,	Proposed communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Replies to No. 160. Fully agrees with India Office proposal in No. 152 ...	130

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
170	India Office ...	...	Aug. 14, 1912	Withdrawal of Chinese garrison from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 13th August from Viceroy of India, reporting main terms of draft agreement for. Eventual policy of Chinese Government in Thibet not to be affected by present arrangement ...	130
171	Sir J. Jordan ...	171 Tel.	14,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. President has sent Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to state that he will sanction immediate advance of, for relief of garrison at Lhassa. Sir J. Jordan's strong warning to him as to consequences of such action (see No. 176)	131
172	To Sir J. Jordan ...	128 Tel.	15,	Political status of Thibet. Statement in No. 152 to be communicated in writing to Chinese Government with verbal alteration (see Nos. 160 and 169)	131
173	To India Office ...	...	15,	Political status of Thibet. Refers to No. 161. Transmits copy of No. 169, and informs of action taken in No. 172. Proposes verbal alteration in communication to be addressed to Chinese Government in order to avoid question of difference between sovereignty and suzerainty. Considers that Russian and Japanese Governments should be informed (see No. 178) ...	131
174	Sir J. Jordan ...	319	July 30,	Question of exchange of mails between India and Thibet. Refers to No. 140, and transmits copy of memorandum addressed to the Wai-chiao Pu, as instructed	132
175	India Office ...	...	Aug. 16,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram of 15th August from Viceroy of India reporting information from trade agent, Gyantse, Negotiations for withdrawal of Chinese garrison at Lhassa	132
176	Sir J. Jordan ...	173 Tel.	16,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. Refers to No. 171. President denies that he authorized statement made by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and disclaims intention of sanctioning advance	133
177	India Office ...	Confidential	15,	Extension of Russian influence in Kashgar and the New Dominion. Transmits telegram of 27th July from Viceroy of India as to. Prospect that these provinces will fall into hands of Russia. Injury to Nepalese interests by recent events. Suggests consideration of question of allowing Russia a free hand in Kashgar in return for similar compensation in Thibet (Foreign Office memoranda summarising recent developments and discussing advisability of concluding a secret agreement with Russia on lines suggested, and prospect of success) (see Nos. 71 and 208)	133
178	,, ,, ...	...	15,	Communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Refers to No. 173. Considers present opportunity should be taken of drawing distinction between suzerainty and sovereignty. Deprecates therefore proposed verbal alteration, but in view of urgency does not press matter	143
179	,, ,, ...	...	16,	Construction of track from Sadiya to frontier. Transmits telegraphic correspondence with Viceroy of India as to. Proposal to be sanctioned (see No. 184)	143

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180	Memorandum communicated to Baron Kato	...	Aug. 17, 1912	Communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Informs of (see Nos. 152 and 172) ...	144
181	Memorandum communicated to Russian Chargé d'Affaires	...	17,	Ditto, ditto	145
182	Sir J. Jordan ...	322	2,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. Considers that Chinese will advance on Lhassa, if strong enough to do so (see No. 166) ...	146
183	India Office* ...	...	20,	Communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Transmits telegram of 17th August informing Viceroy of India in sense of No. 178 and asking for his views as to occupation of Chumbi Valley if Chinese send expedition to Lhassa (see No. 191) ...	146
184	To India Office ...	...	21,	Construction of track from Sadiya to frontier. Refers to No. 179 and agrees with proposed sanction for the work	147
185	India Office ...	...	21,	Chinese garrison at Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 21st August from Viceroy of India. Peace concluded on conditions that arms are to be handed over and modern-drilled Chinese troops to leave for India about 12th September (see No. 188)	147
186	„ „ ...	...	22,	Status of Maharajah of Bhutan. Transmits correspondence with India as to. Maharajah agreed to perform similar homage at Durbar to that required of other ruling chiefs	148
187	To Sir J. Jordan ...	130 Tel.	23,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. He should thank President for disclaimer reported in No. 176, but should repeat, as from His Majesty's Government, warning reported in No. 171 (see No. 205)	149
188	India Office ...	...	23,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 23rd August from Viceroy of India reporting terms arranged and suggesting that Chinese Government should be asked to stop expedition to Thibet (see No. 185)	149
189	„ „ ...	...	24,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 23rd August from Viceroy of India reporting arrangements for	150
190	„ „ ...	...	24,	Construction of track from Sadiya to frontier. Transmits telegram of 21st August to Viceroy of India sanctioning proposal (see Nos. 179 and 184)	151
191	„ „ ...	...	28,	Occupation of Chumbi Valley. Transmits telegram of 20th August from Viceroy of India giving reasons why occupation, though regarded as desirable, cannot be recommended at present (see No. 183) ...	151
192	„ „ ...	...	29,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 28th August from Viceroy of India reporting request for facilities from Chinese general and Minister at Lhassa and despatch of late military attaché at Peking to assist, and suggesting that British good offices should be brought to notice of Chinese Government (see No. 200)	152

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193	Sir J. Jordan ...	349	Aug. 17, 1912	Proposed Chinese expedition to Thibet and status of that country. Interviews with Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and with President reported in Nos. 171 and 176. Memorandum communicated to Chinese Government as instructed in No. 172 ...	152
194	India Office ...	...	Sept. 2,	Approaching departure of Dorjieff from Thibet. Transmits telegram of 31st August from Viceroy of India reporting that Thibetan authorities at Sanding announce	154
195	Memorandum by Mr. Gregory	Extract	2,	China and British policy respecting Thibet. Interview with Dr. Morrison. Latter thinks His Majesty's Government will have little difficulty with Chinese Government, but that latter should be recognised independently of their acceptance of British declaration of policy	155
196	India Office ...	...	3,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India reporting terms agreed on, and that confidential adviser of Dalai Lama complains of obstructive tactics of Chinese in executing them	155
197	„ „ ...	...	3,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Refers to No. 192. Proposes to approve action of Viceroy of India, and agrees with his suggestion as to communicating British good offices to Chinese Government (see No. 200)	156
198	„ „ ...	...	4,	Arrival at Darjeeling of Chinese mission to Thibet to announce republic. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India announcing, and suggesting that permission may be granted to cross frontier (see No. 237) ...	156
199	„ „ ...	...	5,	North-east frontier. Transmits telegram from Viceroy of India reporting, and supporting proposals of Assam Government for establishment of posts, construction of roads, and other arrangements (see No. 216)	157
200	To Sir J Jordan ...	137 Tel.	5,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Refers to No. 192, and instructs him, if no objection, to bring British good offices to notice of Chinese Government (see No. 235)	159
201	„ „ ...	138 Tel.	7,	Chinese mission to Thibet to announce republic. Considers it undesirable to allow mission to cross frontier, but requests views (see Nos. 198 and 204)	159
202	To India Office ...	...	7,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Concurs in proposal to approve action of Viceroy of India (see Nos. 192 and 198) and informs of instructions sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking as to communication to Chinese Government (see No. 200)	159
203	Sir J. Jordan ...	179 Tel.	9	Withdrawal of Chimese troops from Lhassa. Chinese Government desires expenses defrayed, as far as possible, from funds in the hands of Mashihchou (? Ma Chi Fu) at Calcutta (see No. 192)	159

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
204	Sir J. Jordan ...	180 Tel.	Sept. 10, 1912	Chinese mission to Thibet to announce republic. Agrees that it should not be allowed to cross frontier (see No. 201). Will tell Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government should have been consulted before the mission was sent ...	160
205	„ „ ...	357	Aug. 27,	Chinese expedition to Thibet. Refers to No. 187. As interview with President was not obtainable, verbal communication which he was instructed to make delivered in writing	160
206	To India Office ...	...	Sept. 11,	Chinese mission to Thibet to announce republic. Transmits Nos. 201 and 204. Proposes to approve Sir J. Jordan's intended language to President, with addition tha His Majesty's Government adhere to policy stated in note of 17th August (see No. 193). Suggests that mission should be prevented from entering Thibet (see No. 198)	160
207	„ „ ...	...	12,	Communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Acknowledges No. 178. Appreciates argument therein, and transmits draft instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to inform Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government recognise Chinese suzerainty but not sovereignty as regards Thibet (see No. 218)	161
208	India Office ...	...	13,	Extension of Russian influence in Kashgar. Transmits telegram of 12th September from Viceroy of India deprecating British acquiescence in, but preferring, if a new arrangement made, an extension of British frontier (to include Raskam, Aksai Chin, &c.), and the concession of certain British and Nepalese rights in Thibet rather than direct entanglement in Thibetan affairs (see No. 177)	161
209	Sir J. Jordan ...	184 Tel.	13,	Chinese Mission to Thibet. Refers to No. 204. Has refused to apply for facilities for, until Chinese Government recognises British position as regards Thibet (see No. 222)	162
210	Sir G. Buchanan ...	279	11,	British action regarding Thibet. Summary of article in "Novoe Vremya" to effect that British action, though based on pedantic line of reasoning, is practical and worthy of imitation	163
211	India Office ...	...	13,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 11th September to Viceroy of India approving his action as reported in No. 192, and informing him that British good offices are being communicated to Chinese Government (see Nos. 197 and 202)	163
212	„ „ ...	...	14,	Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhassa. Transmits telegram of 13th September from Viceroy of India reporting arrangements made for transporting them to China, and desire of Thibetan Ministers for expulsion of Lien Yu	164

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
213	India Office ...	...	Sept. 13, 1912	Russia and Kashgar. Transmits telegram of 13th September from Viceroy of India suggesting recognition of British trade interests and consular rights in Chinese Turkestan as a further necessary condition should Russian occupation be acquiesced in (see No. 208)	164
214	„ „ ...	...	14,	Chinese Mission to Thibet. Agrees to proposed instructions to Sir J. Jordan (see No. 206). Transmits telegram instructing Viceroy of India to refuse permission for mission to cross frontier	165
215	„ „ ...	...	16,	Communication to Chinese Government of British views as to status of Thibet. Concurs in proposed instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking (see No. 207) ...	165
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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Thibet.

PART XV.

[149] No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 496.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 22nd July last, copies of two reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, relating to the Chinese military operations against Bomi in South-East Thibet.

I should add that the despatch No. 49 of the 1st September, to which Mr. Wilkinson alludes in the earlier of these reports, has not been received, doubtless owing to the chaos that has prevailed in Szechuan for over three months.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Chengtu, October* 11, 1911.

REFERRING to my despatch No. 49 of the 1st September, covering copy of a letter in which Captain Bailey (writing from Kahup in the Kham province of Thibet, 14th July) speaks of a reverse sustained by a Chinese expedition against Pomeh (Bomi), I have the honour to report that my Chinese writer has received two letters from his correspondent at Lhassa, dated the 17th and 26th July, that confirm this news.

The Lhassa correspondent says that at Po-mi, over twenty stages from Lhassa, there was a native rising. Lien-yü, the amban, in April last sent Commandant Chung-ying with an expeditionary force, which met with a severe defeat at a place called Pa-leng-teng. Chung-ying was recalled to Lhassa, and the Senior Councillor (tso ts'an-ts'an) Lo Ch'ang-ch'i placed in command.

The latter left Lhassa on the 23rd June, and effected a junction with a number of battalions of the frontier troops dispatched from Bat'ang, in the Kung-pu territory. On the 9th and 10th July the combined forces gained a series of victories.

I cannot identify Pa-leng-teng; Kung-pu appears to be the name of a native state on the borders of Kham and anterior Thibet, south of Lhari.

Copy to India.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Chengtu, November* 5, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 63 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose translation of a memorial by Lien-yü, amban at Lhassa, reporting the preparations made by him for the reduction of Po-mi (Pomed or Bomi).

This was published in the "Szechuan Government Gazette," No. 50, of the 22nd October, and, as you will observe, does not bring the narrative down to the victory claimed for the Chinese arms early in last July.

I am inclined to think that the Bomi expedition was not occasioned by the "prayers and entreaties" of Thibetans suffering from Bomi raids, but formed part of a considered plan for the subjugation of all Eastern Thibet. It is worth noting how great a strain the expedition placed on the military resources of the amban; as he himself says, "Thibet" (that is, Thibet proper, or Lhassa), was "almost denuded of troops."

I regret that I cannot identify any of the places named in this memorial other than the well-known Chamdo and Shobando, and the vaguely defined native State of Bomi and Kungpu. The "Nu I" are the wild tribes north of the line of effectual administration in Northern Burmah), tribes which, it would appear from the P'ienma controversy, the Yünnan patriots are claiming as part of the Chinese dominions. I would venture to suggest that it should be made clear to whatever Government is in power at Peking that the whole basin of the Irrawaddy must be considered to form part of the British State of Burmah; otherwise the occupation of Bomi may be followed by Chinese expeditions southward from Rima.

Copy to India.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Memorial from Lien-yü, Amban at Lhassa, reporting the Preparations made to annihilate the Bandits of Bomi; Published in the "Szechuan Government Gazette," No. 50, *October* 22, 1911.

(Translation.)

OF the native districts neighbouring on Thibet (Tsang), Bomi is the largest. This country is adjacent on the east to Wei-hsi, in Yünnan; on the west to Kung-pu, in anterior Thibet. On the south it is connected with the Nu I ("Nu barbarians"), conterminous with Burmah; on the north its frontier is mixed up with those of Shobando and Chambo.

Its people have hitherto been beyond the pale of civilisation, rough, rude, and impossible to control; burning, slaying, reaving, and harrying; they have stopped short at nothing. The country, however, is naturally exceedingly difficult, full of mountain jungle, not suited to the movements of an army; so that hitherto it has been impossible to deal with them. But things have gone so far that the Thibetans, suffering more severely from them every day, have come to us with prayers and entreaties.

When in the spring of last year the Szechuan troops came to Thibet, memorialist promptly ordered the commandant of the third battalion of infantry, Ch'en Chü-chen, to occupy Kanpu, with the idea of controlling these tribesmen. The head chief of the latter lived at Ka-lang, and Ch'en Chü-chen sent men in advance to remonstrate with him, but the chief was obstinate, and refused to submit, continuing to pillage as of old.

In the last moon of last year (January 1911), the main band of these tribesmen sneaked out of Tung-chiu, and carried off numberless flocks, herds, goods, and chattels of the inhabitants. When Ch'en Chü-chen heard of it, he set out in pursuit, but the bandits had already crossed the mountains and escaped. As the news spread, the inhabitants were struck with terror, and trade was paralysed. Memorialist therefore sent Commandant Chung-ying, to go and enquire, and gave him order to extirpate or conciliate as his judgment should decide.

When Chung-ying reached Te-mi, a day's journey from Tung-chiu, he sent forward a linguist with a letter to Ka-lang to invite submission, but to his surprise he was beleaguered by the tribesmen and wounded in a place called T'ang-mo. Thence he escaped back by side paths, and learnt that the tribesmen had got together over a thousand fighting men, and were assembled in a body at Cha-chia Shan, in arrant rebellion.

On receipt of Chung-ying's report memorialist reflected that ferocity and trickery had become second nature to these tribesmen, and unless they were crushed it would be useless to speak of conciliation. He wrote accordingly to order that one battalion of Ch'en Chü-chen's infantry should form the advance guard, with the first squadron of the cavalry and a battery of artillery as supports, and so proceed to crush the enemy. As Kungpu has only lately been reduced to order, it was necessary to leave troops there to guard it; so memorialist directed Ch'en Ch'ing to arrange for a force, and select and occupy some position there, by way of reserves on the line of communications.

By this disposition Thibet (*i.e.*, Lhassa) has been almost denuded of troops. When it is considered that the flame of rebellion is daily mounting, and the hardships of the people daily growing deeper, there can be no question of sitting idle. The various contingents have gradually advanced from the neighbourhood of Tung Chiu on their work of extirpation, and it is trusted that this will be accomplished at an early date.

The above details of the dispatch of troops to extirpate the tribesmen of Bomi, is reverently submitted for the sacred glance and His Majesty's consequent commands.

Hsuant'ung 3rd year, 6th moon, 14th day (*July* 9, 1911).

[228] No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 21st December, 1911, relative to fugitives from China.

India Office, December 30, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 2.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December* 21, 1911.

I AGREE with views expressed in your telegram of yesterday as to fugitives from China. Foreign Office are being addressed accordingly. I should be glad if you would consider in the meanwhile whether warning might be given to Mishmi Mission to be on the watch, and, without entering Thibetan territory, to get in touch as soon as possible with any fugitives.

[347] No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th December, 1911, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, January 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

*Government of India to Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Ramna, and Dacca.**

(Telegraphic.) *November* 28, 1911.

CAPTAIN BAILEY has received letter, dated the 11th October, from Edgar, at Batang, saying country is unsafe, that he and family are leaving for Tali-fu, but if road unsafe, he will come to India viâ Menkong and Rima, and asks for help in Mishmi country if necessary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Government of Burmah to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Rangoon, November* 29, 1911.

REFERENCE your telegram, dated the 28th November, 1911, regarding Edgar.

Barnard is being requested to furnish any assistance in his power to Mr. Edgar without departing from his instructions, copy of which was submitted to you with my letter, dated the 4th November, 1911, and Consul Tengyueh is being asked if he has any information as to Edgar's whereabouts. In the event of his travelling from Menkong to Rima, it is not likely that Barnard will be able to render any assistance, but the Mishmi Mission might perhaps be able to assist. If he travels down the Kiu Valley from Menkong he will come within the sphere of operations of Hkamti column.

(Addressed to Delhi and repeated to Calcutta.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

British Trade Agent to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Yatung, November* 30, 1911.

IN view of prevailing unrest in Thibet, and possibility of hostilities in the near future between Chinese and the Thibetans, I strongly urge immediate necessity for increasing our troops in Thibet. Now that Thibetans have ceased to provide Chinese with supplies and transport, Chinese are threatening to loot towns and monasteries. On the other hand, forces are being mustered by Thibetans to resist Chinese aggression. Consequently the risk of an attack on our trade agency is becoming imminent, and disturbance is likely to arise in which lives and property of British subjects may be endangered. I would recommend as a precautionary measure that immediate action be taken to strengthen our escorts at Yatung and Gyantse by fifty additional troops each, and that fifty more be posted at Phari for the protection of telegraph staff there and to safeguard telegraph line. This would necessitate sending the immediate dispatch of 150 additional troops into Thibet.

(Addressed to political Sikkim and repeated to Calcutta.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

Sir, *December* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the telegrams, dated the 27th and the 30th ultimo respectively, from the British trade agent at Yatung regarding the question of increasing the strength of our escorts in Thibet.

2. I would support the British trade agent's recommendation, as it seems to me that there is a certain measure of danger to the British trade agent and other British subjects from the mutinous Chinese soldiery. I trust that the escorts can be thus strengthened temporarily without causing any necessity for their withdrawal with the trade agent.

* Also to Government of Burmah and the General Officer Commanding, Abor Expedition, Abor Expeditionary Force.

3. Perhaps you would wish me to call at the Foreign Office camp for a further discussion of this matter.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Mr. Clarke to Mr. Bell.

Sir, *December* 7, 1911.

I AM directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter, dated the 1st December, 1911, regarding the question of increasing the escorts in Thibet.

2. I am, in reply, to inform you that, in the opinion of the Government of India, there is no need of reinforcements at Yatung, Gyantse, and Phari, and that, as regards Phari, you should, if you consider such a step necessary or advisable, withdraw the telegraphists.

I have, &c.
E. H. S. CLARKE,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

[331]

No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th December, 1911, relative to the Nepalese Mission to China.

India Office, January 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Government of India to Resident in Nepal.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 7, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram, dated the 17th November. Secretary of State telegraphs that permanent abandonment of quinquennial mission was intended, but he concurs with Government of India that it will be better in the first instance to advise Nepal Darbar that mission should not be dispatched until after prior consultation with the Government of India. Please take action accordingly.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Resident in Nepal to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bikna Thori, Nepal, December* 10, 1911.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram, dated the 8th instant, regarding Chinese affairs, I have the honour to report that at an interview with the Prime Minister yesterday I tendered to him the advice that the quinquennial mission should not be dispatched until after consultation with the Government of India, and received the verbal assurance that this advice would be followed.

2. I enclose copy of a letter which I have also addressed to the Prime Minister to confirm the above.

I have, &c.
J. MANNERS SMITH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

Resident in Nepal to Prime Minister of Nepal.

My dear Maharajah, *Bikna Thori, Nepal, December* 10, 1911.

YOUR Excellency will remember making a verbal communication to me through the orderly officer on the 25th September, 1911, regarding Chinese affairs, to the following effect, viz. :—

(*a.*) That a letter had been received by the Nepal Darbar from the Chinese amban at Lhassa, intimating that the period of twenty-seven months' mourning for the late Emperor was now passed, and that the customary presents and letters to the new Emperor should now be dispatched.

(*b.*) That a reply has been sent to the amban, informing him that, following the usual precedent, the presents and letters of condolence will be sent with the next quinquennial mission to Peking when the Nepal Darbar receive notice that it can start from here.

2. This information was duly communicated by me to the Government of India, and has formed the subject of a reference to the Secretary of State.

The question is one of interest to His Majesty's Government, owing to the peculiar political significance which is known to be attached to the mission by the Chinese Foreign Office, and especially so at the present time, in view of the changed situation and general position of affairs in China.

3. I have been directed to tender to your Excellency the advice that the mission should not be dispatched until after prior consultation with the Government of India.

With kind regards, I am, &c.

J. MANNERS SMITH.

[652] No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 4.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 3, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India forwarding in original a letter addressed by the Chinese amban at Lhassa to the Maharaja of Bhutan.*

The communication is of no importance in itself, and in fact belongs to the class of direct communications on purely local matters which, as was suggested in my letter of the 8th October, 1910, is bound sooner or later to spring up. But its tone is rather peremptory, and the language of both versions is, it is understood, such as is habitually employed by superiors to inferiors, though that of the Thibetan is perhaps less distinctively so. It is therefore proposed that no answer should be returned to it, and that, if Sir E. Grey approves, it should be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Peking for use upon some future occasion.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[1097] No. 6.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 8, 1912.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th January, 1912, relative to the Chinese in Thibet.

India Office, January 8, 1912.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 6, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated 16th ultimo. Following telegram received from trade agent, Yatung :—

"Chien-shi-Pao arrived at Gyantse with 100 Chinese soldiers on the 31st December, 1911. He will, it is reported, be coming here shortly."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[1263] No. 7.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 21st December, 1911, relative to the disturbances in Thibet.

India Office, January 8, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

British Trade Agent, Yatung and Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 9, 1911.

PLEASE refer to my previous reports regarding the revolutionary outbreak of the Chinese in Thibet. Hostilities between Chinese and Thibetans are getting more and more pronounced. The few Chinese soldiers and superior officers who remain at Gyantse stand in imminent danger of being massacred by Thibetans, and are therefore coming for protection to the trade agency. According to the orders of Government I observe that they should be sheltered, but if such should prove to be necessary, to defend them against such a host of Thibetans would prove too severe a task for the small garrison to undertake. It is true Thibetans have no such hostile intention as to attack British posts, but the majority of their host is composed of fanatical people from Kham who might demand surrender of refugees, and it might mean committing ourselves to the danger of being attacked to refuse this. I would submit, under the circumstances, the following alternative proposals for immediate orders : first, to shelter no refugees ; second, to strengthen our escorts in Thibet by additional troops from India.

Thibetans killed six Chinese soldiers at Kangma on the 6th, and three more on the 7th instant at Kala.

Addressed to Political, Sikkim, and repeated to Foreign at Delhi and Calcutta.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp, Coronation Durbar, December*, 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to refer to telegram, dated the 10th instant, regarding the situation in Thibet. I telegraphed to the officer commanding at Gyantse and have received his reply this morning.

2. It appears that four Chinese officials have taken shelter in our post at Gyantse and four in our post at Yatung, but no Thibetans. Of the latter one—the Eastern Jongpen of Gyantse—has taken refuge with the Nepalese agent there. So far as the officer commanding Gyantse is able to ascertain, everything is quiet at present between the Chinese and Thibetans. The latter, however, are quite capable of commencing attacks without the officer commanding's previous knowledge.

3. Since the Government of India have decided against strengthening the escorts in Thibet, I certainly think that we should refuse shelter to any more refugees either at Gyantse or Yatung. We have already sheltered a number of Chinese officials at Gyantse and Yatung, and, in accordance with the orders of the Government of India, have even conducted one—the Chinese Customs Commissioner at Yatung—to British territory. It is hardly possible for officers in Thibet to prevent the Chinese officials, while under our protection, from abusing that protection by issuing orders in connection with their military operations.

4. I am therefore of opinion that we should refuse to shelter any more refugees, that we should take a written promise from those now under our protection that they will take no part, directly or indirectly, in the military or civil administration in Thibet, and that they will go to British India immediately it is safe for them to travel. We will give them an escort if we can, and when once in British territory we will give them no permit to return to Thibet.

5. Early orders are solicited.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

Government of India to Mr. Bell.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Coronation Durbar, December* 16, 1911.

IN reply to your letter, dated the 14th December, 1911, I am directed to state that the refugees already enjoying protection in the British trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung should be warned that, if, while under British protection, they take part in the military or civil administration in Thibet, they will cease to enjoy such protection. With reference to the questions raised in the third and fourth paragraphs of your letter, I am to authorise you to use your discretion as to refusing protection to any other refugees.

I have, &c.
E. H. S. CLARKE.

[652] No. 8.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Government of India and an original letter from the Chinese amban at Lhassa to the Maharaja of Bhutan, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for India that no answer should be returned to the amban's letter.

A copy of your letter and the original letter from the amban have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking in accordance with your suggestion.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[469] No. 9.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1912.

IT will be within the recollection of the Secretary of State for India that representations were made to the Chinese Government by His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking on the subject of the action of the Chinese authorities in Thibet on several occasions during the year 1910. The Government of India at that time attached particular importance to the maintenance of an effective Thibetan Government, since they considered that the disappearance of such a Government and the substitution for it of a strong Chinese administration would be likely to complicate

the relations both between China and British India and between China and the frontier States of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

The effect of these representations was not altogether satisfactory, as although the Chinese authorities explained verbally that there was no intention of altering the *status quo* or the internal administration of Thibet, and that they had never contemplated making Thibet into a Chinese province, the written replies of the Chinese Government were not so explicit, and the campaign of Chao-Ehr-feng in Thibet, which had given rise to the original representations, was continued with unabated vigour, with the result that at the outbreak of the present revolutionary troubles in China he had succeeded in reducing the Thibetan authorities and chieftains to almost complete subserviency.

Since the outbreak above mentioned, the situation in Thibet itself has become obscure, but the conference of Imperialist and revolutionary representatives, sitting at Shanghai, decided on the 30th ultimo that the National Assembly, which was to be convoked in order to settle the form of the future Government of China, should include delegates from Thibet, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Turkestan, as well as from the eighteen provinces of China proper. Other signs are not wanting to show that, whatever form the Government of China may assume, His Majesty's Government should be prepared for a strong movement in favour of placing the outlying portions of the Chinese Empire on the same footing as the eighteen provinces.

In these circumstances, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the following questions will, in all probability, have to be decided by His Majesty's Government in the near future, and he directs me to request that they may be brought before the Marquess of of Crewe in order that his Lordship may take them into consideration in case a decision is eventually required :—

1. Whether His Majesty's Government are justified by their treaty rights in opposing the inclusion of Thibet in China proper.

2. Whether British interests would be best served by such opposition or whether it would not be likely to lead to an anti-British outbreak and the dismemberment of other outlying portions of the Chinese Empire.

3. What steps could be taken to give effect to such opposition if it is decided upon?

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[2071] No. 10.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15, 1912.)

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Chengtu, December* 5, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the present condition of the Thibetan Marches.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 89. Confidential.)
Sir, *Chengtu, December* 5, 1911.

M. LEURQUIN, assistant at the French consulate-general here, received yesterday from M. Bons d'Anty, consul-general for France, the letter dated Tachienlu, 22nd October, of which I have the honour to enclose copy.

The British missionaries stationed at Tachienlu are Messrs. A. J. Clements and R. Cunningham. With them in the China Inland Mission is a Swede, M. Sörensen, and his wife.

At Bat'ang, in the same mission, are Mr. and Mrs. Edgar. From none of these have I heard for upwards of three months. In fact, the only news we have of

them is the reference in M. Bons d'Anty's present letter, which says that on the 28th September the situation became so dangerous that, at the instance of the sub-prefect, all foreigners had to leave Tachienlu, the Protestant missionaries going towards Lit'ang.

The telegraph line of which my colleague speaks ran from Tachienlu, viâ Bat'ang, to Chamdo. The stations on the route were Tachienlu, Hok'ou, Lit'ang, Lamaya (for Hsiangcheng, Taopa, and Kungkaling), Bat'ang, Ch'aya (Draya) and Chamdo. Ch'aya was opened on the 21st July of this year; Chamdo, on the 24th August.

A correspondent in yesterday's "Shang-hui Kungpao" takes great exception to the habit prevalent in Szechuan of describing all the country west of Tachienlu as being "in Thibet." He points out that the districts to a little beyond Bat'ang were formally recognised as appertaining to the prefecture of Yachou as far back as 1730, while the province of Kham was annexed last year. It is only the territory west of Chamdo (or, rather, of Kham province) that can be properly described as Tsang or Wei, that is to say, as Thibet: "At a time when foreigners are exploring, and Thibetan affairs are becoming daily more hazardous," he thinks that too great stress cannot be laid on this distinction.

It is permissible to infer that a certain section at any rate of the revolutionaries is prepared to withdraw from Thibet, just as it is believed at Chengtu that the United States of China will not concern itself with Manchuria. The agreement between Chao-er-feng did, it is true, provide for a subvention from Szechuan towards the expenses of Chinese rule in Thibet (see Enclosure No. 2 to my immediately preceding despatch); but whether Chao-er-feng has any serious intention of taking up his post of Warden of the Marches is doubtful.

It would appear that Chao-er-feng wishes to join his brother in Manchuria according to a statement made to me confidentially on the 2nd December by his Excellency's late Foreign Secretary, Tang-uan-shu. On the pretext of marching against the brigands of the south-west, his Excellency would lead a guard of border troops out of Chengtu and then take ship at Sui-fu. I presume that Chao-er-feng is thinking of taking refuge on a foreign war-ship to escape the fate of Tuan-fang, as Tang enquired whether our gun-boat was still at Sui-fu. I have only Tang's authority for this information.

We have no further details of the death of the two French travellers, Dr. Legendre and M. Dessirier, near Ningyuan, or of the murder of the French missionary, Père Castanet, in Hui-li Chou. It is believed that Mr. Wellwood and Dr. Humphreys (the former a Canadian, the latter an American), with their families, are safe in Ningyuan city.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

M. Bons d'Anty to M. Leurquin.

Cher Monsieur, *Tachienlu, le 22 octobre*, 1911.

COMME il est très probable que mes précédentes lettres n'ont pu vous parvenir, je résume de nouveau la situation depuis le début, en continuant jusqu'à ce jour.

J'espère avoir bientôt de vos nouvelles et pouvoir me mettre en route pour Chengtu avant la fin du mois.

BONS D'ANTY

En route pour Cheoser [?], par le pays des Yuko, j'ai dû me rabattre sûr Dawo par suite de l'état troublé de la "terre des Herbes" dans ladite région; je fus même un instant poursuivi par des nomades.

A Dawo, je trouvais le télégramme de Mgr. Leurquin à M. Giraudeau en date du 3 septembre. Parti immédiatement pour Tachienlu à marches forcées. Arrivé le 19 septembre au matin et rencontré M. Kerihuel, qui m'attendait.

Toutes les communications étaient interceptées du côté du Ssuchuan. La ligne télégraphique fonctionnait encore jusqu'à Ch'ing Ch'i Hsien, mais fut coupée du 20 au 21, bien que des forces considérables fussent massées à Ch'ing Ch'i. Depuis lors ces forces n'ont fait qu'augmenter et doivent atteindre un effectif de 1,500 hommes;

ces soldats restent l'arme au pied, semble-t-il, et leurs officiers n'ont pas donné signe de vie ici. Tous nos efforts pour entrer en rapport avec eux ont été vains.

A Tachienlu lors de mon arrivée, pas un soldat ; tous ceux que l'on tirait du Tibet (en grande partie évacué) étaient dirigés d'urgence sur Ch'ing Ch'i et nous n'en entendions plus parler.

Le mandarin (Chün-liang Fu), avec l'aide de la Chambre de Commerce, leva une garde d'une trentaine d'hommes. Le bourg était plein de mineurs, venus des placers à trois ou quatre jours à la ronde, qui menaçaient de piller, sous couleur de proclamer leur régime de la Ligue. En même temps des corps armés des Ligueurs de Tien Ch'uan et [?], etc., étaient en route pour Tachienlu.

Le 28 septembre, la situation devint si dangereux que, sur les instances du Mandarin, nous dûmes quitter Tachienlu pour nous réfugier sur le plateau :—

L'évêque catholique, cinq missionnaires et six sœurs à Tongolo.
Les missionnaires protestants vers Litang.
M. Kerihuel et moi à [?] , au bas du col de Cheto.

C'est là que j'appris tout à coup que le Prince de Tachienlu venait de s'enfuir et qu'une révolte des Tibétains était à craindre. Je regagnais aussitôt Tachienlu le 4 octobre. Après entente avec moi, M. Kerihuel rentra d'urgence à Hokou.

L'évêque et un missionnaire, que j'avais prévenus, reviennent ici le 6 octobre ; mais ce n'est que du 16 au 18 que nous avons pu ramener les autres missionnaires et les sœurs, après de longues démarches tant auprès des Chinois que des Tibétains.

A partir du commencement d'octobre, en effet, nous avons été pris entre les Ligueurs, par l'est, et les Tibétains révoltés par l'ouest. Les Ligueurs, principalement ceux de Tien Ch'uan, sont venus s'installer à Lutingch'iao, qu'ils ont occupé en force avec du canon ; pas de nouvelles depuis lors des missionnaires de Lutingch'iao et Lengtzu (deux Français).

Les Tibétains ont commis de graves attentats à Dawo, Hor Changu et région ; nos missions sont détruites ; les chrétiens pillés, dépouillés, meurent de faim et de froid ; le mandarin de Dawo, un missionnaire français, et un prêtre indigène sont prisonniers des rebelles. Hokou est bloqué sur la rive gauche du Yalung ; MM. Kerihuel et Auffret, tous les Chinois, le matériel du pont, sont en sûreté sur la rive droite. Depuis quinze jours je ne communique plus avec M. Kerihuel ; le télégraphe est coupé.

Je suis heureusement en rapport épistolaire avec le Prince de Tachienlu et j'agis auprès de lui pour empêcher de nouveaux excès. D'autre part, j'avais pu prévenir le Commissaire Impérial Fu, avant l'interruption des communications télégraphiques, et il a dû envoyer d'urgence des soldats à Hokou et Dawo.

Nous avons ici maintenant un assez grand nombre de soldats, levée par le mandarin ou venus de l'intérieur des Marches. Mais il est à craindre qu'ils refuseraient de défendre le bourg contre les Ligueurs. J'ai agi de toutes mes forces auprès du mandarin pour l'empêcher d'autoriser la proclamation de régime de la Ligue, ce qui eût été le signal d'une jonction des Ligueurs avec les Tibétains et l'occasion de graves désordres ; nous étions particulièrement visés, en raison de l'existence à la Mission catholique, au su de tout le monde, d'une grosse somme d'argent en lingots.

Les chantiers de Hokou sont de même tous spécialement menacés par les Tibétains à l'instigation de la Ligue.

A Tachienlu même, la situation s'améliore rapidement. Je presse le mandarin d'en profiter pour dégager les routes de Dawo et de Hokou, et il prépare des colonnes dans ces deux directions.

L'interprète de M. Kerihuel avait été pris par les rebelles ; le Prince de Tachienlu l'a fait renvoyer ici à ma demande. C'est le Prince aussi qui a facilité le retour des missionnaires et des sœurs. J'ai obtenu du mandarin qu'il ne soit pas considéré comme rebelle s'il rentre ici immédiatement en évitant tout conflit avec les Impériaux, en protégeant Hokou et permettant de dégager Dawo.

J'ai vainement tenté de correspondre avec le Préfet de Ningyuan-fu, dans l'inquiétude où je me trouve au sujet de la Mission Legendre.

Les froids et frimas nous ont durement éprouvés. Le plateau est couvert de neiges épaisses, ce qui gêne encore les relations et retarde les opérations.

[2217]

No. 11.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 28th December, 1911, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, January 15, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Coronation Durbar, December* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that I have lately received a letter from the National Assembly of Thibet. It states :—

(*a.*) That Ma Chi Fu, Chinese superintendent of trade marts, and other Chinese police and military officers at Gyantse informed the De-pon (Thibetan general), Jongpen, and the head of a monastery at Gyantse that on account of the troubles in Szechuan the Chinese troops in Lhassa have not received their pay, and, in consequence, Len Amban was forced to give up his appointment. Chien Shi Pao, Chinese councillor, s at present doing the work of the amban. Ma Chi Fu and other Chinese officers at Gyantse asked the De-pon, Jongpen, and the head of the monastery at Gyantse to lend them 30,000 Chinese srangs (1 srang = 2 rupees) and foodstuffs worth the same amount. The Thibetan officials refused.

(*b.*) The Chinese troops have looted the properties of Thibetan officials and merchants in Lhassa city, including 1,000 ponies and mules, and wanted to destroy the Potela (Dalai Lama's Palace) and the monasteries in the city.

(*c.*) On the 30th of the 9th month (20th November, 1911) the Chinese troops in Chumbi Valley suddenly disappeared and went towards Lhassa, and some of them deserted into British territory, including the Chinese frontier officer. The troops killed two of their own officers at Cho-ten Kar-po.

(*d.*) Lastly, as it is not known what will happen hereafter, the Ka-sha (the Thibetan Council Office in Darjeeling) issued orders on Thibetans, directing them to protect their own community, but to make no confusion if no one fights them.

As usual, I have sent no reply to the letter.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

No. 12.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th January, 1912, relative to the Mishmi Mission.

India Office, January 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 13, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of Eastern Bengal and Assam telegraphed 11th instant to following effect:—

"Telegram to following effect, sent from Sadiya on the 10th instant, has been received from Dundas:—

"'Arrived to-day (4th January) River Yepuk, three-quarters of a mile beyond Menilkrai, where some Thibetans sent by Chinese from Rima set up on one side of path on the 2nd instant a flag bearing a red four-clawed dragon, while on the other side they put up a board with a notification of Chinese, probably Thibetan writing. Chinese, as interpreted by Jeffery, means "Zayul, southern limit, boundary of Manchu Empire." Seventy-five yards to the south, down the south slope of the hill, the former flags which Williamson mentioned are still extant. Object of putting up notification and new flag was obviously to reassert, in view of our reported coming, previous claims of Chinese to Menilkrai as their frontier. It appears from information received from Thibetan traders lately come from Rima that there are at present at that place only one subordinate Chinese officer, two soldiers, two interpreters, and one clerk, while, elsewhere, there are at Chikung about fifty soldiers. I will attempt to carry out surveys so as to include all the points raised in the memorandum of the General Staff; but, with a view to abstaining from any action prejudicial to the interests of future friendly negotiations for delimitation of frontier, I do not propose either to send troops or to proceed officially any further. Work of road-making from Yepuk westwards will be begun to-morrow by sappers and miners. No Thibetan has ever lived or cultivated land up to this river.'"

(Repeated to Peking.)

[4451] No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th January, 1912, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, January 31, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 30, 1912.

BELL has been informed by Dalai Lama that latter proposes to leave Darjeeling about the 2nd February for Kalimpong, and hopes to return to Thibet after staying at Kalimpong about one month.

[4853] No. 14.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 11th January, 1912, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, February 2, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Gangtok, January* 3, 1912.

MA SHIH CHOU, Chinese frontier officer in Chumbi Valley, fled to Gnatong, in Sikkim, on the 20th November. He returned to Chumbi Valley on the 24th November, and took sanctuary with British trade agent, Yatung. He has since returned to his post in Chumbi Valley and resumed his administrative work. British trade agent enquires whether he should be again allowed sanctuary, and I am informing him that sanctuary should not be given either to Chinese frontier officer or to other Chinese officials, and that they should be now informed accordingly, and should also be informed that they are welcome to proceed to British India, where they will be safe.

Weir recommends that one non-commissioned officer and twelve men from Gangtok be posted at Gnatong, to prevent Chinese refugees, who have crossed border of Sikkim, from returning to Thibet. I agree that this is desirable, and request sanction may be accorded.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

Government of India to Political Officer, Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, January* 6, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 3rd January. Government of India approve your orders to British trade agent, but see no necessity for action proposed in second paragraph. Any Chinese refugees who attempt to return from Sikkim to Thibet will do so at their own risk, of course.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Gangtok, January* 3, 1912.

IN continuation of the telegram dated the 28th November, 1911, from the British trade agent at Yatung to your address, I have the honour to forward copy of a telegram from the British trade agent at Yatung, regarding the Tashi Lama's request for assistance. In this connection, reference may also be made to your letter dated the 30th March, 1906, to my address, and paragraphs 3 and 4 of my letter dated the 17th November, 1906, to your address.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

British Trade Agent at Yatung to Political Officer, Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) *December* 28, 1911.

TASHI LAMA has sent Kampa Jongpon to me with same request again for British assistance. I informed him of Government orders. He says Tashi Lama while in India was promised every facility in matter of arms and ammunition by British Government in case of trouble, and so he now requests that Government will lend him 200 modern rifles, two machine-guns, and sufficient ammunition for defence of Shigatse. Tashi also suggests that British representative should be placed at Shigatse. I replied these could not be granted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Gangtok, January* 8, 1912.

REFERENCE my telegram 3rd January.

I am informing British trade agent, Yatung, that Thibetan officials should not be given sanctuary in trade agency. I am issuing orders to Gyantsze on same lines as I have issued to Yatung.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Camp Badamtam, December* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a Thibetan letter received by me from the National Assembly of Thibet. It contains recent news from Lhassa.

Recent News received from Lhassa.

(Translation.)

1. On the 23rd of the 9th month (13th November, 1911) the Chinese troops in Lhassa rebelled, and removed the valuables and ammunition from the Amban's residence. They also removed all the property from the house of Lonchen Sha-tra, Lhe-ding, and from the Do-pal Government workshop (in Lhassa) and took them to the military cantonment in Trap-chi.

2. The Chinese, intending to go back to China, looted the properties including ponies and mules of Thibetan, Nepalese, and Chinese merchants of Lhassa. The Thibetan and Nepalese merchants fought the Chinese troops, resulting in a few persons on each side being killed.

3. The Chinese troops in Thibet demanded 40,000 srangs* to meet their expenses on their way to China, and stated that if the demands were not complied with they would destroy the Potala† and other Government property, and would loot monasteries. The Thibetans are thinking of giving them money and transport. Should the Chinese break their promise and come to loot their properties, the Thibetans will not be able to fold their arms and allow others to take their lives. Thus there may be confusion. The Thibetans are helpless.

4. The Regent Gan-den Tri-pa and the National Assembly have deputed monks from Dre-pung, Se-ra, and Gan-den to guard the Potala and its vicinity, and different monasteries. As there was great danger lest the Chinese should prove turbulent, they have called monks from different monasteries, and Thibetan troops from the provinces of Central Thibet.

5. Len Amban informed the National Assembly that the Chinese officials and troops do not obey his orders, and told them that the Thibetans should arrest or kill people misbehaving and acting unlawfully. The Amban handed over to them two of the Chinese subjects for trial, as they committed offences.

6. On the night of the 25th (15th November, 1911) the Chinese troops from Trap-chi military cantonment came and arrested the Amban, and took him to their barracks, saying that they were going to take him to China with them.

7. Chien Shi Pao has been appointed in place of the Amban, and has taken charge of the seal. All the arms have been taken from the Chinese soldiers who were born in Thibet, and they have been dismissed without pay.

6. The Chinese soldiers have murdered Mr. Lo Chang Chi, who went to the Po country.

Submitted by the National Assembly (Darjeeling) on the 12th of the 10th month of the Iron-Hog year (3rd December, 1911).

(Seal of the National Assembly.)

* 1 srang = 2 rupees.

† Dalai Lama's palace.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

Translations of Thibetan Papers received with Letter from the Resident in Nepal, dated December 10, 1911.

(1.)

Proclamation issued regarding Orders received by Yi-wu Tsen-dzen, Acting Minister Resident in Thibet.*

A DESPATCH has been received from Len Amban to the following effect:—

"I, the great Minister, am taking all the troops of Lhassa to Peking, to serve there. You, Tsen-dzen, must perform all the duties in Thibet."

This order has been received. I, Tsen-dzen, obeyed this, and took over charge of the duties. The troops, returning to Peking with the Amban, know their military duties well, and are under strict discipline. Absolutely no injury will be done to any Chinese or Thibetan trader. I am issuing this proclamation, fearing lest you, the subjects and traders, may be frightened. This should be borne in mind by all the Chinese and Thibetan subjects and traders in Thibet. Everybody must carry on their business as before, and not be frightened by false rumours. This is important. Therefore fail not.

Dated the 26th day of the 9th month of the 3rd year of the reign of Shou-tong (approximately the 14th November, 1911).

(2.)

Orders issued to Tsen-dzen.

THE great Minister, Len, appointed by command of the Emperor, is returning with troops to China to serve the great Empire there. Five thousand riding and pack animals are required by him on the road. Therefore this order is issued in order that the commandants of the jongs of Mal-dro-kung-kar and kung-tang, and the jongpens of Gyam-da, Lha-ri Pem-bar, and Lho-jong may keep these in readiness in their respective districts. They must supply these without any delay, when they are demanded. Therefore fail not.

Dated the 26th day of the 9th month of the 3rd year of the reign of Shou-tong (approximately the 14th November, 1911).

[4847]

No. 15.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th January, 1912, relative to the Chinese in Thibet.

India Office, February 2, 1912.

* Probably Chien Tsi Pao.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 25, 1912.

THIBET. Please refer to my telegram dated the 6th instant.

Telegram to following effect received from trade agent, Gyantse, dated the 22nd instant :—

"Seventy-five modern Chinese troops, with four officers, arrived from Lhassa on the 21st instant. Arrival of another 100 is expected shortly."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[5187] No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 31st January, relative to Thibet and the Chinese.

India Office, February 3, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 16.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, January* 31, 1912.

PLEASE refer to letter dated the 13th instant from Foreign Office, enclosed in weekly letter of the 19th instant from Secretary, Political Department, regarding Thibet. Your views are solicited as to the reply to the three questions which Foreign Office have propounded.

As regards the third question, please say whether you can suggest any effective means, short of military action, of bringing pressure to bear on Chinese locally.

[6399] No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 25th January, 1912, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, February 12, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp Darjeeling, January* 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a telegram which the Dalai Lama has received from Mr. Tsien-Shih-Pao, Councillor to the Amban at Lhassa, asking the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet.

2. The Dalai Lama, it is understood, replied to the effect that unless all the Chinese soldiers were withdrawn from Thibet he would not return to Thibet.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Tsien-Shih-Pao to the Dalai Lama.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, January* 3, 1912.

THE Amban has abdicated and his duties assumed by General Chung. My proposal to request your Holiness's return has been sanctioned, and I am on way to welcome. Should your Holiness decide to return immediately, it would be a great blessing to Thibet; should you decide otherwise, I will meet your deputation at Yatung for negotiations. My attitude toward the preservation of life and property of people is undoubtedly known to your Holiness, and expect reciprocation. Please telegraph reply.

Enclosure 3 in No. 17.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp viâ Gangtok, January* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a copy of a telegram from Mr. Machifu, Chinese Superintendent of the Gyantse Trade Mart, to the address of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, at Darjeeling, for the information of the Government of India. The Thibetan Minister showed it recently to Mr. Landen La.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 4 in No. 17.

Mr. Machifu (Superintendent of Gyantse Mart) to the Dalai Lama.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, December* 7, 1911.

IN consequence of railway agitation in China, Lhassa troops mutinied on 13th (15th) November, dispossessing Amban, taking him into custody, and releasing him on 21st. Mutineers dispersed after looting Chinese and Thibetans. Lhassa now quiet at the instance of Shenghuan and Chanschesang. Gyantse police mutinied on 23rd ultimo, looting my and other Chinese and Thibetan officials' property, including beasts of burden. Mutineers fled with some soldiers. Following morning I promised to petition Government for compensation on behalf of people, but Lama Tschechong Chiangpa, pretending to have received instructions from your Holiness, mobilised Thibetan troops, declaring hostilities against orderly and peace-loving Chinese, thirty in my employ, thirty soldiers from Khambajoug, 100 odd in business. Lama Tschechong is adopting a short-sighted policy in attempting to exterminate Chinese, as Thibet has been a dependency of China for over 200 years, and received gracious treatment from His Majesty's Government, and in view of the fact that your Holiness's flight was due to disagreement with the Amban, and the continual grace conferred upon your Holiness and predecessors, this reactionary movement is unreasonable. The Amban has memorialised the Throne to vacate his post in favour of Tsiensihpao. Your Holiness and suite can return to regain the lost dignities and privileges. The present situation in Gyantse resembles fighting in one's own household. Having been in Thibet for over ten years, with the interests of the people at heart, irrespective of race, I cannot permit bloodshed. Hence my request that may it please your Holiness to direct Lama Tschechong to withdraw troops and refrain from rashful acts in consideration of His Majesty's grace. Requests of any nature will be carefully considered.

[6375] No. 18.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 25th January, 1912, relative to British protection of Bhutanese interests in Thibet.

India Office, February 12, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.) [1905]

Sir, *Gangtok, December* 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that His Highness the Maharajah of Bhutan, in the course of a private conversation with me, from which, at his request, everybody, including even Rajah Ugyen Dorje, the Bhutan agent, was excluded, informed me that there is a Bhutanese monastery named To-lung Tsur po, one day's journey from Lhassa. The fifth Dalai Lama, who lived some 200 years ago, took away most of the lands belonging to the monastery, as the Dalai Lamas are of the Ge-luk-pa sect of Lamaism, and the monastery—in common with most other Bhutanese monasteries—is of the Kar-gyu sect. The Maharajah of Bhutan has recently asked Len Amban to give him back the lands, and is afraid that if the Dalai Lama returns to Thibet he will punish the monastery still further for this appeal to the Amban. His Highness therefore asked me whether the Government of India would help him if the Dalai Lama did so. I informed His Highness that I would report what he said to the Government of India, and that if His Highness's apprehensions were fulfilled later on he could again communicate with me.

2. The issue raised is a new one, that of the protection of Bhutanese interests in Thibet. Under the Pu-na-ka Treaty of 1910 the Bhutan Durbar has thrown in its lot with us. The Maharajah has emphasised his position under the treaty by making a nineteen days' journey to Delhi, where he has tendered his homage to His Majesty the King-Emperor. We should therefore loyally support Bhutan in this matter as far as possible, but we need not consider the nature of this support unless and until the contingency which is feared has arisen.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

[7445] No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 1st February, 1912, relative to declaration of a republic at Ili.

India Office, February 19, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Consul-General, Kashgar, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 30, 1912.

RUSSIAN consul at Ili telegraphs to Russian consul-general, Kashgar, that Ili has been declared republic and that foreign subjects are in no immediate danger.

[7420] No. 20.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 1st February, 1912, relative to the Thibetan marches and the Dalai Lama.

India Office, February 19, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp viâ Gangtok, January* 20, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to state that the Dalai Lama proposes to leave Darjeeling for Kalimpong about the 2nd February next, as his party has suffered in health at Darjeeling, two of his high officials having died, and others having fallen ill from time to time. He proposes to stay about one month in Kalimpong. He hopes then to return to Thibet. I am therefore arranging for the accommodation of the Dalai Lama and his high officials at Kalimpong, and for the transfer of his police guard from Darjeeling to Kalimpong.

2. The Lama further desires before leaving for Thibet to be permitted to call on his Excellency the Viceroy, in order merely to thank him personally for the kind treatment which he has received in India. He wishes that if it is inconvenient to receive him, some of his Ministers may be permitted to offer his thanks on his behalf. The Ministers say that at the interview there would be no discussion of political questions, but that the Dalai Lama wishes to convey his thanks by a personal interview in accordance with Thibetan custom before leaving India for good. The Lama therefore asks me to advise him as to whether he should ask his Excellency for the interview. In these circumstances I would solicit orders by telegram, if possible, as to whether the interview is considered desirable or not.

3. The arrival at and departure from Calcutta should in any case be private. He (or his Ministers) should make their own arrangements for accommodation in Calcutta, and should be accompanied only by Mr. Laden La, who speaks English and Thibetan very well, and not by myself. In fact, the visit, if permitted, should be of a purely private and unofficial character. In any case it is bound to attract considerable attention, and will no doubt be open to misconstruction by the Russian and Chinese Governments. Perhaps the best course would be to permit some of the Ministers, accompanied by Mr. Laden La, to call on the Foreign Secretary and tender the Lama's thanks.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

Government of India to Mr. Bell.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 28, 1912.

THE suggestion contained in your letter of the 20th instant that some of the Ministers of the Dalai Lama accompanied by Mr. Laden La should be permitted to pay a visit to Calcutta and should call on Sir H. McMahon is approved by his Excellency the Viceroy.

Enclosure 3 in No. 20.

Government of India to Mr. Bell.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 31, 1912.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 28th January. Please keep in direct communication with Forrest, Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, about visit of Dalai Lama to Kalimpong. It is presumed you are satisfied that nothing further is required to ensure his safety beyond ordinary police guard which accompanies him. Forrest says that there are a great many Chinese in Kalimpong. He has been told that it is not necessary for him to be present at Lama's departure from Darjeeling or Kalimpong, and that you will do whatever is necessary.

[7559] No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 21.)

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 17th February, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, February 20, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 21.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, February* 17, 1912.

REFERENCE is invited to papers regarding letter from Dalai Lama to Czar, which were enclosed in weekly letter of 5th ultimo from Secretary, Political Department. Now that His Majesty the King has left India, Russian Government propose that reply of Czar should be delivered through Russian consul to Dalai Lama. They hope that ceremonial may be observed which is customary on delivery of Royal letter; they would have no objection to a British officer being present. If you see no objection, arrangements should be made accordingly.

[7790] No. 22.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 22.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 21, 1912.

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my letter of the 24th November, 1911, as to the proposal of Mr. Archibald Rose, lately His Majesty's consul at Tengyueh, for a settlement with the Chinese Government based on the exchange of the Mir of Hunza's rights in Sarikol for those of the Teng Keng Chief in the Hpimaw district on the Burman–Yünnan border, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for For eign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject.

The Marquess of Crewe is in general agreement with the Government of India's views.

It is understood that no progress has been made with the negotiations at Peking in regard to the Hpimaw frontier since the 10th April, 1911, and that Sir John Jordan's note of that date to the Wai-wu Pu still remains unanswered. Lord Crewe recognises that, in view of the political situation in China, the present moment is not opportune for pressing the Wai-wu Pu to resume negotiations. But he would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that Sir J. Jordan might be consulted as to the advisability of offering to the Chinese Government hereafter a settlement on the lines suggested by Mr. Rose.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 6, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your despatch of the 24th November last, giving cover to Mr. Rose's report, which is being returned as requested. We should cordially support settlement on lines proposed by Rose, and should be prepared to pay the Mir of Hunza suitable compensation if, in Sir J. Jordan's opinion, there is a reasonable prospect of China accepting the proposed settlement, which includes presumably surrender of all Chinese claims over Hunza, as well as those on behalf of Teng Keng Chief in Hpimaw neighbourhood, in return for Hunza's abandonment of occupancy rights beyond the watershed. It appears to us very doubtful, however, whether there would be any chance of China accepting proposal (see despatch dated the 13th November, 1906, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking); and as each fresh offer suggests weakness of our case, it would appear unwise that further compromise should be offered unless it is morally certain to be accepted.

Great desirability of pressing for a frontier-line following main watershed between Irrawaddy and Salween, in preference to any alternative line by which free access to the practicable line of advance towards Rima and South-east Thibet would be given to China, is fully realised by us; and any further concession than that offered to the Wai-wu Pu in the note of the 10th April last from His Majesty's Minister at Peking is deprecated.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[7708] No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st February, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, February 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 21, 1912.

DALAI LAMA's letter to Czar.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 16th instant. Russian consul-general, in the presence of Mr. Bell, who interpreted, delivered the Czar's reply to the Lama at Darjeeling on the 10th instant. Papers sent on 15th instant by mail.

[6371] No. 24.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1912.

YOUR letter of the 12th instant relative to the progress of the various expeditions at present operating in the tribal country on the north-east frontier of India has been laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir E. Grey observes that in the portions of the Government of India's letter which deal with the proposed change of programme of the Mishmi Mission, no mention is made of the arrangements for the future protection of this country from Chinese aggression which were suggested in the telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy of the 8th November last.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be informed whether the views of the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam have been obtained on this subject, and

whether any steps have as yet been taken to provide for the establishment of a police post in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai or for the institution of the other measures suggested in the above-mentioned telegram for the protection of the Mishmis upon the withdrawal of the present expedition.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[7708] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 150 of 8th June last, relative to the appeal made by the Dalai Lama to the Emperor of Russia for assistance against the Chinese in Thibet, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of a memorandum communicated by the Russian Ambassador containing a summary of the answer which His Imperial Majesty proposed to return to the Dalai Lama, together with a telegram to the Governor of India from the Secretary of State for India giving instructions for the presentation of this answer, and of a telegram from the Viceroy reporting that the letter had already been delivered by the Russian consul-general.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9034] No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 28th February, 1912, regarding the Mishmi mission.

India Office, February 29, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 26.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, February* 28, 1912.

ENQUIRY is made by Foreign Office whether establishment of police post at Menilkrai, or other measures for protection of Mishmis after Mishmi mission has withdrawn, are in contemplation. Reference is invited to my telegram, dated 8th November, 1911. I shall be glad if you will consult local Government and furnish me with your views.

[9037] No. 27.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th February, 1912, regarding the Mishmi Mission.

India Office, February 29, 1912.

* Part XIV, No. 108; and Enclosures in Nos. 21 and 23.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 27, 1912.

MISHMI Mission.

Reference is invited to telegram of the 6th ultimo from Government of India to Eastern Bengal and Assam Government, copy of which was enclosed in letter of the 18th ultimo from Secretary, Foreign Department. The mission returned the 23rd instant to Sadiya. Return is expected in first week of next month of two small survey parties which are still out.

[9635] No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd March, 1912, regarding the Miri Mission.

India Office, March 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 3, 1912.

REPORTS received from Kerwood, dated the 1st March, 1912, state that Miri Mission was attacked in Tali, one day's journey from Savtam, on the 14th ultimo. We have not yet received details, but enemy lost about twenty killed and wounded. There were no casualties on our side. Mission has reached Guchi safely on its return journey.

[7790] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 5, 1912.

WITH reference to the telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India of the 6th ultimo, repeated to you giving the observations of the Government of India on the proposals made by Mr. Rose in his report on the Chinese frontiers of India of the 30th September last, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the India Office on the same subject.*

A copy of Mr. Rose's report has already been sent to you by bag, and I should be glad to be furnished with your views as to the advisability of offering to the Chinese Government hereafter a settlement on the lines suggested by Mr. Rose.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[10194] No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegram from Viceroy, dated the 7th March, 1912, regarding the north-east frontier.

India Office, March 8, 1912.

* No. 22.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 7, 1912.

IN consultation with general officer commanding, Abor expedition, Eastern Bengal and Assam Government have recommended the division of the tribal area into three sections for purposes of future control. It is proposed that Mr. Dundas, with one assistant, should be in political charge of central section, having its head-quarters at Rotung, and comprising Abor country, and that he should also exercise general control over the other two sections. Hkamti tract (to be taken over from Burmah) and Mishmi country are to be included in the eastern section, with Sadiya for head-quarters, under the charge of two political officers, one for the hill country and one for the plains. Tract between central section and Towang to be comprised in western section.

Following measures are proposed :—

Eastern Section.—Establishment near Menilkrai of a post of 200 military police, with posts connecting with Sadiya, early next cold weather.

With reference to your telegram dated the 28th ultimo, establishment of post this season is not possible, see enclosures in letter dated the 22nd ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department. It is proposed that company of sappers and miners should be further employed to improve and bridge line of communications, and that materials for bridging should be laid in during the rains.

Western Section.—It is proposed to send out next cold weather three small missions to explore the country between the ground which the Miri mission covered this season and Towang.

Central Section.—It is proposed that post of 200 military police at Rotung, with connecting post at Pasighat of 100 rifles, and guard of 50 rifles over stores at Kobo, should be established before expeditionary force withdraws, rations up to end of October 1912 being supplied in every case. Berthon boats and materials for rafting to be maintained at Rotung. First line of mules, as well as entrenching tools to keep mule-road to Yambung in repair, to be supplied to the posts. Telegraph line to be retained, certain improvements being made in section between Pasighat and Sadiya.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Government recommend, as a means of finding the extra military police required and their reliefs, that Dacca battalion should be transferred to Assam from Bengal, and that a second Lakhimpur battalion should be raised. We forwarded papers as to this with letter dated 29th ultimo from Secretary, Foreign Department. As regards eastern and western sections, a further communication will be addressed to you. But as regards central section arrangements must be made before force under General Bower withdraws, and are therefore pressing. No taxation of Abors, except such as settle or cultivate in the plains, is proposed by local Government. Latter, from past experience, are satisfied that posts will afford the only satisfactory means of exercising over tribesmen sufficient control to secure peace and prevent complications on external frontier. This view has our entire concurrence. Other arrangements recommended also appear to us suitable, and, to prevent return of expedition being delayed, we propose, if you approve, to sanction their being carried out at once.

We will furnish estimate of cost later. In view of urgency of case it has not yet been prepared.

[11351] No. 31.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 22nd February, 1912, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, March 15, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

Sir, *Gangtok, February* 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the translation of a letter, dated the 5th February, 1912, from the Thibetan Chief Ministers to my address, in which they ask that British troops may be sent with the Dalai Lama when he returns to Thibet, and that a representative of the Government of India may be posted to Lhassa.

2. The Ministers spoke to me on the subject when I was in Darjeeling before I received their letter. I informed them yet once again that it was impossible to grant their requests.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

The Lonchens (Thibetan Chief Ministers) to Mr. Bell.

THE monk and lay officials of Thibet submitted many representations and sent in their delegates to his Holiness the Dalai Lama, requesting him to return quickly to Thibet. The doctor also advised his Holiness to go to Kalimpong for a change, as the climate of the lower country does not suit his health. His Holiness is, therefore, leaving Darjeeling on the 24th of this month (11th February, 1912) for Kalimpong. After considering the situation he will return to Thibet. There are Chinese soldiers in Thibet who could not be controlled by their officers and Len Amban. These soldiers have done continual damage in Lhassa, Lho-Ka, and the central provinces by killing many people and looting their properties. Having such Chinese people in Thibet, it is difficult to say what will happen when his Holiness goes back to Thibet, although his Holiness will have Thibetan troops to guard him. The great British Government being very generous, we beg you will kindly move the Government immediately to send along with his Holiness to Thibet some British officials and at least 100 soldiers to guard his Holiness and the Gyantse and Yatung British agencies. Although the British Government may find it difficult to say this or that between the Chinese and Thibetans, yet there is a custom to protect people who apply to them for protection. If there is any difficulty in sending the troops prayed for, we beg you will very kindly move (the Government) that it will not do without sending an official as the representative of the British Government to Thibet (Lhassa) with the Dalai Lama.

Submitted with a scarf of greeting on the 18th of the 12th month of the Iron-hog year (5th February, 1912).

(Seal of the Lonchens.)

[11767] No. 32.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th March, 1912, regarding the Miri Mission.

India Office, March 18, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 12, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 3rd instant.

Mission to Miri country returned safely, on 16th instant, to British India.

[11918] No. 33.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, March* 20, 1912.

THIBET.

According to semi-official and other newspapers published at Chengtu, which have not been contradicted, Chengtu Government, fearing that Dalai Lama may be intriguing with British, sent Tengyulung, former secretary there, to Lhassa on 6th March to report on domestic and foreign affairs of Thibet. Two other delegates were dispatched to Assam frontier on 8th March and 13th March respectively.

(Sent to India.)

[12191] No. 34.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 21.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my letter of the 6th November, 1911, as to postal arrangements in Thibet, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India on the subject.*

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Government of India that the proposal of the Chinese Postmaster-General, that the Indian Post Office should hand over mails for Thibet at Gyantse and should take over those from Thibet at Yatung, is not one that should be accepted at the present stage. His Lordship would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that His Majesty's Minister at Peking might be instructed to inform the Chinese Government accordingly, in reply to the Postmaster-General's letter of the 4th July, 1911.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[12128] No. 35.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated 14th March, 1912, regarding the Abor country.

India Office, March 20, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 35.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 14, 1912.

NORTH-EAST frontier.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 7th March, 1912. In view of what we have stated as to objects of Abor expedition, strong opposition would be aroused in Parliament by establishment of permanent police posts in Abor country, to which I am most unwilling, on grounds of general policy, to accord my sanction. It would even be preferable, in my view, that no permanent post beyond the inner line should be maintained. Please say whether, without posts beyond Kobo, your policy as described in letter dated 21st September last from Government of India, No. 19 of the White paper presented to Parliament, could not be carried out.

* Not printed.

[12350] No. 36.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st March, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, March 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 22, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 25th January, 1911, regarding Thibet. Political officer, Sikkim, has received telegram to following effect from trade agent, Gyantse, dated the 18th instant :—

"Fighting between Chinese and Thibetans, in which the former suffered defeat, took place on the 16th instant at Penamjong between Shigatse and Gyantse. Only thirty-two Chinese soldiers returned to Gyantse out of sixty-five. It is stated that Thibetan and Khamba soldiers to the number of 300, under command of Teling Depon, are marching from Penamjong to Gyantse. Arrival at Shigatse of 2,000 Thibetan troops is reported. Further developments will be reported."

[12953] No. 37.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, March 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Chengtu :—

"Semi-official newspaper 23rd March states that orders have been given to garrison at Batang to send detachments to align Assam frontier with the republican flag."

I have good reason to believe that this is true.

[13401] No. 38.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure to a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 29th February, 1912, on the subject of the Dalai Lama.

India Office, March 28, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

THE elder brother of the Dalai Lama and three other high Tibetan officials have arrived at Kalimpong to discuss the situation with the Dalai Lama and his Ministers.

[13403] No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure in a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 7th March, 1912, on the subject of the Dalai Lama.

India Office, March 28, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

Gangtok, February 22, 1912.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter No. 36, dated the 10th February, 1912, I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of what is believed to be a copy of the letter from His Holiness the Dalai Lama to His Imperial Majesty the Tsar of Russia. The copy was sent by the Lama to Mr. Laden La.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Dalai Lama to the Tsar of Russia.

TO the august presence of the Great Russian Emperor who is governing the broad kingdom :

I was very glad to receive the kind letter and the scarf sent by your Majesty, which your Calcutta representative (consul-general) personally brought to me at Darjeeling. It is very kind of you to state that you have been taking an interest in the benefit of the religion and people of Thibet. According to circumstances, I have been making continual representations (regarding Thibetan affairs) to the British Government. From my side I have been carefully observing the principles of the treaties, and shall continue to observe them.

The Chinese officials and soldiers in Thibet have oppressed the Thibetans in an unaccountable manner, and have taken away our power by force. I beg that the Russian and British Governments will kindly discuss the Anglo-Russian agreement deeply and carefully and as soon as possible, so that all the Chinese officials and soldiers may be withdrawn from Thibet, and that the kingdom of Thibet may be restored to us.

Submitted on an auspicious day of a month by the Dalai Lama, with a scarf of greeting.

(Seal of the Dalai Lama.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 39.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

Gangtok, February 29, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to state that the Dalai Lama's Ministers report that the Dalai Lama and they have received letters from the Tashi Lama, in which the latter requests them all to return to Thibet as soon as possible. The Tashi Lama adds that

he is willing to negotiate with the Chinese officials on their behalf, should they so desire.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

[13593] No. 40.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th March, 1912, regarding fighting in Thibet.

India Office, March 30, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 29, 1912.

TELEGRAM dated the 27th instant received from trade agent, Gyantse, to following effect:—

"Fighting is imminent; 300 Thibetan soldiers arrive to-day at Gyantse."

Following telegram dated the 28th March received from Mr. Bell:—

"I am informed by Thibetan Minister that Chinese soldiers from Shigatse, and subsequently sixty Chinese soldiers from Gyantse attacked 300 Thibetan soldiers on their way to Chumbi valley to escort the Dalai Lama. Thibetan losses were slight. First Chinese party lost twelve killed and the second forty killed and missing."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[13739] No. 41.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Peking, March* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of three despatches* which have recently reached me from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu reporting upon the situation in Thibet and the marches of Szechuan.

I venture to call attention to the very interesting memorandum written by Mr. Teichman, which indicates the extent to which China's power in Thibet has been shattered by the events of the past few months.

The city of Yachou appears to have been more than usually unfortunate in its experience of revolutionary warfare.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Chengtu, February* 1, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Fu Sung-mu, the acting warden of the marches, took refuge with the

* Consul-General Wilkinson, No. 16, February 13, 1912 (not printed).

Catholic Mission at Yachou. Arrangements were made for his rendition, and he was finally brought as a prisoner to Chengtu. Here he is permitted to live at the Normal School, under surveillance, and it is now probable that his life will be spared. There is, indeed, some talk of employing him as adviser on the affairs of the marches.

Mr. Openshaw's last letter from Yachou was dated the 23rd January, and reached me through the post in five days. Dr. and Mrs. Humphreys, with their child, arrived in Yachou from Ningyuan on the 21st January. They had been delayed for some time near Fu-lin owing to reports of danger on the roads, but had otherwise suffered no inconvenience. They will probably now descend to Chiating and Chungking. Yachou itself is quiet, though much confusion still prevails. Contributions are being levied on the pawnshops and wealthier inhabitants, and opportunity is being taken to pay off old scores. The Chengtu Government would seem to have been unfortunate in their choice of a man to replace the Ya-ngan magistrate, for their nominee has already caused some offence by his flighty manners.

At Tachienlu the troops were said to have got out of hand and to have looted all the town, with the exception of the Catholic Mission. The bishop, Mgr. Girardeau, and the priests and sisters, withdrew to Lu-t'ing-ch'iao. A letter from Mr. Cunningham, however, dated the 13th January, reported that all was quiet, so that the alarm would appear to have been false. Nothing lately has come through from M. Kérihuel at Ho-ko'u, but Mr. Ritchie, the provincial postmaster, received last night a letter from his Chinese agent at Batang, saying that the post office is functioning as before between Batang and Lhasa, and with fair regularity between Batang, Ho-k'ou and Tachienlu.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 14 A.)

Cheng-tu, February 6, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose a memorandum by Mr. Teichman, assistant at this consulate-general, on the situation in the tribal country and marches of Thibet.

It is calculated that the annual cost to Szechuan Province of the maintenance of Chinese authority in Thibet and the marches did not fall far short of 1,000,000 taels. As the present Government, or Governments, in Szechuan can hardly raise sufficient money for current expenses, it may well be that they are contemplating the abandonment of the protectorate. Should the Central Government (if it succeeds in firmly establishing its position) insist on the retention of Thibet, then Szechuan will ask that the burden of administration shall be lightened for her. Meanwhile she would seem to look on that country less as a dependency than as a foreign State: an attitude that would justify, at any rate for a time, the discontinuance of the subsidy.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 41.

Memorandum on Situation in Tribal Country and Marches.

ON the 6th February we were somewhat surprised to receive a visit from So Tu-ssu, chief of the Wassu tribe, with whom I was stopping on the first outbreak of trouble in Szechuan at the beginning of September. He had come into Chengtu with 200 of his tribesmen in order to try and get a supply of modern rifles and ammunition from the Chün Cheng Fu, in which he was, of course, unsuccessful. So Tu-ssu is naturally in favour with the present revolutionary administration, as he joined the insurrectionary movement from the start, and gave the Tung Chih Hui the armed assistance of a strong force of his tribesmen; but he is of the old school, and is evidently disgusted with the ultra-radical foreign-hatted young revolutionaries who are at present directing the destinies of Chengtu and Western Szechuan. He has no sympathy with democratic ideals, and his idea of tu-li (independent self-government) is limited to the recovery of his absolute powers over his own tribesmen, which had

been much curtailed of late by the Chinese authorities. The present position of the tu-ssu, or native chiefs, of the tribal country, appears to be that they have got rid of all Chinese official interference in their own affairs, while acknowledging a kind of protectorate on the part of the Chengtu military administration, a protectorate which they are ready to cast off at any moment. The situation in the Upper Min Valley during the last few months has been one of chaos. The fighting between the Hsünfang troops and the Tung Chih Hui was complicated by the eruptions of the Mantzu tribesmen and the raids of the fei-tu, or robber bands. Sungpan, according to So, is now non-existent, having been burned to the ground by raiding Mantzu from the north-west, with the result that the highly valuable tea trade between Szechuan and North-Eastern Thibet has ceased to exist. Lifan, Maochou, Weichou, Wenchuan, and other frontier towns have been much knocked about. Since Imperialist resistance has practically ceased in Szechuan, however, the situation has improved, and the main road is now somewhat more peaceful. So was himself now proceeding to Sungpan, apparently in the interests of the Chengtu Government, to try and quieten matters. Practically all the isolated garrisons of Hsünfang in the border towns had been wiped out, with their officers.

Speaking of affairs generally in Szechuan, So was most pessimistic. The Szechuan Luchun (the present republican army in Chengtu), he said, were useless in a fight; they were nearly all recruits without proper military training, their courage was highly doubtful, and their discipline was little better than that of the rabble of the Tung Chih Hui. The Yünnanese, on the other hand, he considered, were a real fighting force, and would yet cause trouble to Chengtu. As for the pei-fa, the much discussed expedition against the north, he said it was all empty talk. If the troops ever got to the frontiers of Kansu or Shensi, they would be too demoralised and tired to do any serious fighting.

According to So Tu-ssu, and other reports, Thibet proper seems to be at peace. Chinese domination was always of so light a kind that its removal, if it has been removed, would make but little difference.

Writing from Tachienlu, under date of the 22nd January, Mr. Cunningham says:

"Our city was proclaimed republican yesterday amid much pomp and show. To-day and yesterday the Ta Han flags have been flying. The people seem pleased and the soldiers seem willing. Everything has been very quiet up here, and I feel like staying."

From this it would appear that the rumours received through the French consul-general, that Tachienlu had been looted by Thibetans or soldiers, were without foundation. From Yachou Mr. Openshaw writes, on the 30th January, that the city is quiet, but that there is great confusion in the Government. The new hsien official having gone mad, there is no head to the local government: there is much mutual jealousy amongst the gentry, and extortion practised by those having power.

China does not apparently intend to relinquish her hold on Thibet, though it is quite possible that a reconquest will be necessary, owing to the withdrawal of many of the Chinese garrisons. It may be noted that in the draft agreement between the Governments of Chengtu and Chungking, published recently here, one of the stipulations of the Chungking Government is as follows:—

"Thibet to be considered a dependency of China, not of Szechuan."

And it would seem that the relations between Szechuan and Thibet are in future to be on the basis rather of those between two foreign countries than of those between a Power and its dependency. Thus amongst the departments of the Chengtu Wai-wu Pu, or Foreign Office, are those relating to Great Britain and America, France, Germany, &c., and Thibet; while the former acting warden of the marches, Fu Sung-mu, informed M. Bons d'Anty at Yachou that he had been offered the post of tsung ling-ssu (consul-general) in Thibet by the republicans, an appointment that he could by no means understand.

ERIC TEICHMAN.

Chengtu, February 6, 1912.

[14007] No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure to a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, dated the 14th March, 1912, on the subject of the Dalai Lama.

India Office, April 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Gangtok, March* 5, 1912.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 17th February, 1912, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of correspondence between the Thibetan chief Ministers and myself regarding their request that British troops may be sent with the Dalai Lama as his escort when he returns to Thibet, and that a permit to purchase 200 firearms may be granted.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

Thibetan Chief Ministers to Mr. Bell.

(Translation.)

WE have already applied for an escort for our precious protector, the Dalai Lama, when he returns to Thibet. We have again received petitions from the National Assembly and the Jongpens and people of Lho-ka, through the Dza-sa, Khen-po, and the representatives of Sera, Dre-pung and Gan-den, who have come here to receive the Dalai Lama, stating that the Chinese officials and soldiers are plundering properties without restraint, and it has now become impossible for them to remain in Thibet any longer, and they therefore beg that the Dalai Lama may return to Thibet quickly, with some escort from the British Government. A statement of properties plundered is enclosed herewith.* The number of escort we asked before is too small, therefore we request that no less than 500 officers and men may be given to us. The Thibetan Government will pay their expenses, including their pay. In this connection we also request that a permit to purchase 200 firearms of the best kind, both big and small, may also be kindly obtained for us as soon as possible.

Submitted with a white scarf as "Patrochin" on date and month of the water-mouse year.

(Seal of the Chief Ministers.)

[13970] No. 43.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram, dated the 1st April, received from the Viceroy on the subject of Thibet and China.

India Office, April 1, 1912.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 1, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram, dated the 29th ultimo, regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated 29th ultimo, received from trade agent :—

"Fighting began yesterday at Gyantse between Thibetan soldiers to number of 600 and 160 Chinese."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[14175] No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 2, 1912.

IN reply to your letter dated the 23rd March, 1912, as to the recognition of the new Government in China, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe accepts the view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it is not expedient for His Majesty's Government to take the initiative in proposing to attach to their recognition conditions relating to the settlement of purely local disputes not involving any question of treaty right, such as those suggested in the Viceroy's telegram of the 15th March, 1912.

Lord Crewe assumes, however, that recognition must in any case be conditional on the new Government demonstrating its ability to control the outlying provinces of the Empire. Without such control no guarantees as to the maintenance of foreign rights and interests would be of any practical value. His Lordship trusts that, in the circumstances, Sir E. Grey may see his way to convey to the Chinese Government the warning suggested in my letter of the 23rd March, 1912.

Lord Crewe also desires to advert in this connection to the question of the political status of Thibet raised in your letter of the 13th January, 1912, with reference to which I am to enclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India.* His Lordship agrees with the Government of India that, as was admitted by the President of the Wai-wu Pu in the conversation with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, reported in Mr. Max Müller's telegram No. 45, dated the 6th March, 1910, the conversion of Thibet into a regular province of China would be a contravention of Anglo-Chinese treaty stipulations. I am accordingly to suggest that His Majesty's Government would be justified in requiring of the Chinese Government, as part of its treaty obligations, an undertaking that the autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty will be preserved, and in declining to accept any general guarantee as to the safeguarding of foreign treaty rights in China which does not provide for the maintenance of a *bonâ fide* Thibetan administration.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 23, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 31st January, 1912, regarding Thibet

We would reply to question No. (1) in the affirmative, on the ground that autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty has always been recognised, and that Thibetan administration, which would certainly disappear in the event of the country being converted into a province of China, is provided for in our treaties and trade regulations. The view that Thibet is not part of China proper has always been held by us ; this view is supported by the fact that treaties between China and foreign Powers are not valid in Thibet, and it has been taken by the Chinese themselves (see despatch of 6th October, 1904, from Sir Ernest Satow, and telegram dated 6th March, 1910, from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking).

* See No. 16 for telegram to Government of India of January 31, 1912.

Question No. (2), part I: Opposition to the inclusion of Thibet in China proper would best serve British interests (including the special rights and privileges in Thibet, which we are pledged to defend, of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal). We believe that the effect in Thibet, especially in the event of Dalai Lama managing to return and re-establish himself, would be wholly good. Lama is very grateful for our hospitality and much impressed with British justice and power. The maintenance in Thibet of state of political isolation is in any case absolutely necessary, owing to the geographical position of the country. Part II: So far as we know, there has been no anti-Russian outbreak in connection with the support given by Russia to the Mongolian Government, and we have no reason to suppose that anti-British outbreak would follow British opposition to inclusion of Thibet in China. We are not in a position to say whether dismemberment of other outlying provinces would result from such opposition on our part.

As regards question No. (3), it appears to us doubtful whether a sufficient deterrent could necessarily be administered to aggressively inclined officials in remote localities by force, either naval or military, or both, applied near the seat of government. Short of military action locally, which is deprecated by military authorities as additional responsibility on army in India, there are no means of bringing pressure to bear under present conditions. A possible alternative is, however, offered by change of Chinese Government, and it is suggested that satisfactory settlement by Chinese regarding Thibet should be made condition of our according recognition to new Government.

(Repeated, with questions, to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[14402] No. 45.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secrecary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th April, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, April 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 45.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 4, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram, dated 1st instant, regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated 30th ultimo, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"At the request of the Chinese soldiers, the Chinese commercial officer interviewed me this morning. The soldiers say that they are in imminent danger, and beg me to act as intermediary between Thibetans and Chinese, and to save their lives. It was agreed to by Chinese to surrender to me all their arms and then to return viâ India to China, British protection being accorded them as far as Jelap-la. Except that they would like to secure the arms, this would, I think, please Thibetans."

In view of the following telegrams, no action was taken on the above :—

1. Dated 1st instant from Mr. Bell :—

"I was informed to-day by the Dalai Lama that he had telegraphed, in reply to a telegram from Chinese at Gyantse, forbidding the killing of Chinese soldiers, and saying that from Gyantse to the border of Sikkim they must be given food and transport free of cost."

2. Dated 2nd instant from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"Everything is now quiet at Gyantse. Chinese leave the place to-morrow for China viâ India. They surrendered their arms and ammunition to the Thibetans and

were given free transport from Gyantse to Sikkim frontier, besides 9,250 Chinese rupees for travelling expenses, and cost price of 144 rifles and 11,800 rounds of ammunition."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[15106] No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th April, 1912, regarding fighting in Thibet.

India Office, April 10, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 9, 1912.*

THIBET.

Please refer to my telegram dated the 4th instant.

Telegram dated 6th instant to following effect received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"Fighting has been continuous between Chinese and Thibetan troops at Lhasa; truce is sought by the former. Thibetan troops to the number of 300 left to-day for Lhasa from Gyantse."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[14175] No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 10, 1912.*

RECOGNITION of Chinese Republic.

My telegram No. 72 of 29th March.

India Office suggest that Chinese Government should be required as a condition of recognition to give undertaking that autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty will be preserved.

In view of intentions of Russian Government, it seems to me that we should be justified in making reservations respecting our treaty rights with regard to Thibet.

Do you agree with suggestion made by India Office, and, if so, what is your opinion as to the manner in which proposed undertaking should be obtained?

[14175] No. 48.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 11, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, relative to the recognition of the new Government in China.

With regard to the Marquess of Crewe's suggestion that a warning might be conveyed to the Chinese Government on the lines indicated in your letter of the 23rd ultimo, to the effect that recognition must be conditional on the new Government demonstrating its ability to make their will effective in the outlying provinces of the Empire which border on His Majesty's Indian dominions, Sir Edward Grey is of opinion that the introduction of this new element into the question of recognition, in which His Majesty's Government are compelled to act with so many Powers, might lead

to complications, and he would prefer, in the first instance at any rate, to deal with it separately. Sir Edward Grey would therefore propose, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Peking to make a further protest to the Chinese Government with reference to the attitude of the local officials at Tengyueh, and to enquire whether the latter are acting with the knowledge and approval of the Central Government, and if, as seems probable, this is denied, to urge that steps should at once be taken to put a stop to the proceedings and to prevent their recurrence.

With regard to the suggestion that recognition by His Majesty's Government of the new Government in China should be made conditional on an undertaking on the part of the Chinese Government, as part of their treaty obligations, that the autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty will be preserved, I am to state that Sir E. Grey sees no objection, in view of the reservations made by Russia in regard to her special rights and interests in North Manchuria, Mongolia, and the West of China, to His Majesty's Government making a similar reservation in regard to the political status of Thibet. Sir John Jordan has, however, been asked for his views on the matter, and for his opinion as to the manner in which the required undertaking should be obtained from the Chinese Government.

On receipt of his reply a further communication will be addressed to your department.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[15324] No. 49.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India regarding the situation on the North-East Frontier.

India Office, April 10, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 21, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram, dated the 14th instant, regarding North-East Frontier.

Unless proposed posts are established, it is, in our opinion, impossible to bring our relations with tribes into accord with existing conditions as our letter of the 21st September last contemplated. No advance of administrative frontier is proposed, but results of present expedition will speedily vanish and fresh trouble may arise, making further operations necessary, if no posts are placed in tribal territory beyond. Complete withdrawal is also to be deprecated in justice to friendly tribes: see paragraphs 7 and 8 of letter, dated the 22nd September, 1911, from assistant political officer, Abor Expedition, copy of which was enclosed in weekly letter of the 18th January last from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department. Considerable military force will also be required for eventual demarcation of frontier with China in the absence of posts. Proposed posts in Abor country are, in our opinion, quite as necessary as post near Menilkrai, which His Majesty's Government suggested. The immediate boundary at least seems to be known and respected in the Menilkrai neighbourhood.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 6, 1912.

NORTH-EAST Frontier.

Please refer to your telgram dated the 21st March, 1912.

Posts at Pasighat and Kobo are sanctioned; but after fullest consideration His Majesty's Government have arrived at conclusion that no posts should be established in Abor country for reasons indicated in my telegram dated the 14th March.

[15375] No. 50.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, April* 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 10th April.

Chinese Government might, I think, be reasonably required, as a condition of recognition, to give an undertaking that the political status of Thibet should remain as it was when our treaties were concluded. This demand would be justified by the fact that the Chinese Republic avowedly aims at the incorporation of Thibet as an integral part of China, and that such conversion of suzerainty into sovereignty is inconsistent with the principle which has been established making the Thibetan Government party to negotiations and signature of our recent treaties. Chinese answer to this would doubtless be that we have since acquiesced [in], if not encouraged, the consolidation of Chinese influence in Thibet, but our position is stronger than that of Russia, who cannot claim to have had any direct treaty relations with Mongolia.

We should, however, I think, confine ourselves to a demand for the maintenance of the *status quo* under treaty. If we go further and insist on a measure of autonomy, apparently claimed by Russia for Mongolia, we may give other Powers opportunity of putting forward similar claims, and incur the charge of promoting a policy of dismemberment. There will be presumably no question of recognition until the formal election of President by the National Assembly to be convened within the next ten months, and in the meantime we could, if you approve, prepare the way for an understanding by letting the Chinese know that we cannot accept the attitude of the Republican Government towards Thibet.

(Repeated to India.)

[15527] No. 51.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, April* 13, 1912.

MY telegram No. 100 of 12th April.

It will be remembered that the Chinese Government have on several occasions formally undertaken to make no changes in the *status quo* of Thibet (please see last paragraph of No. 322 and ante-penultimate sentence of Enclosure 3 in No. 340 in Thibet Blue Book [?] 1910).

(Repeated to India.)

[15834] No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th April, 1912, regarding fighting in Thibet.

India Office, April 15, 1912.

[16605] No. 53*

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 20.)

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Peking, March* 31, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to invite your attention to the accompanying extracts from a recent number of the "Peking Daily News,"* an official organ of the late Government, which has transferred its allegiance to the republic.

The correspondent in Calcutta from whom this paper receives its news of Thibetan affairs is in all probability Mr. Chang, who was sent there some time ago as the representative of the Chinese Government in connection with article 5 of the Opium Agreement of the 8th May last.

The article, entitled "The Situation in Thibet," which is based on this correspondence, is undoubtedly an inspired production, and is the first indication which the Provisional Government has given of its policy in regard to the outlying dependencies of the Empire. The republican flag, it is true, symbolises the incorporation of these distant units into the Chinese body politic; but the confusion and disorder which the revolution produced in Szechuan and the murder of Chao Erh-fêng, the only Chinese who ventured upon a forward policy of a practical nature during the last years of the Manchu dynasty, relegated the Thibetan question to a silence which has scarcely been broken since October last. With the prospect of the formation of a coalition Government of north and south, interest in the Thibetan question is now revived, and the efforts which are made to bring back Thibet into the national fold show on the part of their authors a consciousness of the difficulty of the task. It is realised that the Chinese hold upon Thibet was largely a Manchu achievement, which must necessarily have been considerably weakened by the fall of the dynasty. The result has been the almost complete disappearance of Chinese influence in the country, and something more than the gift of a stripe in a Chinese republican flag was evidently required to regain the allegiance of the Thibetans. The problem has engaged the attention of Yuan Shih-kai and his advisers, who have been in close communication with the authorities of the lama temple in Peking on the subject. It is evidently felt that the secular arm is not long enough to extend to Thibet, and that the question must be approached from the spiritual side. Yuan Shih-kai has accordingly issued a presidential order (copy enclosed),* which constitutes a reversal of the policy pursued by the late Government towards the Dalai Lama, and practically cancels the decree of the 25th February, 1910, deposing him from his position as supreme Pontiff of the Yellow Church. Though presidential orders carry little weight even in the neighbourhood of Peking and are not likely to penetrate to Thibet, the solicitude which is shown for the future of Thibet and Mongolia is a foretaste of what may be expected if the President succeeds in establishing a stable form of Government. The Manchu Government, favoured by a combination of political circumstances, succeeded in its declining days in converting its suzerainty over Thibet into something closely akin to practical sovereignty, and the attainment of this object is evidently part of the republican programme, which is stimulated by the apprehension that an autonomous Thibet on the Indian frontier might serve as a suitable offset to an independent Mongolia on the Russian border.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 12, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram, dated the 9th instant, regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated the 11th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"After five days' fighting Thibetans have defeated Chinese troops at Shigatse. Thibetans lost seven killed, and Chinese one wounded and five killed. Chinese troops have left Shigatse viâ Khamba Jong for India, on their way to China ; they surrendered to the Thibetans 130 rifles and 10,300 rounds of ammunition, and in return were given 8,000 Chinese rupees towards expenses of journey."

Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.

[16016] No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 11th April, 1912, as to the recognition of the new Government in China, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe accepts the view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the question of the local situation at Tengyueh should, in the first instance, be dealt with independently of that of the recognition of the republican Government. His Lordship concurs in the instructions which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on this subject.

As regards Thibet, the further communication promised in the final paragraph of your letter will be awaited.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[17642] No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 4th April, 1912, relative to the position of Nepal *vis-à-vis* China.

India Office, April 26, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 54.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith (Resident in Nepal) to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp, vid Raxaul, March* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with my letter, dated the 10th December, 1911, regarding the Nepalese Quinquennial Mission to Peking, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter from the Prime Minister in Nepal, dated the 17th December, which I regret to find has not yet been submitted to the Government of India.

2. When the letter was received during the King-Emperor's shoot, I had a short conversation with the Prime Minister about it, which satisfied me that the Nepal Darbar had no intention of taking any action regarding the dispatch of another mission without consulting the Government of India, but I wished before reporting to Government to have a fuller discussion with the Prime Minister. The opportunity

for so doing, however, did not occur, and the fact that the letter had not been seen by the Government of India was subsequently overlooked.

3. The Prime Minister's expression of surprise at the political significance attached by China to the mission is slightly disingenuous, as it is impossible that he should not be aware that in the eyes of the Chinese Government the mission is a sign of vassalage, and that the presents which accompany the mission are a tribute.

It is quite true, however, that he has received from me no official intimation of the claim put forward by China. No communication has been made to the Nepal Darbar on the subject, except such as have been from time to time specifically authorised by the Government of India, which were to the effect that the Chinese Government had been warned that administrative changes in Thibet would not be allowed to affect the rights of Nepal, and the advice given to Nepal to refuse to accept any honour from China if the acceptance of it implied the recognition of China's suzerainty. In other respects complete reticence regarding the course of the negotiations between the British Government and the Chinese Foreign Office regarding the status of Nepal and Bhutan *vis-à-vis* China has been observed.

4. Under the circumstances it is not unnatural for the Nepal Darbar to hint that fuller information should be given them, and I venture to suggest, for the approval of Government, whether a communication containing a general summary of the negotiations above referred to should not be made to the Prime Minister.

I enclose herewith a draft reply to his letter for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
J. MANNERS-SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 54.

Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal to Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith.

I HAVE received your letter of the 10th instant, in which you have mentioned that peculiar significance is attached to the quinquennial mission from Nepal to Peking by the Chinese Foreign Office. Indeed, I read this communication with the greatest surprise, for it is beyond our comprehension, in view of our emphatic disclaimer of any sinister significance sought to be attached to it, how the mission could be taken in an altogether different light than what we take it to be. I am in the dark whether the British Government are in possession of the views of China on the subject, and, if so, what was the nature of the communication made by them with regard to the status of Nepal, and what was the reply that China gave to it. I need hardly say that Nepal firmly believes in her independence, and means to maintain it too at any cost, and, firmly convinced as she is that the independence so dearly herished by her sons will be upheld by the friendly British Government, will only be too glad to consult with the Government of India should it be in any way jeopardised from other quarters.

Enclosure 3 in No. 54.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith to Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal.

IN your letter of the 17th December, 1911, regarding Chinese affairs, you write that your Excellency was unaware whether the British Government are in possession of the views of China on the subject of her relations towards Nepal, and, if so, what was the nature of the communication made by them with regard to the status of Nepal, and what was the reply that China gave to it.

My Government recognise that it is natural for the Nepal Darbar to wish to know the position of affairs in regard to this important question, and I am authorised to give your Excellency the following information :—

In October 1910 the British Minister in Peking was directed to repeat the warning given to the Chinese Government in April 1910, that the administrative

changes made by China in Thibet would not be allowed to affect the integrity of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, and, as regards Nepal, to express the hope that the report from Lhassa that Chinese envoys would shortly be dispatched to give the Prime Minister of Nepal a letter and a new title from the Chinese Emperor was without foundation.

This intimation was given in a note, dated the 14th October, 1910, addressed to Prince Ching. On the 28th October, 1910, Prince Ching replied to the above note, and, as regard Nepal, wrote that the Chinese Government observe that Nepal has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past, and has long ago submitted to vassalage to China.

On the 17th January, 1911, the British Minister in Peking, under instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed Prince Ching again, and informed him, as regards Nepal, that, while His Majesty's Government have no desire to interrupt the present friendly and complimentary relations existing between that country and China, they must act, and advise the Nepalese Government to act upon the assumption that Nepal is not a vassal, but wholly independent of China, and in intimate relations with the British Government in accordance with the treaties and the mutual understanding agreed upon between them.

It was added that " these views of His Majesty's Government are not new, and do not portend any change in their attitude either to the State concerned or to China," but the assertion of them in unmistakable terms has been rendered necessary by the recent development of Chinese policy in Thibet, involving the temporary overturn of stable Government in that country, and the dispatch of Chinese troops in the direction of the frontier of India and her allies. His Majesty's Government have recognised China's interests in Thibet, and have been unwilling to embarrass her in her action there so long as she adheres to her own pledges, and does not prevent the Thibetan Government from fulfilling its treaty obligations. But no attempt of the Chinese Government to exercise influence over States so remote from the sphere of direct Chinese interests, and in such close relations with the Government of India as Nepal (and Bhutan), can possibly be tolerated.

On the 31st March, 1911, Prince Ching acknowledged the receipt of Sir John Jordan's note of the 17th January, and replied briefly reaffirming the claim that both Nepal and Bhutan are vassal States of China, and requested that the renewed declaration should be communicated to His Majesty's Government.

In consequence of the above the British Minister in Peking was directed to inform the Chinese Government through Prince Ching that His Majesty's Government are unable to recognise the claim of the Chinese Government to the suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, and that they will be bound to resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to impose their authority on, or in any way to interfere in, either of these two States.

This is how matters stand at present.

Enclosure 4 in No. 54.

Government of India to Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Simla, March* 27, 1912.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 7th March, 1912, regarding the position of Nepal *vis-à-vis* China.

2. In reply, I am to state that the Government of India approve the reply you propose to send to the Prime Minister's letter on the subject, but desire that, if you see no objection to this, you should preface your reply with a reference to your communications to the Prime Minister, dated the 16th April, 1906, the 11th November, 1910, and the 23rd May, 1911.

I have, &c.

(For Deputy Secretary to the Government of India),

S. B. PATTERSON.

[17790] No. 55.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

Sir, *India Office, April 26, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India regarding Russian action in Sarikol.*

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Government of India that the proceedings of Captain Kolbine, the officer in command of the Russian post at Tashkurghan, as reported by His Majesty's consul-general at Kashgar, are of a nature to justify a representation on the part of His Majesty's Government.

He would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh might be instructed to bring those proceedings to the notice of the Russian Government, and to intimate that His Majesty's Government, while they entertain no aggressive designs whatever in Sarikol or elsewhere in Chinese Turkestan, continue to support the long-standing claims of the Mir of Hunza to cultivation rights in Raskam (which formed the subject of Sir C. Scott's memorandum to Count Mouravieff, dated the 12th August, 1899,† and of Lord Lansdowne's memorandum to the Russian Ambassador, dated the 22nd January, 1903‡), as well as his claims to a share of the revenues of the Taghdumbash Pamir. Attention might also be invited to the language used by his Excellency Count Mouravieff (quoted in Mr. Hardinge's despatch No. 199, dated the 28th June, 1899), as to the paramount importance of maintaining the relative positions of Russia and England in Central Asia, as settled by the Pamirs convention. It seems evident that the claims of the Mir of Hunza would be greatly affected and the situation created by the convention would be seriously modified if the local Russian officers are permitted to override Chinese authority in Sarikol, which His Majesty's Government regard as an integral part of the Chinese Empire.

As regards the question of re-establishing a British news-writer in Sarikol, Lord Crewe would prefer to await the result of the above representations before moving in the matter. Should the present aggressive policy of the local Russian officials continue, it may become necessary hereafter to strengthen the personnel of the British post. But his Lordship doubts whether any useful purpose would be served by raising this point with the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[18304] No. 56.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th April, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, April 30, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 30, 1912.*

THIBET. See my telegram dated 12th instant.

Trade agent, Gyantse, telegraphed 26th instant to following effect:—

"It is reported that the Tashi Lama, who is at present at Khamba Jong, whither he went for safety during recent fighting at Shigatse, intends shortly to return to

* Not printed. † Enclosure in Sir C. Scott's despatch No. 248, August 17, 1899.
‡ Enclosure in Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Sir C. Scott, No. 14 A, January 21, 1903.

Shigatse; and that he then means to go to Yatung to meet the Dalai Lama on the latter's return to Thibet. The Prime Minister of the Tashi Lama has to-day left for Lhassa to try to make peace between Thibetans and Chinese."

Trade agent telegraphed again on 28th instant to following effect :—

"Following information was given me to-day by Nepalese representative at Lhassa, who has arrived at Gyantse. Fighting between [? passage apparently omitted] is proceeding continuously. 900 Thibetans and 300 Chinese have been killed; 10,000 Thibetan troops and 10,000 monk volunteers have surrounded the Chinese troops at Lhassa, who now number about 1,000. The south of the city is occupied by Chinese, and the north by Thibetans. Apart from wife and family of brother of Dalai Lama, whose house has been forcibly occupied by Chinese, no arrests have been made of Thibetan officials. Peace is desired by both sides, but no mediator is forthcoming. Unless fighting is immediately stopped it is feared that much life and property will be lost, and that Chinese, when their supply of ammunition and provisions is exhausted, will eventually be worsted. Several buildings on the south were burned, but Lhassa temple, palace of Dalai Lama, and Sera monastery have not been damaged. Chinese are said to be receiving help from Teng-ye Ling."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[18305] No. 57.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th April, 1912, regarding British recognition of the new Government in China.

India Office, April 30, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 57

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 29, 1912.*

WE consider that endeavours should be made to get Chinese to agree to following conditions, if suitable opening offers during negotiations for recognition by His Majesty's Government of the new Government in China, in addition to satisfactory settlement of Thibet question, as to which a separate communication is being addressed to you :—

(*a.*) That Chinese claims to suzerainty over Bhutan and Nepal should be finally withdrawn, Nepalese mission (see your telegram dated the 5th December, 1911) being in consequence discontinued;

(*b.*) That persecution of Chinese mule contractors should cease, and that Salween-Irrawaddy watershed should be accepted as boundary on conditions already presented;

(*c.*) That Chinese should refrain from encroaching on tribal territory on north-east frontier outside territory recognised locally as belonging to China, such tribal territory being under the control of Great Britain.

Renewed interest displayed by Chinese in Assam frontier (see your telegram of the 29th and Sir J. Jordan's of the 20th ultimo) indicates necessity of giving such warning, in anticipation of results of Abor expedition and missions, and even in general terms.

We should be glad to be consulted as to the terms to be employed in the event of His Majesty's Government agreeing to these conditions being proposed.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[18528] No. 58.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy regarding the north-east frontier.

India Office, May 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 58.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 22, 1912.

NORTH-EAST frontier.

Reference is invited to your telegram dated the 6th instant. On the following grounds I must, with all deference, again request that question of post at Rotung may be reconsidered:—

1. Assurances of our intention to hold Rotung, practical though unauthorised, have been given to friendly tribes (see Bentinck's diaries dated 20th January and 18th February, as well as his diary of 25th February, which were transmitted respectively with letters dated 14th ultimo and 18th instant from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department). Not only will impression of bad faith be given if these assurances are not fulfilled, but Minyong Abors will no doubt be encouraged to avenge themselves speedily on other Abors, with result that further operations will be necessitated.

2. We at present hold post at Rotung which Abor expedition has actually constructed. Undesirable impression of weakness will be created by abandonment of post, and further expedition within a few years will almost certainly be necessitated. Moreover no extension of our administrative frontier need result from retention of post, while it will tend to prevent others intruding and to maintain peace and order.

His Majesty's Government will, we trust, be pleased to reconsider their decision and to agree to post which has already been created being retained permanently, as its maintenance appears to be imperatively necessary on grounds indicated above.

Enclosure 2 in No. 58.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 25, 1912.

ROTUNG post.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 22nd instant. Difficulty caused by pledges to friendly tribes and by establishment of post is regretted by His Majesty's Government. They are not prepared, however, as at present advised, to approve the policy contemplated in diary of 20th January, to which you refer, of establishing further posts in direction of Chinese frontier. In these circumstances maintenance in Abor territory of a solitary post cannot be sanctioned by His Majesty's Government.

[18661] No. 59.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 175.)

Sir, *Peking, April* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 94 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu on the subject of the dispatch of Chinese troops from Batang to align the Assam frontier with the flag of the Chinese Republic.

The importance of this manœuvre is that it shows that the efforts of the republican authorities to incorporate Thibet in China are seconded by Szechuan, the province which finances Thibet.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir, *Chengtu, March* 25, 1912.

IN the semi-official "Szechuan Kungpao" of the 23rd instant appeared the paragraph of which I have the honour to enclose copy and translation, stating that the Director of the Office for Frontier Arrangements (Ch'ou-pien Ch'u) had moved the Government to order the garrison at Batang to detach troops to align the Zayul (that is, in effect, the Assam) frontier with the flag of the Chinese Republic.

I at once caused private enquiry to be made, and on being assured that the orders thus solicited have actually been issued, I have this morning telegraphed the news to you.

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India would appear to have foreseen as early as November last the probability of just such a move on the part of the Chinese, and it is to be presumed therefore that, although the Mishmi Mission will be preparing in a few days from now to return to Sadiya, steps will have been taken to forestall any attempt to plant the Chinese flag in territory that should properly appertain to Assam or the unadministered region of Northern Burmah.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

Extract from the "Szechuan Kungpao" of March 23, 1912.

FORETHOUGHT ON THE PART OF THE OFFICE FOR THIBETAN ARRANGEMENTS.

(Translation.)

WE learn that Mr. Huang Liu-ch'ing, Director of the Office for Thibetan Arrangements, for the reason that the country of Zayul is of the very greatest importance in regard to frontier defence, has requested the Government* to give orders to the forces now stationed at Batang to detach a number of men in various directions to proceed to Zayul and take up position all along the frontier, besides sending officers bearing the five-coloured flag of the Chinese Republic to plant these on the border line, so as to show that this country is an appanage of our State.

It is an excellent scheme of precaution against anticipated trouble.

Translated March 25, 1912.
W. H. WILKINSON.

[19558] No. 60.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th April, 1912, relative to the status of Nepal.

India Office, May 7, 1912.

* Tu-tu fu, the Szechuan Military Government.—W. H. W.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners Smith to Government of India.

Sir, *Nepal, April* 5, 1912.

WITH reference to Foreign Department letter, dated the 27th March, 1912, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my letter to the Prime Minister, dated the 31st ultimo, and a copy of a letter from Maharaja Sir Chandra Shum Shere Jung, dated the 4th April, which I have received in reply to that communication.

2. It will be seen that the Prime Minister, on behalf of the Nepal Darbar, gratefully acknowledges the friendly interest which the Government of India have taken in the recent negotiations with China regarding the status of Nepal, and again emphatically repudiates the claim of suzerainty over Nepal put forward by the Chinese Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
J. MANNERS SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners Smith to the Prime Minister of Nepal.

March 31, 1912.

IN your letter of the 17th December, 1911, regarding Chinese affairs, you write that your Excellency was unaware whether the British Government are in possession of the views of China on the subject of her relations towards Nepal, and, if so, what was the nature of the communication made by them with regard to the status of Nepal, and what was the reply that China gave to it.

The views of China and the negotiations which have taken place between the two Governments have already been indicated to some extent in the letters which I have from time to time addressed to your Excellency.

My Government, however, recognise that it is natural for the Nepal Darbar to wish to know more fully the position of affairs in regard to this important question, and I am authorised to give your Excellency the following information:—

In October 1910 the British Minister in Peking was directed to repeat the warning given to the Chinese Government in April 1910, that the administrative changes made by China in Thibet would not be allowed to affect the integrity of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, and, as regards Nepal, to express the hope that the report from Lhassa that Chinese envoys would shortly be dispatched to give the Prime Minister of Nepal a letter and a new title from the Chinese Emperor was without foundation.

This intimation was given in a note dated the 14th October, 1910, addressed to Prince Ching. On the 28th October, 1910, Prince Ching replied to the above note, and, as regards Nepal, wrote that the Chinese Government observe that Nepal has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past and has long ago submitted to vassalage to China.

On the 17th January, 1911, the British Minister in Peking, under instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed Prince Ching again, and informed him as regards Nepal that while His Majesty's Government have no desire to interrupt the present friendly and complimentary relations existing between that country and China they must act, and advise the Napalese Government to act, upon the assumption that Nepal is not a vassal but wholly independent of China and in intimate relations with the British Government, in accordance with the treaties and the mutual understanding agreed upon between them.

It was added that "these views of His Majesty's Government are not new and do not portend any change in their attitude either to the State concerned or to China, but the assertion of them in unmistakable terms has been rendered necessary by the recent development of Chinese policy in Thibet, involving the temporary overturn of stable Government in that country and the dispatch of Chinese troops in the direction of the frontiers of India and her allies. His Majesty's Government have recognised China's interests in Thibet, and have been unwilling to embarrass her in her action there so long as she adheres to her own pledges, and does not prevent the Thibetan Government from fulfilling its treaty obligations. But no attempt of the Chinese Government to

exercise influence over States so remote from the sphere of direct Chinese interests and in such close relations with the Government of India as Nepal (and Bhutan) can possibly be tolerated."

On the 31st March, 1911, Prince Ching acknowledged the receipt of Sir John Jordan's note of the 17th January, and replied briefly re-affirming the claim that both Nepal and Bhutan are vassal States of China, and requested that this renewed declaration should be communicated to His Majesty's Government.

In consequence of the above, the British Minister in Peking was directed to inform the Chinese Government through Prince Ching that His Majesty's Government are unable to recognise the claim of the Chinese Government to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, and that they will be bound to resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to impose their authority on or in any way to interfere in either of these two States.

This is how matters stand at present.

Enclosure 3 in No. 60.

The Prime Minister of Nepal to Lieutenant-Colonel Manners Smith.

April 4, 1912.

MANY thanks for your letter dated the 31st March, 1912, giviug an account of the communications that passed between the British Government and the Government of China, showing how matters at present stand as regards the relations between China and Nepal. Our views on the question of the claim which his Excellency Prince Ching appears to have given expression to in connection with our relations with China are well known to you and to your Government. It is impossible for us not to repudiate the claim with all the emphasis at our command, based as it is on mistaken grounds and a misconstrued view of the relations that bind us to the Government of China. I need hardly repeat that we regard the relation as essentially friendly and complimentary, and it is much to be regretted if a false interpretation is put upon it to neutralise its real significance. We still hope, however, that good sense will prevail, and the Chinese Government would hold the only correct and reasonable view of the relation as being merely friendly and complimentary.

Please convey our grateful thanks to your Government for all the friendly interest they have taken for us. Much as the Gurkhas value their independence above everything else, they cannot be too deeply grateful to the British Government for their good intentions to see that it is preserved intact.

[19802] No. 61.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 194.)

Sir,

Peking, April 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to enclose copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, which further illustrate the interest taken by the revolutionary Government of Szechuan in Thibet and its borders and in the expeditions from India at present engaged in surveying on the Assam frontier.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 29.)

Sir,

Chengtu, March 19, 1912.

THE native press of Chengtu has, during the past fortnight, been much occupied with affairs in Thibet and the Marches. The renewed interest thus evidenced is probably due to Huang Liu-ch'ing, whom I described in my despatch No. 24 of the 2nd instant as director of the newly established "Ch'ou-pien-ch'u," or office for frontier arrangements.

The organisation of that office is given in what purports to be an interview between Huang and a member of the staff of the semi-official journal, the "Szechuan Kung-pao," on the 4th March. The office comprises four departments ("ssu"), each of which is sub-divided into sections ("k'o") thus:—

1. Colonisation ("chih-min ssu"):

 (*a.*) Plantations ("k'en-chih k'o").
 (*b.*) Educational ("hsüo-wu k'o").
 (*c.*) Practical ("shih-yeh k'o").

2. Frontier defence ("pien-wei ssu"):

 (*a.*) Interpretation ("fan-yi k'o").
 (*b.*) Survey ("ts'e-hui k'o").
 (*c.*) Military ("chün-hsü k'o").
 (*d.*) Transport ("t'ung-yün k'o").

3. Administration ("cheng-wu ssu"):

 (*a.*) Civil and criminal ("min-hsing k'o").
 (*b.*) Taxation ("fu-shui k'o").
 (*c.*) Intelligence ("tiao-ch'a k'o").

(4.) Miscellaneous ("shu-wu ssu"):

 (*a.*) Accounts ("hui-chi k'o").
 (*b.*) Audit ("t'ung-chi k'o").
 (*c.*) Contingencies ("tsa-wu k'o").

The first action taken by the director, after thus constituting his office, was to obtain from the military government the appointment of Wu Shu-yu (not Shu-hsien) as conciliator ("hsüan-wei shih"), a post which fairly corresponds to that of a territorial taotai under the Empire. A special messenger was sent to Tachienlu with Wu's seal of office and commission. On arrival at Ch'ing-ch'i the messenger heard that Wu had returned to his home at Ching-yen (near Mei Chou, on the Min), so brought back the seal to Chengtu. Wu is regarded as being pre-eminently suited for the post of conciliator, as he is intimately acquainted with conditions in the Marches, and is trusted by the natives. Huang has accordingly sent the seal to him at his home, with a letter urging him to accept the post. It was not known on the 11th instant, says the "Tu-li Hsin-pao," whether he will consent.

Meanwhile, according to the "Kung-pao" of the 15th, the Central Government (at Nanking) has appointed Ksiung K'e-wu, "a man of ability, experience, industry, and endurance," to be agent (Ching-lüo-shih) between Szechuan and Thibet, whatever that may mean.

Hu Ying was the first choice of the Central Government. Hsiung was substituted at the suggestion of one K'ang. Chang, the new vice-president (lieutenant-governor), tells me, however, that both of these officers are now on their way viâ Ichang and Chengtu to Thibet.

Other appointments have been made from Chengtu, some of which may not be without interest to the Government of India. I would preface my translation of certain paragraphs that appeared in the "Kung-pao" of the 13th instant by remarking that officials under the new Government are spoken of indifferently by their "ming," or formal name, and by their "hao," or familiar name, with the result that two distinct individuals appear to exist where in reality there is only one:—

"*Intelligent Officer leaves for Lhassa.*—There is no detailed information of what has happened in Thibet since the rioting by the soldiery. Mr. Director Huang is greatly afraid less the Dalai Lama should be intriguing with British troops, which might cause no slight harm. He has accordingly commissioned Teng Yü-lung to go to Lhassa and report on the domestic affairs and foreign relations of the Marches and Thibet. Teng is a Chekiang man, who was at one time secretary in the amban's yamen. He is well acquainted with all the conditions in Thibet, and will fill the post to admiration.

"*Also to Tsa-yü.*—Tsa-yü is conterminous with the British territory of Assam, and is of far more importance than is Hou Tsang (Ulterior Thibet, or Shigatze), as has been earlier stated in this paper. We now hear that Mr. Director Huang has commis-

sioned Ch'en Kuei-yuan and Shu Chin-ling (Shu Chin-kuo) to proceed thither and make enquiries as a basis for effective action.

"*And to Chamdo.*—Chamdo is a place where Thibet and the Marches meet. South of it is Tsa-yü, quite close to British territory. If we want to strengthen the defences of the border, that country (Tsa-yü, or Zayul) cannot be left to be dealt with as an afterthought. Mr. Huang has sent the chief of his Intelligence section, Chou Ssu-chao (Chou Kuang-hsüan) to proceed thither and to enquire into all the affairs of the Marches. He will at the same time attend to everything relating to the forwarding of correspondence. The place (Chamdo) has been connected (with Chengtu) by telegraph, and though there is at present an interruption the proper discharge of his mission will doubtless result in the repair of the line.

"*Others to deal specially with dispatch of Correspondence.*—The Marches are vast and remote, and news is not readily transmitted. We hear that the Office for Frontier Arrangements has sent Mr. P'eng Te to Tachienlu and Mr. Hsü Cheng-ting to Ho-k'ou, specially charged with the forwarding of official correspondence. In a few days they will be packing up to take the road. Henceforth news will be promptly transmitted, and it may be safely conjectured that great acceleration will be attained.

"*Intelligence Officer to report on Practical Work.*—West of Tachienlu no large amount of land has been brought under cultivation. If those who are concerned with the affairs of the Marches do not maturely consider means for raising funds locally there will be no permanence. If they wish to raise funds locally, and do not maturely consider the perfectionment of agriculture, trade, industry, and mining, no beginning will be made. We learn that the Office for Frontier Arrangements has sent the chief of the practical section, Mr. Wang Hsin-ch'en, to enquire into all forms of practical work."

The "Tu-li Hsin-pao" of the 15th states that Wang Hsin-ch'en left Chengtu on the 6th March, Chou Kuang-hsüan and Teng Yü-lung on the 8th March, Hsü Cheng-ting on the 13th March. Of Shu Chin-kuo it remarks: "He is to start shortly for Tsa-yü, where matters are pressing, on a diplomatic mission."

References to what is doubtless the Mishmi expedition appear in other issues of the local journals. The "Tu-li" of the 3rd March contains a letter from Tachienlu chronicling the arrival there of a delegate sent from Batang in January to report to the Chengtu Government that "British troops are constantly advancing in the neighbourhood of Chi-kung and Yen-ching (Yarkalo), seven stages from Batang, and close to the Yünnan frontier."

Interviews with Huang, director of the Frontier Office, are given in the "Kung-pao" of the 4th and 11th March. He is made to say:—

"People talk only of the imminence of danger from Shigatze, which borders on India, but from Yatung and Gyangtse the road is very long to Chamdo, and we need feel no undue anxiety. What is, on the other hand, a real cause for anxiety is the country to the extreme south of Chamdo—Tsa-yü—which is adjacent to the British territory of Assam, and is distant only a dozen days' journey from Chamdo. From Tsa-yü to Chiang-ka (Gartok), again, is not more than a dozen stages. Should an Anglo-Thibetan question arise, and one (British) army proceed from Shigatze and another from Tsa-yü, the whole length and breadth of Thibet for hundreds of miles would be cut through.

"The Frontier Office is much alarmed, and as a first step troops are being sent to occupy Tsa-yü. That country is tropical, heavily wooded, with bananas everywhere. It is suited for plantation, since the banana only flourishes in tropical climates."

Asked whether the British occupation of P'ienma is not a serious menace to the Szechuan Marches, he replied:—

"There are no reliable maps of China's long line of frontier; hence constant controversies whenever a frontier question arises. It is now proposed to send a special officer ("wei-yuan") along the whole line to survey and map, not in great detail, but so as to give a general idea of it. The most important thing, however, is to get our Government to send troops to occupy strategic points; for the encroachment of foreigners on our territory is often due to the fact that we have no garrisons in evidence, and do not show the national flag. All we have to do is to station a few soldiers, and fly the flag, when foreign troops, however bold, would not venture to press forward."

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On the general situation in Thibet he is represented as saying:—

"Mongolia has proclaimed its autonomy, and I fear that the Two Tsang (Anterior and Ulterior Thibet) will not fail to follow this example. I have recently heard that the Dalai Lama has returned to Lhassa, and it is to be feared that, following on the mutiny of the troops, autonomy has been already proclaimed. The way thither is, however, long, and reliable news has not yet reached us. I have sent men to make enquiries, and they set out a few days ago.

"Their escorts went to the Government and asked for rifles, but came away empty-handed. It is now proposed to make an advance to buy back the rifles that were lost or stolen (in the Marches)."

As regards the question of arms, a letter from Chamdo, published in to-day's "Kuo-min-pao," says that the garrisons at Batang and Litang now number only a little over 2,000, and that there are accordingly now more rifles than men.

Director Huang laid stress on the necessity for improving communications. The British, he said, have a telegraph station, which is in touch with India; and any Chinese State Department desirous of getting news from Thibet has to get it by way of India. "We must," he adds, "link up Chamdo by telegraph with Lhassa, and Lhassa with Yatung, if we are to have a firm grip of affairs."

He has, in point of fact, sent the chief of his transport section, Chu Yu-wan, to set up courier stations (dak bungalows) ("yi-chan"), at every 40 *li* (say 12 miles) along the road from Chengtu to Tachienlu, twenty-two posts in all. At each post there is to be one agent ("tai-li") and two runners ("k'uai-ting"), while at Ch'iung Chou, Ya-ngan (Yachou), Ch'ing-ch'i, and Lu-ting-ch'iao there will be superintendents ("ssu-shih"). The distance will thus be covered in five days, or in the case of very urgent despatches, when the runners travel by night, in three days. Between Tachienlu and Ho-k'ou the courier service is still running, and despatches can get through in three days. From Ho-k'ou to Chamdo the telegraph line is still intact.

The native newspapers from which I am quoting have a great deal to say about the condition of affairs at Lhassa at the time of the *émeute*. Accurate information on this point will have some time since reached the Government of India from the trade agent at Gyangtse. The extracts I now translate are, however, of value as showing how the Chinese regard the situation.

"The Manchu Government employed only Manchus in Thibet, men of no knowledge, whose only object was to bully and plunder the natives. The (Thibetan) gentry and wealthier traders therefore went to reside in the treaty marts, under the protection of foreigners, and their sentiments towards the men of the inner land (China) grew daily more estranged. Moreover, Indian priests are passing to and fro in Thibet, ostensibly on business connected with their religion, but in reality as puppets of the white men, who aim to seduce the governing classes. Hence the favour of the Thibetans towards the Chinese will be harder than ever to regain."—("Kung-pao," 15th March.)

"Thibet is agitating for independence much as Outer Mongolia has done. The movement was started by the ex-Dalai Lama, whose faction is now in the ascendant. He seeks to return to Lhassa not merely as a pontiff, but, if one may judge by the facts, as King of Thibet. His policy in old days was to establish close relations with Russia, whose alliance he sought. At the present time, a certain foreigner much in his confidence, who has visited St. Petersburgh more than once by his orders, is now acting as his private secretary." (This is presumably Dorjieff, the Buriat.) "The majority of the officials sent by the Ch'ing dynasty to Thibet have been slain and the rest are scattered. The princes and chief lamas of Thibet aim at the restoration of the authority of the Dalai Lama. Thibet would be not a mere dependency on the model of Outer Mongolia, but a confederacy in alliance with Bhutan and other States on the Indian frontier, such as P'ai-li-erh and Po-cheng-ya-k'e, the peoples of which would be under the rule of Lhassa. The form of government would be a theocracy, with 'k'an-pu' (abbots) in charge of military affairs in each circuit."—(Letter from Lhassa in the "Tu-lu Hsin-pao," the 14th March.)

The "Min-kuo Pao" of the 12th contains an interview with a Chinese who left Lhassa last year, reaching Chengtu in the middle of February. His version of the riot at Lhassa (which, however, he did not himself see) is this:—

"The 'Luchün' (modern troops) had received no pay for eight months, so they rose. At the beginning of the riot the Amban Lien-yü took refuge in the P'ieh-feng

Temple, his residence was looted, and then those of the Nepaulese traders. An 'i-kuan' (barbarian official) named A-jeh-tuan was also plundered. The next day General Chung-yin calmed down the mutinous soldiery. Lien-yü handed over his seal to Chung's safe-keeping and so escaped being killed. It is reported that over 100 of the soldiers started to return home with their arms, but as the road was not open they have joined forces with the garrison of Chaya, who are Hsi-chün, and are marching on Yünnan. It is said, too, that Yünnan has sent troops to occupy Atuntzu and dispute their passage. No small number of the mutineers died on the road.

"Wang Haha, an educational officer at Lhassa, and a dozen other Chinese, made their way to India, and thence by sea to Canton, whence they have just reached Chengtu."

Asked what the Dalai Lama was doing, the traveller replied that "when he fled to India he was well treated by the British, and he and his lamas have been busy learning to speak and read English."

I may add, in conclusion, that Chang Tutu (military lieutenant-governor) verbally admitted to me to-day that Teng Yü-lung has left for Thibet and other officials for Zayul, but insisted that they were sent merely to report. He appeared to be under the belief that British troops were again occupying Lhassa. Of this I told him I have no information, but I did not think it probable that more is being done than, possibly, to strengthen the trade agent's guard at Gyangtse.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 30. Confidential.)

Sir, *Chengtu, March* 22, 1912.

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to enclose translation of a memorandum* submitted to this Government by the political officers for the affairs of the Szechuan Thibet Marches, a document published in the semi-official "Szechuan Kuanpao" of the 17th instant.

The memorandum throws considerable light on the administration, both past and future, of the Marches, more especially as regards the strength and cost of the Chinese garrisons. You will observe that the total force for which provision has to be made is only 5,000 men; but this will not, I imagine, include contingents to be stationed in Thibet (that is, west of Chamdo). Each soldier has hitherto drawn pay at the rate of 4·1 taels a-month, together with 3 pints (12½ lbs.) of rice, but it is now recommended that both pay and rations should be substantially increased. The men are in future to serve for three years only. More liberal treatment is also recommended for civil officials in the Marches, and this Government is urged to lose no time in carrying the various proposals into effect.

To ourselves, the most interesting of those proposals is the fifth:—

"The English, last winter, moved forward a force by way of Tsa-yü (Zayul). It is most urgent to dispatch an experienced political officer thither, and to select persons who can read and write English to proceed to the spot as quickly as possible, at the same time telegraphing to the Central Government to open direct negotiations with the British Government."

On the 13th instant I telegraphed to you to report that the semi-official paper of that morning had stated that Teng Yü-lung, at one time secretary to the amban, was to be be sent to Lhassa to report on the domestic and foreign affairs of Thibet, the reason for his mission being the fears entertained here of intrigues between the Dalai Lama and the British forces. Two other delegates were proceeding to Zayul on the Assam frontier. On the 15th instant you replied asking whether I could obtain official confirmation of the above report.

I answered that uncontradicted statements in more than one newspaper gave

* Not printed.

details of the names, purposes, destinations, and dates of departure of the various delegates who left Chengtu respectively on the 6th, 8th, and 13th March. I hesitated to apply to this Government for information, fearing that I should only be met with an evasive answer, while instructions would be issued to the newspaper offices to refrain from further publication of news relating to Thibet.

My immediately preceding despatch will have explained to you the reasons I have for believing in the substantial truth of the report, but the reference to "the English force moved forward last winter by way of Zayul" appeared to me to afford a good opening for obtaining some official corroboration. I accordingly wrote a brief and friendly note in Chinese to the director of the local Wai-wu Pu, drawing his attention to this paragraph, and asking whether any steps had been taken to carry into effect the recommendation of the political officers.

Mr. Yang replied last night as follows (I translate from the Chinese) :—

"The special officer ('wei-yuan') in Zayul reported to the military governor ('tutu') that a British force was moving to and fro in the country of the Mo-yü (? Mishmi) savages, two stages south-west of Zayul. As it was feared lest the tribesmen should misapprehend and trouble should ensue, an officer acquainted with the English language has been sent from the Marches to negotiate ('shang-pan').

"This matter must be brought up for discussion by the Office for Thibetan Arrangements ('Ch'ou-pien Ch'u'), and a telegram has not yet been sent to the Central Government to enter on direct negotiations.

"When it is ascertained what procedure has been decided upon, a further communication will be made."

There can therefore be no doubt that the Chengtu Government is interesting itself in the Mishmi expedition, or that it has made, and is making, preparations to enter through its agents on the frontier upon some form of discussion with the British officers concerned. I learn that an English-speaking clerk of the Post Office has recently been engaged, at what to him will be the munificent salary of 120 dollars a-month, to proceed to Thibet, and it is most probable that this appointment is also motived by the expedition.

In my last despatch I spoke of one Hu Ying as the original nominee of the Central Government for the post of "ching-lüo-shih" in Thibet. A "ching-lüo-shih" under the Ming dynasty was an officer of very high rank, whose duty it was to travel through and report on the conditions of two or more provinces. The title is now apparently being revived as a substitute for the "Ch'in-ch'ai Ta-ch'en" (Imperial commissioner, commonly styled "amban") at Lhassa. In other words, Hu Ying was to succeed Lien-yü as Chinese resident in Thibet. He is a Hunan man, who, as a member of the "ko-ming-tang," or revolutionary party, was arrested by the late Chang Chih-tung, Governor-General of the Hukuang, and kept in gaol at Wuchang until the successful rising of last October. Against his appointment K'ang, a Szechuan man, protested, and pressed the claims of his fellow provincial, Hsiung K'e-wu, a member of the council ("ts'an-yi-yuan") of the Central Government. As I have reported, both men, Hu Ying and Hsiung K'e-wu, are believed to be on their way from Wuchang to Chengtu, and it is probable that while one of them will be the resident, the other will act as commander-in-chief of the Chinese forces in Thibet.

Whether they, or the delegates of lesser rank that have been sent westward from Chengtu, will get through to Batang, or, having got so far, will safely attain to Lhassa and the Indian frontier is not yet certain. There seems to be no doubt that the tribesmen and their lamas are up in arms. The letters from Catholic missionaries at Tachienlu, of which I enclose copies (these were courteously placed at my disposal by my French colleague), describe the capture of Hsiangch'eng by the Thibetans on the 9th February and the attempt on the part of the Ming Cheng-Ssu (the native chief of Chala, the State of which Tachienlu is the capital) to stir up a general revolt throughout the Marches. Their accounts are confirmed by Chinese letters from Batang and Tachienlu, describing the summary execution of the "t'u-ssu's" brother, Kia-mu-ra-so-kya, and the flight to Batang, in the guise of a beggar, of the Chinese commandant at Hsiangch'eng. The "Kungpao" of yesterday learns that the troops at Tachienlu are falling back on Yachou, that the "t'u-ssu" (chieftains) of Litang and elsewhere are taking the opportunity to rebel, and that at Batang and Yarkalo mission property has been destroyed. The editor remarks that British soldiers are in the neighbourhood of Zayul, and fears that, if the news is

true of these disorders in the Marches, the British will make a pretext of the destruction of mission buildings to invade the country. In that case, what will, he says, become of the work of centuries through territory hundreds of miles in extent?

You will observe that Mgr. Giraudeau, Catholic bishop at Tachienlu, on the authority of Père Desgodins, seems to cherish very similar suspicions of the motives of the Abor and Mishmi expeditions, though his subordinate at Batang had informed him that "les Anglais aux portes de Zayul semblent se contenter de garder leur frontière, et s'amusent à construire des routes."

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

[19838] No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 10.)

Sir, *India Office, May 8, 1912.*

IN continuation of my letter dated the 15th April, 1912, as to the recognition of the Chinese Republic, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 29th April on the subject, and to enclose the draft of a telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to address to the Government of India in reply.*

With reference to Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 100, dated the 12th April, 1912, copy of which was communicated to this Office on the 24th idem, I am to explain that the phrase "autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty," as used in my letter of the 2nd April, did not imply that any new claim to Thibetan independence was put forward, but had reference merely to the maintenance of a *bonâ fide* Thibetan administration in accordance with the principle recognised by Anglo-Chinese treaty stipulations. Lord Crewe concurs entirely in Sir J. Jordan's view that our demand should be restricted to the effective preservation of the *status quo* under treaty. His Lordship would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that Sir J. Jordan might now be authorised to proceed in the manner proposed in the last sentence of his telegram of the 12th April.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[20101] No. 63.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, May 12, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 12th May.

I venture to think that we should encourage Nepalese to take measures for restoration of order at Lhassa and the surrender of Chinese garrison, which should, if possible, be sent back through India, and not by way of Szechuan, where Thibet is engaging some attention.

(Sent to India.)

[20409] No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 11th and 12th May, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, May 13, 1912.

* Draft of telegram.

Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 11, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday's date, I have received by telegraph the following report, dated the 10th instant, from the trade agent, Gyantse :—

" A letter dated Shigatse, 8th May, from the Prime Minister to the Tashi Lama reached me yesterday evening. The following is its purport :—

" ' By the Tashi Lama's order I leave to-day for Lhassa, where I am instructed to negotiate a treaty between the Thibetans and Chinese. If, by the exercise of the influence of yourself and the Nepalese representative at Lhassa, the contending parties could be induced to come to terms, many lives would be saved. If, however, treaty stipulations preclude you proceeding to the Thibetan capital, I trust that you will assist in every possible way.'

" In veiled language the Prime Minister proceeds to request information respecting the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Thibet, the intentions of the Dalai Lama, and the state of affairs at present prevailing in China. A connected narrative of events will be telegraphed to you this afternoon ; it appears from the latest trustworthy reports that, by degrees, the Chinese soldiers are being forced back eastwards out of Lhassa, although several houses round the Mahommedan mosque and gardens on the east of the city are still held by them. The place is indicated on the plan at p. 342 of Perceval Landon's ' Lhassa.' When the fighting commenced the soldiers rebelled against Tung Tung Ling, the acting amban, and many excesses were committed by them. It is stated that an elected republican council of twelve persons, with little power, is the only authority now recognised by them. Through fear of reprisals and excesses they dare not surrender. It is stated by the Nepalese representative that until his departure a month ago he endeavoured to mediate. Since he left, Haji Ghulam Muhammad, the principal Ladakhi trader, who is practically a prisoner of the Chinese in the mosque, has been the only go-between. The Nepalese representative at Gyantse, Lal Bahadur, expects that orders to proceed to Lhassa will shortly reach him."

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 12, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram of yesterday.

An official representation has been made by the Prime Minister of Nepal to the resident that the present anarchy is causing suffering to the Nepalese in Thibet, whose lives and property are endangered. His proposal is that strong representations shall be made to the Dalai Lama, and to the Chinese and Thibetan authorities at Lhassa ; and, in the event of these failing, that military force shall be employed. He has solicited our advice, in accordance with the standing agreement. The reply we have sent is that representations to the Chinese at Lhassa would be useless, as their present position is one of helplessness, but that the suggested communication by the Nepalese Government to the Thibetan authorities should be made. We have added that the Nepalese representative, who now awaits orders at Gyantse, shoul d be instructed to return without delay to Lhassa, and to spare no effort to mediate between the antagonists with the object of bringing the fighting to an end, and of securing the withdrawal of Chinese from Thibet in safety. We have at the same time sent instructions to the political officer, Sikkim, to make similar representations to the Dalai Lama and the Regent of Thibet, directing the latter's attention to his responsibility for Nepalese and other aliens, as regards their lives and their property.

[20423] No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th May, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, May 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 10, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to my telegram, dated 30th April.

The following communication, dated 9th May, has been received by telegraph from the political officer, Sikkim :—

" Under date, Lhassa, the 18th April, a letter has been received from the Thibetan Government, reporting that in view of the difficulty experienced by Thibetan soldiers in forcing the Chinese quickly to evacuate their strong positions, slower measures are being adopted. An offer has been made by the amban that the Chinese troops, if allowed to retain their arms, should retire viâ Eastern Thibet to China. The Thibetans, however, insisted on their surrendering their arms and returning to their country through India. It is also reported that certain Chinese subjects who were born in Thibet have surrendered to the Thibetan Government, and asked for their protection."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[20555] No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 25th April, 1912, relative to Thibet.

Inda Office, May 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

Sir, *Camp viâ Gangtok, April* 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter, dated the 8th instant, regarding the fighting between the Chinese and Thibetans at Lhassa.

2. The Dalai Lama's Chief Ministers at Kalimpong have received a further report from Lhassa. The report was dated the 17th of the 2nd month (3rd April, 1912). It states that the Chinese re-attacked the Se-ra monastery on the 24th March last and continued the attack till the 26th idem.

3. On the 26th the Chinese gained an entrance into the gate of the Se-ra monastery, when ten monks rushed out with swords to defend it. The Chinese had to retire after killing four out of the ten monks.

4. The total casualties on both sides are said to be heavy, but the actual number has not been mentioned. However, the Thibetans claim the victory.

5. When the Chinese troops were returning to Lhassa they were again attacked by the Thibetans, who were now assisted by the merchants and shopkeepers, in the streets, and several Chinese were killed.

6. Reinforcements for the Thibetans have already arrived near Lhassa from Lho-ka, Kong-bu, and Yang-pa-chen.

7. The report further says that Len Amban is now occupying the house of Yap-shi, the relatives of the present Dalai Lama. This house is near the amban's own residence. Thibetan soldiers have already occupied the houses of Shape San-druk Po-trang, Lon-chen Sho-Kang, and other officials, who are now with the Dalai Lama in Kalimpong. It is said that the Thibetans killed the Chinese soldiers who were occupying those houses.

8. Len Amban, General Chung, and Ho Da-rin sent the Nepalese agent at Lhassa and the chief man among the Mahommedan residents there to the Regent, asking him to prevent the Thibetan troops from attacking the Chinese, and promising that they would conclude a treaty with the Thibetans. The Regent, the four Shapes (Ministers), and the National Assembly replied that, if the Chinese surrender their arms and ammunition and returned to China, the Thibetans would pay their travelling expenses.

9. The report concludes by saying that the Thibetan Government in Lhassa is now negotiating with the Chinese for the return of the Chinese to China, but if the Chinese refuse to leave Thibet the Thibetans will fight to the end.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,

Political Officer in Sikkim.

[20650] No. 67.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 196.)

Sir, *Peking, April 27, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 156 of the 31st March last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith various documents, as marked in the margin, which give evidence of the growing intention of the Republican Government to make good its claim to the possession of Thibet.

The telegram from the military governors of Szechuan, which forms Enclosure 1, shows an eagerness on the part of the province which has always been a potent factor in moulding Thibetan policy to make every sacrifice in its power to retain the Western dependency. It is pointed out that Thibet has a powerful neighbour whose presence is regarded as an ever-increasing peril, and that the maintenance of a military force is the first essential for its safety. The general in command of the Chinese troops in Thibet, whose number is given as 2,000, had telegraphed to the Provincial Government that his men had received no pay for months, and that further delay would result in their desertion. Szechuan, like all the other provinces, was paying its own forces with military notes, and was unable to send the required sum in cash to Lhasa. The military governor therefore suggested to the President that he should remit a sum of 100,000 taels through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to Gyangtze for transmission to Lhasa. The President appears to have made a serious attempt to give effect to this suggestion, but abandoned it on finding that the Government of India, in replying to an application from the bank, stated that they could give no assistance beyond the Indian frontier.

The knowledge, however, that Szechuan was prepared to support the policy of the Government in converting Thibet into a province of China has evoked two presidential orders on the subject. They both have the ring of unreality which is associated with most of these platitudinous utterances. In the first, Yuan Shih-kai, following the precedent set by the late Empress Dowager for healing the breaches between Manchus and Chinese, advocates intermarriage as a bond to link the five races of the republic into one family. The proposal is too grotesque even for a Chinese presidential message. That a people who have from time immemorial generally limited their marriage alliances to their native province should suddenly be moved by a presidential mandate to enter into such relations with the despised tribes of Mongolia and Thibet will probably be considered too great a sacrifice to expect for the doubtful blessings of Republican Government.

The second order, if made effective, is one of far-reaching importance. It abolishes all the old machinery for the government of "dependencies," and states frankly that Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan are in future to be treated as provinces of China proper. For this purpose all matters pertaining to their administration are to be transferred from the Ministry of the Dependencies to the Ministry of the

Interior, and the republic has now a unified dominion greater, at least on paper, than the Empire ever was.

So far as Thibet is concerned all these arrangements show a complete disregard for the political status of the country as exemplified by treaty arrangements and guaranteed by the assurances of the late Imperial Government. The fact that Thibet has signed treaties with us might at least have made the Chinese anticipate a possible protest against its summary absorption, and it is hard to see how their present action can be reconciled with the definite statement of the late Government that there was no intention of altering the political *status quo*.

It is quite possible that the province of Szechuan may make some attempt to restore by force the shattered reputation of China in Thibet, but it is very unlikely that the Central Government, whose only hope for the pacification of China proper depends upon the complaisance of foreign financiers, will embark at present upon such a distant and costly enterprise.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Translation of a Telegram from Yin Ch'ang-heng and Chang P'ei-chüeh, Tu-tus of Szechuan, to Yuan Shih-k'ai, Li Yuan-hung, &c.

April 5, 1912 [*? date*].

THIBET is a buttress on a national frontier—the hand, as it were, which protects the face—and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China. Now, after the railway disturbances in Szechuan last September Republican troops sprang up everywhere, communications were interrupted and all news of Thibet cut off. In December, after the province had come over to us, the acting warden of the marches under the late dynasty, Fu Hua-feng, came to the rescue of Chao Erh-feng at the head of a large army, and it was only after a terrific struggle that we at last brought him to his knees.

We now have further news, for we have received a report from Thibet to the effect that on the 13th November last the troops in Lhasa revolted and thoroughly looted the place, while Lien Yü fled for his life. Now Thibet is of enormous extent, and unless there is someone to restore order in the country the consequences will be most serious. At the time of the *émeute* no Central Government had as yet been established, and the situation in Szechuan itself was so serious that we had no time to think of other matters; but now that Szechuan is somewhat more peaceful we have established an "Office for Frontier Arrangements," with a special official in charge of frontier matters. We have also appointed Wu Chia-mo as conciliator of the marches, and he will cross the frontier in a few days with troops to restore peace (in the marches).

There is a desperate shortage of funds here in Szuchuan, and it is almost impossible to take thought for other places as well, but owing to the importance of the frontier we dare not but strain every nerve to do whatever may be necessary. Thibet, it must be remembered, has a powerful neighbour, and the foreign peril draws rapidly closer and becomes more urgent. At present, too, since the revolt of the troops, the country is left defenceless, and the people are in a constant state of terror and alarm, Unless something is done, and that at once, unless strenuous measures are taken to put matters straight, it will be impossible to gauge the consequences. But for the defence of Thibet the first essential is a military force, and for the maintenance of a large army pay and other necessaries must first be provided. In this respect we recently received a very urgent letter from General Chung Ying, commander-in-chief of the army in Thibet under the late dynasty, and interim resident in Thibet. He said that the troops in Thibet numbered about 2,000, that they had had no provisions nor pay for some months, and that if there were any further delay they would all desert and get out of control. This message put us on the horns of a dilemma, for the troops in Szechuan at present are all paid in military notes, which are not current on the frontier, while if by a tremendous effort the total amount was raised in ready cash, the distance from Chengtu to Lhasa is over 2,000 miles, and at the very earliest the money could not reach its destination in less than 100 days, and that we fear would be too late to avert the crisis. Under the circumstances we have no option but to telegraph to you (Yuan Shih-kai) imploring you to take pity on the Western

dependency, and order the Ministry of Finance to hand over to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank the sum of 100,000 taels to be transferred by telegraph to Gyangtse, or transmission to General Chung Ying at Lhasa, that he may distribute it, and so perhaps secure the loyalty of the troops and the safety of our national territory. If this opportunity is lost, the troops will revolt and the results will be terrible. If necessary Szechuan will be responsible for this sum, and immediately we receive your reply (saying the money has been sent) we will set to work to find some means of repaying it in full.

Another thing we would mention is that during the mutiny of the troops in Thibet it was entirely due to the confidence of the soldiers in Chung Ying, who took prompt measures in the face of deadly peril, that order was gradually restored and the danger averted. Fearing under these circumstances that a change of officer would involve a long delay, and that difficulties would arise from the new man's ignorance of local circumstances, it has been proposed that Yin Ch'ang-heng (one of the writers) should temporarily appoint Chung Ying as administrator of Thibet, so as to gain the benefit of his experience, and at the same time save delay. We have the honour to ask you to decide whether or not he shall be given new letters of commission. These are matters of the first importance. Hoping for an early reply.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

Presidential Order in "Gazette" of April 13, 1912.

(Translation.)

Intermarriage among the Five Races.

NOW that the constitution of China has been changed, and the five races have been united to form a new State, all distinctions between them must be removed, and the ties of affection daily drawn tighter. In former times voluntary intermarriage between Chinese and Manchu, Chinese and Mongol was strictly forbidden, while Mohammedans and Thibetans but rarely intermarry with Chinese stock. Of recent years various proposals have been put forward to do away with these old restrictions and abolish this ancient practice; but notifications are disregarded, and exhortations treated with suspicion and disobeyed. With the foundation of democratic union the five races are now one family; but if this or that distinction is allowed to stand in the way of intermarriage, there will be too many obstacles to allow of uniformity and the promotion of fellowship. Wherefore the five races—Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Mahommedan, and Thibetan—are hereby exhorted each to intermarry freely with the other, firstly, in order to do away with the tradition of racial distinction; and, secondly, in order to cultivate affection. All customs which really hinder intermarriage, such as footbinding, &c., should first and foremost be abolished. It is the will of the President that the gentry and elders of the five races should weary themselves with their exhortations, that they should strive heart and soul to promote intermarriage, themselves setting an example for others to follow, that our nation may rid itself of its old prejudices, that good-will may be revived, the union consolidated, and our five races joined by a bond of love and sympathy such as never existed before.

All local and other authorities concerned with the internal administration must forthwith issue proclamations exhorting the people, so that all may know that it is the earnest desire of the President to cultivate (among the five races) a sentiment of brotherhood, and to grant all alike the benefits accruing from a wise government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 67.

Presidential Order, dated April 21, 1912.

NOW that the five races are joined in democratic union, the lands comprised within the confines of Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan all become a part of the territory of the Republic of China, and the races inhabiting these lands are all equally citizens of the Republic of China. The term "dependencies," as used under the monarchy, must therefore cease to be used, and henceforth as regards Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan a complete scheme must be devised to arrive at a unified system of administration, and so promote unity in general among all races of the

Republic. The reason why the Republican Government did not create a special Ministry to deal with dependencies was that Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan are regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper. For the future all administrative matters in connection with these territories will come within the sphere of internal administration. Now that the establishment of a single united Government is an accomplished fact, let all matters formerly dealt with by the Ministry of Dependencies be forthwith transferred to the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and all matters which belong to the province of other Ministries be handed over to the Ministries respectively concerned. Until the local politics have all been brought into harmony all matters in Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan should be dealt with in accordance with existing procedure.

[20906] No. 68.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th May, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, May 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 15, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram dated 12th instant regarding Thibet. Reports have been received from trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung, of which substance is to following effect :—

There are in Lhassa the following separate parties of Chinese soldiers :—

1. Sixty men comprising ex-Amban Len's escort ;
2. Acting amban's men numbering 130 ;
3. Independent republican troops to the number of some 800 or 900.

Chinese are revictualling by plundering inhabitants, the population of the city, which is estimated at 100,000, being unable to leave the town. But main obstacles in the way of settlement are, trade agent, Gyantse, understands, Thibetan's desire to obtain rifles, which Chinese are unwilling to surrender, and Chinese troops' apprehension as to treatment of force if they are unarmed, and as to their fate in China should they return without their arms.

According, however, to report by trade agent, Yatung, desire for permission to return viâ India to China with remaining Chinese troops has been signified by General Chung King and Amban Len, and Regent has been approached by them with request for his mediation in coming to a settlement with Thibetans on an amicable basis. They are ready to surrender arms and ammunition if travelling expenses are given them, and if no molestation is offered them *en route*. Matter has been referred to Dalai Lama by Thibetan authorities, whom Regent sounded on the subject.

Thibetans are bombarding monastery of Ting-ye-Ling, whose monks have taken Chinese side, and which is held by a Chinese force. One-fifth of monks of monastery have been killed. Thibetans attacked small detachment of Chinese troops, which was holding Yutok Bridge at Lhassa, and communications have now been cut off by them between Chinese in monastery and main Chinese body. A thousand additional Thibetan troops from Kongbu, in Kham, reached Lhassa on the 9th instant.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[20977] No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th May, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, May 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 16, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated the 15th instant regarding Thibet.

Following is purport of further reports which have reached us:—

A message with letters to Dalai Lama was sent from Lhassa by Thibetan commander on the 10th May. It is stated by messenger that the Sera and Ganden monks are not willing, on any terms, to make peace, and that fighting has taken place every night since hostilities were resumed on the 6th instant on the breakdown of negotiations. There are said to be between 600 and 800 Chinese troops now at Lhassa, with six maxims and one cannon. But their ammunition and supplies are stated to be running short, and it is reported that they are reserving rifle cartridges for emergencies and firing empty cartridges out of prong guns in order to husband their ammunition supplies. Only 200 Thibetans have been killed according to messenger. Strength of Thibetan armed men is approximately 20,000, and there are stated to be twice that number of reinforcements from Popas. If Chinese will not agree to terms Thibetans are resolved to exterminate them and their families; they have captured 1,000 modern rifles. Upper portion of Ten-ye-Ling monastery has been damaged by Thibetans who are using captured field-guns against it. Total demolition of the monastery has been decided upon by Thibetan National Assembly. Monks from monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden are reported to be guarding house near Lhassa cathedral from which Thibetans have driven Chinese troops.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[21189] No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th May, regarding Thibet affairs.

India Office, May 17, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 17, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram dated the 15th instant.

Following is purport of further reports that have reached us:—

Orders have been sent to Gyantse Jongpen by Thibetan commander at Lhassa to prevent monks of Teng-ye-Ling monastery being provided with supplies. Trade

agent, Gyantse, had had a visit from high officer of Tashi Lama, by whom he was informed that instructions to proceed to Lhassa at once in order to mediate between Thibetans and Chinese, are being given to chief Minister of the Tashi Lama; 200 Chinese soldiers who had proceeded two months ago from Lhassa to Kong-bu, are reported to have been killed by Thibetans at the latter place.

[17790] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 173.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 20, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from the India Office enclosing copies of correspondence with the Government of India relative to the situation created in Central Asia by the recent aggressive policy of the local Russian officials, and suggesting that the proceedings of Captain Kolbine, the officer in command of the Russian post at Tashkurghan, should be officially brought to the notice of the Russian Government.*

You will observe that the Government of India attach considerable importance to the claims of the Mir of Hunza in Raskam and the Taghdumbash Pamir, which are, in their opinion, threatened by the present attitude of the Russian frontier officials. The moment, however, does not appear to me opportune for making further complaints against the action of officers of the Russian Government, and, in view of the more favourable reports which have recently been received from His Majesty's consul-general at Kashgar as to the conciliatory attitude of the Russian consul-general and the assistance which has been rendered to British subjects by the Russian consular officers in Ili and Urumtchi during the revolutionary disturbances of the past few months, I am unwilling to make representations to the Russian Government on the subject in such definite terms as those suggested in the enclosed letter. The matter has therefore been discussed verbally with the India Office, and, as a result of the discussion, I request that you will take a suitable opportunity to express to the Russian Government the gratitude of His Majesty's Government for the assistance which has been rendered to their representative at Kashgar, and to add an informal statement of British policy in Sarikol, emphasising the paramount importance of maintaining the relative positions of Russia and England in Central Asia, and explaining that, while entertaining no aggressive designs whatever in Sarikol or elsewhere in Chinese Turkestan, His Majesty's Government continue to support the long-standing claims of the Mir of Hunza to cultivation rights in Raskam, as well as his claims to a share of the revenues of the Taghdumbash Pamir.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21796] No. 72.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 211.)

Sir, *Peking, May* 4, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu on the subject of the Thibetan marches, and the claim of China to the country inhabited by the Lo-yü tribes.

These tribes are probably those referred to in the Memorandum by the General Staff Branch (see enclosure in letter from the Government of Burmah to the Government of India of the 4th November, 1911), on the points which should be brought to the notice of survey parties working in the tribal territory on the Assam–Thibet border in 1911–12, paragraph 5 (2), which reads: "North of the Mishmi country is said to be Lhoyul, whose people (the Lhobas) are a race similar to the Mishmis, but having a slightly different language."

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

* No. 54.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Chengtu, April* 5, 1912.

THE Chengtu native press continues to publish articles on the situation in Thibet and the marches, some of which would seem to be worthy of note. Of particular interest is the account given in the semi-official "Kung Pao," of the 31st March and of the 1st April, of the acquisition of Pomed (Bomi), and the consequent claim of China to the possession of the country of the savages known to them as Lo-yü, and to us (as I suspect), as the Abors and Mishmis.

The original Chinese garrison in Thibet, says the writer, consisted of some 600 chih-ping (gendarmes), stationed at Lhassa, Shigatse, Tingjih, and Gyangtse. In consequence of the many abuses perpetrated by these men they were replaced in 1909 by a body of 1,700 Szechuan troops, comprising one piao (regiment of about 1,000) of infantry, one ying (battalion of 350 or so) of cavalry, and one tui (or battery) of mountain guns. Last year, one ying of native (Thibetan) infantry, and one ying (in this case, "squadron") of native cavalry were formed. The whole force was distributed at Lhassa, Gyangtse, Gyangda, and Kungpu (between Chamdo and Lhassa).

The writer goes on to speak of the native State of Pomed. When in the 18th century the celebrated Yo Wei-ching (the conqueror of Nepaul) was fighting in Thibet, a detachment of his soldiers lost their way in this country (Pomed), and were prevented from returning by heavy snows. They intermarried with native women, and became the progenitors of a tribe, which in the T'ung-chih period of the late Ch'ing Dynasty (1862–1874), and again in 1900 and 1901, acknowledged allegiance to China. The tribe subsequently revolted, and for some years past has been harrying its neighbours, in particular Kungpu.

When the Szechuan troops entered Thibet, as described above, the third battalion was stationed at Kungpu. Its commandant, Ch'en Chü-chen (see my despatch No. 77 of the 5th November last), a man keen on pioneer work, proposed to invade Pomed. Lien-yü, the amban at Lhassa, sent Lieutenant-General Chung-yin with a force, but his expedition failed, owing to the precipitous nature of the country. Several battalions were then sent in to attack by various routes; this time with success. The enemy's spirit has been broken, and for many months now the tribe has kept the peace. The climate, adds the writer, is warm, and natural products are many. With steady effort wealth and population should daily increase. In Pai-ma-kang, the northern district, rice grows, and would supply a conspicuous need in the marches.

To the south of Pomed, and to the west of Zayul, which last forms part of the marches, is the country of the Lo-yü. These people fear the tribesmen of Pomed, and have been paying to them a yearly tribute. At two localities in the Lo-yü country the Pomed chieftain stationed officers to control them. "Now that Pomed has submitted to our country" (China) "and has become a possession of ours, there cannot be the least doubt that Lo-yü belongs to us. We hear, however, that 200 or 300 men of a certain country" (India) "are moving about on the borders of Lo-yü, taking advantage of our troubles to peer and pry. Our rulers ought to ask for an explanation; for otherwise the savages in their ignorance may easily become suspicious, and some harm may result to the foreign relations of our republic."

The writer then speaks of the troubles at Lhassa last November, in which, it now appears, the mountain battery that had returned victorious from Pomed, took an important part. November 15 is given as the date on which the mutineers imprisoned Lien-yü, and November 21 the date on which, through Chung-yin's intervention, they released him. "The proceeding was unintelligent," remarks the author, whose sympathies are plainly not with Lien-yü.

The troops at that time at Lhassa were, besides the artillery, the amban's bodyguard, and the first and second battalions; the main body was still in Pomed, and there were details at Gyangtse. In Pomed it was reported that the amban was dead, and the expeditionary force hurried back to Lhassa. According to telegrams from Ch'angtu (Chamdo) at the beginning of January, all was quiet in Thibet. Lien-yü had handed over charge to Chung-yin, as amban, *ad interim*, and was living at an inn kept by a Nepaulese.

The "Kuo-min Pao" of the 1st April gives further details of the fall of Hsiangcheng. The tribesmen rose last January, burnt the Yamên, looted the treasury, and flayed alive the Chinese farmers and their families without distinction

of age or sex, to the number of 160 or 170. On the 25th February the Batang garrison proceeded to attack them, whereupon the tribesmen abandoned the hills and took to the jungle. The following day a non-commissioned officer with thirty-eight men and three or four civilians, while searching the mountain gulleys, fell in with a large body of natives, and was killed. Eighteen Chinese soldiers, bringing up supplies from Kung-ka-ling (on the Kinsha, or Upper Yang-tsze, below Batang), were literally cut to pieces.

At Yenching (Yarkale), Tehjung (see my despatch No. 69 of the 25th October), Draya, and Chamdo, trouble is brewing, and these places, says the journal, seem about to follow the lead of Hsiangcheng. The villages in Pa-ngan district (Batang), are said to be manufacturing powder and shot. "If they rise, not a Chinese soul in those parts will be left alive."

Wu Shu-yu, who was appointed by the Chengtu Government to take, under the title of hsüan-wei-shih (conciliator), the place of the warden of the marches, has had an interview with Chang, the assistant military governor, says the "T'ien-min (formerly the "Tu-li") Pao," of the 1st April. He persists in declining the appointment, stating, somewhat naively, that ten days after he left Tachienlu the natives rose. He objects, moreover, to the restoration of his seal and authority to the Ming-cheng-ssu (the native Chief of Tachienlu), whose State lies across the main route into Thibet. He, himself, pleads age and ill-health as an excuse to retire. (I learn from M. Kérihuel, who knows him well, that Wu Shu-yu has the appearance of a man broken and prematurely old.) According to the "Kuo-min Pao," of the 3rd April, Tachienlu is to be renamed K'ang-ngan Hsien, and Wu Shu-yu is to be appointed its magistrate (hsien chih-shih).

The Ming-cheng-ssu is believed, says the "Kung-Pao" of the 3rd April, to be now in Chantui with some thousands of disaffected tribesmen. The Chief of Tan-shu has moved the "Chinese Lands Delegates," of Meng-kung T'ing, to arbitrate. These last have sent express messengers to Tachienlu to stay military operations while they go and treat with the insurgents.

Meanwhile, Hsiung K'e-wu, who (as I reported in my despatch No. 30 of the 22nd ultimo) has been appointed to be ching-lüo-shih (or, as we may conveniently translate it, resident), in Thibet by the Central Government, is said to be on his way from Ichang with one chen (division, of 10,000 men), some 6,000 or 7,000 of whom are Cantonese, and the rest Szechuanese, who were engaged (out of Ch'uan-Han Railway funds) at Shanghae, to take part in the now unnecessary northern expedition. Hsiung is a fellow townsman of Wu Shu-yu, that is, he is a native of Ching-yen district in Mei Chou; and it is believed that the Chungking people desire him to take the place of chen-fu-fu (protector) of that city, just vacated by Hsia Chih-shih. That place, however, is to be filled, under order of the Chengtu Government, by Hu Ching-i, who is now on his way thither, accompanied by an army division.

Assuming that these statements are true, it remains to be seen whether Hsiung's large escort is designed to make good his pretensions to the protectorship at Chungking, or to enable him to settle affairs in Thibet and the marches.

(Copy sent to India.)

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

[21879] No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 16th May, 1912, on the subject of Nepalese intervention in Thibet.

India Office, May 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 73.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 16, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to my telegram dated the 12th May from His Majesty's Minister, Peking, and to your telegram of same date.

I should be glad to have your views as to whether Nepal should be encouraged to intervene. The present seems an opportune moment, and action on part of Nepal might pave the way to local settlement of Thibetan question on satisfactory lines, risk of Chinese reconquest being thus avoided.

[21900] No 74.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st May, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, May 22, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 21, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to my telegram dated the 17th instant. Following is substance of further reports received :—

Conclusion of an agreement by Tawang and Tsona districts to assist Thibetans to drive Chinese out of Thibet, and the despatch of militia to Lhassa by those districts, are reported by Thibetan deputation which arrived at Kalimpong from Tsona, north-east of Bhutan, on the 14th instant. It is reported by Thibetan Ministers at Kalimpong that the Potala, where all principal Thibetan officials are, has been shelled by Chinese without serious damage being done, and that mansions of the Palha and Karmashr Thibetan nobility were burnt down by Chinese. Deputation of monks from Ganden and Sera are strongly urging Dalai Lama to return immediately to Thibet, as great difficulty in controlling monks is being experienced by heads of monasteries all over the country. No definite reply has been given by the Dalai Lama, but orders are said to have been sent to officials between Yatung and Lhassa to keep supplies ready for Lama's return shortly to Thibet, to repair roads, and to send Lama's ponies, mules, and tents to Phari. Trade agent, Gyantse, has been told by Chief Minister of Tashi Lama that latter was returning to Shigatse, as he had been informed that it would be useless for him to make any attempt to mediate at present.

A Thibetan official who left Lhassa on the 18th instant is now awaiting orders at Gyantse as to whether he should go on to visit Dalai Lama at Kalimpong. According to statement of this official, Chinese are already reduced to eating dead transport animals, and will not be able to hold out beyond the end of May. Thibetans have surrounded Chinese on all sides, and, by occupying both banks of Kyi and Chu and islands in midst of stream, which cannot at present time be forded anywhere, have cut off any possibility of retreat on part of Chinese. A report has been received from Lhassa representative of Nepalese Government, now at Gyantse, to the effect that endeavours have been made by Chinese to obtain stocks of Martini ammunition, which is maintained for use of escort, from the representative's office in Lhassa. Instructions not to comply with any such request have been given by representative to his people; but he fears that the ammunition, which is not of large quantity, may possibly be seized by the Chinese if they are hard pressed.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[19838] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 22, 1912.

RECOGNITION of China and Thibet.

You are authorised to proceed in manner proposed in the last sentence of your telegram No. 100 of 12th April. You should report in due time the form of assurance which the Chinese Government are prepared to give in regard to the effective preservation of the *status quo* in Thibet under treaty.

[22190] No. 76.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy dated the 24th May relative to affairs in Thibet.

India Office, May 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 24, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 21st instant regarding Thibet. Following is purport of further information received :—

British trade agent, Yatung, has received letter from Ministers of Dalai Lama intimating intention of Lama to leave for Thibet shortly and his desire to halt for five days at the agency. Road from Yatung to Lhassa has been repaired, and supplies and transport have been got ready all along the route. Thibetan troops have been posted to Langram, near Jelap-la, in order to prevent return of Chinese soldiers to Thibet. It is credibly reported that Chinese delegate (?) in southern part of the city, with 60 soldiers, is now in occupation of Kunsangtse, and that Len Amban, with 30 soldiers, occupies Horkang; 60 Chinese soldiers are besieged by Thibetans in monastery near old Chinese cantonment; 100 Chinese soldiers have been expelled by Thibetans from Nyarong in Eastern Thibet, which Thibetans have formally reoccupied. In reply to communications made to him, Dalai Lama states that Chinese will not agree to surrender their arms, though they have been repeatedly told that, if they do so, transport will be supplied to them and they will be sent back to China in safety. He also said that National Assembly had asked him on several occasions to request that British Government would mediate between Chinese and Thibetans, but that, as he had been informed by British Government that they could not interfere between the two, he could not give effect to National Assembly's desire. Request is now made by Lama that British trade agent may be instructed to depute some one to see that arms are surrendered to Thibetans by Chinese, and that the latter quit Thibet. Nepal Durbar have instructed their representative to go back to Lhassa at once, but doubt as to representative's mediation being welcomed is expressed by Prime Minister.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[22220] No. 77.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, May 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 84 of 22nd May : Thibet.

I spoke to Foreign Minister to-day in the sense of your instructions.

He expressed the hope that we would not follow the example of Russia by placing obstacles in the path of the new Government, and foresaw the difficulty in giving any assurance which might evoke criticism in the National Assembly. He promised to report to the President and let me know what arrangement could be made.

As all Chinese authority in Thibet has now practically ceased, it occurs to me that an assurance to maintain *status quo* under treaty might possibly be used by Chinese as a justification for recovering their suzerainty by force of arms. Would it not be advisable to stipulate, if possible, that they should not undertake military measures against Thibet without previous consultation with us, and that a renunciation of their claims over Nepal and Bhutan should be included in the arrangement ?

(Sent to India.)

[19838] No. 78.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant, relative to the conditions to be attached to the recognition of the Chinese Republic by His Majesty's Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he concurs in the terms of the proposed telegram to the Viceroy of India.

I am further to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* instructing him to proceed in the manner proposed in the last sentence of his telegram No. 100 of the 12th April.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[22931] No. 79.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 24th and 26th May, 1912, relative to affairs in Thibet.

India Office, May 29, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 24, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated 16th instant. Remnant of Chinese at Lhassa will shortly, as is indicated by recent reports, either surrender or will be annihilated in the event of the failure of our attempts at mediation. The opportunity has thus passed by for Nepal to intervene effectively for benefit of Thibet and with latter's concurrence. Thibetans would now regard such intervention as an act of

* No. 75.

hostility. We are of opinion, therefore, that Thibetans should be left to keep Chinese out and consolidate their own position at Lhassa, and that it is now undesirable that Nepal should intervene. We should be justified in using extreme pressure on China, and in inviting Russia to help us, to secure this end. Our good offices in promoting mediation—while refusing to countenance intervention on the part of Nepal—might be intimated to China at the same time, and we might warn her that Nepalese intervention would probably be inevitable if Chinese troops reappear in Thibet. There are 117 guns and 35,000 efficient troops in the Nepalese army.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 26, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated the 24th instant regarding Thibet. Following telegram dated the 25th instant received from trade agent, Yatung :—

"Following information was given me by a messenger who reached Yatung yesterday, having left Lhassa on the 19th instant:—Two Nepalese and Ladakhi headmen were sent on the 17th and 18th instant by Len Amban and the Chinese general to the general officer commanding at Lhassa, Chansa-nang-gang, with request that, as Chinese soldiers have decided to surrender arms and ammunition to Thibetans against payment and then return to China, negotiations might be re-opened. Chansa-nang-gang has answered that he is quite agreeable to meet the Chinese soldiers' wishes, but has demanded that the property looted by them should be restored and the 200,000 rupees lent to them repaid. He added that, pending fulfilment of the specified conditions, there can be no suspension of hostilities. Messenger should arrive on the 27th instant at Kalimpong, having been sent thither to report and obtain Dalai Lama's orders."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[23173] No. 80.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Peking, May* 13, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 100 of the 25th March last, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a memorandum which I have addressed to the Chinese Government in accordance with your instructions informing them that the change proposed by the Chinese Postmaster-General in the arrangements for the exchange of mails between India and Thibet is one which cannot be accepted by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-chiao Pu.

Peking, May 11, 1912.

HIS Majesty's Minister has the honour to refer to the note addressed to him on the 13th September, 1911, by Prince Ch'ing on the subject of the exchange of mails between India and Thibet.

A copy of this note in translation was duly forwarded to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Sir John Jordan has now received instructions from Sir Edward Grey to inform the Chinese Government that the arrangement proposed by the Chinese Postmaster-General is one that cannot be accepted by His Majesty's Government.

[23144] No. 81.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to he Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 9th May, 1912, relative to Thibet.

India Office, May 30, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 81.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp, viâ Gangtok, April* 24, 1912.

WITH reference to the correspondence resting with my letter dated the 15th April, 1912, regarding the fighting between the Thibetans and Chinese in Thibet, I have the honour to submit for the information of the Government of India a copy of a translation of a Thibetan letter received from the chief Ministers of the Dalai Lama.

2. As usual, I have sent no reply to their letter.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 81.

The Lon-chens (Chief Ministers) of the Dalai Lama to Mr. Bell.

THE reason of submitting this by the chief Ministers is that the following information has been received from the Government of Lhassa:—

That after delivering the Dalai Lama's letter* to Tung, the acting amban, the Lhassa Government repeatedly informed him that if the Chinese officials and soldiers return to China without molesting the Thibetans, according to their verbal and written promise, the Thibetan Government would provide them with transport and necessary help for their journey. They asked Tung to send the Chinese quickly to China, but Tung did not accede to this. Lately the Chinese representative council at Lhassa promised to the Lhassa Government through the Nepalese agent and the head of the Mahommedans at Lhassa, that the Chinese will not fight with the Thibetans until the latter attack them. But on the night of the 5th of the 2nd month (23rd March 1912), the Chinese attacked the Sera monastery, about which a report has already, been submitted to you. The fighting again continued day and night from the morning of the 6th of the 2nd month (24th March, 1912). The Chinese fired many times on the Potala. On the morning of the 7th of the 2nd month (25th March, 1912), some Chinese soldiers disguised as monks went to the hills above Sera and told the monks who were stationed there as guards that they were sent as help from the Gan-den monastery. The Chinese brought their fire-arms under their shawls. But immediately after this they threw fire on the monk's residences above Sera and Gyu-kang‡ near the monastery and tried to burn them. They caught and killed some people there. The Chinese came near the walls of the Sera monastery and fired with their small arms and big guns many times. The Thibetans returned their fire and many of them were killed. Some monks were also killed and wounded. Ten monks rushed out

* The Lon-chens say that the Dalai Lama wrote a letter to Tung.
† The Dalai Lama's palace. ‡ Name of a small chapel.

with swords in their hands, and in a hand-to-hand fight about 100 Chinese were killed. On the 8th of the 2nd month (26th March, 1912), the Chinese retreated to Lhassa and their new barracks, constructed last year, and opened fire on the Thibetans. About 100 mounted troops suddenly entered the Dalai Lama's brother's house. All the Thibetans, both laymen and monks of Lhassa, in despair threw stones and fired at the Chinese and killed and wounded many of them. At this time the Nepalese agent and the head of the Mahommedans at Lhassa intervened and asked the Lhassa Government to stop the fighting for two days and discuss matters with the Chinese. The Lhassa Government have unanimously agreed and decided to reply that they can never live in peace with the Chinese even for a day. The Lhassa Government request us to move the British Government to grant them help either with force or otherwise, as may be necessary.

2. We have also received report from the general of the Dalai Lama's body-guard who were coming to escort him to Lhassa. It states that he had been observing the orders from the Dalai Lama and others officials not to attack the Chinese. But when he arrived at Penam the Chinese troops from Gyantse and Shi-ga-tse purposely came and attacked him. When he reached the Gyantse Fort they again attacked him. As the Thibetans could not give up their lives they had to fight with the Chinese, who were defeated. The Chinese asked the Thibetans, through the British trade agent at Gyantse to cease fighting,* hence the Thibetans spared their lives and are sending them back to China after supplying them with transport. The Chinese gave them about 150 rifles with ammunition and in return the Thibetans gave them a little over 9,000 rupees as price of the rifles and ammunition and also as their road expenses. More than 100 Chinese soldiers from Shi-ga-tse Jong made a night attack on the second batch of the Dalai Lama's guard at Pen but they were repulsed. The Chinese returned to Shi-ga-tse Jong. From the above it will be seen that the Chinese unlawfully attacked the Thibetans. The Thibetans in presence of witnesses gave about 1,00,000 rupees to the Chinese to return to China. The Chinese in spite of their written and verbal promises looted many thousand rupees worth of property belonging to traders, Thibetan subjects and monasteries of Lhassa, U, Tsang, the northern and southern provinces. The Chinese forcibly took away married women and some thousand ponies and mules. They arrested some Thibetans officials residing in different jongs and punished them. They beat and killed the Thibetan subjects. The oppressions of the Chinese in Thibet are innumerable. They are known to the British trade agents in Thibet and some of the cases of such oppressions may be known to the British Government also, whose country adjoins Thibet. Although it is written in the Thibet Blue Book that when the British Government raised the question about Thibet at Pekin, the Chinese gave an assurance that they would not interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, yet Len Amban and the Chinese officials and soldiers, disregarding the law and treaties, took away the Thibetan power from them. The Chinese, not satisfied with the killing and looting of people in Thibet, falsely submitted telegrams repeatedly to their Government saying that the Thibetans are collecting troops to attack the Chinese, and asked for reinforcements. Some Chinese officials who had returned to China also represented in a similar way to their Government. Therefore, some thousands of Chinese troops are said to be coming to Thibet.

We beg that you will kindly take necessary action in order to secure peace to the Thibetans, and get their own power back, and request the British Minister at Peking to inform the Chinese Wai-wu Pu of the oppressions of the Chinese in Thibet, and to ask them not to listen to the false reports of the Chinese in Thibet, and not to send more troops to Thibet. This action is necessary in order to prevent further fighting between the Chinese and Thibetans. He should also press the Wai-wu Pu to observe their assurances that are mentioned in the Thibet Blue Book.

On the 26th of the 2nd month of the Water-mouse year (13th April, 1912).

(Seal of the Chief Ministers.)

* The Lon-chens say that Te-ling Depon received a letter about this from the British trade agent at Gyantse. I am communicating with the British trade agent to ascertain what correspondence actually passed.

Enclosure 3 in No. 81.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Camp, vid Gangtok, April* 28, 1912.

IN continuation of the correspondence resting with my letter dated the 24th instant, regarding the fighting between the Thibetans and Chinese in Thibet, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a Thibetan letter received by me from the National Assembly of Thibet.

I have, &c.

C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 4 in No. 81.

Recent News received from the U and Tsang Provinces of Thibet.

(Translation.)

THERE was fighting between the Chinese and Thibetans at Shi-ga-tse for four days from the 17th to the 20th of the 2nd month (3rd to 6th April, 1912), in which the Chinese were defeated. At the earnest request of the Tashi Lhun-po officials, the Nepalese representative and the Mahommedans of Shi-ga-tse, no further harm was done to the lives of the Chinese. The Thibetans took possession of about 130 rifles, both good and defective, two cannon and some ammunition, these all being surrendered by the Chinese. The Thibetans paid the Chinese about 4,000 Chinese rupees* and 5,000 srangs† of Thibetan money, as price of the arms and ammunition, and provided the Chinese with transport and sent them towards India. They deputed two Thibetan lay officials to accompany the Chinese for their protection.

2. No further important development has occurred at Lhassa‡ besides what we already reported. Present reports state that the Chinese soldiers have occupied some strong and secure houses near the Lhassa Cathedral, and are continally firing at the Thibetans who are guarding the Cathedral.

The Chinese soldiers disguised as Thibetan women, are setting fire to houses. The Lhassa Government issued orders to the Dalai Lama's bodyguard, who are in the Tsang province, to come to Lhassa immediately. Thibetan officials and soldiers are gradually arriving at Lhassa from the north and south. Len Amban, General Chung, and the head of the Chinese representative council at Lhassa wrote a letter to the National Assembly, stating that they would send back the new Chinese officials and soldiers with arms to China the Kham province, as it would be against the Anglo-Chinese treaty to send them back through India. They suggest this with the evil intention of causing the Chinese soldiers to harm and destroy the Thibetan subjects on their way. The National Assembly replied that if they sell their arms to the Thibetan Government and return to China by the sea route, the Thibetans will provide them with transport protection and other necessary assistance ; otherwise they will have nothing further to say to each other. The Lhassa Government are negotiating with the Chinese through the Nepalese representative and the head of the Mahommedans at Lhassa.

Submitted on the 9th of the 3rd month of the Water-mouse year (25th April, 1912).

(Seal of the National Assembly.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 81.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith to Government of India.

Nepal Residency, April 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, the translation of a news-letter from the Nepalese representative at Lhassa to

* 1 Chinese rupee = 11 annas. † 1 srang = 1 rupee 10 a.

‡ The Chief Ministers say that this report is dated Lhassa, the 24th of the 2nd month (11th April, 1912).

his Excellency the Prime Minister of Nepal, dated the 2nd April, 1912, giving information regarding the state of affairs in Lhassa up to that date.

2. It would seem that the Chinese revolutionary troops are outnumbered, and it is probable that by this time they have laid down their arms or been annihilated by the Thibetans, as it does not seem likely that any assistance can have been sent to them from the direction of China.

Enclosure 6 in No. 81.

Nepalese Representative at Lhassa to Prime Minister of Nepal.

(Translation.)

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness the following information concerning the state of affairs as it stands here at present relating to the Chinese and the Thibetans.

On Wednesday, the 8th Chaitra, the newly-established Republican Chinese officers at the yamên sent word to me to the effect that a conference was being held that day between the Chinese and the Thibetans in which the Thibetan kazis as well as the members of the Chhong-dui Council (National Assembly of Thibet) would take part, and requesting my presence and that of the Khajai Gova on the occasion. On receipt of this message I sent my ditha and Seo-Kuseo to the yamên with a view to ascertain what we had been sent for. They found the three Kasyal kazis, the Ladak Khajai and the Chinese Republican officer, Tun Thonlin, assembled at the place. The Chinese officers received them courteously, and having seated them on chairs, they took their own seats and spoke about the situation at Gyantse and Penam, after which they addressed my men thus—

"The Gurkhas, the Thibetans, the Mahommedans and we, the Chinese, are all one and the same. It has become necessary for us all to put our heads together to come to a decision concerning the existing disturbance. A big conference will be held to-morrow at 1 o'clock, and it would be better if the representative himself be pleased to attend it."

My men in reply said that their chief officer could not attend that day as he was unwell, and that they would convey the message to him who, if he was well, would surely attend the conference. On this, the three Thibetan officials, including Chharong kazi, suggested that it would be better if the representative himself were to come to obviate the necessity of their having had to refer any question to him again by the ditha and Khajai Gova should they find it necessary to do so in the course of the discussion. The meeting broke up after this, the Chinese officer repeating his request to all to come over at 1 o'clock the next day. While coming back my men were told on the way by the three Kasyal kazis that in consequence of a misunderstanding between some Chinese and Thibetan spies near about Penam, some loss of life had taken place, and as further troubles in the same time were apprehended, they would request the representative to attend unless kept back by ill-health, especially as the conference was to discuss very serious matters. Ladak Khajai also repeated a similar request to them, and my men came to report to me all as have been stated above.

As I was requested both by the Chinese and the Thibetans to attend the conference, I thought it proper to comply with their request, so that my absence might not be construed as a slight to both the parties, and that I might, after having ascertained the facts, lay before them my views on the matter. Accordingly, I went to the yamên on Thursday, the 9th Chaitra, to attend the conference, and was cordially received by the Chinese officers. I said that, though I was suffering from colic, I could not help acceding to their earnest joint request to come to the conference to avoid my absence being construed to be a slight on both the parties. The Chinese officers, in reply, said that it was only with a hope that my presence at the conference would better conduce towards bringing about a reconciliation between the Thibetans and the Chinese who, as matters then stood, were running the risk of a serious misunderstanding with each other through mutual distrust and suspicion, and that they expected the Kasyal kazis and members of the Chhong-dui Council would come up when the question at issue would be duly discussed and considered. I said that it was indeed very good that they should think of bringing about a reconciliation so very essential to the peace and happiness of the people at large by means of a conference, and that

though I, too, could perceive that the relation between the Chinese and the Thibetans was strained, yet I did not see why they should not be able to pull on well together, as it was well known that while China stood to Thibet as a disciple, the latter stood to the former as priest, so that neither side could do without the other, and I should, therefore, be only very glad to mediate between them, as they were so anxious for the same. The only thing which I would ask of them if they wanted my mediation on any point on which they could not agree was to let me have a written statement of them to enable me to get them solved by referring the matter to my Government at home. And, in the meantime, they should try their best to come to an understanding and avoid bloodshed by all means, as neither party would be benefited by it. The Chinese officers said that they would certainly see that no loss of life took place, and would do their best to bring about a reconciliation between the Chinese and the Thibetans. We were talking like this till 3 o'clock, and even then the kazis of the Kasyal failed to put in their appearance. Words were sent requesting their immediate presence, when they sent back a reply requesting not to be offended for their inability to attend that day in consequence of the non-attendance of the members of the council, and promising that they would come the next day. The Chinese officers thereupon informed me of the message they received from the Kasyal kazis, and while giving me leave to go to my place, requested me to go over to the Kasyal kazis and the members of the Chhong-dui Council, and explain the situation to them, adding that if the Thibetan kazis and the members of the council were to come with a view to remove all misapprehension, it would be well and good. If not, they would be obliged to do what they deemed proper under the circumstances. I remarked that they should avoid doing anything which might lead to fighting, and that I would, as requested, go over to the Kasyal and explain matters to them. I then added that I had come, though my health was not in such a state as to enable me to bear the strain, and that if, on the following days, I might be unable to attend I would, if required, send my ditha to them. To this they agreed, saying that it would do equally well if my ditha were to attend. From the Yamên I went to Chhomulinka, where the Kasyal office and Chhong-dui Council were held, and spoke to the kazis there to this effect—

"Why did you not come to the yamên? I had a talk with the Chinese officers there to the effect that they should carefully avoid all troubles, and that the Chinese and Thibetans should be reconciled. You, too, ought to keep that object in view, and write to the Dalai Lama to the same effect. It will be a mistake to spoil the interest of your country by acting heedlessly. I too shall write to the Dalai Lama."

The Kasyal kazis and the members of the Chhong-dui Council said in reply—

"What are we to do? We are in such a difficult plight. You must have already known from your ditha through whom we sent word to you how matters stand with us. We informed Lien Tarin Amba of what we have heard from the Chinese Republican officers here and enquiring what we are to do in the matter, but the amba chooses not to reply, and in consequence the members of the council object to our going to the conference. We are thus in a difficult plight. We expect that you and your Government would continue to do good to the country, as they have been doing."

I assured them that my Government would be always ready to do, as they had never failed to, what they reasonably could. But they must on no account act without much deliberation and forethought, and must be careful to avoid misunderstanding each other. I added—

"I will report to my Government, and shall abide by their instructions, in the meantime you will try to avert fighting. The Chinese officers appeared to be offended for your not attending to-day, so it would be your lookout to come to an understanding with them."

After this, as I was returning home, the kazis said that they did not know what to do, as the amba would not reply to them, and that they would request that I should look to the interest of the country.

On Friday, the 10th Chaitra, the ditha, Seo-Kueso, and Khajai Gova went again to the yamên in answer to a call from them. The Kasyal kazis again did not attend, possibly for fear of being arrested. The Chinese officers took offence at this, which they took to be an insult to them, and uttered threats of blowing up

the Potala as well as the temple of Bhagwan. My men suggested that the Kasyal kazis possibly could not come for not being able to consult amongst themselves, and proposed that they would go with a view to bring the kazis to the yamên, and actually brought them. The meeting, however, could not be held as the khembus of the three monastries were absent. The Chinese officers postponed the conference till the next day, requesting the Kasyal kazis to come and bring with them the khembus as well.

On Saturday, the 11th Chaitra, the ditha and Khajai Gova went to the yamên again. The Kasyal kazis did not again appear. On this the Chinese got angry, and fixed their guns ready loaded in front of the temple of Bhagwan, closed the bazaar, and the Chinese soldiers took up their equipments ready to fight.

The same evening, after the ditha had returned from the yamên, the Chinese officer, Tun Thonlin, again sent for him and told him that the non-attendance of the kazis at the yamên that day must be due to some ulterior motive and evil designs on their part, and consequently disturbance was about to take place that day, but the soldiers were kept back from it for the time being, and so he would request that the representative be so kind as to go over and explain matters to the kazis, as they expected that such a step would have the desired effect of avoiding the disturbance. On this the ditha said that the kazis' absence was perhaps due to their having to attend the Potala in company with Thering Pocchai Lama on a usual ceremonial visit, and that they have sent word to say that they would be late in coming. Tun then requested the ditha to go over to the kazis and the members of the Chhong-dui to bring them to the conference, proposing at the same time that if there be any khembus who, on account of old age, might not be able to attend, substitutes might come in their place, and that, if the kazis feared to come to the yamên, the conference might be held at Kusanche. Accordingly, my men went to the Potala and delivered the message, at which the Thibetan officials said that their words having been of no avail, they have put down all what they had to say on paper, and so they might go and speak to the Tun Thonglin accordingly. They then went and spoke to the Tun as desired. Tun thereupon said that the Thibetans should give a paper sealed with the seals of the Regent, the kazis, and the Chhong-dui Council undertaking not to commence fighting or commit any injury to the Chinese, and that the papers so sealed might be sent to him if the Thibetan officials did not like to come. On the other hand, the Chinese would also write out a similar document duly sealed and hand it over the very next day to the Thibetans. The ditha was requested to take this message to the Thibetans the next day. When I received this report from the ditha, I thought that I should myself go and do what I reasonably could. So on Sunday, the 12th Chaitra, I got myself ready to go to the Kasyal and Chhong-dui Council, when I heard continual reports of the firing of rifles and guns. I did not then think that my going would be of any use, and so instead sent the letters which I had written to the various parties through my ditha to Tun Thonglin, with a request to have them forwarded to the addressees. I also sent a message to the Thibetan officials, informing them of what Tun had said, and suggesting that necessary papers as might be deemed expedient might be written and delivered, with a view to avoid hostilities.

Of the letters which were sent to Tun for dispatch, one was addressed to all the civil and military Chinese officers whom it might concern, explaining to them the utter futility of protracting the existing tension, and exhorting them not to commence hostilities, which would simply mean loss to both sides, and adding that, if they desired a reconciliation through our medium, both sides might give me a statement showing the points where they could not agree, to enable me to refer the matter to my Government, and do our best quite impartially to bring about a settlement, having due regard to the friendly relations that had subsisted between the two Governments and Nepal.

The next letter was addressed to the officers commanding the Thibetan troops collected on the Gyantse, Digarcha and Punan side, requesting them to refrain from any aggressive actions, in view of the inadvisability of causing useless bloodshed, pending the conclusion of the negotiation that was being carried on, and to come to an understanding.

The other letter was addressed to the Kasyal kazis and the Chhong-dui Council to the same effect as the one addressed to the Chinese civil and military officers.

On Monday, the 13th Chaitra, the Kasyal sent me a Thibetan letter, the purport of which was to the effect that, though the Thibetan officials were desirous of

coming to an amicable settlement, the Chinese had aggressively attacked the Sera monastery at night, and hence they would be compelled to take things as they came and meet the eventualities irrespective of their consequences unless the Chinese agreed to give up their arms and return to China. This letter, together with the Thibetan paper which the Thibetan kazis handed over to my ditha for delivery of the message contained therein to Tun Thonglin as reported above, could not be submitted with this letter, as it was found difficult to go out to fetch those papers from the place where they were kept, owing to the constant flying of bullets about all night and day.

The Chinese soldiers continued firing their rifles and guns the whole night and day in the direction of the Potala at the commencement of the hostilities.

When the Chinese officers saw that the Thibetan kazis did not put in their appearance for the proposed conference, they asked the ditha to put up some distinctive flags on the houses occupied by our subjects, and enquired of what kind and colour the flags would be. The Mahommedans decided to put up white flags, and according to my order our subjects have put up yellow flags with the letters "Gorkha" written on them. I sent an intimation of this also to the Kasyal.

I was also sending a letter to the Dalai Lama, informing him of the state of affairs here, and advising the desirability of coming to an understanding with the Chinese by peaceful means with a view to avoid the spilling of innocent blood and other disturbances. This letter could not yet be sent owing to the dâk being closed on account of the disturbance.

It seems that the Kasyal and Chhong-dui Council have received instructions from the Ministers of Thibet, who are with the Dalai Lama, and who, with the hope of making Thibet into an independent State, have caused Thibetan levies to be collected at different places on instruction that if the Chinese (who had come to keep peace and order in the country have themselves taken to looting and killing) would agree to go back to China they should be sent back provided with necessary expenses and conveyances and transport, or otherwise to deal with them with a strong hand. The raising of Thibetan troops at different places, combined with a threatening report, which had emanated from the Thibetans and reached the Chinese, that the Thibetans would not leave a single Chinese alive in the country is case they refused to evacuate it, seems to have led the Chinese to demand a written promise signed and sealed by the three monasteries and the Thibetan high officials, undertaking not to entertain hostile motives against the Chinese, and to propose to give a similar undertaking from the Chinese side in favour of the Thibetans. The Thibetan high officials, probably under the apprehension that if they were to give such an undertaking they would be taken to have sided with the Chinese, could not dare to agree to the proposal. This led the Chinese to believe that the Thibetans were bent upon killing them, and so opened hostilities with the Sera monastery, burnt two houses that were standing above that monastery, and subsequently, as there were men of said monastery, as well as the monks of the Galden monasteries which have sided with Sara residing in Lhassa mixed up with the people, fighting spread to the town of Lhassa as well. The fighting continues still, and the Chinese are burning down houses. The inhabitants are unable to come out of their houses and get even their daily food. What else has happened could not yet be ascertained.

Dated the 21st Chaitra, Tuesday, 1968 (corresponding to the 2nd April, 1912).

P.S.—With a view to enable our subjects and merchants to remove themselves and their property, I made a request to both the Chinese and the Thibetans to stop fighting for a month. Till now, however, the fighting has not ceased, but is being carried on night and day. The Chinese have burnt down some 200 or 300 houses in the city.

Only a vague report has reached me that in the conflagration the kothi belonging to one of our merchants has been burnt down, and that he is nowhere to be found; also that a newar was hit by a bullet and died. It is now eleven days since a panic has been created, owing to the discharge of a hail of bullets from both sides and the conflagration that has taken place. So I have not been able to definitely ascertain the loss in life and property.

I had called together our merchants and subjects here at my place, and, in view of the signs of a disturbance arising, I had advised them to leave their kothis in charge of only one of their own men and remove themselves away beforehand to some isolated place. But they failed to do so through the greed of trade, and

now they appear to be unable to stir out of their houses owing to the flying about of a hail of bullets.

It seems that on the Chinese side there are about 1,400 or 1,500 men, while on the Thibetan side some 5,000 or 6,000 have so far collected. Even though inclined to try to bring about a reconciliation between the parties, the fact of there being no established head among the revolutionary Chinese stands in the way. The town of Lhassa is going to be devastated by the machinations of the revolutionary Chinese on the one hand, and the Thibetan kasis who had gone down to Darjeeling on the other.

[23410] No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st May, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, June 1, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 31, 1912.*

ORDERS to proceed to Gyantse, and hold himself in readiness to go to Lhassa, have been given to Laden La, deputy superintendent of police, on special duty with Dalai Lama at Kalimpong, in connection with Thibetans' wish that, in view of their disinclination to accept mediation of Nepalese, someone should be deputed by Government of India to proceed to Lhassa to assist in mediating between Chinese and Thibetans. Unless, in the meantime, Thibetans and Chinese come to terms, prompt mediation is obviously desirable to prevent remnant of Chinese being massacred. If present situation at Lhassa still continues on 3rd June, by which date Laden La will arrive at Gyantse, I propose to instruct him to press on rapidly to Lhassa to help in settling terms between Chinese and Thibetans, and to ensure safe conduct out of the country for Chinese. He would at once return after doing so.

[23577] No. 83.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 227.)

Sir, *Peking, May 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 77 of the 5th March last, in which you instruct me to furnish you with an expression of my views on a suggestion made by Mr. Rose for a settlement of pending frontier questions with China based upon the exchange of the Mir of Hunza's rights in Sarikol for those of the Teng Keng chief in the district of Hpimaw.

I have no hesitation in saying that the suggestion is one which would not be favourably received by the Chinese Government. As stated in my despatch No. 471 of the 13th November, 1906, the occupancy rights of Hunza in the region in question were never regarded as of much importance by the Chinese, and their value has been much impaired since Mr. Rose wrote his report by the course of events in the new dominion where Chinese authority is at present at a very low ebb. The tendency of the Central Government in all these frontier questions is to consult the interests of the province concerned, and Yünnan would certainly not consent to a bargain which deprived it of what it regards as substantial rights for the benefit of an outlying region of which it has no knowledge. We should be raising another frontier question to which no attention has hitherto been directed without in any way advancing the settle-

ment of the Yünnan one, and I fully agree with the Government of India that each fresh offer of compromise is only regarded as a further sign of weakness on our part.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

[23578] No. 84.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 228.)

Sir, *Peking, May* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 224 of the 13th instant I have the honour to enclose the translation of a memorandum from the Wai-chiao Pu asking me for a detailed statement of the reasons which render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to accept the arrangement proposed by the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Communications for the exchange of mails between India and Thibet.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Memorandum communicated to Sir J. Jordan by Wai-chiao Pu.

(Translation.)

THE Wai-chiao Pu have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum from His Majesty's Minister referring to Prince Ch'ing's note of the 13th September, 1911, on the subject of the exchange of mails between India and Thibet.

The memorandum stated that a copy of that note in translation was duly forwarded to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and added that Sir John Jordan had now received instructions from Sir Edward Grey to inform the Chinese Government that the arrangement proposed by the Chinese Postmaster-General was one that could not be accepted by His Majesty's Government.

In this matter an equitable arrangement was drawn up by the former Ministry of Posts and Communications; His Majesty's Government are, however, unable to accept the arrangement proposed. The Wai-chiao Pu have the honour, therefore, to request His Majesty's Minister to favour them with a detailed statement, setting forth the reasons which render acceptance impossible, so that the matter may be referred to the Ministry of Communications.

HU WEI-TÊ.

Peking, May 14, 1912.

[23814] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 31st May regarding the situation in Thibet, I am directed to inform you that, in all the circumstances of the case, the Marquess of Crewe considers that no objection need be taken to the dispatch of the Indian police officer, Laden La, to Gyantse, and, if necessary, to Lhassa, to mediate between the Thibetans and Chinese. His Lordship assumes, however, that Laden La will confine his good offices to the immediate requirements of the situation, viz., the termination of hostilities at Lhassa and the safe withdrawal of the Chinese garrison, and that nothing will be done to prejudice in any way the general question of the future status of Thibet. I am to enclose, for the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the draft of a telegram which it is proposed to address to the Government of India on the subject.

It is for Sir E. Grey's consideration whether, in view of the terms of article 3 of the Anglo-Russian agreement concerning Thibet of 1907, Laden La's mission should not be notified to the Russian Government. It would appear undesirable to make any intimation on the subject to the Chinese Government at the present stage.

I have, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Draft of Telegram from the Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Secret.)

THIBET.

Your telegram of the 31st May. Laden La's mission is approved, but he should be instructed to confine his good offices to settling immediate difficulties and to do nothing to prejudice question of future status of Thibet. Russian Government are being informed.

[24187] No. 86.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to and from the Viceroy, dated the 5th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 6, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 86.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June 5, 1912.*

SEE your telegram dated the 31st ultimo regarding Thibet. Laden La's mission is viewed with some apprehension by His Majesty's Government in view of the risk to him which it would involve, and of the interference that may become necessary in consequence; or, in the alternative, as entailing difficulty in view of Anglo-Russian agreement through a too close development of relations with Thibetan authorities, who may expect further support. I desire to be furnished with fuller information and reassurance on these points before giving my assent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 86.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 5, 1912.*

CONFIRMATION has been received from Thibetan Ministers at Kalimpong of report received recently to the effect that Tsarong Shape, two abbots of Loseling College in monastery of Drepung, one Thibetan secretary, and other minor officials have, on account of their pro-Chinese leanings, been put to death by Thibetan authorities at Lhassa.

Mr. Bell was informed on the 1st instant by Chief Minister of the Dalai Lama that it is the Lama's intention to leave on the 24th instant for Thibet, but that he wishes the matter to be kept strictly secret for the present. Dalai Lama has received a letter from Prime Minister of Nepal, asking that ponies may be supplied for the removal out of Lhassa to a place of safety of the Nepalese and their property. Prime Minister's letter adds that if Nepalese life and property are not protected by Thibetan Government, a claim will be put in for losses. Letter also hints that, if claim is not met, portion of Thibetan territory will be seized by Nepal. Reply is stated to have been sent by Dalai Lama to effect that orders for necessary protection have been frequently issued by him.

A report has been received that in consequence of instructions from the National Assembly at Lhassa that troops should be sent not later than 10th instant to co-operate against Chinese, all available persons in the Shigatse neighbourhood have been called out by Tashi Lama.

Letter has been addressed to trade agent, Gyantse, by officer in command of Chinese troops at Lhassa, saying that it was thought that Chinese would willingly

surrender their arms and ammunition if safe conduct were guaranteed them in presence of a neutral whose authority would be respected. There seemed, however, on neither side a willingness to accept as peacemaker the Nepalese representative. We have, in the circumstances, instructed Laden La (see my telegram dated the 31st ultimo) to proceed at once to Lhassa. He is receiving orders on arrival to inform Thibetan authorities that Government of India have deputed him to assist in arranging a settlement between the Thibetans and the Chinese still in Lhassa, and in expediting safe conduct to Indian frontier of Chinese. In the event of Thibetans accepting his mediation, Laden La has been instructed to endeavour to arrange for Chinese to return as soon as possible to India, and to accompany them thither himself. Trade agent, Gyantse, will give a letter to Laden La saying who he is, and stating that he has been sent in response to informal messages from both Thibetans and Chinese in Lhassa in order to co-operate in friendly manner with Thibetan authorities in arranging a settlement with the Chinese.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[24317] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th June, 1912, regarding Laden La's mission to Thibet.

India Office, June 7, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 7, 1912.*

LADEN LA.

See your telegram, dated 5th instant.

Your silence in regard to our telegram, dated the 31st ultimo, was interpreted by us as indicating approval, and Laden La was ordered to start, both in consequence of anxiety for assistance in mediation which both sides had expressed and because immediate and speedy action on behalf of Chinese remnant appeared necessary in view of more recent developments of situation at Lhassa. Laden La is now beyond chance of recall, having started on the 5th instant, as we reported in our telegram of that date. Thibetans now know of his departure, and to recall him, even if it were possible to do so, would create bad impression among them. We are of opinion, with regard to apprehensions mentioned in your telegram, that Laden La's personal risk is so small as not to be worth considering; while, as to closer development of relations in consequence of mission, we propose before Dalai Lama's approaching departure from India to state our attitude to him in a very clear manner. We trust in these circumstances that you will approve our action, which was due to the urgent exigencies of the case. In no circumstances do we consider that any serious consequence can result.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[24384] No. 88.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 232.)

Sir, *Peking, May 18, 1912.*

THE despatch which I have the honour to enclose herewith from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu is of considerable interest as showing that, with all its professions of anxiety for the union of the five races, the Republican Government is chary about entering upon a policy which may be interpreted as bringing Thibet under its direct rule. Yuan Shih-kai's telegraphic reply to the Szechuan Government shows very clearly that he is fully aware of the danger of attempting to make any alteration in the status of Thibet, and there have since been other indications of a

weakening amongst leading members of the Government. Tong Shao-yi, the Premier, who stood for a strong Thibetan policy under the Manchu régime, in addressing the National Assembly on the 13th instant, made the following remarkable statement:—

"The vast area of our country, comprising the twenty-two provinces and the territories of Mongolia and Thibet, tends to the retention of old traditions and usage, and consequently it is difficult to apply one system for the government of the whole."

Contrasted with the Presidential order of the 22nd April, which abolished the Board of Dependencies and declared Mongolia, Thibet, and Turkestan to be integral parts of China proper, Tong's utterances are highly significant. It is probable that the telegraphic reports about the condition to which the Chinese troops at Lhassa are reduced have moderated the Chinese attitude. But the keen interest which Szechuan still takes in Thibet is a disquieting feature, and may some day lead to another expedition similar to the one organised early in 1910, which has now come to such a disastrous end. As a matter of fact, the Chinese Government, acting upon the suggestion of the Chengtu authorities, approached the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank with the view of remitting a lac of taels to meet the requirements of the troops at Lhassa, but abandoned the idea on learning that the Government of India could accept no responsibility for its conveyance beyond the Indian frontier. It is hardly conceivable, however, that China will be allowed to engage in enterprises of this kind so long as she is dependent upon foreign money for the maintenance of order within her own dominions, more especially as recent events have demonstrated the futility of relying upon her to exercise any effective control over Thibet.

The surveying party which left Chengtu on the 8th April is not likely to proceed very far until it meets with difficulties, and its doings need not be treated very seriously. But the programme shows an increasing knowledge of frontier questions, which merits attention, and justifies the precautionary measures recently adopted by the Government of India. As Colonel Willoughby, the military attaché, is shortly leaving Peking, and his unrivalled knowledge of Indo-Chinese frontier questions will no longer be available, I have asked him to compile, for purposes of future reference, a geographical note upon the route to be followed by the Chinese survey party, and have the honour to enclose a copy of it herewith for transmission to the War Office.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Chengtu, April* 21, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy and translation of a telegram, dated the 5th instant, from the Chengtu Government to President Yuan at Peking, and of the President's reply, dated the 12th, on the subject of a request that the Central Government should advance a lac of taels for the support of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa, and should approve of the temporary appointment of General Chungying as "commissioner administering the government" in Thibet.

These documents are of interest as showing that the Republican Government of Chengtu admits the continued liability of Szechuan province to provide for the cost of the Chinese occupation of Thibet, but chiefly because they throw light on Yuan Shih-kai's views as to the nature of that occupation. The Chengtu Government was evidently prepared to regard the resident at Lhassa as at the head of the Thibetan executive, since they proposed for their nominee the style of "hsing-cheng shih." Yuan Shih-kai, on the other hand, insists that the powers and duties of this officer are to be in all respects identical with those of the former ambans, "lest suspicion be aroused, and many inconveniences ensue to internal order and to foreign relations." In short, the Chinese representative at Lhassa is to be not a governor but a resident. Yuan Shih-kai admits that the old title of chu tsang ta ch'en ("High Minister resident in Thibet," is no longer suitable; but he proposes to substitute for it a designation which will convey the same idea (or be of an equally serviceable vagueness): Hsi-tsang Pan-shih Chang-kuan (literally, "the senior officer discharging duties in Thibet").

It may be worth noting how dependent, at any rate for the time being, is the

Chengtu Government upon India for its transactions with Lhassa; the lac of taels is to be sent thither through the agency of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank at Calcutta. At the same time it would seem as though such a procedure is distasteful to President Yuan, though his instructions to wait until the land route is again open may only be a device for putting off a grant which the Central Government can ill afford.

Incidentally the President's reply shows that the subordination of the Provincial Governments is being emphasised; the military governor of Szechuan is addressed "kai tutu" ("the said tutu"), a common way, under the empire, of marking inferiority. I need only remark further, in connection with this telegram, that Chungying, as far as we know here, is still at Lhassa.

On the 12th instant, each of the consular representatives at Chengtu received a communication from the Lu-pien Hsüan-wei-shih ("conciliator for the marches of Tachienlu"), announcing his appointment by the tutu, and his receipt of a wooden seal inscribed "Szechuan Lu-pien Hsüan-wei-shih chih Kuan-fang." This is the first "Chao-hui, or formal despatch, sent to us by any official of the present administration. The body of the document is printed, and I am addressed as "Ying-kuo ling-shih-fu" ("British consul"). Not less subversive is the omission of the conciliator's own name.

As there are difficulties, pending the recognition of the republic, in the way of formal correspondence, and as I wished to learn something more than the "Chao-hui" tells us of the scope of the conciliator's duties, I wrote a note to the Wai-wu Ssu (Foreign Department), asking what the name of the new official is, what are his functions, and where will be his seat of government. The Wai-wu Ssu replied that his name is Wu Chia-mo; that his authority and jurisdiction will for the present be equally extensive with those of the former Pien-wu Ta-ch'en ("warden of the marches"), a title now abolished; and that he will have no fixed residence.

Wu Chia-mo is the individual of whom I have more than once written as Wu So-yu, a former educational officer in the marches. He is still at Chengtu, and has verbally expressed to my French colleague. M. Bons d'Anty, an old acquaintance of his, the intention to call on me before his departure.

The "wei-yuan" (special officer), who, as I reported in my despatch No. 30 of the 22nd March, was to go to the Assam frontier and parley with the British expeditionary force, is said, in a highly interesting article that appeared in the "T'ien-min Pao" of the 17th instant, to have left Chengtu for Zayul on the 14th March. His name is Chiang Feng-ch'i, and he was accompanied by an English-speaking interpreter (late a junior clerk in the Chinese post office), Chao Yang-yün, and by a guide, Shu Chin-liang. The same paper, in its issue of the following day, says that "Chiang Feng-ch'i, sent by the Military Government to parley with the British, and who proposed, as the road is unsafe, to halt for a time at Lit'ang, has just turned back," apparently to Tachienlu.

The earlier article, of which I have the honour to enclose copy and translation, states that, subsequent to this mission of Chiang wei-yuan, a surveying party has left Chengtu (on the 8th April) to map the frontiers adjacent to Assam and northern Burmah, in order that the diplomatic blunders in the Kachin Hills of Yünnan may be avoided when negotiations are begun for the delimitation of this part of the border.

The route to be taken is quite evidently the lower, and little used, road from Bat'ang and Kiangka (Gartok) to Lhassa, marked on the Chinese version, prepared by Hu Wei-teh in St. Petersburgh in August 1904, of the map of Thibet by the late M. Dutreuil de Rhuys. (Of this map I have the honour to enclose a copy; to India I am sending a tracing of such portion of it as will serve to illustrate the article in the "T'ienmin Pao.") At about the point where this road reaches the Tsangpo (upper Brahmuputra river) is a place marked Kungpu (*i.q.* Kongbu) Shih-k'e Cheng. By a careless reading of the hieroglyphs, Kung-pu has become, in the instructions given to the surveyors, Hsi. From this point the party is to follow the course of the Tsangpo—a feat of which the most ardent and intrepid of our explorers have long dreamt in vain—down to a place called in the Chinese "Menpo," almost certainly identical with Mebo, in about latitude 28° 12′ north, longitude 95° 32′ east. From Mebo (if, which it is permissible to doubt, the Abors by that time have left them with power of further locomotion) they are to proceed to Sami, which must be the Sama of the Indian survey, in about latitude 28° 8′ north and longitude 97° 7′ east.

From Sama they will go, "passing over the upper waters of the Irrawaddy" and "by way of Mu-si-p'u, on the border of the savage country," to Sung-t'an, "on the lower reaches of the Salween." Sung-t'an is the Songta of the Indian survey, on the

left bank of the river, in about latitude 28° 10′ north, longitude 98° 30′ east. As you will observe, it is only just on the northern side of the Yünnan frontier.

It is evident, indeed, that the Chengtu Government is regarding, at any rate provisionally, the line marked in the St. Petersburgh map as being approximately the frontier that should be claimed for China. You will notice that this map repeats the old error that identifies the Sang-ch'u, on which Sangachu Dzong and Drowa Gompa stand, with the Upper Irrawaddy. I am not sure, however, that the office for frontier arrangements ("ch'ou-pien ch'u"), when drawing up the present instruction for the surveyor, Fu Hsieh-ch'en, was under that delusion. It is quite possible that by "the upper waters of the Irrawaddy" the compiler means what we should mean, the sources of the Kiuchiang, Malikha, and other affluents of that river in, or east of, Hkamti Long.

It seems, unfortunately, certain that the Chinese, or their vassals, have some claim to the possession of part, at any rate, of this country. Captain Bailey (p. 15 of the report on his journey last year from Peking to Sadiya) says that "the Chinese are in effectual occupation of the upper waters of the Irrawaddy and Tara Wan Rivers along my route; this country is inhabited by Thibetans," although "the Chinese in south-eastern Thibet have not extended their influence down these rivers south of my route."

I would, nevertheless, venture to submit that we should claim as part of Burmah the whole basin of the Irrawaddy north of Bhamo, offering, if necessary, monetary or other compensation wherever the Chinese can establish actual rights of possession. If this could be accepted as a principle of delimitation, details could be arranged at leisure, whereas if we once admit the Chinese to a foothold on any of these streams, we shall have difficulty in defining how far south they may go, and the advance of our line of effectual administration may be embarrassed.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

Urgent Telegram from the Governor ("Tutu") and Lieutenant-Governor ("Fu-tutu") of Szechuan to Yuan Shih-kai, President, and Li Yuan-hung, Vice-President, of China, and to the Governors of the other Provinces.

(Published in the "Szechuan Kungpao" of April 17, and dispatched—as appears from President Yuan's reply—on April 5, 1912.)

(Translation.)

THE marches and Thibet are a fence to the State, even as the feet and hands keep the head and eyes. For weal or woe their importance is of the very gravest. In Szechuan province, after the troubles over the railway controversy of last August arose, citizen soldiery sprang up everywhere, and the highways were blocked. News from the Marches and Thibet was for this cause cut off. Then, after the revolution in November, Fu Hua-feng (Fu Sung-mu) acting warden under the late Ch'ing (dynasty), broke with his forces into the barrier (crossed the Rubicon of Tachienlu), professedly to come to the aid of the malignant, Chao (Erh-feng). By constant spending of our military strength at last we succeeded in slaying (the latter). Then we received news from Thibet how that on the 13th November the Lhassa troops had risen and plundered everything, and Lien-yü had fled and was in hiding.

The marches and Thibet are each thousands of *li* in length and breadth, and with no one to control and protect them their dangerous condition is beyond the power of words to express. At that time the Central Government had not yet been set up, while in Szechuan itself disorder was at its height, so that none was at leisure to attend. Later on, as conditions in Szechuan became gradually more settled, a special office for frontier arrangements ("ch'ou-pien ch'u") was established, and directors and assistants were appointed to deal with frontier affairs. Furthermore, Wu Chia-mu (Wu So-yu) was commissioned as conciliator ("hsüan-wei shi) for Tachienlu and the marches, with a personal escort of troops. In a few days he will be going beyond the barrier (*i.q.*, west of Tachienlu), to tranquilise everything.

The finances of Szechuan are depleted, and just at present it is impossible to undertake double duties. Still, the defence of the frontier is of consequence, and we do not venture to refrain from efforts to provide for it. Yet Thibet has, far and near, powerful neighbours, aud the menace of foreign troubles grows daily more pressing.

Since the mutiny of the troops, watch and ward are illusory; the people fear disaster, and every day there are alarms. If we do not hasten to press forward and sedulously plan for their succour there will be troubles later on that we cannot bear to think of. But if we protect Thibet, a strong garrison is indispensable; to support such a garrison a grant in aid towards its cost is equally unavoidable.

A special memorandum from Chung-ying, general of the modern troops ("lu-chün") in Thibet, under the late Ch'ing (dynasty), and acting temporarily as resident, says: —

"The soldiers stationed in Thibet have so far been 2,000, but for several months they have received neither pay nor rations. If the issue of these is longer delayed, it is certain that the men will all disperse, and it will be impossible to recall them."

On reading this letter we could not repress our anxiety. Not only at the present time is payment of troops in Szechuan dependent on the military notes, which cannot be suddenly put into circulation on the border, but if we are forced to get together actual silver, yet, as the road hence to Lhassa is some 6,000 *li* (say some 2,000 miles) long, at the speediest the money could not reach there under 100 days, when, we fear, it would be too late to be of use.

We would telegraph to beg the President to take thought for Thibet, and to direct the Board of Finance to provide a lac of taels, to be remitted through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to Gyantse in Thibet, for conveyance to Chungying at Lhassa. He would receive and distribute it, and it may be that this would quicken the spirits of the soldiery and save the whole dominion. The opportunity once lost, turmoil and desertion are to be feared.

Should this sum be granted, Szechuan will still be responsible for it, and when we have been honoured with your reply we will at once proceed to take steps to repay it in full.

P.S.—It appears that at the time of the mutiny of the soldiers in Thibet, everything depended on Chung-ying, who, having earlier won the men's hearts, braved all danger and came forward to help; so that quiet was gradually restored and a critical situation was saved. If changes are now abruptly made, it is to be feared that, through lack of acquaintance with the people and the country, there may be some offshoots of trouble. Time, moreover, presses, so it is proposed that we (Yun) Ch'ang-heng and the rest shall provisionally delegate Mr. Chung(ying) to be "hsing-cheng shih" (commissioner administering the Government) in Thibet, to make temporary arrangements in all Thibetan affairs. We should thus be availing ourselves of an old hand, and could hope to expedite matters. Whether or not he should receive a commission (from the Central Government) we would ask the President to be good enough to decide. The matter is one that affects the general situation, and is exceptionally urgent, so that our hopes and our prayers are extreme.

Salutations of the military governors of Szechuan (Yun) Ch'ang-heng and (Chang) P'ei-chuo.

Translated April 19, 1912:
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 88.

Telegram from Yuan Shih-kai, President, dated Peking, April 12, 1912.

(Published by the Chengtu Telegraph Agency, April 19.)

(Translation.)

To Yun, Military Governor at Chengtu; and Chang, lieutenant governor.

THEIR telegram of the 5th.

The marches and Thibet are the gates to the west, and are of the very greatest importance. The proposals in the telegram under acknowledgment may be considered as well elaborated, and it is requested that occasion may be taken to carry them into effect, so as to avoid miscarriage by delay. As regards the suggestion to apply for the issue of a lac of taels, to be remitted to Gyantse, it should be observed that Gyantse is not open for telegraphic remittances. Wait until the road to Thibet is clearer, when the question of a grant-in-aid can be considered.

The marches and Thibet are to Szechuan as the lips to the jaw. The provision of troops (for Thibet) and their maintenance has hitherto had Szechuan for its base; and it is still hoped, and is of consequence, that (Szechuan) will, in the first instance, take steps and try to arrange to render help.

With regard to the delegation, as mentioned in the telegram, of Chungying as "hsing-cheng shih" of Thibet, diplomacy in Thibet is always busy, while the natives of that country have long been accustomed to the old governance. If the style (of the resident) is abruptly changed to "hsing-cheng shih," it is to be feared that suspicion will be aroused, and many inconveniences may follow to internal order and foreign relations. Since, on mature reflection, the style of "chu tsang ta-ch'en" (High Minister resident in Thibet) is nowadays also not suitable, it is proposed to change it to "hsi-tsang pan-shih chang-kuan" (senior officer on duty in Thibet). This will sound like the former "chu tsang ta-ch'en," while the powers and duties being in all respects as of old, it is hoped that obstruction will be obviated.

It is reported, however, that affairs in Thibet are not yet settled. If Chungying has already returned to Szechuan province, let the military governors ("kai tutu") as being near at hand, consider and recommend a person capable of dealing with Thibetan affairs, and report by telegraph, that the President may provide him with a formal commission ("wei-jen ming-ling"), so as to give weight to his responsibility.

By the President, "Wen" (12th of the month), seal.

Translated April 19, 1912:
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 4 in No. 88.

Extract from the "T'ien-min Pao" of April 17, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE Office for Frontier Arrangements on the 8th of the 4th month, solar calendar (8th April, 1912), selected and dispatched the chief of the survey section, Fu Hsieh-ch'en, and two of his subordinates, Ch'ü Chen-hsiang and Chao Chuang-hsüan, to hasten beyond the barrier at Tachienlu, surveying as they go along. They will then take the road through Ho-k'ou, Lit'ang, Sanpa, and Bat'ang to Kiangka (Gartok), proceding due west. Crossing the Lan-ts'ang Chiang (the Mekong), they will the cut across the mountain ridge and be ferried over the Nu Chiang (Salween), traversing Pomi (Pomed), to Kungpu (Kongbo). Crossing the Sang-ch'u Ho, they will get to Si-shih-k'e Ch'eng, then, skirting the Ya-lu-tsangpu Chiang (Yarimatsang, or Thibetan Brahmaputra), they will go towards the south-east, to Menpo, straight to the northern boundary of the British possession of A-sa-mi (Assam)—the original notes that "this country lies west of Mientien" (Burmah), "north-east of Eastern India." They will then at last turn towards the east, traversing Lang-t'ang Sami ("all this stretch belongs to the area of the savages" ("yeh-fan")). They will then again turn north-east, passing over the upper waters of the I-la-wa-ti (Irrawaddy), and so on to Tsa-yü (Zayul).

It seems that in the country of Zayul it was reported that English troops were furtively entering ("ts'uan," sneaking in, as rats do); so on the 14th March the special officer ("wei-yuan"), Chiang Feng-ch'i, accompanied by the English-speaking interpreter, Chao Yang-yün, and a guide, Shu Chin-liang, was sent straight to Zayul to parley ("chiao-she") with the English forces. Accordingly, on the present occasion, when Mr. Fu and the others are also being sent to survey up to Zayul, they will return from Zayul due east, by way of Mu-si-p'u, on the border of the country of the savages, to Lung-po [and] Sung-t'a, on the lower reaches of the Nu Chiang (Salween). [This district is in the fever zone, and between spring and summer the heat is torrid; Chinese rarely go there.]

The district from Men-po to Sung-t'a is conterminous for over 1,000 *li* (say 300 miles) with British territory. The object of the Office for Frontier Arrangements in now sending Mr. Fu and the others to proceed thither, despite all risks, is to survey the salient points in the mountains and rivers and to draw an accurate map, as a preparation for negotiations at a later date, so that we may not tread in the old rut of diplomatic loss, as in the Kachin Hills of Yünnan under the late Ch'ing (dynasty). [The allusion is of course to the P'ienma controversy.—W. H. W.] Still, Mr. Fu and the rest, in shrinking from neither dangers nor distance, and willingly braving peril and hardship, cannot be too highly commended.

Translated April 19, 1912:
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 5 in No. 88.

Note by Military Attaché on the Route laid down for the Chinese Survey Party dispatched to survey the Anglo-Thibetan Border from the Dihang to the Salween, (as mentioned in Consul-General Wilkinson's Despatch No. 43, dated April 21, 1912).*

(Confidential.)

AS regards Chinese activity on the Assam border, to which Mr. Wilkinson draws attention, the route laid down for the Chinese survey party from Kung-pu† to Sung-t'a‡ is particularly interesting. In the first place, the directions to pass through Po-mi (Po-med) point to the pacification or subjugation of that region, which was last year in revolt and the scene of military operations (in which at first the Chinese were badly beaten).

In the second place, part of the route will take the party through the Abor country, in which Major-General Bower's expedition has been operating. The detachment from the Abor expeditionary force which was sent up the Dihang, to explore, if possible, to the Pe-ma-koi Falls, got only as far as Shinging, in the vicinity of the proposed new frontier.§

Thus, from Shinging downwards,‖ along the course of the Dihang, the party would be travelling through country quite recently brought under effective British control, and which, by the Viceroy's statement of the 27th February,§ will be within the proposed new British border-line.

The "Men-po" mentioned (in the translation from the "Tien Min Pao" of the 17th April, sent by Mr. Wilkinson) is evidently (from the description of its position) the Padam Abor village of Mem-bu (a few miles east of our frontier post of Pasi-ghat, on the Dihang River), and mentioned in General Bower's letter of the 10th October, 1911, to Chief of the General Staff, India, wherein he says that the Hkamti chief, Chowna, reported that Mem-bu had sent twenty men to take part in the massacre of the late Mr. Williamson's party.

It is pertinent to mention also that the Abor expedition of 1894, starting from Bom-jur (on the Dibong River), attacked and burnt Mem-bu for its complicity with other Padam Abor villages in the attack on Bordak Camp.

From Mem-bu the party is to go eastward, traversing Lang-t'ang [? Rong-thod.—M. E. W.] Sami.¶ It is to be observed that a due easterly course from Mem-bu would take them through the Bebejiya Mishmi country, where, as a result of the past winter's friendly Meshmi Mission under Mr. Dundas (not to mention the previous influence of Mr. Williamson** and Mr. Needham), they will again find themselves in a region acknowledging British control.

(Colonel Molesworth's punitive Mishmi expedition of 1899–1900 also, I may mention, traversed this region.)

From Sama this party is directed to turn north-east and reach Tsa-yü (Zayul)—*i.e.*, presumably Chikung, the Chinese military head-quarters in Zayul—"passing over the upper waters of the Irrawaddy."††

This is the only bad geographical blunder in the instructions, which are otherwise remarkable for the accurate geographical knowledge they display (*e.g.*, the bearings from point to point and the knowledge that Mem-bu is on the Assam border, &c.). The mistake regarding the "upper waters of the Irrawaddy" is doubtless based on the old French map, a copy of which Mr. Wilkinson sends.‡‡ This map, as he points out, repeats the old error of identifying the Sang-ch'u with the Upper Irrawaddy, whereas we know now without any doubt, from Captain F. M. Bailey's recent important geographical discoveries on his journey from "Peking to Sadiya" that the sources of the Irrawaddy lie to the south and east of the divide which forms the

* In view of the latest news from Thibet, of the eclipse of Chinese authority at Lhassa and in the dependency generally, as well as in the "marches," it is hardly likely that the programme laid down for this survey party will now be carried out.—M. E. W.

† In the Dihang Valley.—M. E. W.

‡ On the Salween.—M. E. W.

§ Viceroy of India's telegram of 27th February to Secretary of State for India.—M. E. W.

‖ Stage 40 of Pundit A. K.'s route down the Brahmaputra. (See route 53 of "Routes in Thibet," General Staff, India, 1910, Confidential.)

¶ Which Mr. Wilkinson, probably quite correctly, takes to be Sama, in the Lohit Valley, near Rima.

** See "Geographical Journal," October 1909.

†† It is interesting to note the Chinese rendering of the name, viz., "I-la-wa-ti."—M. E. W.

‡‡ With the names given in Chinese.—M. E. W.

southern watershed of the Lohit basin, and that Sanga, Chutsong, Drowa Gompa, Chikung, and Rima are all situated on the upper waters of the Lohit. (*Vide* map accompanying Captain Bailey's report to the Government of India.)

I do not, however, agree with Mr. Wilkinson's conjecture that the Chengtu "Office for Frontier Arrangements," when drawing up the instructions for the survey party, could have meant the route to cross the headwaters of the Mali-Kha, as known to us, because the said instructions say that the party will cross the "upper waters of the Irrawaddy" in getting from Sama to Zayul (Tsa-yü), from which it would appear clear that they consider the river which would have to be crossed between Sama and Chikung (head-quarters of Zayul) as being the upper waters of the Irrawaddy, whereas we know it to be the Upper Lohit.

The English troops alluded to as "sneaking in" to Zayul territory are, of course, the escort of Mr. Dundas's recent mission into the Mishmi country to ascertain where the "confines of Thibet" begin in the neighbourhood of Menil-krai.

Lastly, the Chinese survey party is directed to proceed straight east from Zayul viâ Mu-si-p'u, on the border of the country of the savages, to Lung-po and Sung-t'a. Unless taken absolutely literally (by leaving the Lohit valley and striking directly east into the high mountains), this instruction would take the party actually by Captain Bailey's recent route viâ Drowa Gompa (only 9 miles north of Chikung) and over the Zhashala, Tsong La, and Tsema La passes to the Salween, 9 miles from Lung-po (some 10 miles north of Menkong, and almost "due east" from Chikung (as mentioned in the instructions).

Captain Bailey made the distance from Chikung to Lung-po, 113½ miles, which he covered in eleven stages (some very short ones of only 7 or 8 miles). Sung-t'a* is just 10 miles north of Chamu-tong (which is some 42 miles below Menkong and also on the right bank of the Salween).

This mention of Sung-t'a (in the vicinity of Chamu-tong) as the point on the Salween for which the Chinese survey partly details to map the region conterminous with British territory is to make is especially interesting to me as corroborating in some measure the conclusions which I arrived at more than a year ago, when our geographical knowledge of these regions was in a more nebulous condition than it is now. On p. 5 of my memorandum of the 7th March, 1911,† I suggested that it might be found necessary to recognise the "confines of Thibet" (mentioned in the draft convention submitted with Sir E. Satow's note of the 1st May, 1906 (see Burmah–China frontier, Part I (B. 174), paragraph 37, and footnote), as beginning "somewhere about the latitude of Chamu-tong, *i.e.*, approximately latitude 28° north."

I am unable to locate Mu-si-p'u (? possibly it may be the Mi-chi shown on Captain Bailey's map, 8 miles east of Drowa Gompa, and some 12 miles north-east of Chikung, but this, of course, is only conjecture).

A word is now necessary regarding the map sent by Mr. Wilkinson. This, I think, in spite of its geographical inaccuracy, is of particular value, in that it gives the Chinese characters for place names which may prove of use to the Chinese secretariat of this legation in correspondence, which is sure to ensue about these frontier regions. Mr. Wilkinson has sent one copy only of the map, on which I have entered the English renderings of most of the places along the border, or which are likely to be referred to. I have also had a tracing taken, and will ask the General Staff, Tien-tsin, to make some blue prints from it, as, if the original is sent on to the Foreign Office, we should otherwise be left without a copy for reference here in the Chancery. As regards the inaccuracy I have referred to, it is particularly marked in the Zayul, Hkamti, and Chiu-tzu regions. As regards the former (Zayul), we have Captain Bailey's route map to go by. As regards Hkamti, one of the special objects of Mr. Barnard's mission this last "cold weather," was to have surveys made of the upper basin of the Mali-hka, and, as regards the last-mentioned region (Chiu-tzu), Mr. Barnard was also to send an exploring party into the upper Chiu-tzu (headwaters of the Nmai-kha) valley. The actual headwaters of the Nmai-kha and Tara Wan rivers are indicated on Captain Bailey's map.

In conclusion, with regard to this frontier, it is satisfactory to note the recommendations of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam (as shown in the papers sent in Government of India letter dated the 14th March, 1912),‡ viz. :—

* See Survey of India, sheet 91 of India and adjacent countries. (Parts of Assam, Thibet, and China, 946 S. 94.)

† See printed B. 185, Burmah–China frontier, Nmai-Kha Section, Part II, p. 25.

‡ India, 61/12.

The division of the tribal country, for future control, into three sections, namely :—

Eastern.—Mishmi and Hkamti (latter to be taken over from Burmah), with head-quarters at Sadiya.

And a post of 200 military police to be established at Menil Krai early next "cold weather," with connecting posts on the route thither from Sadiya.

Note.—It is to be regretted that road-making difficulties rendered it impossible to leave a post at or near Menil Krai this last "cold weather" on the withdrawal of Mr. Dundas's mission.—M. E. W.)

Central.—The Abor country, with head-quarters at Rotung, two days distant up the Dihang from Pasi-ghat (present frontier police post on the administrative border*), to be garrisoned by 200 rifles, to be established there before the Abor expeditionary force is withdrawn, and supported by another post of 100 rifles at Pasi-ghat, and 50 at Ko-bo.

Western.—The Aka, Dafla, and Miri hills.

Three small missions, each with an escort of 100 rifles (Gurkha regulars), to be sent out again next cold weather to supplement the work of this last cold weather's Miri expedition.

(*Note.*—It is unfortunate that the Miri Mission, intended, like that into the Mishmi country, to be a "friendly mission," was attacked by the tribesmen,† and had to fight, as an attitude of hostility to next winter's expeditions may thereby be engendered.)

To find the necessary force for the above frontier arrangements the local Government recommends the raising of an extra battalion of Assam military police (about 750 strong) and the transfer of the Dacca battalion from Bengal to Assam.

The Government of India concurred regarding the central section,‡ but refrained from committing itself to an opinion regarding the eastern and western sections pending further consideration.

(*Note.*—Doubtless the suggestion to take over Bor Hkamti from Burmah may meet with some opposition from the Burmah Government, within whose geographical area (the basin of the Irrawaddy) it lies, and it seems questionable whether it is more accessible from Sadiya than from Myitkina and Mogaung.)

The main point, however, is that the general question of the whole frontier line from Bhutan to Yünnan has now at last been definitely and seriously taken up, which is eminently satisfactory.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché, Peking.

Peking, May 15, 1912.

[24349] No. 89.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, June* 8, 1912.

THIBET.

Thibetan clerk in charge of customs at Yatung has telegraphed to the inspector-general suggesting that he should be empowered to arrange terms for the repatriation of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Dalai Lama, who is shortly expected at Yatung.

The telegram has been submitted to Yuan Shih-kai.

(Sent to India.)

* Inner line.—M. E. W.

† See India, 59/12 Report, Miri mission.—M. E. W.

‡ The matter being urgent.

[24514] No. 90.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, June 8, 1912.*

THIBET.

Consul-General at Cheng-tu telegraphs yesterday that the provincial council have decided that the military governor of Szechuen with superintendent of police as his chief of staff should lead an expeditionary force of four regiments against Thibet. Date of departure not fixed.

Should this proposal materialise, it might be perhaps advisable that I should be instructed to warn Yuan Shi-kai that we cannot be expected to give the central Government financial assistance in order to set free provincial funds for the conduct of distant military enterprises.

(Sent to India.)

[24498] No. 91.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy dated the 7th June, 1912, regarding Laden La's mission to Thibet.

India Office, June 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 7, 1912.*

THIBET.

My telegram and yours of the same date have crossed one another. Urgent telegram has been sent by me to trade agent, Gyantse, directing him to despatch immediate instructions to Laden La to halt wherever he may be pending receipt of fresh orders, and not to proceed to Lhassa. Laden La would arrive to-morrow at Kamba Potal, about 100 miles from Gyantse, reaching Lhassa on the 10th June. Our view that Laden La runs practically no risk is further corroborated by fact that instructions have been sent by Dalai Lama to Gyantse Jongpen to afford him every assistance in his power. It should also be remembered that Dalai Lama is still in India in our hands. Further instructions as to Laden La's movements are solicited at a very early date, as the extermination of the remaining Chinese soldiers may at any moment remove the object of his mission, and as rumours of the wildest kind will no doubt be created in Thibet by his delay or recall.

[24731] No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 16th May, 1912, relative to Thibet and Nepal.

India Office, June 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Manners-Smith to Government of India.

Nepal, April 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the correspondence between His Majesty's Secretary of State for India and his Excellency the Viceroy with the connected papers which were forwarded to me under endorsement, dated the 15th April, regarding our proper policy towards China in regard to Thibet.

2. In the light of the above information, I have taken an opportunity of again discussing the present situation with the Prime Minister in Nepal.

3. I am now in a position to assure the Government of India that the earnest desire of the Nepal Durbar is to see Thibet restored to its proper status of practical independence, and that to attain this object Nepal is prepared to aid Thibet by all the means in her power which may be approved by the Government of India.

4. If the British Government decide to leave China a free hand in Thibet, the Prime Minister is of opinion that steps should be taken at the same time to rectify the boundary between Nepal and Thibet, so that the political frontier may coincide in future with the natural boundary or water-parting of the Sanpo or Brahmaputra River.

This suggestion should not, however, be considered as an alternative proposal to that in paragraph 3 above, because the Nepal Durbar consider that their interests will be better served by maintaining in the future as in the past an independent Thibetan Government for a neighbour rather than a Thibet converted into a province of China, however carefully the frontier between Thibet and Nepal may be defined.

[24734] No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 6th June, 1912, regarding Laden La's mission to Thibet.

India Office, June 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 93.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 6, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated 5th instant.

Pending consideration by His Majesty's Government of further report called for in my telegram dated 5th instant, Laden La should not proceed beyond Gyantse. Instructions to this effect should be issued immediately.

[24776] No. 94.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy dated the 8th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 10, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 8, 1912.

TELEGRAM to following effect dated 7th instant received from trade agent, Yatung:—

"Following report dated 28th ultimo received from my informant at Lhassa:—

"'Neither side shows as yet any sign of capitulation, and fighting continues incessantly. At Tengye-ling monastery the Chinese garrison is holding out well, and has three maxim guns. Chinese garrison occupying buildings in south of city are surrounded by Thibetans, who are in occupation of five strongholds in the north. It is the case that Chinese are living on carcases of donkeys and horses, their provisions being nearly exhausted. Lhassa is reduced to one-third of its size, many houses having been burnt both by Thibetans and Chinese. Thibetans have been besieging Trapchi barracks, which have a garrison of about sixty Chinese soldiers. In a recent engagement Chinese lost twenty killed; it is not known what were Thibetan losses. Ladakhi headman is absent from Lhassa; Nepalese representative has returned there. All Nepalese residents have returned for safety to villages at a distance. Many helpless Thibetans are being rescued from danger by them, about 15 rupees for each soul being exacted by them. People are looking forward to arrival of British officer to negotiate peace, as negotiation is at a standstill.'"

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[24775] No. 95.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th June, 1912, regarding Laden La.

India Office, June 10, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 8, 1912.

SEE your telegram dated the 7th instant.

Laden La is a British subject, a native of Sikkim; he is a deputy superintendent in the Bengal police. He has been on special duty with Dalai Lama since latter arrived in India, and was attached to Tashi Lama during his stay in this country. He had previously been employed on Thibet Mission. Besides being a staunch Buddhist, which renders him acceptable to Thibetans, he is a man of great tact, ability, and reliability, and has thorough knowledge of English, Nepali, and Thibetan languages.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[24987] No. 96.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 11, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 10, 1912.

SEE my telegram, dated the 8th instant, regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated the 8th instant, has been addressed by trade agent, Gyantse, to political agent, Sikkim, and repeated to Government of India :—

"According to information from Lhassa, dated the 30th ultimo, from reliable source, forty to fifty Chinese troops were still holding out in Trapchi barracks. Thibetans have been firing on Chinese with two big guns which they have placed on Kyi-chu hills. Thibetan wounded are under treatment to the number of 300. Defeat was recently sustained by seventy Chinese at Shopado, which is situated east of Lhassa, 15 days' march away; all Chinese were permitted to proceed viâ Kham to China, after surrendering arms and ammunition, with the exception of one officer who had been detained in custody. Thibetans have degraded Depon over all Dopa because a month ago he failed to attack Chinese in the vicinity of the cathedral. It appears from other reports that on the 2nd instant some fighting was still in progress and that the middle of the month is the latest that the garrison of Tengye-ling monastery can hold out. There will be a better propect of peace when defenders of that monastery have been disposed of."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[24514] No. 97.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 11, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking relative to the proposed dispatch of an expeditionary force from Szechuan to Thibet.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished as soon as possible with the views of the Secretary of State for India on Sir J. Jordan's proposal to warn Yuan Shih-kai that His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to afford financial assistance to the Central Government in order that provincial funds may be set free for the conduct of distant military enterprises.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[25083] No. 98.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 10th June, 1912, regarding Laden La's mission to Thibet.

India Office, June 11, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 98.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram, dated the 8th instant, shows that a much more political character than had been understood here attaches to the mission of Laden La, which accordingly, besides being more open to criticism in view of the terms of article 3 of Anglo-Russian

* No. 90

agreement, is also in the opinion of His Majesty's Government even more objectionable on its merits. His Majesty's Government must therefore require that, if overtaken before he reaches Lhassa, Laden La should be at once recalled. In the event of his having reached Lhassa in conditions which render it impracticable for him to return immediately, he might say that his functions are limited to arranging for safe conduct of Chinese if they surrender (see reference in your telegram of 5th instant to letter from Chinese officer), but that he has no authority to discuss terms of surrender in which His Majesty's Government are not concerned. Instructions should be given to Laden La to restrict his stay to shortest period possible, and to leave if there is any prospect of settlement of terms of surrender between Thibetans and Chinese being delayed.

[25114] No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 11th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 12, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 99.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 11, 1912.

PLEASE see telegram dated 8th instant from Sir J. Jordan regarding affairs in Thibet. We trust that reported proposal to dispatch expedition from Chengtu against Thibetans may be made subject of strongest protest to Chinese Government, based on grounds connected with eventual recognition of new Government, as well as on those connected with loan to which Sir J. Jordan refers. Not only would recent undesirable situation be re-created by such an expedition, but general unrest, which would react on Indian frontier and Nepal, would be involved by it. There is prospect that internal order will be restored in Thibet with Dalai Lama's return, and it will be best to settle subsequently by peaceful methods the question of restoring the suzerainty of China.

Enclosure 2 in No. 99.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 11, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 10th instant regarding Thibet. General situation at Lhassa remains unchanged according to latest information from Gyantse. Regent of Thibet states, in reply to letter from trade agent, Gyantse (see my telegram dated 12th ultimo), that attempts to negotiate have been made by Nepalese representative. Regent suggests, however, that representative enjoys little confidence with Chinese, and he hints that no mediation is likely to be successful unless a British representative is present.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 99.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 11, 1912.

WE propose that farewell message to following effect should be given to Dalai Lama before he leaves India on 24th instant. It seems desirable to give him some message:—

After expressing Government of India's hope that Lama has found his stay in India comfortable, and wishing him a safe and prosperous journey, it is proposed to

say that Government's wish is to see cordial relations maintained between India and Thibet, and internal autonomy preserved in Thibet, subject to suzerainty of China, but without interference on part of Chinese; that Government of India look to Dalai Lama to do his best to secure these objects; that restoration of order and cessation of internal discord is the first essential; and that friendly letters from the Dalai Lama will always be gladly received and answered by the Viceroy.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[33577] No. 100.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st February last, relative to the proposal of Mr. Archibald Rose, lately acting British consul at Tengyueh, for a settlement of pending frontier questions with the Chinese Government, based on the exchange of the Mir of Hunza's rights in Sarikol for those of the Teng Keng chief in the Hpimaw district, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking containing his views on this proposal.*

Sir E. Grey considers that, in view of Sir J. Jordan's very definite expression of opinion, Mr. Rose's suggestion must be abandoned.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[25296] No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th June, 1912, regarding Laden La's mission to Thibet.

India Office, June 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 101.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 13, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated the 11th instant.

Laden La should now be returning to Gyantse; instructions to halt reached him on the 9th instant at Chusul, 31½ miles from Lhassa.

[25312] No. 102.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 15.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 13, 1912.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 30th May and the 11th June, forwarding, for the observations of the Secretary of State for India, copies of telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Peking as to the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to Thibet.

In reply, I am to say that the Marquess of Crewe doubts the expediency of raising the question of the status of Nepal and Bhutan, as suggested by Sir J. Jordan, in connection with the recognition of the Republican Government in China. It would seem more politic to treat that question as finally closed by Sir J. Jordan's note to the

* No. 83.

Wai-wu Pu of the 10th May, 1911,* and to advise the Nepalese Durbar simply to discontinue sending the quinquennial mission to Peking. His Lordship would therefore prefer that our demands should, as previously proposed, be confined to the preservation of the *status quo* under the convention between Great Britain and Thibet, viz., the maintenance of Thibet as a separate political unit, subject to the suzerainty of China, but enjoying a full measure of self-government for the purpose of its relations with the British Government, as defined by the treaty of 1904 and the trade regulations of 1908. In order to secure this, it would seem necessary that His Majesty's Government should satisfy themselves as to the measures contemplated by the Chinese in Thibet before according recognition to the Republican Government.

It would no doubt be desirable, if possible, to come to an arrangement with China defining the powers of the Chinese resident at Lhassa, and restricting within suitable limits the number of Chinese troops in Thibet. But for the present, it does not seem practicable to go beyond Sir J. Jordan's suggestion that he should endeavour to obtain a stipulation from the Chinese that no military action will be taken against the Thibetans without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government. And since it would appear from the facts reported in Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 127, dated the 8th June, which forms an enclosure in your letter of the 11th June, that this question may at any moment reach an acute stage, I am to suggest that Sir J. Jordan should be instructed without delay, as a preliminary step, to convey a warning to Yuan Shih-kai in the sense proposed in the second paragraph of the telegram in question. He might add that, while His Majesty's Government have no desire to prevent the present Chinese garrison at Lhassa from returning to China viâ India should they wish to do so, that route must be regarded hereafter as closed absolutely to Chinese troops and officials.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[25531] No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 15.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 14, 1912.

IN continuation of my letter of the 13th June, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 11th June, 1912, as to the reported intention of the Chinese authorities at Chengtu to dispatch a military expedition into Thibet. As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will have learned from my letter cited above, the Marquess of Crewe is in general agreement with the views expressed by the Government of India. But he would suggest that it might be left to the discretion of His Majesty's Minister at Peking, to whom the Government of India are being instructed to repeat their telegram, to determine the precise grounds on which to base his remonstrance at the present stage.

Lord Crewe desires to refer in this connection to your letter of the 11th June, 1912, transmitting a request from the Chinese Government for a detailed statement of the reasons of His Majesty's Government for declining to accept the arrangements proposed by the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Communications for the exchange of mails between India and Thibet. His Lordship would suggest that the Chinese Government might be informed in reply that, in view of the altered conditions in Thibet consequent upon the complete breakdown of Chinese authority in the country, His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion of postal arrangements with the Wai-chiao Pu, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the question hereafter when and in what manner they may think desirable.

I have, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[25530] No. 104.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 15.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 14, 1912.

I AM directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 11th June, 1912, as to the proposed farewell message to be communicated to the Dalai Lama

* Enclosure in Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 206, May 10, 1911.

before his departure from India on the 24th instant, and to state that the terms of the proposed message appear to the Marquess of Crewe to be generally of a suitable character. The words "without Chinese interference" are, however, somewhat unguarded in view of the terms of article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention and of the trade regulations. His Lordship therefore proposes to amend the sentence as follows:—"Desire of Government is to see internal autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty maintained without Chinese interference so long as treaty obligations are duly performed and cordial relations preserved between Thibet and India." This formula has the further advantage of conveying a warning to the Dalai Lama of the consequences of disregarding the convention.

I have, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[25314] No. 105.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 14, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 13, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 11th instant. Following is present programme of Dalai Lama:—

28th June, reach Yatung, where he will stay till the 2nd proximo; 3rd–5th proximo, halt at Phari, thence proceed viâ Ralung and Kangma, but not Gyantse, to Lhassa.

Trade agent, Yatung, was confidentially informed by messenger returning from Kalimpong to Lhassa that National Assembly at Lhassa has been instructed by Dalai Lama to inform Chinese that they will be allowed to proceed to China without being molested *en route* if they surrender arms and ammunition in presence of a British representative. A popular ovation was given to Laden La at Kamba Partsi, Chaksam, and Chusul. Chen-sa Nangang, commandant of Thibetan troops, who was on his way to Kalimpong, met Laden La at Pedijong, and at the latter's request agreed to return to Lhassa. Information to following effect was furnished by Chen-sa:—

If Chinese yield arms and ammunition they will be given free transport to frontier. They have only small quantity left of ammunition or provisions. Thibetan forces comprise 9,000 lay experienced men, and monk soldiers to the number of 1,500, with 3,000 magazine rifles and 300 Martini-Henry rifles. 500 fairly serviceable cartridges are being manufactured daily by Thibetans for the latter and 1,500 for the former, and a gun factory has been started which has already turned out two 8-pr. guns. A month ago, in an engagement at Yutok bridge, one gun lost at Shigatse was recaptured by Chinese.

News has been received, the trade agent at Gyantse reports, that Thibetans have refused offer made by Amban Len to surrender arms and ammunition on condition that a guard of 500 armed Chinese soldiers should be allowed him, and that he should himself retain his former position.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[25980] No. 106.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 17, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 17, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated the 13th instant regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect dated the 14th instant received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"In a letter dated the 11th instant Laden La states that Thibetans' camps east of Lhasa were attacked by Chinese, who took the offensive in large numbers, on the evening of the 8th instant. The Chinese were repulsed, it is not known with what casualties. The new Trapchi barracks were captured by the Thibetans earlier on the same day, the Chinese being confined to old portion of the barracks. There was a loss of about twelve killed and wounded on each side."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[26067] No. 107.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 17th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 18, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 107.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 17, 1912.

SEE my telegram of to-day's date regarding Thibet.

I repeat three further telegrams which have been received from trade agent, Gyantse, to following effect. The first was dated the 15th instant, the second and third the 16th instant:—

(1.)

"In a letter from Chusul, dated the 12th instant, Laden La reports that 100 armed monks, thirty-four from Drepung manastery and thirty-three each from Gaden and Sera, have arrived *en route* to the Chumbi Valley. They should arrive at Gyantse on the 19th instant. Laden La also states that he is urged by Thibetan general to come without delay to Lhassa, and that he has replied that before doing so he must await orders."

(2.)

"Orders regarding recall reached Laden La on the 14th instant, and it was his intention to start back on the following day."

(3.)

"Tsetrung Lobsang, bearing three letters practically identical in terms, and addressed to Laden La as 'the officer deputed by the British Government to make a peace between Chinese and Thibetans,' from Thibetan general, National Assembly, and Regent, arrived at Chusul on the 13th instant, with a view to urging Laden La to proceed to Lhassa at once. Tsetrung Lobsang is taking an active part in resisting the Chinese. The letters are to the effect that if Laden La would save life of Dalai Lama's brother and of other Thibetans who are under Chinese detention he should lose no time. I was visited to-day by Tsetrung Lobsang, who is proceeding to Kalimpong instead of returning to Lhassa. He informs me that position of Thibetans in power of Chinese is very grave, Chinese being now really in extremities. In the absence of a British witness prospects of peace appear to be very slight, so great is the mutual distrust of the opposing parties. I believe that, if only Thibetans could feel sure that Chinese would not attack villages *en route* for India, they would be willing to forego surrender of some, or possibly all, Chinese arms, while, if assured of safe conduct, Chinese would be disposed to consider question of surrendering rifles. Overtures for negotiations on these lines, on the understanding that a British officer would be present, but not otherwise, are reported to have been made by Amban Len."

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 107.

Goverment of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 17, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram of to-day's date.

Telegram to following effect, dated the 17th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"Laden La returned to Chaksam from Chusul on the 15th instant on plea of ill-health, but he retraced his steps subsequently as far as Chusul at request of Chinese, and in response to earnest entreaties of Thibetan Government and people that his mission should not be abandoned. Having already arrived so near Lhassa, he requests that permission to remain at Chusul for a fortnight and act according to alternative instructions may at least be granted him."

I have repeated orders to Laden La to return at once, in view of definite instructions contained in your telegram dated the 10th instant.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[25979] No. 108.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, June* 18, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Chengtu, dated 17th June:—

"First detachment of Thibet expedition left Chengtu 16th June amidst greatest enthusiasm. Consisted of only about 700 men, including servants. Other detachments will leave 26th June and 3rd July. Total force will be about 8,000, of which at least 10 per cent. non-combatants. Governor will be probably last to leave. His instructions to expedition are to maintain strict discipline and not to ill-treat natives. Deserters will be shot. Object of expedition not only to force Thibet to enter Chinese confederacy and to safeguard Szechuan frontier, but also to convince foreign nations that Chinese army is not despicable.

"Lolun addressing the troops said that beyond Thibet they would find [?] India, and must avoid complications."

[26144] No. 109.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th June, 1912, relative to Kashgar.

India Office, June 18, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 109.

Mr. Fraser (Resident in Kashmir) to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Srinagar, May 10, 1912.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 26th April, 1912, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 6th April, 1912, from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Kashgar, reporting news of the revolutionary movement in the Sin-Chiang province.

2. With reference to paragraph 5 of Mr. Macartney's letter, I have the honour to recommend that, if there be no objection, the thanks of His Majesty's Government be tendered, through the usual diplomatic channel, to M. Sokow, the Russian consul-general at Kashgar, and to the Russian consular officers at Ili and Urumtchi, for their readiness to extend their good offices to British subjects at Ili during the recent troubles.

Enclosure 2 in No. 109.

Consul-General Macartney to Mr. Fraser (Resident in Kashmir).

(Confidential.) *Kashgar, April 6, 1912.*

IN continuation of my letter dated the 20th ultimo, I beg to report the following news concerning the revolutionary movement in the Sin-Chiang province.

2. About a week ago, the Chinese officials in Kashgar changed their chronological system; the current year having been altered from the 4th of Hsuan-tung to the 1st of the Chinese Republic, and the dates of the month, no longer on a lunar basis, being reckoned according to our own Gregorian Calendar. In official documents, too, the authorities have begun to style themselves functionarios of "The Great Chinese Republic" ("Ta Chung-hua Ming-Kuo"). A few Chinamen have cut off their queues, but so far the functionaries have not taken this step. It is noteworthy that, in effecting these changes, the officials in Southern Sin-Chiang have acted on their own initiative; Provincial Governor Yuen at Urumtchi having, instead of leading the movement, done what he could to retard it, by his refusal to communicate to the Kashgar and Aksu taotais information of the abdication edicts and of cognate revolutionary matters.

3. The differences between him and Yang Tsuan-hsu, the revolutionary chief in possession of Ili, have not yet been composed. At the beginning of February last, Yuen received a reinforcement of some 2,000 troops from Kansu. Nevertheless, since the battle on the 11th February at Ssu-ko-shu, no engagement has taken place. As regards Yang Tsuan-hsu, despite the desertion of his Major, Tsai Loshan, with some 200 men, his position continues to be fairly strong. Moreover, he is said to have ample funds for one year at least. The ultra-Manchu attitude of the governor—himself an Anhui man—is condemned by the officials in Kashgar, and his refusal to come to terms with the Ili revolutionists causes general surprise. My own impression is that, if there be obstinacy, now at least it is less on the governor's than on the revolutionists' part. By his barbarities after the revolt in Urumtchi, on the night of the 28th December, the governor has compromised his position irretrievably, and now it is too late for him to declare himself republican, even if he should wish to; for the republicans, whom the course of events has justified, are not likely to pardon a man whose hands have been stained with the blood of over one hundred of their partisans.

4. As regards the position of British subjects in Ili, the following remarks contained in a letter, dated the 10th (23rd) February last, from the officiating Russian consul at Ili, will be of interest:—

"A la réception du télégramme du consul général de Russie à Kashgar, M. S. Sokov, en date du 6 (19) janvier, je me suis enquis de suite concernant vos sujets, comme je l'ai annoncé dans mon télégramme réponse.

"Un de nos 'aksakals' a reçu ordre de dresser une liste et de dire à chacun qu'en tous cas de vexation ou de danger, ils pouvaient s'adresser à nous par lui.

"Je crois le danger conjuré, et jusque maintenant personne n'a été molesté; si dans le futur de nouvelles difficultés surgissaient, vous pouvez être sûr que notre protection ira aussi bien à vos sujets qu'aux nôtres.

"A Kouldja nous avons recensé neuf familles de Peshawar, une de Lahore, et une de Delhi. Les villes Koura et Souiding apportent un autre petit contingent. Dix-sept familles d'Afghanistan (Badakshan, Kabul, Kandahar, et Ghazni) se réclament à être sujets indiens.

"Mes soins et vigilance ne se démentiront pas; et comme notre 'aksakal' parle persan et passablement hindostani, vous pouvez être sûr que nous sommes toujours bien informés des besoins de votre peuple."

5. I do not know if my action in getting M. Sokow to ask the Russian consul at Ili to give, in case of need, protection to British subjects will be approved. If so, though the Russians have not been put to the necessity of taking measures, yet for the good-will displayed by them, and for the encouragement of a neighbourly feeling, I venture to suggest that the thanks of His Majesty's Government be tendered, through the usual diplomatic channel, to those concerned, namely, to M. Sokow, consul-general at Kashgar; M. A. Diakoff, officiating consul at Ili; and to the consul at Urumtchi (name not known). I may add that M. Sokow continues to be most friendly. He has informed me, as a piece of news which he thought would give me pleasure, that, at his request, Captain Kolbine is to be superseded at Sarikol, "pour se mêler des politiques." What he meant exactly by "politiques" I have not thought necessary to ask. In any case, it is possible that some words I had used in informal conversations with M. Sokow and his secretary regarding Captain Kolbine's proceedings have not fallen on deaf ears.

Enclosure 3 in No. 109.

Consul-General Macartney to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Kashgar, May* 21, 1912.

WANG, whose election as taotai has been confirmed by governor, has been recognised as such both by the Russian consul-general and myself.

Situation continues disturbed.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking has been furnished with a copy of this telegram.

[26186] No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 19, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 18, 1912.

SEE my telegram of yesterday regarding Thibet. I repeat telegram from trade agent, Gyantse, also dated yesterday, to following effect:—

"On condition of their surrendering arms and travelling viâ India, safe conduct out of Thibet, under guarantee of National Assembly, Regent, Ladakhis, and Nepalese representative, was offered to Chinese by Thibetan Government about the middle of last month. In a letter dated 16th ultimo, of which a copy has just reached me, Tung Tung Ling and Len replied that Chinese had not sufficient confidence in Thibetan people or their sureties, and therefore could not accept the above terms; but that they were willing to send delegates to Gyantse, and to accept the terms offered if safe conduct were guaranteed by British trade agent. Laden La was informed by Thibetan general in a letter dated 14th instant, that affairs are still in the same position, and he has also received an oral message from the general to the following effect:—'Relations of Dalai Lama are in danger. Fact that British Government deputed you to mediate is known to all Thibet. Matter at issue might even require no more than three days for settlement. You should in any case stay at Chusul rather than go back to Gyantse, as, unless you do so, your Government may be accused of deserting Thibetans or yourself of cowardice.' Haji Ghulam Mohammed was urged by Tung Tung Ling, in letter dated 14th June, to expedite British officer's arrival, and a message to the same effect was sent by the Amban. Laden La asks in these circumstances for permission to proceed to Lhassa, or, if that cannot be given, to remain for ten days where he is."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[26187] No. 111.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th June, 1912, regarding the North-East Frontier.

India Office, June 19, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 18, 1912.

DISPATCH of a party consisting of three native surveyors and one British officer, under Captain Pritchard, 83rd Wallajahbad Infantry, to explore north-east salient of Burmah frontier, about longitude 98°, latitude 28°, is proposed by military authorities. This undertaking, it is thought, will increase present geographical knowledge of region in question, and will prove of great importance as completing exploration work carried out by late expedition to Hkamti Long. Provided party does not go south of Taron River bend (latitude 27° 40′)—south of which tribesmen are reported to be troublesome—there is no objection to proposal on part of Burmah Government, who have been consulted. We see no objection to proposed journey, and propose, if you approve, to sanction it on the above condition.

[26208] No. 112.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, June 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Chengtu, dated 17th June:—

"President of the Republic on 11th June telegraphed to Yünnan governor, directing the Yünnan contingent for the Thibet expedition to march through Atentzu to join Szechuan contingent at Batang. It must not go from Wei-hsi through the country of the Loyi savages direct to Lhassa, as progress would be slow and costly, but preparations may be made for the future strengthening of that frontier. Two provinces are to select joint commander-in-chief of the expedition, which should hasten its movements."

(Sent to India.)

[25312] No. 113.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 8th June and Viceroy of India's telegram of 11th June.

After consultation with Secretary of State for India I agree that you should without delay, as a preliminary step, warn Yuan Shih-kai in sense suggested in second paragraph of your telegram.

You can add that, while we have no desire to prevent present Chinese garrison at Lhassa from returning to China viâ India, route must be considered hereafter as closed absolutely to Chinese troops and officials.

We do not think that it would be expedient to raise question of Nepal and Bhutan, and would prefer to consider it finally closed by your note of 10th May, 1911, and to advise Nepal simply to discontinue sending quinquennial mission.

(Repeated to India.)

[25312] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 20, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Do you think it would be possible to induce Chinese Government to come to an arrangement as to the powers of Chinese Resident at Lhassa and number of Chinese troops in Thibet?

(Repeated to India.)

[26327] No. 115.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 20, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 20, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 18th instant. I repeat telegram dated the 18th June from trade agent, Gyantse, to following effect :—

"Village and monastery of Dip were occupied by Chinese on the following day, the 13th June, and a large quantity of food was captured by them. 200 Thibetan and 300 Kongbu soldiers were sent by Thibetans, also on 13th instant, to evict Chinese, and during the night fighting ensued. It is not known what was the result."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[25530] No. 116.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th instant relative to the proposed farewell message to be communicated to the Dalai Lama before his departure from India, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he concurs in the amendment in the terms of this message proposed by the Secretary of State for India.

Sir E. Grey would suggest, however, that in view of the undertaking in article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Convention, "à ne traiter avec le Thibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement chinois," it would be advisable to omit the last sentence in the message suggested in the Viceroy's telegram, *i.e.*, "The Viceroy will always be glad to receive and answer friendly letters from the Dalai Lama."

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[26565] No. 117.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 19th June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 117.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 19, 1912.

PLEASE refer to telegram dated 18th instant from His Majesty's Minister, Peking, regarding Chinese expedition to Thibet. Has possibility of prohibiting export of rice from India to Thibet been considered by you?

[26590] No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 21st June, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 22, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 21, 1912.

REFERENCE is invited to telegram dated 18th instant from His Majesty's Minister, Peking. News of Chinese advance on Thibet will probably have the immediate effect that the faction in Thibet which favours the Chinese will revive with recrudescence of disorder as a consequence; that hopes of Chinese remnant will be renewed, all possibility of a peaceful settlement being thereby removed; and that Dalai Lama's return, on which hope of restoring order mainly depends, will be deterred. It may also be impossible again to restrain armed intervention on part of Nepalese, whose interests in Thibet will again be placed in jeopardy. Protest suggested in our telegram of 11th instant will, we trust, be made, and Chinese Government strongly urged to recall force. A further attempt at the incorporation of Thibet as a province of Chinese empire is evidently intended by Chinese Government; strenuous resistance should be offered to this as being contrary to treaty. Independence of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal would be seriously menaced by presence of Chinese on their frontiers.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 21, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated to-day regarding Thibet. Following dated 19th instant from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"Entrenched position has been taken up by Chinese in Dip, where Thibetans are surrounding them on all sides. According to a letter from Haji Ghulam Muhammad, Chinese in Lhassa are not likely to be overpowered until their ammunition runs out, as they can always revictual by breaking through the investing force at its weak point."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[26562] No. 119.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, June* 22, 1912.

THIBET.

I am to have interview with President to-morrow to carry out instructions contained in your telegram No. 96 of 20th June. Grateful for early instructions if I am to take action on Government of India telegram of 21st June.

(Sent to India.)

[26683] No. 120.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, June* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 96 of 20th June.

President, to whom I spoke to-day in the sense of your instructions, said that Szechuan expedition was authorised to deal only with the state of disorder in the Thibetan marches, and would not, he thought, proceed further without definite orders from the Central Government.

I pressed him to give a definite undertaking that it would not cross frontier without previous consultation with us, but he said he must consult Cabinet on this point. He promised, however, to inform me of Cabinet's views, and of any further developments.

Speaking quite privately, he said internal situation in Szechuan was causing him

grave anxiety, and would probably have to be dealt with by force. The province was in hands of a few young men who were getting out of all control. Their object in organising this expedition was probably to find employment for unruly troops who were proving dangerous in Chengtu.

He disclaimed all idea of incorporating Thibet as an integral part of China, or of making any change which would conflict with treaty obligations.

He welcomed the intimation that Chinese garrison at Lhassa, of which he had no news, would be allowed to return through India. He said he would be grateful for anything Government of India could do to facilitate their extrication. I would suggest advantage should be taken of this, as the departure of the garrison would remove all excuse for advance of the Szechuan expedition, and that I should be authorised to inform him as to what arrangements can be made.

(Repeated to India.)

[26920] No. 121.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, June* 24, 1912.

MY telegram No. 136 of 19th June.

Consul-general at Chengtu telegraphs that Thibetans have occupied Lamaya, east of Batang, and that Chinese troops retreated to Litang, where they are preparing to decamp together with permanent garrison.

(Sent to India.)

[26912] No. 122.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary for State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd June, 1912, regarding the Chinese expedition to Thibet.

India Office, June 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 23, 1912.

CHINESE expedition to Thibet. See your telegram dated the 19th instant.

Possibility of prohibiting export of rice to Thibet from India as a means of checking advance of Chinese had been considered by us, but for the following reasons the idea was discarded as ineffective :—

1. The prohibition to have effect should include exports of rice from Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, which would involve paying compensation and would be difficult to arrange effectively. The export from India alone is negligible, amounting only to about 60,000 rupees per annum.

2. Supplies can be obtained by Chinese from Eastern provinces and Kham ; that arrangements for supplies of rice were in hand is known from letter, dated the 22nd March, from consul-general, Chengtu.

3. Chinese would regard the proposed action as pin-pricking, and retaliatory measures or [?] trade action on their part would probably be the only result.

Action should, we consider, be directed for present on lines of diplomatic protest in very strong terms based on conditions of loan, on recognition of new Government, and on treaty arrangements and assurances. It will be for consideration, if action on the above lines fails, whether Nepal should be further restrained by us from armed intervention in Thibet to protect her interests which reoccupation by Chinese will menace.

[25531] No. 123.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant relative to the proposed Chinese expedition from Chengtu into Thibet and to the question of the exchange of mails between India and Thibet.

With regard to the latter point, Sir E. Grey is inclined to think that the reply to the Chinese Government suggested in the second paragraph of your letter might be liable to be construed by the latter as an invitation to them to re-establish their authority in Thibet, and he would, therefore, propose, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, merely to inform the Chinese Government that, in the present disturbed state of Thibet, His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion of postal arrangements with the Wai-chiao Pu, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the question hereafter when and in what manner they may think desirable.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[27017] No. 124.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 25.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 22, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th June, 1912, as to the proposed farewell message to the Dalai Lama before his departure from India, I am directed to inform you that, in accordance with the suggestion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Government of India have been instructed to omit the final sentence of the proposed message relating to the exchange of friendly letters between the Viceroy and the Dalai Lama. A copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the Government of India on the subject is enclosed herewith for your information.

I am at the same time to add that, while adopting the suggestion above referred to, the Marquess of Crewe has not read your letter as implying that correspondence of the kind no doubt contemplated by the Government of India is, in principle, precluded by article 2 of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. The right of communicating direct with the Thibetan Government at Lhassa has always been held to be established implicitly by the Anglo-Thibetan Treaty of 1904, which was confirmed by article 1 of the Peking Convention of 1906; and it must therefore, in Lord Crewe's opinion, be classed as one of the "engagements assumés par la Grande-Bretagne et la Chine," which are expressly exempted from the operation of article 2 of the agreement with Russia.

His Lordship would point out, moreover, that direct correspondence between the Government of India and the "Thibetan High Authorities" at Lhassa is clearly contemplated in article 3 of the Thibet Trade Regulations of 1908, which were concluded subsequently to the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 124.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 21, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 11th instant.

Last clause of proposed farewell message to Dalai Lama should be omitted, and for the clause regarding the wish of Government should be substituted a clause to the effect that Government desires to see internal autonomy of Thibet under suzerainty of China maintained without interference on part of Chinese so long as cordial relations are preserved between India and Thibet and treaty obligations are duly performed. Subject to these modifications terms of proposed message are approved by His Majesty's Government.

[27005] No. 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th June, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, June 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) *June 24, 1912.*

DALAI LAMA left Kalimpong *en route* for Thibet this morning.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[25530] No. 126.

Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff.

AS the Russian Government are no doubt aware, the situation in Thibet has recently given cause for considerable anxiety.

The amban and some 1,000 Chinese troops are besieged by the Thibetans in Lhassa, and are reported to be in such straits for food and ammunition that their annihilation or surrender appears imminent.

Small bodies of Chinese troops in other parts of Thibet have already surrendered and have been allowed to return to China viâ India, and the Thibetans appear to have regained control of practically the whole country.

Both the Chinese and Thibetan authorities at Lhassa have appealed to the Government of India to send an officer to Lhassa to arrange for the surrender of the Chinese troops there and for their safe conduct to India. His Majesty's Government have so far not acceded to this request.

The Dalai Lama proposes to leave India on his return to Lhassa on the 24th instant, and His Majesty's Government have authorised the Government of India to communicate to him the following message of advice and farewell:—

"The Government of India wish the Dalai Lama a safe and prosperous journey, and hope that he has found his stay in India comfortable. Desire of the Government is to see the internal autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty maintained without Chinese interference so long as treaty obligations are duly performed and cordial relations preserved between Thibet and India. They look to the Dalai Lama to do his best to secure these objects. The first essential is that there should be a cessation of internal discord and a restoration of order."

Foreign Office, June 25, 1912.

[27103] No. 127.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 247.)

Sir, *Peking, June 6, 1912.*

IN obedience to the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 84 of the 22nd May, I had an interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th May for the purpose of clearly defining our position with regard to Thibet. I drew his Excellency's attention to the presidential order of the 21st April last, which formed Enclosure 3 in my despatch No. 196. This explicitly stated that Thibet was in future to be on the same footing as a province in China proper, and that its administration was to be entrusted to the Ministry of the Interior. It was hardly necessary for me to point out that this step involved a change in the political status of Thibet, which was at complete variance with the treaties which Thibet had

concluded with Great Britain, and with the repeated undertakings which China had given to His Majesty's Government. I had therefore received instructions to lodge a formal protest against the attitude of the Republican Government towards Thibet as displayed in its original constitution and in subsequent presidential messages.

The Acting Minister made an ineffectual attempt to explain away the passages in the order of the 21st April to which I had directed his attention, but I reminded him that Thibet had never at any time been directly administered by China, and that the country had always been an autonomous State. He expressed a hope that Great Britain, which had rendered China such valuable and friendly services during the revolution, would not follow the example of Russia and throw difficulties in the way of the new Government by raising such an embarrassing question.

I disclaimed any intention of causing embarrassment, and added that I had purposely refrained from recording the protest in writing in order that the Government might have an opportunity of reconsidering their attitude and arriving at a solution of the difficulty before the question of formal recognition of the Chinese Republic came up for decision.

It was impossible, however, to overlook the fact that the republic at its inception had arrogated to itself a position in Thibet which conflicted with the international obligations it had inherited from the Manchus, and with the autonomy which the country had always enjoyed.

The Minister intimated his intention of consulting the President, and promised to let me have a reply in a few days. He foresaw that there would be serious difficulty in obtaining the consent of the National Assembly to any modification of the constitution of the republic.

I had hoped to be able to report the terms of the Wai-chiao Pu's reply in this despatch, but although I have seen the Minister and Yuan Shih-kai several times since the date of my interview, they have made no allusion to the subject, and it seemed to me inadvisable to press the matter further until I had received your instructions with regard to the suggestions I ventured to offer in my telegram No. 117 of the 24th May.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

[27260] No. 128.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 146 A.)
(Telegraphic.)

Peking, June 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 97 of 20th June.

I think it may be possible to come to some such arrangement later on, but it woul t be premature to propose it at present. At my interview of 23rd June I gave Presiden to understand that if the expedition were stopped there would be no difficulty in arriving at friendly settlement. He knows that we are in future in earnest, and will, I think, do his utmost to check enthusiasm of Szechuan, but his authority is far from decisive in such matters.

(Sent to India.)

[27011] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 107.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 26, 1912.

I TOLD the Japanese Ambassador on the 26th instant of the article in the "Manchu Nichi Nichi Shimbun" enclosed in your despatch No. 147 of the 25th May last.

I said that as these rumours were about I should like to tell him exactly what had passed in Thibet as far as we were concerned. We had no missionaries in Lhassa, and we had sent no force into Thibet. There were in Lhassa some Chinese troops which were surrounded by Thibetans. The latter apparently wished to get the Chinese out of the country, and the Chinese were willing to go on condition that they were given a guarantee that they would not be massacred on the way. They had asked for the

guarantee of the British trade agent, who, under our treaty with Thibet, resided in Gyantse. The Indian Government, on being appealed to, had sent not a British officer, but a native of one of the frontier provinces, who held some position in the Indian police, and had been attached to the Dalai Lama in Darjeeling. This native, Laden La by name, had started for Lhassa, but had been stopped on the way, as we were reluctant to be mixed up in the affair at all. The Thibetans were now urging him to proceed to Lhassa in order that he might mediate there between the Chinese and Thibetans, but we had not yet sanctioned his proceeding there. In any case, if the Chinese left Lhassa he would come away with them.

We were not thinking of any new departure in Thibet at all. We wished it to remain with its own Government under Chinese suzerainty. If the Chinese were going to send troops into Thibet and attack it, we should no doubt object to lending them money to be spent on such a purpose as that, just as the Japanese Government might object to expenditure contrary to their interests in Manchuria. If the Chinese did pursue a really aggressive policy in Thibet they might be brought into conflict with Nepaul, and therefore we should discourage any such policy on the part of the Chinese. But we were not thinking of taking any new step in Thibet on our own initiative.

The Ambassador made a note of the date of the article in the Japanese newspaper, which he said was taken in at the Japanese Embassy.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27320] No. 130.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 27.)

Sir, *India Office, June 26, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 12th June, 1912, as to the proposal of Mr. A. Rose, lately acting British consul at Tengyueh, for a settlement of frontier questions with the Chinese based on the exchange of Hunza rights in Sarikol for those of Teng Keng at Hpimaw, I am directed to inform you that, in the circumstances, the Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Mr. Rose's suggestion must be abandoned.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[27521] No. 131.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, June 28, 1912.*

CHINESE Government have no means of telegraphing to Lhassa except through our agency, and have requested me, in accordance with arrangement made with President of the Republic at interview of 23rd June, to have following message transmitted to Chinese resident-general, through Viceroy of India:—

"President is very anxious as to your welfare. You are earnestly requested to telegraph in detail recent condition of affairs in Thibet. Your reply telegram you should hand for transmission to party conveying this message to you.—(Seal of the Wai-wu Pu.)"

Above message is in ordinary public Chinese figure code. I trust you will approve this action, as it may give an opening for future negotiation on lines of your telegram No. 97 of 20th June.

(Sent to India.)

[27260] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1912.

YOUR telegrams No. 142 of 23rd June and No. 146 A of 26th June.

If we were to endeavour to procure the assent of the Thibetans to the safe and unmolested withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Thibet, we should, in a measure, be making ourselves responsible to the Thibetans that no Chinese force would subsequently be sent. Although you should continue to press the Central Government not to dispatch any force across the frontier, their authority in Szechuan is evidently weak and uncertain, and it is quite possible that even should they send orders that the expedition was to be abandoned their injunctions might be disobeyed and a Chinese force enter Thibet. In such circumstances the Thibetans would probably appeal to us for assistance, which we could not afford without such interference in internal affairs of Thibet as would be inconsistent with our agreement with Russia and our policy towards Thibet, and they would then have grounds for reproaching us with having mis led them. After careful consideration of all the circumstances and possible eventualities, we have come to the conclusion not to intervene in the matter of the Chinese garrison at present in Thibet, but it will be permitted to return to China through India if it likes to take that route.

[27521] No. 133.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* relative to the desire expressed by the President of the Chinese Republic to communicate with the commandant of the Chinese garrison in Lhassa through the Government of India.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that such a course may be open to objection on the part f the India Office and of the Government of India, and he would therefore be glad to be informed of Lord Crewe's views on the question, in order that early instructions may be sent to Sir J. Jordan.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[28128] No. 134.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st July, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, July 2, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 134.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *July* 1, 1912.

DALAI LAMA arrived at Yatung safely on the afternoon of the 28th June.
(Repeated to Peking.)

* No. 131.

[28204] No. 135.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 13th June, 1912, relative to the Dalai and Tashi Lamas.

India Office, July 2, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

The Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Kalimpong, June* 6, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 4th (received the 5th) June, regarding the Dalai and Tashi Lamas.

To-day I mentioned the matter quite informally, and according to the instructions contained in your telegram to the Dalai Lama, who, as well as Lamen Khenpo, who happened to be in the room at the same time, denied that there was any truth in the rumour.

Do you wish any further communication to be made to the Tashi Lama on the subject by the British trade agent at Gyantse.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

The British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, June* 7, 1912.

THE Tashi Lama, who is pressing for an answer to his message referred to in my telegram of the 28th ultimo, now makes the further request that he may be given an assurance that in future he will enjoy an independence equal to that which he enjoyed prior to the departure from Thibet of the Dalai Lama.

This telegram has been addressed to the political officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 3 in No. 135.

The Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Kalimpong, June* 8, 1912.

PLEASE refer to telegram dated the 7th June, 1912, from trade agent, Gyantse. As assurance asked for by Tashi Lama would involve intervention in internal administration of Thibet, it is, I think, undesirable to give it to him. I should be glad to receive orders about it.

Enclosure 4 in No. 135.

Government of India to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, June* 10, 1912.

SITUATION in Thibet.

Gould should inform Tashi Lama that Government of India is not concerned with internal affairs of his country, and cannot therefore accede to his wishes, or give him any assurances. Government of India have however ascertained informally from Dalai Lama that action on latter's part apprehended by Tashi Lama is not contemplated. *Vide* correspondence ending with telegram dated the 7th June.

(Repeated to the British trade agent, Gyantse.)

[28390] No. 136.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, *India Office, July 3, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter of the 24th June, 1912, as to the exchange of mails between India and Thibet, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform the Chinese Government that, in view of the present disturbed state of Thibet, His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion of postal arrangements, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the question hereafter.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[28400] No. 137.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, *India Office, July 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 1st July, 1912, transmitting copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking as to Yuan Shih-kai's desire to communicate with the commandant of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, in the special circumstances of the case, to comply with the President's request.

But his Lordship would suggest that it might be explained to Yuan, if Sir J. Jordan sees no objection, that His Majesty's Government, in giving their consent, have had regard solely to the exceptional character of the present situation, and that they will not hereafter be prepared in any circumstances to afford facilities to the Chinese Government for communicating with Thibet viâ India.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[28392] No. 138.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 3, 1912.*

MESSAGE, of which the following is the purport, has been sent me by Dalai Lama:—

"1. A letter from Len Amban and Chinese General Chung at Lhassa reached me on the very day that I arrived at Yatung, stating that they are willing to send Chinese troops back to China after depositing arms with the Tashi Lama [? a few incarnate] Lamas, and the Gurkha. I am requested by them, in order that lives may be saved, to issue necessary instructions to people of Thibet.

"2. In reply I have proposed to the General and Len Amban that all Chinese soldiers should return to China, and that arms should be taken charge of by representatives of myself and of themselves. It would, however, be a good thing if I were accompanied to Lhassa by a British representative to stand as a witness

who can be fully relied upon, as it is difficult for Thibetan people to believe that everything will be properly conducted. Len and the General were also informed that I am applying to British Government to send a British representative with me as mentioned above, and were told that they should apply without delay to British Government to send a British representative at an early date.

"3. I request, therefore, that, for the benefit of both parties, your Excellency will be so good as to send at an early date a British representative to accompany me to Lhassa. We shall ever be grateful for this. I request that I may be favoured with an early reply."

In reply I propose, in view of orders conveyed in your telegram dated the 10th ultimo, to tell Dalai Lama that I regret that his request cannot be complied with, but that I trust that he will succeed in effecting a settlement by his own efforts.

[28582] No. 139.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 5, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 139.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 4, 1912.

SEE my telegram of the 3rd instant regarding Thibet. Telegram dated 2nd instant to following effect received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"It is stated on reliable information from Lhassa, dated the 27th ultimo, that Dip Trapchi barracks and southern part of city are now held by Chinese, who have built light suspension bridge over Kyichu, connecting Dip with Chinese in town, and have obtained supplies in abundance. On 26th and 27th ultimo fighting of spasmodic nature, in which Thibetans suffered most, took place north and east of town. Haji Ghulam Muhammed was addressed ten days ago by Chinese authorities, who stated that British officer is desired by them either as witness of terms of settlement or as intermediary. Speaking generally, the situation is that both Chinese and Thibetans have grown tired of fighting, and that peace on any suitable terms is desired even by monks. But secret information of advance of column of 2,000 Chinese troops from Szechuan is buoying the Chinese up."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[28390] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 194.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 6, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 228 of the 16th May last, enclosing a memorandum from the Wai-chiao Pu, asking for a detailed statement of the reasons which render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to accept the arrangement proposed by the Chinese Government for the exchange of mails between Thibet and India.

I am of the opinion, after consultation with the India Office, that it is undesirable to return a detailed answer.

You should therefore inform the Wai-chiao Pu that, in view of the present disturbed

condition of Thibet, His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion of postal arrangements, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the question hereafter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28400] No. 141.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 6, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th instant relative to the desire of Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with the commandant of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to suggest that it might be desirable to obtain the views of the Government of India on this question before instructing His Majesty's Minister at Peking to accord the facilities desired by the President.

It appears possible to Sir E. Grey that, if this request were granted, the Thibetans might consider that His Majesty's Government are acting in concert with the Chinese against the Dalai Lama.

Should the Government of India not share this objection to the proposed action, Sir E. Grey would not press it, and would be prepared to send telegraphic instructions to Sir J. Jordan in the sense proposed in your letter.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[29109] No. 142.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th July, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, July 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 142.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 4, 1912.

I APPROVE reply to Dalai Lama proposed in your telegram dated the 3rd instant.

[29206] No. 143.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th July, 1912, regarding the Dalai Lama.

India Office, July 9, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(*Decode.*) *July* 8, 1912.

MY telegram of the 1st July.

Dalai Lama left Yatung on the 5th July *en route* to Lhassa. His entrance into Chumbi Valley was triumphal, and he was well received by inhabitants.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[29319] No. 144.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 6th July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 9, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 144.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 6, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram dated the 3rd instant.

It is apprehended by Foreign Office that Thibetans may infer that we are combining with Chinese, if latter's request is complied with. Your views are solicited.

[29267] No. 145.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th July, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, July 9, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 9, 1912.

ARRIVAL at Phari of the notorious Dorjieff is reported by trade agent, Yatung. Latter has had an interview with Dorjieff, who states that his object is merely to meet Dalai Lama, and denies having authority from Russian Government. He appears to have travelled from Mongolia by overland route.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[29270] No. 146.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 20th June, 1912, relative to Dalai and Tashi Lamas.

India Office, July 9, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 146.

British Trade Agent to Government of India.

(No. 82. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, June* 18, 1912.

I HAVE dispatched the following telegram to the political officer in Sikkim:—

It is the intention of the Tashi Lama to meet the Dalai Lama on his return at such a place as the latter may appoint. The Tashi Lama is still uneasy as to the future, and would like to have a further assurance as to the intentions of the Dalai Lama; and, if he should hereafter be unable to come to an understanding with the Dalai Lama, to know definitely how he would be received in India.

As regards the first point, I told the messenger that the final answer has already been given (*vide* telegram of the 10th instant from the Government of India in the Foreign Department), and that the second point raises a hypothetical question which can well be considered if it should become a matter of practical importance hereafter.

Both questions will, I expect, be raised again shortly.

[27017] No. 147.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, forwarding a copy of a telegram addresssd to the Government of India in regard to the farewell message to the Dalai Lama before his departure from India.

I am to say, however, that Sir E. Grey regrets that he is unable to concur in the opinion expressed in your letter on the subject of the exchange of friendly letters between the Viceroy and the Dalai Lama.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that it is difficult to argue on the grounds stated in your letter that "les engagements assumés par la Grande-Bretagne et la Chine," which are expressly exempted from the operation of article II of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, can be held to cover all forms of direct communication between the Government of India and the Government of Thibet. Indeed, the fact that the exceptions to this article are expressly stated and limited to direct relations between the British trade agents and the Thibetan local authorities would seem to imply that all other communications must be considered as coming under the undertaking "à ne traiter avec le Tibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement chinois."

Sir E. Grey would further observe that the arrangement for direct communication in article III of the Anglo-Thibetan Trade Regulations of 1908, quoted in the last paragraph of your letter, does not deal with correspondence upon general questions, but merely provides for the reference to the "Thibetan high authorities" of questions on which the British trade agents and the local officials are unable to come to an agreement, and that the purport of such a reference must be communicated to the Amban.

Finally, I am to point out that, in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, the trade regulations of 1908 cannot, in any case, be interpreted as overriding or setting aside our obligations under the convention with Russia.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[29417] No. 148.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th July, 1912, relative to the Tashi Lama and Dalai Lama.

India Office, July 10, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 10, 1912.

TRADE agent, Gyantse, telegraphed 7th instant to the following effect:—

"In course of long interview this morning with Tashi Lama, who is very seriously alarmed for his own and his officers' safety, I was repeatedly requested by him to urge Government to allow me to act, whether officially or unofficially, as intermediary between Dalai Lama and himself at Ralung or Kangma."

Telegram dated 6th instant in following sense received from trade agent, Yatung:—

"I have been asked by Dalai Lama whether I could go as far as Ralung with him in order to mediate between himself and the Tashi Lama. On my telling him in reply that I should require your sanction before doing so, he asked that a message to the following effect might be sent to you by telegraph:—

"'It is my wish to be on friendly terms with Tashi Lama, and I therefore earnestly desire British Government's good offices in the matter, with a view to maintenance of peace on this border. Please be so good as to move Government of India to allow trade agent, Yatung, to go as far as Ralung with me and to act as intermediary, officially or otherwise, between myself and the Tashi Lama. A very early reply is requested.'

"In the event of this request being granted, and if trade agent, Gyantse, is authorised to mediate, the latter can perhaps arrange a meeting at Kangma between the two lamas."

Please say whether proposed mediation by trade agent, as desired by two lamas, is approved by your Lordship. It could only be on the understanding that we are not thereby committed to any responsibility as to any arrangement arrived at between the lamas being fulfilled. Kangma is south of Gyantse, on our trade route between that place and Yatung.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[29497] No. 149.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 10th July, 1912, relative to the Chinese and Thibetans at Lhassa.

India Office, July 11, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 149.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 10, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 4th instant regarding Thibet. Following message was sent in word code on 3rd instant to Customs, Peking, by Thibetan clerk in charge of Customs, Yatung:—

"Full safety of Chinese garrison hemmed in at Lhassa is guaranteed by Thibetan authorities, provided orders to surrender arms and quit Thibet are issued to garrison by Chinese Government. In order to avoid inevitable massacre full authority of Chinese Government is requested to convey urgently to Thibetan authorities such order of negotiations."

Recent information from Lhassa shows that prospects of peace appear remote, that Chinese have ample provisions and are still in possession of Dip, and that during last three weeks Thibetans have on the whole suffered most.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 149.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 10, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated 6th instant regarding Thibet. A messenger from Chinese in Lhassa is reported by trade agent, Gyantse, to have left Lhassa on 7th July, and on the following day to have dispatched telegrams of over 150 words each from Gyantse to "Board of Army, Peking," and "President of China." It appears from this that the Chinese in Lhassa are able without help from us to communicate with Chinese Government direct; and in these circumstances, it seems unnecessary that Yuan's message should be forwarded by us, especially as Thibetan suspicions would undoubtedly be aroused by such a course.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[29538] No. 150.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Peking, June* 26, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 142 of the 23rd instant and my telegram No. 146 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an account of the interview which I had with the President for the purpose of communicating to him the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 96 of the 20th instant with regard to Thibet.

Mr. Barton, the Chinese Secretary, who interpreted on the occasion, has so accurately reproduced the substance of the interview that I need only record the general impression it left on my mind.

I think the President is quite sincere in the assurance, which he gave me with marked emphasis, that he has no intention of incorporating Thibet as an integral part of China, and that he will scrupulously observe treaty engagements. But he was careful not to commit himself to any interpretation of these engagements, and would not undertake to restrain the Chinese forces from crossing the frontier pending the conclusion of an undertanding with us. In all probability he has not the power to enforce such an undertaking in the present state of things in Szechuan, but I think he fully realises that the advance of the expedition into Thibet will create a very grave situation for himself and his Government, and that he will do what he can to avert it. Bearing in mind the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 97 as to the possibility of arriving at some understanding limiting the functions and the number of Chinese troops in Thibet, I gave the President clearly to understand that the Thibetan question could be easily settled by friendly negotiation later on, but that the use of force at this juncture would seriously prejudice an amicable arrange-

ment. All we can do is to insist as strongly as possible upon this line of action, for once the troops enter Thibet there will be little prospect of negotiating a settlement which will not involve a serious alteration of the *status quo*. Strange as it may seem, the confusion which at present obtains in China proper only seems to stimulate the desire for aggressive action in outlying portions of the country, and a new and dangerous spirit of military enterprise is beginning to animate frontier provinces like Yünnan and Szechuan, which are practically independent of central control. It would greatly strengthen the hands of the Government here in dealing with Szechuan if arrangements could be made for the withdrawal of the beleaguered Chinese garrison at Lhassa, as all pretext for a military advance would then be removed. The defeats which the Chinese troops in the marches seem to be sustaining at the hands of the Thibetans may perhaps tend to moderate the ardour of the annexationists in Szechuan.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Memorandum of Interview on 23rd June, 1912.

SIR JOHN JORDAN, accompanied by Mr. Alston and Mr. Barton, called on the President, with whom were Captain Tsai Ting-kan and Mr. [?] (of the Wai-chiao Pu), at 5 P.M.

Colonel Willoughby, military attaché, also accompanied Sir John Jordan for the purpose of taking leave of the President on the occasion of his return to India on the completion of his term of duty with the legation.

Sir John Jordan said that he had come under instructions from His Majesty's Government to discuss the question of the Chinese policy towards Thibet. Various announcements had been made in the official gazette, and an expedition had now left Chengtu for Lhassa. In view of the treaties existing between Great Britain and Thibet and between Great Britain and China, the question had become one of grave importance for His Majesty's Government, and he hoped that the President would furnish him with a satisfactory explanation of the Chinese Government's policy towards that country.

Yuan Shih-kai explained that the Szechuan tutu had sent repeated complaints to Peking of the action of the frontier savages in attacking Chinese life and property in the marches, and had urged that he be allowed to lead an army against them. The Cabinet had finally given him authority to send an expedition for the purpose of investigating and dealing with the state of affairs on the frontier, but, in view of the scarcity of supplies and shortage of funds, it was not probable that the expedition could advance any distance into Thibet. In any case, the existing arrangements based on the treaties between Great Britain, Thibet, and China would be scrupulously observed.

Sir John Jordan asked the President to specify exactly what the Chinese Government understood by the existing arrangements under treaty; would, for instance, the advance of this expedition to Lhassa without previous reference to His Majesty's Government be considered as in keeping with treaty stipulations?

Yuan contented himself with repeating his general assurance as to treaty observance, but Sir John Jordan explained that, in view of the events of 1910 and of the unfortunate consequences arising from the dispatch of Chinese troops to Lhassa on that occasion, he must ask for a plain statement of China's intentions, in order, if possible, to avoid any risk of a breach in the friendly relations between Great Britain and China, which, as the President well knew, he would do his utmost to maintain.

Yuan replied that the expedition had only gone to investigate affairs on the frontier, and would report the result to Peking, whereupon the Cabinet would decide what policy it should adopt.

Sir John Jordan pressed the President to give an assurance that the expedition would not go beyond the frontier without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Yuan replied that by constitutional usage he could not do this without consulting the Cabinet, but he promised to keep Sir John Jordan informed of the progress of the Cabinet towards a decision.

Sir John Jordan expressed a strong hope that a decision in accordance with his suggestion would be arrived at, as His Majesty's Government could not possibly allow a repetition of the previous Chinese policy, which was adopted without any reference to them, and which produced a state of unrest on the Indian frontier and throughout Thibet, which was highly detrimental to British interests and which still existed. The treaties required the continuance of an effective Thibetan Government, and not one wholly under the control of China, and the intention of incorporating Thibet as a province of China was entirely contrary to existing engagements. His Majesty's Government had always treated China with the greatest forbearance in regard to Thibet; they had absolutely no designs on that country or desire to interfere in its internal administration. What they wished to see was an autonomous Thibet lying between the territories of Great Britain and China.

Yuan disclaimed any intention of incorporating Thibet as a province of China, or of allowing any alteration in the arrangements based on existing treaties. The question of policy was a matter for the Cabinet, and the proper course would be for Sir John Jordan to address himself to the Wai-chiao Pu.

Sir John Jordan replied that he had made representations on this subject to Mr. Hu, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, exactly a month ago—on the 24th May. Mr. Hu had promised to lay them before the President and inform him of the result. In spite of this, not a word in reply had been received from the Wai-chiao Pu. Moreover, there had been a great deal of correspondence on this subject during the past few years, and many verbal and written assurances had been given by the former Government; but the Wai-chiao Pu were inclined to ignore engagements and precedents, and if they dealt with the Thibetan question on these lines a very serious situation would arise.

Yuan expressed the hope that, the substantive Minister for Foreign Affairs having now arrived, there would be an improvement in this respect, and in any case he would give special instructions.

Sir John Jordan asked for details of the composition of the Szechuan expedition and how it was being financed.

Yuan said that the Cabinet had no information as to its numbers, and the tutu had represented that public subscriptions were forthcoming from the province for its maintenance.

Sir John Jordan informed the President that the question of the funds expended on this expedition was a very serious one. It practically amounted to this: that Szechuan province, which should contribute nearly 1,000,000 taels annually towards the indemnity due to the Powers, had defaulted in this payment, and was employing the funds to finance their Thibetan expedition. At the same time, China was borrowing more money from the Powers to make up the deficit in the indemnity.

Yuan ridiculed the idea of such a possibility, but Sir John Jordan insisted on its substantial accuracy, and warned the President that His Majesty's Government would not contribute towards any further advances to China if the expedition went beyond Chinese territory. We could not be expected to finance the requirements of China in order to release funds for distant ventures of this kind, or, in other words, to enable China to disturb the peace of Central Asia to the detriment of the interests of India.

Yuan repeated that the expedition only aimed at dealing with matters on the frontier—which was hard to define. He admitted that the Szechuan tutu had some time ago referred to the desirability of relieving the Lhassa garrison, but he considered that the Central Government were in a position to control the movements of the expedition, and he did not think that it would advance into Thibet without orders from the Cabinet. He also admitted that Yünnan province was anxious to send an auxiliary expedition, but this had not been sanctioned by the Cabinet. He could state quite privately that the internal condition of Szechuan was causing grave anxiety, owing to the lawlessness of the secret societies and the headstrong character of the youthful tutu. He believed personally that the real object of the expedition was to rid Chengtu of a number of unruly soldiery. He was trying to induce the ex-Viceroy, Tsen Chun-hsuan, to accept office as Tutu of Szechuan, but the latter demanded large supplies of money and men before he would undertake the task, and it seemed as if force would eventually have to be used to restore order in the province.

Sir John Jordan urged that this information strengthened his conviction that it was madness for China to embark on distant expeditions while her own territory was in such a state of chaos. If the Chinese Government were anxious as to the fate of their garrison in Lhassa—and, according to the information received through India,

they were in a very desperate condition—he felt sure that the Government of India would, on the grounds of humanity, allow the Chinese troops to leave the country through India.

Yuan expressed pleasure at this intimation, and added that he had no news whatever from the garrison.

Sir John Jordan said that, according to his information, the garrison was surrounded by Thibetans and were reduced to great straits for provisions. Unfortunately, neither side placed any confidence in the other, and the assistance of a third party appeared necessary if arrangements were to be made for the departure of the garrison under safe conduct or otherwise.

Yuan said that he would be most grateful for anything the Government of India could do in this regard, and added that he would endeavour to communicate with the Chinese resident.

Sir John Jordan undertook to telegraph to the Government of India and inform the President of the result.

Yuan having renewed his expression of gratitude, the interview closed at 7 p.m.

[29539] No. 151.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 271.)

Sir, *Peking, June* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for your information, and with a view to its communication to the War Office, copy of a report which has been addressed to me by the military attaché at His Majesty's Legation respecting the views of Wen Tsung Yao (late assistant resident at Lhassa) on Chinese policy in Thibet.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 151.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby.

IN view of the present situation in Thibet and the interest that the affairs of that country possess for the Government of India, the opinion of an enlightened ex-official who has held the office of assistant resident there, and must be fairly conversant with the local conditions, may be considered of some interest.

That opinion, as expressed by him recently to Major Robertson, at Shanghai, is set forth in the attached memorandum.

It has to be borne in mind that Wen Tsung Yao's views are naturally likely to be somewhat biassed against his own Government, seeing that he was to all intents and purposes recalled from Lhassa in disgrace in March 1910 for being too pro-Thibetan, the head and front of his offending being his pledge to the Dalai Lama, when General Chung Ying's expedition was *en route* to Lhassa, that not more than 1,000 Chinese troops should come there.

Wen Tsung Yao is a Cantonese, educated in America; he was secretary to the Canton Viceroy from 1905 to 1908, and assistant resident at Lhassa from June 1908 to March 1910.

The portion of the memorandum which is more especially of interest to the War Office is that part wherein Wen Tsung Yao's views regarding the military situation are set forth. His marked confidence in the vast superiority of the Chinese troops over the Thibetans is noteworthy; but his disparagement of the soldierly quality of General Chung Ying's expeditionary force of 1909–10 (the remnants of which are now in such straits in Lhassa) is not, I think, altogether justifiable. Expert opinion held that this force was well disciplined and well equipped, its weak points being the short time the men had been under training and their extreme youth (vide Report, April 1910, "The Chinese Advance into Thibet").

Major Pereira, my predecessor as military attaché in Peking, who visited the Szechuan Luchun at Chengtu in 1910, also expressed a very favourable opinion as to their military value.

Recent events in Thibet have demonstrated that Wen Tsung Yao's estimate of

1,000 (split up in small detachments) as a force sufficient to garrison Thibet is quite inadequate.

It is interesting to note Wen Tsung Yao's remark that the force of Thibetans sent out to meet Chung Ying's expedition was 60,000. I greatly doubt the accuracy of this figure. Very little resistance, it will be remembered, was offered, viz., at Lhari and Kiangka (Giamda). The entry into Lhassa itself was practically unopposed. Wen Tsung Yao's confidence in the ability of the Chinese troops now in Thibet to hold their own leaves out of account the important factor of munitions of war. If supplies and ammunition fail, a force of any nation, however courageous, is in a very hopeless situation, and it seems clear from a recent report that the Chinese garrison at Shobando (on the main relay road from Batang to Lhassa) had been defeated, disarmed, and allowed to return viâ Kham to China, and that the communications of General Chung Ying's force at Lhassa are cut.

Wen Tsung Yao's remarks regarding the impolicy (from internal, not external, reasons) of attempting to convert Thibet into a regular Chinese province are instructive.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Peking, June 26, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 151.

Memorandum respecting Chinese Policy in Thibet.

THE following remarks on Thibet were made to me in Shanghai last month by Wen Tsung Yao, at one time Chinese assistant resident at Lhassa. They were made in a very frank way, but, of course, it is not possible to say whether they are the views he really holds. As, however, he may possibly later on be in an official position in Thibet, I am forwarding his remarks.

Wen Tsung Yao said that the Premier, Tong Shao Yi, had recently asked him to accept the appointment of resident in Thibet, but that he had refused the post on the ground that he was opposed to the policy of the Republican Government in making Thibet a Chinese province. The Thibetans were a different race to the Chinese, and it was unreasonable to expect them all at once to substitute a republican idea for their own traditions and the allegiance they owed to their spiritual head. It was, in his opinion, unwise to try to effect this by force, and it would be far better to make friends with the Thibetans and endeavour to attain the same object by peaceful methods. He compared the policy of Great Britain with regard to Thibet with that of the Chinese, stating that the Thibetans said the British treated them like brothers, while the Chinese treated them like dogs. It was a mistake to alienate the Thibetans if they wished them to become part of the republic; and this the Chinese were certainly doing by their treatment of the Lamas, who were held in great respect by the Thibetans, and, by their overbearing manner towards the latter, compelling, for example, high Thibetan officials to stand or kneel in the presence of the Chinese resident. The concentration of large numbers of Chinese soldiers had raised the price of living, owing to the shortness of supplies in Thibet; and the soldiers also were in the habit of taking supplies without payment, and used to insult the Thibetan women. All this helped to make the Thibetans dislike Chinese rule.

From a military point of view, he considered that it was necessary to keep a large force in Thibet, and he thought a force of 1,000 men would be a sufficient garrison, split up in detachments, not greater than 100 men. These detachments ought to be able to hold out against any force the Thibetans could reasonably bring against them, and a force of this size, split up in this way, would not be a drain on the supplies of the country. Wen Tsung Yao had little respect for the Thibetans as a military force, saying that in his opinion the Chinese troops sent into Thibet in 1909 were badly trained and of little use; nevertheless, the 60,000 Thibetans sent to meet them melted away, and they succeeded in reaching Lhassa without disaster. He was confident that the Chinese troops now in Thibet could hold their own as far as fighting was concerned. He thought Thibet was capable of supporting 10,000 Chinese soldiers.

Wen Tsung Yao considered that China's policy in Thibet should be that of peaceful penetration, which could not be completely successful under a generation. It was useless to try to educate the present generation to new ideas; but at any rate,

the Chinese could avoid alienating their sympathies. Schools, however, should be set up, and the younger generation should learn the Chinese language and imbibe Chinese ideas. Chinese colonists should be given inducements to settle in Thibet and intermarry with Thibetans. Communications, consisting of wide mule tracks, should be opened up. He considered that there was plenty of suitable land in Thibet for colonisation, and that the climate would suit Chinese.

In conclusion, he said that he did not think it likely that either Russia or Great Britain would wish to occupy Thibet. It was, in his opinion, quite out of the question for Russia to do so on account of her distance from Thibet, and it was not to the interest of Great Britain to do more than protect her trade interests there.

D. S. ROBERTSON, *Major*.

[29616] No. 152.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 12.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 11, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd July, 1912, and to previous correspondence regarding the political status of Thibet, I am directed to inform you that, in the opinion of the Marquess of Crewe, the time has arrived when it is desirable to formulate in definite terms the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Thibet, with a view to a comprehensive statement on the subject being communicated to the Chinese Government.

2. His Lordship would suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the proposed statement might be to the following effect:—

(1.) His Majesty's Government, while they have formally recognised the "suzerain rights" of China in Thibet, have never recognised, and are not prepared to recognise, Chinese sovereignty over that country.

(2.) His Majesty's Government do not admit the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Thibet, which should remain, as contemplated by the treaties, in the hands of the Thibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under article 1 of the convention of the 27th April, 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of treaty stipulations.

(3.) On these grounds, His Majesty's Government must demur altogether (i) to the conduct of the Chinese officers in Thibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country; and (ii) to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's presidential order of the 21st April, 1912 (Enclosure No. 3 in Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 196, dated the 27th April, 1912), that Thibet is to be "regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper," and that all "administrative matters" connected with that country "will come within the sphere of internal administration."

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Thibet, and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

(4.) While the right of China to station a representative with a suitable escort at Lhassa, with authority to advise the Thibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhassa or in Thibet generally.

(5.) His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.

(6.) In the meantime, all communication with Thibet viâ India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese, and only be reopened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

This does not apply to the withdrawal of the present Chinese garrison at Lhassa, who, as Yuan Shih-kai has already been informed, are at liberty to return to China viâ India if they wish to do so.

3. Should these views commend themselves to Sir E. Grey, Lord Crewe would suggest that a communication in the above sense should be made to the Chinese Government in writing at an early date. The precise moment for making the communication might be left to Sir J. Jordan's discretion. His Lordship does not overlook his Excellency's opinion that the President is aware that His Majesty's Government are in earnest (telegram of the 26th June), and that a recent utterance of the late Prime Minister indicates a moderation of the Chinese attitude as set forth in Yuan's presidential order of the 22nd April (despatch No. 232 of the 18th May). But that order is the published official pronouncement of the Government, and presumably holds the field until withdrawn or modified in writing. In the meantime, there is always the risk that the Chinese Government may find it convenient to commit themselves to some action or statement which, to quote the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (as reported in Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 247 of the 6th June), there may be "serious difficulty in obtaining the consent of the National Assembly" to modify.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[29767] No. 153.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 13.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 12, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 6th July, 1912, as to the desire of Yuan Shih-kai to communicate with the Chinese garrison at Lhassa through the Government of India, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy on the subject.

In the circumstances reported in the Viceroy's telegram of the 10th instant, the Marquess of Crewe accepts the view of the Government of India that Yuan's request should not be complied with.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 6, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram dated 3rd instant.

It is apprehended by Foreign Office that Thibetans may infer that we are combining with Chinese if latter's request is complied with. Your views are solicited.

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 10, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated 6th instant regarding Thibet.

A messenger from Chinese in Lhassa is reported by trade agent, Gyantse, to have left Lhassa on the 7th July, and on the following day to have despatched telegrams of over 150 words each from Gyantse to "Board of Army, Peking," and "President of China." It appears from this that the Chinese in Lhassa are able without help from us to communicate with Chinese Government direct; and in these circumstances it seems unnecessary that Yuan's message should be forwarded by us, especially as Thibetan suspicions would undoubtedly be aroused by such a course.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[29771] No. 154.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th July, and a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 10th July, regarding China and Thibet.

India Office, July 13, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 154.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 5, 1912.*

REFERENCE is invited to telegram dated the 20th ultimo, from Foreign Office to His Majesty's Minister, Peking. If you see no objection, we propose that, except in very special circumstances which will be considered on merits, all applications from Chinese military or civil officials for passes to cross frontier into Thibet should be refused.

Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July 10, 1912.*

I APPROVE proposals submitted in your telegram of 5th instant as to applications by Chinese to cross frontier into Thibet.

[30066] No. 155.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, July 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 143 of 24th June.

His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu telegraphs that first Chengtu detachment of 600 men reached Tachienlu 4th July. Governor of Szechuan left Chengtu 10th July with 1,800 men. It is also reported that Litang, which was captured by Thibetans on 15th June, has been now retaken by Chinese.

(Sent to India.)

[30220] No. 156.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 156.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 15, 1912.*

SEE my telegrams of the 9th and 10th instant regarding Thibet.

Tashi Lama has been directed by Dalai Lama to meet him at Ralung, where he arrives on the 16th July. Dalai Lama will proceed to Samding Monastery, near

Nagartse Jong, on the 20th instant. Pending cessation of hostilities at Lhassa, he is likely to remain at Samding for indefinite period.

A letter from Len Amban, asking him to make peace, reached Dalai Lama while he was in Chumbi valley. In reply, he said that he could only do so if British representative were deputed to witness agreement between the parties.

On the 12th instant two long telegrams in cypher, one unaddressed and the other addressed to Tung Tung-ling, were received at Gyantse from Peking. Neither of the two telegrams has as yet been delivered. Presumably they are in reply to those referred to in my telegram dated the 9th instant. Laden La was informed by Dorjieff, who is now at Dalai Lama's camp, and is being treated almost as a member of Lama's staff, of his determination, as head of Mongolian Buddhists in St. Petersburgh, to serve the Dalai Lama in any way he can, to go to Samding with him, and while there to watch how events at Lhassa progress, and to restore to power the head of Buddhist religion in Thibet at whatever risk to himself. Dorjieff expressed his delight at seeing that British Government are friendly to Dalai Lama, while they adhere to terms of Anglo-Russian Convention; but he anticipated that without British mediation no solution could be found of present difficulties in Lhassa, and he asserted that he would address Russian Government, should occasion arise, in such terms as would result in suggestion being made by them to British Government that convention should be modified in such a way as to allow the British Government to mediate. It was not the case, he added, that he was a Russian agent, though he knew he was suspected of being one.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[29767] No. 157.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 147 of 28th June and Viceroy's telegram of 10th July.

You can, if necessary, inform President that there now appears to be no necessity to send message, as Chinese at Lhassa have succeeded in communicating with him without His Majesty's Government's assistance.

[30477] No. 158.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 12th July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 17, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 158.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 12, 1912.

TASHI LAMA. See your telegram dated the 10th instant.

It appears undesirable to mediate in manner proposed in view both of risk of encouraging Tashi Lama to count on our assistance in future and of terms of article 1 of Anglo-Russian Agreement. Understanding suggested in last paragraph of your telegram would not, in my opinion, remove risk. In these circumstances, you should refuse Lama's request.

[30553] No. 159.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th July, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 18, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 159.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 16, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to my telegram of yesterday. We instructed trade agent, Gyantse, Dalai Lama having asked for private interview with him, to take opportunity of sounding Lama as to object of presence in Thibet of Dorjieff, and of giving him a warning that, as on former occasion, trouble would inevitably result from his intriguing with foreign Powers. Telegram to following effect dated the 14th instant received from trade agent:—

"I had long private interview this evening with Dalai Lama, who arrived here to day at 3 P.M.; in the course of this interview warning contained in telegram of 13th instant from Government of India, Foreign Department, was conveyed by me to the Lama. The latter thanked me for the warning, to which he listened with great attention, and promised that he would take such action in respect to Dorjieff as would dispel any apprehensions as to intrigues with a foreign Power. He said, however, that he had no reason to suppose Dorjieff to be an emissary of Russia. Request was also made to me by Dalai Lama that an expression of his steadfast friendship with British Government and of his appreciation of the hospitality extended to him in India might be communicated to the King, and repeated to the Viceroy, now that he was on the eve of bidding farewell reluctantly to the officer in charge of the most advanced British outpost in Thibet. He went on to express hope that existing mutual friendship and regard would be increased by time, and to ask that thanks for great kindness shown in advising him and attending to his comfort might be conveyed to political officer, Gangtok, trade agent, Yatung, Laden La, and other officers. In conclusion, he asked me repeatedly always to remember that any advice would be most welcome to him which would conduce to efficient administration of his country or would tend to maintain unimpaired the friendship now existing between British Government and himself.

"A return visit of two hours' duration was paid me this evening by Dalai Lama, who gave directions to Tashi Lama at Gyantse in course of communication with him by telephone to meet him at Ralung on the 16th instant, and added an assurance that no apprehension as to future need be felt by Tashi Lama or his officials."

Further telegram dated 15th July, received from trade agent, Gyantse, to following effect:—

"Dalai Lama left for Nyeru after paying me another call this morning. He called suddenly for Laden La, and presented him with a sanad appointing him an honorary official of the 4th rank, corresponding to a depon or general, shortly before he left. He expressed hope that there will be no objection to acceptance of honorary title by Laden La, as latter has done much for him and is a Buddhist. I directed Laden La to accept the sanad, as I considered that an appearance of thwarting Dalai Lama's wishes in the matter would be impolitic, and I told the Lama that his wishes would be reported for Government's orders. I would venture to suggest that permission may be granted to accept honorary distinction, *sub rosâ* at any rate."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[29616] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 205.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from the India Office, proposing that a comprehensive statement with regard to the political status of Thibet should now be made to the Chinese Government.*

I should be glad if you would communicate to me by telegraph your views on this proposal, together with any modifications which you may consider desirable in the text of the statement itself.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29616] No. 161.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a copy of your letter of the 11th instant, proposing that a comprehensive statement with regard to the political status of Thibet should now be made to the Chinese Government, has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Sir J. Jordan has been requested to report his views on this proposal by telegraph, and a further communication will be made to you on the subject on the receipt of his reply.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[31742] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 126.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1912.

THE Japanese Ambassador asked me to-day about Thibet.

I told him that a native policeman of ours, Laden La, was in Thibet; but we had not allowed him to go to Lhassa. Both the Thibetans and the Chinese had appealed for our mediation there; but we were reluctant to intervene in any way, feeling that, if we did so, whichever party found the development of events unfavourable afterwards would base upon anything which we did now a claim for our further intervention. We wished to avoid interfering in Thibet. At the same time, we held that, though we recognised Chinese suzerainty over Thibet, Thibet ought to remain an autonomous State between India and China; and this view we should press diplomatically in Peking as strongly as need be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32274] No. 163.

Question asked in the House of Commons, July 25, 1912.

Major Archer-Shee,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that in the preamble of the Thibetan section of the Anglo-Russian Agreement the special interest of Great Britain in the maintenance of the *status quo* is recognised by both Powers, what steps are being taken to maintain the *status quo* as it was at the time of the signature of the convention.

* No. 152.

[31836] No. 163*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 27.)

Sir, *India Office, July 26, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 10th July, 1912, expressing the view that the terms of article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 cannot, without difficulty, be "held to cover all forms of direct communication between the Government of India and the Government of Thibet."

2. The Marquess of Crewe does not desire to reopen discussion relative to the insertion of the words proposed in the Viceroy's telegram of the 11th June, 1912, viz., "the Viceroy will always be glad to receive and answer friendly letters from Dalai Lama"; but to prevent misunderstanding hereafter, I am directed to submit, for the consideration of Sir E. Grey, the following observations:—

3. By article 1 of the Peking Convention of the 27th April, 1906, Great Britain and China jointly engaged to take at all times such steps as may be necessary for the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement signed on the 7th September, 1904. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of the 31st August, 1907, expressly preserves from modification the article just quoted. If, then, the Chinese Government should ever be unable, or fails to carry out its joint engagement in respect of any matter that is covered by the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement of the 7th September, 1904, the Secretary of State for India presumes that the British Government is at liberty to take what steps it pleases, including all necessary communications with Thibet, for the fulfilment of the terms of that agreement.

The question is not one of merely academic or remote interest. Sir E. Grey will have learnt from the Viceroy's telegram of the 9th July, 1912,* that one of the first persons to approach the Dalai Lama on his recent return to Thibet was the Mongolian Buriat, Dorjieff, whose relations with the Russian Government are well known, and who, according to a Reuter message from St. Petersburgh, dated the 1st May, 1912, which was published in the Indian newspapers, visited the Russian capital as recently as the spring of the present year. From the Viceroy's subsequent telegram of the 15th July,† it appears that Dorjieff, while he now denies being a Russian agent, admits that he is in correspondence with the Russian Government; and the Viceroy, who was in St. Petersburgh at the time, is satisfied as to the nature of his former connection with them. It will be remembered that in the preamble of the Anglo-Russian Convention the special interest of Great Britain in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Thibet was admitted, and in these circumstances Lord Crewe apprehends that His Majesty's Government may find themselves at a serious disadvantage in dealing with Thibet (for example, should the Thibetan Government, contrary to the terms of article 9 (*c*) of the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of the 7th September, 1904, admit an agent of a foreign Power) if, by placing a narrow interpretation upon the terms of the Convention of 1907, they deliberately deprive themselves of their only certain means of access to the Dalai Lama.

I am to take this opportunity of enclosing copy of a further telegram, dated the 16th July, 1912, from the Viceroy,‡ containing a report of interviews between the Dalai Lama and the British trade agent at Gyantse. The cordial nature of the language held by the Dalai Lama on these occasions appears to Lord Crewe to emphasise the undesirability of putting him in the position of having no friendly Power with whom to correspond except Russia.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

* See Enclosure in No. 145.

† See Enclosure in No. 156.

‡ See Enclosure in No. 159.

Answer.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking, acting under instructions from His Majesty's Government, has protested against any change in the political status of Thibet which would be at variance with the treaties concluded between Thibet and Great Britain and with the repeated undertakings given by China to His Majesty's Government.

[32149] No. 164.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th July, 1912, regarding Nepal and Thibet.

India Office, July 29, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 164.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 27, 1912.*

RESIDENT, Nepal, has received letter to the following effect from Prime Minister :—

"Dalai Lama's return is welcomed by Prime Minister as being surest means of restoring order. Interests and stakes of large value and extent have been acquired by Nepal in Thibet as the outcome of centuries. Those interests have been seriously damaged by recent events, and it is necessary that Nepal should be compensated in an adequate manner. Nepal will be compelled, in default of compensation, to exact satisfaction in manner that may seem best to her. Restoration of order will be postponed indefinitely if Szechuan Government persists in sending expedition. Departure of present garrison, leaving only amban with usual escort, is the only solution."

Dalai Lama is also being addressed by Prime Minister. Rectification of frontier between Thibet and Nepal, by Nepalese occupying small district near Kirong, is understood by resident to be one measure of reparation contemplated.

Telegram to following effect has been sent by us in reply to resident, Nepal :—

"Reference is invited to your letter dated the 7th July. After conveying our thanks to Prime Minister for frank expression contained in his letter of 5th instant of his views on situation in Thibet, you should say that his hope that restoration of order will result from Dalai Lama's return is shared by Government of India. You should add that an attempt to induce Chinese to stop expedition from Szechuan is being made by His Majesty's Government. Any remarks about question of compensation, or measures proposed by Nepal to exact redress in default of compensation, would be both undesirable and premature."

[32224] No. 165.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 22nd July, 1912 (with paraphrase), regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 29, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 165.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 22, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 16th instant regarding Thibet.

Following telegram dated 19th instant received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"I am informed by Tashi Lama, who returned on evening of 18th instant to Gyantse and leaves on 21st instant for Shigatse, that his visit to Ralung was a complete success, and that settlement was arrived at of all old differences. Warning as to their conduct in future was, however, given to his Ministers. Tashi Lama is willing to send troops to Lhassa, and he appears to be entirely relieved of his previous anxiety. He states that it is believed, though details are lacking, that Chinese have recently been very successful at Lhassa, and that an attempt to advance from Menkong is being made by 1,000 Chinese troops. Offer of his services as an intermediary has again been made by him; he is of opinion, however, that an attempt will first be made by the Dalai Lama to settle terms himself, and that, in the event of failure, the latter will appeal once more for mediation of British Government. Tashi Lama gave his opinion that presence of Dorjieff, whom he regards as a dangerous man, will not be tolerated in Lhassa for long. He went on to say that, according to statement made by Dorjieff himself, the latter would be proceeding shortly viâ Nagchukha to Mongolia."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[32170] No. 166.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, July* 30, 1912.

THIBET expedition.

Consul-general at Yünnan telegraphs that 1,500 men left there 27th July for Batang, and that Lichiang troops to the same number are leaving in a day or two.

(Sent to India.)

[32864] No. 167.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 2nd August, regarding Thibet affairs.

India Office, August 3, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 167.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 2, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram, dated 22nd ultimo.

Telegram, dated 31st ultimo, to following effect, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"I am informed by Dalai Lama, in a letter dated the 27th instant, that directions to leave Thibet without delay have been given by him to Dorjieff, and the latter states, in a letter also dated the 27th instant, that he will be leaving for his own country viâ Chengri and Changtang on the 5th August. I have also received letter from Chief Minister, indicating in guarded terms that watch is being kept on the Japanese.

"Orders have been issued by the Dalai Lama to all Jongpens that instructions to

send one representative apiece to Samding to represent National Assembly should be given to every village; the men are to bring provisions for six months with them. Thibetan commandant has returned to Lhassa."

We have directed political officer, Sikkim, to summon and examine the Japanese referred to above immediately upon his return to India. The person in question is Yasojiro Yajima, who arrived in disguise at Kalimpong on the 23rd June, and afterwards, without obtaining permission, crossed the frontier into Thibet. He is described as a gunmaker in a passport from his Government which is in his possession, but accuracy of description is denied by him. The number of his passport is 1067. Yajima's real object in going to Thibet is not known. He gives himself out to be leader of adventurous Japanese who are travelling round the world without money, and who belong to Nippon Rikikokwal No. 142, Kaminweki, Uwehasumura, Sawagori Guma Prefecture, Japan.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[33225] No. 168.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 5th August, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 6, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 168.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 5, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 2nd instant regarding Thibet.

Reports to following effect have been furnished to trade agent, Yatung, by messenger from Lhassa, who arrived at Yatung on the 31st ultimo :—

"Fighting proceeds every day without intermission. No decisive victory has been gained by either side. Attack made by Thibetans on Trapchi barracks was repulsed with heavy losses by Chinese. Provisions have been obtained by latter from Tip Monastery, and houses in vicinity of that place, including two large estates, one of which belonged to Chief Minister, have been burnt by them.

"Monks are making merry and acting drama in Tengyeling Monastery, where Chinese still hold their own.

"Chinese officers were summoned by General Chung and told not to be disheartened, as news, he said, had reached him that 15,000 Chinese troops were hastening from China to their relief. General is going to demand large sum of money as indemnity, instead of surrendering arms.

"Strained relations still exist between monks of Loseling College, in Monastery of Drepung, and those of Sera Monastery. The Loseling monks possess 250 rifles given them by the Chinese amban, and are practising shooting. More soldiers are being collected by Thibetans, and country militia between ages of 18 and 60 are being called out.

"Fighting will probably go on for another year if peace is not proclaimed."

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 168.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 5, 1912.*

SEE my telegram of to-day's date regarding Thibet.

Telegram dated the 4th instant to following effect received from resident, Nepal :—

"Copy of agreement prepared by Chinese in Lhassa, and consisting of eight articles, in connection with immediate surrender of Chinese arms, is being for-

warded by me to-day to your address. Agreement provides that arms, on surrender, should be locked up in charge of intermediary; Chinese will then leave Lhassa on obtaining permission to do so from Chinese Government by telegraph. Arrangement proposed is regarded by Prime Minister of Nepal as a risky one for Chinese. Prime Minister has accordingly given instructions to Lal Bahadur that, unless safety of Chinese is guaranteed by Dalai Lama or other responsible Thibetan official, he should take no further action in negotiations."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[33657] No. 169.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, August* 9, 1912.

THIBET.

India Office letter of 11th July.

I fully agree with the terms of the proposed statement, and think that the communication should be made to the Chinese Government as soon as possible.

(Sent to India.)

[34386] No. 170.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 14, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P *August* 13, 1912.

FOLLOWING are main terms of draft agreement drawn up by Chinese in Lhassa and containing conditions on which withdrawal might be effected, which has been forwarded by Prime Minister of Nepal through resident :—

1. Any person breaking the armistice to be punished by mediators;
2. Pending Chinese Government's orders, arms of Chinese to be deposited in warehouse locked up by Chinese;
3. Responsibility for safe conduct of Chinese to frontier to rest with mediators;
4. Loan of 400,000 rupees for journey of Chinese to be granted by Thibetan Government;
5. Previous Chinese political arrangements in Thibet to be restored after troops have withdrawn;
6. Both sides to vacate monasteries held by their respective troops;
7. Eventual policy in Thibet of Szechuan Government or Central China Government is not affected by agreement, which is for purpose of immediate peace;
8. Mediators, as well as Chinese and Thibetan authorities, to sign agreement.

The Nepalese representative assisted in preparation of agreement, but has been instructed by Prime Minister, in view of heavy responsibilities placed on mediators, not to take further part in negotiations unless Dalai Lama or other responsible Thibetan official guarantees safety of Chinese.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[34402] No. 171.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August 14, 1912.*

THIBET.

President of the Republic has just sent Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform me that, in view of perilous position of Chinese garrison at Lhassa, he has decided to sanction immediate advance into Thibet of combined relief expeditions from Yünnan and Szechuan.

I warned him in the strongest terms against taking such a decision, but Minister said that public opinion demanded rescue of garrison.

I replied that President knew perfectly well that garrison had means of escape, and that no pretext of any kind would absolve him from grave responsibility attaching to a step which would bring him into acute collision with us. His Thibet policy had been without any justification from the outset, and had been immediate cause of all the trouble that had occurred.

Minister said that withdrawal of garrison would mean relinquishment of Chinese position in Thibet, for the recovery of which it would eventually be necessary to use force, and asked if I could suggest any solution. I replied that re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty on the basis of treaty stipulations and recognised usage would naturally be a matter for subsequent friendly negotiation, and that any attempt to solve the question by force would precipitate crisis, which might prove fatal to President and his Government.

I offered to wait upon the President to-morrow or the next day before going on 17th August to visit admiral at Wei-hai Wei.

(Sent to India.)

[34402] No. 172.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 14th August: Thibet.

You should at once communicate to the Chinese Government in writing declaration contained in my despatch No. 205 of 19th July, omitting words in clause 1 "Chinese sovereignty" down to and including words "do not admit" in clause 2, so that first two paragraphs form one clause.

Your language reported in your above-mentioned telegram is approved.

[33657] No. 173.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 19th ultimo relative to the proposed communication to the Chinese Government of a statement with regard to the political status of Thibet, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* expressing agreement in the terms of the statement in question.

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, to modify the draft statement by amalgamating the first two paragraphs and by the omission of the words "Chinese sovereignty" to "His Majesty's Government do not admit," in order to avoid any controversy as to the difference between sovereignty and suzerainty, and to instruct Sir J. Jordan to communicate the statement, as modified, to the Chinese Government at the first suitable opportunity.

Sir E. Grey considers that the substance of the instructions to Sir J. Jordan should be communicated to the Russian Government, and further that, as the acceptance of these demands is to be a condition precedent to the recognition of the

* No. 169.

republic by His Majesty's Government, it will be necessary to inform the Japanese Government of the action which is being taken.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[34560] No. 174.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 319.)

Sir, *Peking, July 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 194 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a memorandum which, in accordance with your instructions, I have addressed to the Wai Chiao Pu, informing them that His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing at present the discussion of postal arrangements between India and Thibet, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the question hereafter.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 174.

Memorandum communicated to the Wai Chiao Pu by Sir J. Jordan.

HIS Majesty's Minister duly communicated to His Majesty's Government the Wai Chiao Pu's memorandum of the 14th May last on the subject of the exchange of mails between India and Thibet, and he is now directed to state, in reply, that, in view of the present disturbed condition of Thibet, His Majesty's Government see no object in continuing the discussion of postal arrangements, though they reserve to themselves the right to reopen the discussion hereafter.

Peking, July 30, 1912.

[34643] No. 175.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 15th August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 175.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 15, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 13th instant regarding Thibet.

In a telegram dated 10th instant, trade agent, Gyantse, reported that from 30th ultimo to 4th instant there was a recrudescence of fighting at Lhassa (which has now subsided), in which no decided impression was made on Chinese by Thibetans. There have been several desertions from ranks of Chinese. Dalai Lama has been urged by Amban Len and Tung Tung-ling to send a representative to effect a settlement, if he cannot come himself.

Trade agent telegraphed to following effect to political officer, Sikkim, on 12th instant:—

"Two letters in practically identical terms, both dated 10th instant, have been addressed to you and me by Dalai Lama, in which he states that Tsetrung Tenzing Gyaltsen and Tsawa Tritul Wan Sang Jampel have been sent by him to Lhassa to discuss terms with the Chinese, in accordance with the latter's request. Tsetrung is

an aide-de-camp to the Dalai Lama; Tsawa is the lama who paid a visit last year to Japan, and returned in January last with the Japanese Aoki. Lonchen Tekang has also been sent by Dalai Lama to Lhassa to exercise general control in all civil and military affairs, and to supervise negotiations."

Yashima, the Japanese, who is said to be no longer at Samding, is believed by trade agent to have accompanied the above-mentioned Thibetan officials. Trade agent also thinks it probable that Dorjieff, who is reported to have left Samding for Mongolia, is staying at present in Drepung monastery at Lhassa.

Telegram to following effect now received from trade agent:—

"Telegram to following effect (handed in by Gurkha) was this afternoon addressed to Prime Minister of Nepal by Tung Tung-ling and amban:—

"'Our thanks are due to your Highness for indicating desirability of concluding peace in so clear a manner. Following terms have now been offered us by Dalai Lama:—

"'1. Arms and ammunition of Chinese to be deposited in custody of representative of Len Amban, Nepalese representative, and Dalai Lama, consent of all three parties being required before they can be removed.

"'2. Return viâ India to China of Chinese new-drilled troops.

"'3. No molestation to be offered by Thibetans to any Chinese in Thibet, whether merchants, officials, or ordinary inhabitants, after withdrawal of troops.

"'Payment of sum demanded by us as travelling expenses is refused by Dalai Lama. This, however, is a matter of small importance. Provided Dalai Lama will undertake not to take vengeance on Tengye-ling monastery, we are willing to conclude negotiations on terms proposed (?) by him. Nepalese representative will accept responsibility for safety of Chinese if above stipulation is agreed to by Dalai Lama. Latter has not yet informed us whether he is prepared to agree to it.'"

(Repeated to Peking.)

[34668] No. 176.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August* 16, 1912.

MY telegram No. 171 of 14th August.

At interview to-day President of the Republic absolutely denied that he had ever instructed Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs to speak to me in the sense he had done, and said there must have been complete misunderstanding. All he had authorised Vice-Minister to say was that, although there was nothing in the treaty to prevent an advance into Thibet, no such advance was contemplated. Vice-Minister had probably mixed up what President had told him with the views held by Wai-chiao Pu.

President spontaneously affirmed that although he had been pressed to do so by several provinces, he had no intention of sanctioning an advance into Thibet, or of incorporating any portion of Thibetan territory. He would prefer to work through Dalai Lama, whose return to Thibet he considered desirable.

(Sent to India.)

[34756] No. 177.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 17.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *India Office, August* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to the despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, No. 263, dated the 24th June last, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 27th July, 1912, that has been received from the Government of India regarding the occupation of Kashgar by Russian troops.

In their Secret letter of the 9th May, 1901, the Government of India expressed

the opinion that Kashgar and the New Dominion would inevitably, sooner or later, fall into the hands of Russia, but they regarded this event as one to be postponed as long as possible by the diplomacy of His Majesty's Government. This general view the Marquess of Crewe shares, less because of any specific military danger to India than because of the political disadvantages likely to follow from so violent a disturbance of the balance of power in those regions and the inconvenience likely to arise out of the rights of Hunza in Raskam and the Taghdumbash Pamir. This consideration His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh was instructed to put informally before the Russian Government as recently as the 20th May last (see Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 173), with what result Lord Crewe is not aware.

His Lordship shares the objection of the Government of India to the dispatch of Indian troops to Kashgar, and, on the other hand, the information received at this Office does not indicate that the time has come when it would be possible to press the Russian Government for the withdrawal of their own troops on the ground that their presence is no longer necessary. There would, therefore, seem to be no plausible case for diplomatic action at present, and, indeed, it is for consideration whether it would not rather be advantageous to acquiesce in an eventual Russian occupation, provided that Hunza's rights are secured and that suitable compensation is given elsewhere. Such compensation, Lord Crewe would suggest, might be found in Thibet, where the terms of the Anglo-Russian convention are making it increasingly difficult for His Majesty's Government to regulate their relations with the Dalai Lama and the Chinese in a manner consistent with our interests. In his Lordship's opinion the progress of events in China is tending to make a reconsideration of our policy in the countries bordering on Northern India and Burmah not only desirable but inevitable, while the attitude of Russia towards Mongolia, her general policy in China, and M. Sazonof's avowal that her interests there are mainly political (see Mr. O'Beirne's despatch No. 212 of the 8th July), seem likely to involve a recasting of the relations between the three Powers in those regions.

The attitude of Nepal in view of the unexpected events which are occurring in Thibet is another factor in the situation which could not have been foreseen when the existing treaties were negotiated, but it has now forced itself into consideration. It will be remembered that the policy of that State is not formally under British control, and though the Prime Minister has hitherto shown himself amenable to advice, effective coercion would be, if only for military reasons, impracticable. On the other hand, he has been formally assured that "so long as he consults the British Government and follows their advice when given, and preserves his present correct and friendly attitude, His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Thibet." But in fact those interests are suffering, and, so far from being able to prevent it, directly or indirectly, His Majesty's Government have seen Ladhakis, who are entitled to their own protection, dependent upon the good offices of the Nepalese representative at Lhassa. We are therefore not on firm ground for advising Nepal to abstain from taking action on her own account, while the effect of such action might at any moment be to confront His Majesty's Government with the alternatives—either of which would be equally disagreeable—of having to justify it to the Russian Government or to disavow it. It is indeed far from improbable that Russia would use such circumstances as a pretext for seeking "compensation" herself.

Lord Crewe would therefore suggest that the situation should be reviewed comprehensively in the light of these remarks.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Government of India, and their views invited. On receipt of their reply a further communication will be made to you.

I have, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 177.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *July* 27, 1912.

MY telegram of the 15th July. Kashgar affairs.

It is becoming increasingly more evident that Russia is taking advantage of disorder in New Dominion to push her policy of peaceful penetration, and that if unchecked it will end in permanent occupation, which we cannot but regard as serious menace to interests of India. We trust that every effort will be made to secure

withdrawal of Russian troops from that province. In this connection we have had under consideration proposal frequently urged by Macartney to send a detachment of Indian infantry as guard to our consul-general at Kashgar. It was thought this might be acceptable to His Majesty's Government as strengthening their hands in negotiations with Russians by stultifying the Russian argument that increase of their garrison is necessary for safety of our consulate as well as their own, and by demonstrating that we are not prepared tacitly to surrender our interests in the New Dominion. On the other hand, military objections are very strong, and deter us from recommending at the present juncture a step which has no advantages beyond those of a purely political character—the safety of our consulate being assured under existing conditions.

Minutes.

No immediate action is necessary upon this. But as the question is a large one and will need consideration, a short history of recent events and some comments on the possible courses of action open to His Majesty's Government are contained in the annexed memorandum.

R. T. N.

Memorandum respecting the Situation in the Countries bordering on the North-Eastern Frontier of India.

1. *Thibet.*

The development of the present situation in Thibet commences with the expedition of 1904 under Sir F. Younghusband, undertaken in order to enforce the observance of the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 and of the trade regulations of 1893, and incidentally to check the Russian and anti-British influence exercised by the notorious Dorjieff and other agents.

This expedition resulted in the signature of the Anglo-Thibetan convention of 1904, which was confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1906, and elaborated with regard to certain details by the Thibetan trade regulations of 1908.

These conventions provided for the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for three years, for the establishment of British trade agencies, and for the general regulation of customs dues, and of commercial intercourse between India and Thibet.

In addition, article 9, confirmed by articles 2 and 3 of the Anglo-Chinese convention, regulated the relations of Thibet with China, Great Britain, and foreign countries.

In 1907, the Anglo-Russian convention was signed, by which the two contracting parties undertook to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet, to abstain from interference with its internal administration, to enter into no negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government,* and not to send representatives to Lhassa.

They further engaged neither to seek nor to obtain any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, or mines in Thibet, and agreed that no part of the revenues of Thibet should be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia, or to any of their subjects.

These conventions are still in force and still, nominally, control the relations between Great Britain, Russia, and China with regard to Thibet.

From the conclusion of the agreements until the autumn of 1909, the *status quo* was substantially maintained; during October and November of this year, however, anti-British articles appeared in the Chinese newspaper published at Lhassa, and the Chinese amban began to evince decided anti-British bias in connection with commercial matters, this change of attitude coinciding with the return of the Dalai Lama from his enforced visit to Peking.

Early in 1910 a definite forward movement on the part of the Chinese occurred. Chao-erh-feng, the warden of the marches, who, supported by his brother, Chao-erh-Sun, the Viceroy of Szechuan, had been engaged for some years in subduing the semi-independent tribes of the Szechuan–Thibet border, and in raising the troops under his command to a high pitch of efficiency, entered Thibet at the head of a considerable force, nominally as a reinforcement for the amban's guard.

* The arrangements entered into by Great Britain in the Anglo-Thibetan and Anglo-Chinese conventions of 1904 and 1906 were expressly exempted from the operation of this clause.

Mr. Lindley's memo., Jan. 1911.

He met with but little organised resistance, and in due course reached Lhassa, from which the Dalai Lama fled a few days before his arrival.

From this time the Chinese influence in Thibet was steadily strengthened and extended; the principal towns were garrisoned by Chinese troops, Thibetan officials deprived of power, or even superseded altogether by Chinese officials, and a regular anti-British campaign instituted.

His Majesty's Government had protested early in 1910 against the proceedings of the Chinese Government, and continued from time to time to address further notes to the Wai-wu Pu as fresh instances of the infringement of the trade regulations and of the Anglo-Chinese convention were brought to their notice, and were supported in some of these protests by the Russian Government.

The Chinese Government, in reply, repeatedly asserted their intention of observing scrupulously the terms of the conventions, and returned evasive or untruthful answers to complaints as to particular infringements of them, but made no attempt to restrain or control the action of their local officials.

At the same time attempts were made to resuscitate the old Chinese claims to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, but these claims were specifically denied by His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Minister at Peking stating in a note to the Wai-wu Pu that "His Majesty's Government will be bound to resist any attempt of the Chinese Government to impose their authority upon or in any way to interfere with these two States."

Matters were at this stage when the revolution broke out in the autumn of 1911. The arrival of the news in Lhassa was followed by a mutiny of the Chinese troops, who killed some of their officers, deposed the amban, and looted a large portion of the town, their example being followed by most of the other garrisons.

The depredations of the Chinese soldiers soon aroused the Thibetans to reprisals, and the Chinese garrisons and officials of Eastern and Western Thibet were gradually driven out or killed, while the force in Lhassa was hemmed in by nearly 30,000 Thibetans. In July 1912 the Dalai Lama left India and returned to Thibet.

The chief interest during the spring and summer of 1912 has centred in the various proposals for the solution of the deadlock thus occasioned.

Proposals for the mediation by an officer appointed by the Government of India and for the intervention of the Nepalese having been successfully vetoed, a solution has at last been reached by the surrender of the garrison on condition of their repatriation viâ India.

Meanwhile the question of the future status of Thibet had been occupying the attention of His Majesty's Government.

In January 1912 the attention of the India Office had been called by the Foreign Office to this problem, which became more pressing upon the issue of a presidential order on the 25th March announcing the approaching inclusion of Thibet as an integral province of the Chinese Republic.

India Office, April 2, '12.

The India Office, after consultation with the Government of India, eventually recommended that the inclusion of Thibet in China proper should be resisted, and suggested that an agreement to this effect should be made a condition precedent to the recognition of the republic.

Sir J. Jordan was accordingly consulted as to the best method of giving effect to this suggestion, and proposed that he should prepare the way for an understanding by informing the Chinese that His Majesty's Government could not accept the attitude of the Republican Government towards Thibet.

Sir J. Jordan, No. 269, June 26, '12.

Meanwhile the provincial Government of Szechuan, acting apparently on their own initiative, had commenced to organise an expedition for the recovery of Thibet, and this action was also included in the discussions which took place at an interview between Sir J. Jordan and Yuan Shih-kai on the 26th June.

At this interview Yuan Shih-kai denied all intention of incorporating Thibet in China, and reaffirmed his intention of adhering to the treaties; but, while deprecating the action of the Szechuan authorities, refused to undertake to check the advance of their expedition.

At subsequent interviews in the course of the summer he maintained this attitude, but added that the Szechuan expedition was to confine itself to restoring order in the marches and to recapturing Litang, Batang, and the towns in Szechuan itself which had fallen into the hands of the Thibetans.

India Office letter, July 11, '12.

Meanwhile, further consultation between the Foreign Office, India Office, Government of India, and Sir J. Jordan had resulted in the formulation of a statement of the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the Thibetan question, in which it was laid down

that, while recognising China's suzerainty over Thibet, they could not countenance any attempt to interfere actively in the internal administration; that they must consequently warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct of the past two years, that while admitting the right of the Chinese Government to station a representative with a suitable escort at Lhassa they were not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops in Thibet, and that, finally, they must press for the conclusion of a written agreement to this effect.

Before this statement could be communicated to the Chinese Government the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Sir J. Jordan that, in view of the perilous situation of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa, the Government had decided to sanction the immediate advance of the Szechuan expedition into Thibet. Sir J. Jordan warned him in the strongest possible terms against such action, informing him that it must inevitably lead to direct conflict between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government. This language he repeated at an interview with the President on the following day, who informed him that the matter was a misunderstanding, that there was no intention of sanctioning such an advance, and that he would prefer to work through the Dalai Lama.

Sir J. Jordan No. 171, Telegraphic. Sir J. Jordan, No. 173, Telegraphic.

Sir J. Jordan was instructed by telegraph on the 15th August to communicate the above-mentioned statement of the attitude of His Majesty's Government in writing to the Chinese Government, and on the 24th August he was instructed to repeat the warning given in his interview with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs as coming from His Majesty's Government.

To Sir J. Jordan, No. 128, Telegraphic, August 15.

The Szechuan expedition is meanwhile slowly concentrating, and some detachments have already moved forward towards the frontier, although they have not, as far as is known, yet come into collision with the Thibetans, or made any attempt to drive back their advanced forces which are occupying positions some 50 miles inside the Szechuan frontier.

The expedition is to be assisted by a contingent from Yünnan, and no secret is made locally of their intention to reconquer Thibet. It seems probable that it will be impossible for the Central Government to exercise any effective control over their action for some time to come. They may, however, be seriously hampered by lack of funds and transport and by the inferior quality of their troops and organisation.

The India Office have recently suggested that, should this expedition be persisted in, the reoccupation of the Chumbi Valley by British troops should be seriously considered.

2. *Kashgar and the New Dominion.*

The relative positions of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia were to some extent regulated by the Pamir convention of 1895, which does not, however, include Chinese Turkestan directly within its scope.

Since that date, however, Russian influence has been gradually increasing in Chinese Turkestan and the New Dominion, their consular guards have been strengthened, the promiscuous registration of natives as Russian subjects has proceeded rapidly, and the high-handed methods of the Russian consular officers in dealing with local officials and magistrates have become more and more marked.

As early as 1901 the Government of India expressed the opinion that this district must inevitably sooner or later fall into the hands of Russia, and the events of 1912 would seem to have provided the Russians with the opportunity for which they have been waiting.

In May last His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh was instructed to represent informally to the Russian Government the importance of maintaining the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia, and to call particular attention to the claims of the Mir of Hunza to cultivation rights in Raskam and to a share in the revenues of the Taghdumbash Pamir—claims which were being threatened by the attitude of the Russian commandant at Taghdumbash Fort.

India Office, April 26, '12. To Mr. O'Beirne, No. 173, May 20 '12.

The result of this communication has never been reported, but it is significant that Captain Kolbine, the officer in question, was shortly afterwards removed from his post.

Meanwhile the revolution in Kashgar followed the usual course; local disturbances and the murder of magistrates gradually producing a state of anarchy, culminating in a rising of the mob in Kashgar itself, in which several of the newly appointed republican officials were killed.

This, coupled with isolated attacks on Russian subjects, provided an excuse for the reinforcement of the Russian consular guards, and 700 men with artillery duly arrived at Kashgar on the 21st June, while smaller reinforcements were sent to various other consular posts in the district, and the Russian Minister at Peking commenced to address vaguely threatening notes to the Wai-wu Pu.

India Office letter, July 29, '12

This was the situation, when on the 27th July the Government of India, basing their views on despatches and telegrams from His Majesty's consul-general at Kashgar, expressed the opinion that, unless steps were taken to check the Russian policy of peaceful penetration, the present occupation of important points by Russian troops would become permanent, and the province would become, in fact if not in name, a Russian protectorate.

The only ground upon which the Russian Government could reasonably be urged to withdraw their troops would, in the disturbed condition of the country, be the presence of a strong British consular guard at Kashgar, and this, for military reasons, the Government of India are unwilling to supply.

The India Office consequently now propose that the whole question of Anglo-Russian relations should be reconsidered, and that His Majesty's Government should give Russia a free hand in Kashgar in return for adequate compensation elsewhere.

This compensation, Lord Crewe suggests, might be found in Thibet.

This would of course necessitate a revision of the Thibetan and possibly also of the Pamir convention. But it is quite possible that the Russian Government would be willing to consider the question favourably, and it certainly has much to recommend it from the point of view of His Majesty's Government.

Russian interests in Thibet have never been more than hopes, and these hopes seem in the course of the last few years to have been abandoned.

In Turkestan and the New Dominion, however, Russian commercial and political interests are large, and it is probable that the Russian Government would be willing to sacrifice any vague ambitions that they may still retain in Thibet in return for freedom from the trouble and annoyance which could be caused them by British opposition.

On the side of the Government of India the disadvantages in the proposed arrangement would lie, as pointed out by the India Office, in a certain loss of prestige and in the after-effects of a considerable disturbance of the balance of power in Central Asia. On the other hand, Russian influence and trade are already infinitely greater in this district than British. Chinese Turkestan is connected with Russian territory by good caravan routes and easy passes, and the Russian railhead at Andijan is already within three days' journey of the frontier, while the passes into India are difficult and the road for most of its length a mountain track passable only by mules.

The solution would appear to lie in a new convention giving Russia a free hand in Chinese Turkestan, the New Dominion, and Outer Mongolia, and Great Britain a free hand in Thibet, and providing for the protection of Russian and British interests respectively should either Power eventually assume complete control of the districts in question.

This new convention if it were concluded would presumably be secret and involve a renunciation of any claim to political interests in Chinese Turkestan, the New Dominion, and Outer Mongolia on the part of His Majesty's Government and a reciprocal renunciation on the part of the Russian Government with regard to Thibet and contain clauses regulating and defining the Mir of Hunza's rights in Raskam and Taghdumbash Pamir, and the still more shadowy claims of the Chinese Government in Hunza (to which the Russian Government would presumably succeed).

In addition provision would have to be made for safeguarding the present commercial and taxation privileges enjoyed by British subjects in Chinese Turkestan, and for continuing the present British consular jurisdiction until, if ever, the province became an integral portion of the Russian Empire.

Assuming that such a convention can be concluded, it remains to be seen what steps could or should be taken with regard to Thibet.

Setting aside the possibility of establishing a British protectorate, a course which for both political and military reasons the Government of India are unwilling to adopt, the best plan would appear to be to preserve Thibet as an autonomous State on the same footing with regard to India as Nepal and Bhutan.

The present moment is peculiarly favourable for such an attempt, the Dalai Lama has just returned to Thibet, grateful to the Government of India for their hospitality and profoundly impressed with the power and justice of His Majesty's Government,

while the Chinese, after two years of oppression and misgovernment, have just been driven from the country.

A new agreement with China on the question must in any case, for the reasons given earlier in this memorandum, be concluded, and if, as is intended, a definition and limitation of the powers of the amban and the restriction of Chinese troops in Thibet to his personal guard, are included in this agreement, the task of establishing an autonomous Thibet would be half accomplished.

The question of maintaining the influence of the Government of India and their present friendly relations with the Dalai Lama remain to be considered.

For this purpose the establishment of a British resident at Lhassa, holding the same semi-diplomatic position as the present resident in Nepal, would seem to be sufficient.

In view of the unwarlike nature of the Western Thibetans (30,000 of them have only succeeded in inducing 800 Chinese soldiers to surrender on terms after six months' fighting), a small escort should be sufficient to ensure his personal safety, while the improvement of the road and the extension of the telegraph from Gyantse to Lhassa, should put him in close touch with the guards at the trade agencies and with India itself in the unlikely event of an attack.

Unless some such scheme is adopted, it appears inevitable that, even should His Majesty's Government be successful in averting the threatened reconquest of Thibet, the Dalai Lama, cut off by the provisions of the Anglo-Russian convention from direct communication with the Government of India and subjected to constant pressure from the Chinese representative—who alone will have the right to approach and advise him—will fall gradually under Chinese influence again, an influence which will be gradually and almost imperceptibly extended until the situation of 1910 is reproduced.

While in Kashgar the provision of a consular guard and the utmost exertion of diplomatic pressure cannot be expected to do more than delay the fulfilment of Russian expectations, a delay which will have been gained at the expense of constant friction and the probable destruction of the friendly relations which at present exist between the two Powers in this region.

R. T. N.

Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.

It will be useful to be prepared for the Indian Government's statement of policy by considering forthwith the whole question of a change in the status of Thibet and the consequent revision of that part of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which at present hampers our action there.

The considerations will fall under three heads :—

1. The reasons for a change in the status of Thibet.
2. The nature of a new status of Thibet.
3. The nature of a new agreement with Russia.

Roughly speaking (1) and (2) fall within the province of the Indian Government and the India Office ; (3) is the affair of the Foreign Office. But it is obviously difficult to draw a hard and fast line, and to assign the group of considerations on one side of it to India and that on the other to ourselves. We are, in fact, concerned less with what is required than how to obtain it, and the diplomatic consequences of obtaining it, viz., our relations with Russia and China in the matter, but we are bound also, firstly, to be convinced of the necessity of a change and the opportunity now afforded before putting in motion the machinery for obtaining it, and, secondly, to be assured that the projected detachment of Thibet from Russia and China is so complete and permanent, and the agreements affecting it so free from ambiguity as to exclude all possibility of future trouble or controversy arising with the two Powers concerned.

1. *The Reasons for a Change in the Status of Thibet.*

There are two main reasons for a change in the status of Thibet in the immediate future. The first is the new forward policy of China herself, the opportunity afforded by her present weakness, and the general remodelling of her constitution consequent on the revolution, and the friendliness and gratitude towards us of the Dalai Lama and the Thibetans. The second is the new forward policy of Russia in Mongolia and the New Dominion.

The new forward policy of China in Thibet dates from 1910 and is related in

Mr. Nugent's memorandum. The latest and most active phase has been the Szechuan expedition which, whether sanctioned by the Central Chinese Government or not—and there is no security that our recent success in getting their sanction withdrawn will be permanent—may suddenly produce a conflict either directly with ourselves or with the Nepalese, which is the same thing. The declaration which has just been made at Peking by Sir J. Jordan makes it perfectly clear to the Chinese that we shall utterly refuse to tolerate any attempt on their part to consolidate their administration in Thibet, and limits the extent of their relations with the Thibetan authorities by defining the amount of Chinese representation that we shall permit at Lhassa. We are to insist that the Chinese shall bind themselves by a written agreement to comply with our demands. But in the prevailing conditions we are not in a position to see clearly whether the agreement is being carried out, and we are largely powerless to see that it is carried out. The Chinese Government may or may not be equally powerless to see to it, but we cannot trust them to act straightforwardly. Chinese activity may be quiescent for a short period and then, imperceptibly at first, the Szechuan and Yünnan intrigues will begin again, and the influence which we have acquired over the Dalai Lama will be gradually undermined. There will be a recrudescence of disputes between the Chinese and the Thibetans, and in the event of a massacre—which is no unlikely contingency—we, or the Nepalese, will be forced to take sides.

At the present moment the Thibetans look on us as their natural protectors, and, if they now find that we are going to hold aloof from them, the result will be that we shall drive them into the arms of the Chinese, or, worse still, into the arms of the Russians. The 1907 agreement will certainly not prevent the latter, if appealed to, from putting unofficial agents at Lhassa, after the manner of Dorijieff, if they have not got them there already. These unofficial agents are mostly Mongols, Buriats, or half-Thibetans, and it is easy to find an excuse for their presence in the religious interests of their fellow-Buddhists.

Chinese encroachments on the north-east frontier of India and on the Burmah frontier will become intolerable, and Chinese troops may occupy positions essential to us from which it will be impossible to eject them without raising trouble at Peking.

Unless, therefore, we strengthan our hold over Thibet and have both regular means of information as to what is passing at Lhassa, and the necessary machinery for maintaining our influence and prestige with the Thibetan authorities, we are bound to be exposed to the constant danger of disturbance and intrigues, and the risk of a far-reaching conflict with China, when the latter has become once more organised, and perhaps powerful, and has possibly made a friend among the European Powers.

It will be impossible, too, to restrain Nepal in the long run, and, if this State once becomes embroiled, we should be bound to lend our support. Moreover, even should we not go so far, we should be identified with the policy of our own protected State, and the situation created would be the same.

The second, and perhaps more potent, reason for utilising this moment for a forward movement in Thibet, is the forward movement of Russia in Mongolia and the New Dominion. Russia, by her activity in these regions, is evidently contemplating a consolidation of her political position there in some form or other. The most significant step which she has taken in this direction was, I cannot help thinking, to enquire through M. Cambon in May last how we should like the formula of 1904, recognising the special interests which France had along her extended frontier with Morocco, being applied to the extended Russian frontier with Mongolia. This was thought a cynical suggestion at the time in the light of contemporary events in Morocco, but the discussion of it was dismissed chiefly on the ground that no action was required on the specific point on which the question had been raised (Chinese loan interests), but also on the ground that, while Great Britain had received the large *quid pro quo* of Egypt in return for her assent to the Morocco formula, in the case of Mongoliat here was no obvious *quid pro quo* for her to obtain—the Thibet question being at the moment dormant.

But two conclusions may be drawn from Russia's *ballon d'essai*. The first is that she is on the move; and the second is that she prefers to move with our favour and assent. These conclusions refer to Mongolia, but they may apparently be applied equally to the New Dominion. That she is either anxious for our acquiescence or afraid of our opposition in this region too is probable from her recent action there. The sudden removal from his post of Captain Kolbine, the objectionable Russian commandant at Jaghdumbash, as the apparent result of our representations at St. Petersburgh, the studied politeness of the Russian consular officers at Kashgar, M. Sokof and M. Behrens, and Russia's

apparent disinclination, even under considerable provocation, to go to full lengths at once and occupy the whole district, would appear at first sight to be evidence of her belief that we could make her position there somehow or other uncomfortable. It is not very easy to understand her motives, since she is bound to us by no treaty, either as to Mongolia or the New Dominion. A possible explanation may be that she is anxious not to appear alone before the Powers as the first aggressor in the partition of the Chinese Empire; but this may be far-fetched, and it is more likely that she is seriously afraid of some effective opposition to her schemes on our part, and would therefore prefer to strike a bargain with us before proceeding further.

Whatever her motives may be, however, there is good reason to suppose that she is quite prepared, if not anxious, to strike a bargain, and we may therefore at this moment be face to face with an opportunity which may never recur. We appear to have received a very strong, if indirect, hint that she is going ahead—with our concurrence for a price, if we are ready to bargain—without, if we are not. In any case she is bound, before many years, or perhaps months, are past, to have drawn the whole of Mongolia and the New Domonion within her political sphere, and we may suddenly awake to find ourselves confronted with a *fait accompli* and no cards left to play. We have now an opportunity of conceding to her as a favour what we cannot in the end keep from her, and obtaining in return a free hand in a country from which she can have no reasonable object in keeping us out, and which, her interest in it being valueless to her, she might very well be willing to part with and consider a cheap price to pay.

2. *The Nature of a New Status of Thibet.*

It is agreed that it is not desirable to establish a British protectorate over Thibet, and it is suggested that it should be placed in the same position as Nepal or Bhutan. What appears to be essential is that Thibet, while nominally retaining her position as an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, should in reality be placed in a position of absolute dependence on the Indian Government, and that there should be set up an effective machinery for keeping out the Chinese on the one hand and the Russians on the other. But there is no danger of one of these influences, the Russian, getting a foothold in Nepal; there is no reason to fear the other if we effectively keep the Chinese out of Thibet. The two cases are therefore not quite parallel. In Thibet we have got to insure against both Chinese and Russian influence, so that the machinery for maintaining our hold over it ought consequently to be more effective and more organised than in Nepal. The externals need not be considered at all. The fiction of Chinese suzerainty may easily be retained, and the appearance and name of protectorate avoided. But if an agreement is arrived at now, there ought obviously to be no loophole left for the encroachment or interference of any other Power. Thibet should quite frankly fall completely under British influence in such a way that its transformation into a protectorate, should any contingency ever render this desirable, should be a transformation in name only, and should make no difference whatever in its status. The first urgent step towards attaining this end is the establishment of a British resident at Lhassa with a strong line of communication, a good road, and a telegraph to Gyantse. Further machinery of control is a matter for the Indian Government to suggest. What is essential at present is that we should obtain a completely free hand both by an agreement with Russia and by an agreement with China. It is no good at this point shirking the reality of our requirements, and, if it is undesirable to call things by their proper name, at least we should make quite sure that we are obtaining them to the full, and really making our position secure and solid. Only if this is done will it be really possible to obtain permanently the object desired and prevent further trouble with China and Russia.

3. *The Nature of a New Agreement with Russia.*

On the whole, the method of initiating negotiations that would seem to recommend itself most would be to inform Russia of our desire to reverse the 1907 agreement, and thereby to obtain a free hand in Thibet, and then ask what her price is to be. By this means we should know at once the full extent of her designs. She would be obliged to declare her hand immediately. Pourparlers might be opened by the Russian Government being informed that the policy of non-intervention agreed on in 1907 had failed to bring about the results expected, and that His Majesty's Government supposed that they, the Russian Government, were finding equal difficulties in maintaining the same policy in the Chinese countries conterminous with her frontier.

We ought first to consider, however, what we have got to concede, or are prepared to determine to be a concession, and how we are going to concede it. The question at once arises whether it would not be easier to bargain if we had something tangible to give away, and the presence of Indian troops at Kashgar at once suggests itself as something that we could withdraw by way of concession. But there are military objections to the dispatch of troops to that region, and it may therefore be an unpractical suggestion. At present the rights of the Mir of Hunza are our only tangible asset, and it would probably be well to reserve these as a card to play later in the negotiations. There seems to be no difficulty in abandoning these eventually to the Russians and compensating the mir with a cash payment and some extra personal prestige.

In principle Russia is certain to require a far more drastic control of Mongolia and the New Dominion than we require in Thibet. In those countries she already has as much as and more than that. She must, therefore, contemplate practical occupation and a protectorate perhaps in name as well as fact. It is true that by the adoption of the Morocco formula she would "declare that" she "has no intention of altering the political status" of Mongolia and the New Dominion. But we shall recognise that it appertains to her "to preserve order in" those countries, "and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which they may require." We should preserve any rights which we possess in virtue of treaties, &c., with China, but otherwise we openly and avowedly abandon the countries. Whether it would be good policy to try and restrict her as much as possible would depend on the manner in which she meets our first overtures. Our only object should be to make certain of getting all we want without any reservations. On the other hand, the less we could make Russia accept in the southern part of the New Dominion the better for our prestige in India. If we could save that we should have done well. To gain it, it might be pointed out that any serious disturbance of the *status quo* on the Indian frontier would require considerable compensation elsewhere—which might not be forthcoming. But we might in the end make this concession without a pang, if necessary—as it is of absolutely no vital importance to India strategically—and its retention might easily lead to future friction with Russia.

But, when all is said and done, we have nothing concrete to offer Russia—and no concession to make to her of anything which she has not already got *de facto*. In approaching her, we can only trust to the correctness of the assumption of her either hesitating to recognise that we are aware that she has got or can have everything she wants without giving us a *quid pro quo* or her being apprehensive about beginning or continuing a forward policy of her own without our favour. There is, therefore, bound to be an element of bluff about the negotiations, and this should be borne in mind before they are initiated. But having regard to it immediate action is required in order to be successful. The publication of our recent declaration to China about Thibet (communicated officially to Russia) may—we suspect it from a recent enquiry from the Russian Embassy—cause her suprise and possibly concern, and she may hasten any day to make a counter-stroke by increasing correspondingly her hold over Mongolia and the New Dominion, and so forestall action of ours.

Whether it would be advisable to allow Russia to have a resident at Lhassa must also be considered. It would surely be better if this could be avoided.

There is finally the question whether the new agreement with Russia should be secret or not. If it is not, we run the risk of being involved in the charge of beginning the partition of China, and that at a moment when we are publicly proclaiming the doctrine of her integrity, and taking steps, financial and otherwise, to assist her to establish and consolidate her new régime. There would be the danger too of another Power claiming compensation elsewhere for the dislocation of the *status quo*.

On the other hand, if the 1907 agreement is annulled secretly, and a British resident appears spontaneously at Lhassa, the fact will immediately become known, and there may be a general suspicion of a secret agreement possessing a more far-reaching effect than is the case in reality.

The solution might be a published agreement with secret clauses, the published agreement containing the minimum of disturbance of the *status quo*.

J. D. G.

Foreign Office, September 1, 1912.

It will be well to ponder the arguments and suggestions which have been put forward pending the receipt of the considered views of the Government of India. The difficulties of any revision of the agreement with Russia and of practically ousting the Chinese from Thibet after our having played into their hands during years of inactivity, if not of encouragement, will undoubtedly be great.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in first going to Lhassa and then retiring without making any arrangements for securing either a recognition of British or of the stability of any native authority was much criticised at the time. It looks as if the India Office have now come to the conclusion that the policy of negation was a mistake. But meanwhile we have put serious obstacles in our own way by tying our hands by the Russian agreement.

I understand that the occasion of M. Sazonof's forthcoming visit to England is to be utilised for reconsidering the policy of both England and Russia in respect to Persia. If anything is to be done as regards Thibet, it seems essential that the discussions with M. Sazonof should extend to that country also. This means that time presses, and I think we should explain this to the India Office, and ask them to endeavour to obtain the views of the Government of India by telegraph, or in any case in time to allow of their being studied and considered here before the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs arrives.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.

I am glad to have had the subject surveyed in these minutes. I will discuss it with Lord Crewe before I go to Balmoral.

E. G.

[34809] No. 178.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 15, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, on the subject of the proposed communication to the Chinese Government regarding the political status of Thibet.

I am to explain that paragraph 1 of the statement contained in my letter dated the 11th July was dictated by the consideration that China has always attempted to extend our recognition of her suzerainty over Thibet into an admission of her sovereignty; and whereas the issue has been evaded in previous negotiations, the Marquess of Crewe was of opinion that the present opportunity should be taken of placing on record the view of His Majesty's Government in formal and unambiguous language.

For this reason, and because the Chinese are apt to take as admitted what is passed over in silence, his Lordship would deprecate the omission of the words to which Sir E. Grey takes exception; but as the presentation of the statement has been rendered urgent by the circumstances described in Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 171 of the 14th instant, he will not press his view. He trusts, however, that in the discussions which will doubtless take place with the Chinese Government an opportunity will be found of stating formally in writing the position of his Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[34795] No. 179.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to previous correspondence as to the future control of the north-east frontier of India, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, recommending as a measure of immediate urgency, pending the submission of detailed proposals on the

general question of the frontier, the construction of a properly bridged track from Sadiya to the frontier in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai.

The question of the improvement of communications in the Lohit valley is discussed in paragraph 7 of the Assam Government's letter No. 69 of the 7th July, 1912, copy of which is enclosed herewith for Sir E. Grey's information.* The Marquess of Crewe is in general agreement with the views expressed by the local Government on this subject, and he supports the Government of India's recommendation that the construction of the proposed road should be taken in hand immediately, without prejudice to the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government as to the measures to be taken for the future control of the Mishmi country.

I am to enclose the draft of a telegram which Lord Crewe proposes, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, to address to the Government of India.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 179.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 7, 1912.

PLEASE refer to papers regarding north-east frontier enclosed in letter dated 18th ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department. In anticipation of orders on whole question of north-east frontier, as to which we shall shortly address you, we request that construction of property bridged track from Sadiya to frontier near Menilkrai may, in the meantime, be sanctioned immediately. Owing to spring floods and shortness of working season, we regard the construction of this track as most urgent. It will take two seasons to complete unless work is started immediately. Two double companies of pioneers and two companies of sappers could, without risk of complications, carry out work at once.

Enclosure 2 in No. 179.

Draft Telegram to the Government of India.

(Secret.)

YOUR telegram of 7th August: North-east frontier.

Your proposals are approved.

[33657] No. 180.

Memorandum communicated to Baron Kato.

IN the course of a conversation on the 24th ultimo with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject of Thibet, Sir E. Grey informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government held that, though they recognised Chinese suzerainty over Thibet, the latter ought to remain an autonomous State between India and China, and that they should press this view diplomatically in Peking as strongly as need be.

In order to obviate any misunderstandings that may arise in the near future out of the complicated relations between China and Thibet, His Majesty's Government have thought it desirable to formulate in definite terms their policy with regard to the status of the latter country, and His Majesty's Minister at Peking has accordingly been instructed to make the following statement to the Chinese Government:—

His Majesty's Government, while they have formally recognised the "suzerain rights" of China in Thibet, have never recognised, and are not prepared to recognise, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Thibet, which should remain, as contemplated by the treaties, in the hands of the Thibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under article 1 of the convention of the 27th April, 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of treaty stipulations.

On these grounds, His Majesty's Government must demur altogether (1) to the

* Not printed.

conduct of the Chinese officers in Thibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country; and (2) to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's presidential order of the 21st April, 1912, that Thibet is to be "regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper," and that all "administrative matters" connected with that country "will come within the sphere of internal administration."

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Thibet, and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

While the right of China to station a representative, with a suitable escort, at Lhassa, with authority to advise the Thibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhassa or in Thibet generally.

His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.

In the meantime, all communication with Thibet viâ India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese, and only be reopened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

This does not apply to the withdrawal of the present Chinese garrison at Lhassa, who, as Yuan Shih-kai has already been informed, are at liberty to return to China viâ India if they wish to do so.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1912.

[33657] No. 181.

Memorandum communicated to Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

THE Russian chargé d'affaires will recollect that on the 25th June a memorandum was communicated to Count Benckendorff on the subject of the present situation in Thibet, and that in the message sent by the Government of India to the Dalai Lama, the terms of which were set out in the memorandum, the former stated that it was their desire to see the internal autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty maintained without interference so long as treaty obligations were duly performed and cordial relations preserved between Thibet and India.

In order to obviate any misunderstandings that may arise in the near future out of the complicated relations between China and Thibet, His Majesty's Government have thought it desirable to formulate in definite terms their policy with regard to the status of the latter country, and His Majesty's Minister at Peking has accordingly been instructed to make the following statement to the Chinese Government:—

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On these grounds His Majesty's Government must demur altogether (1) to the conduct of the Chinese officers in Thibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country, and (2) to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's presidential order of the 21st April, 1912, that Thibet is to be "regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper," and that all "administrative matters" connected with that country "will come within the sphere of internal administration."

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Thibet, and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

While the right of China to station a representative, with a suitable escort, at Lhassa, with authority to advise the Thibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhassa or in Thibet generally.

His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines, as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.

In the meantime, all communication with Thibet vîa India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese, and only be reopened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

This does not apply to the withdrawal of the present Chinese garrison at Lhassa, who, as Yuan Shih-kai has already been informed, are at liberty to return to China viâ India if they wish to do so.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1912.

[34927] No. 182.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 322.)

Sir, *Peking, August* 2, 1912.

THE accompanying despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu* gives a detailed narrative of events on the Thibetan frontier in continuation of the accounts furnished in my despatch No. 299 of the 15th ultimo, and shows that the two provinces of Szechuan and Yünnan are making a formidable effort to expel the Thibetans from China and recover the Chinese hold over the dependency. With the troops which I reported in my telegram No. 164 to be leaving Yünnan-fu, the expedition will number approximately some 8,000 men, and, if properly armed and led, it should be sufficient to deal with any Thibetan opposition that it is likely to encounter.

It is evident from Mr. Wilkinson's despatch that the President has exercised a restraining influence upon the enthusiasm of the two provinces, and two days ago he again assured me that there was no intention of prosecuting the campaign beyond the borders of China. He said, in effect, that the prospect of carrying the war into Thibet was only put forward as an incentive to encourage popular subscriptions for financing the expedition. But although there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement, it seems unlikely that if the expedition succeeds in driving the Thibetans out of China it will be content to stay its march on Lhassa should it feel strong enough to undertake the task. The course of events will probably be determined not by orders from Peking, but by the relative strength and fighting capacity of the opposing forces.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

[35323] No. 183.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 17th August, 1912, regarding the Chinese and Thibet.

India Office, August 20, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 183.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 17, 1912.

SEE telegram of 14th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Peking regarding Thibet.

Language held by Minister is being approved by His Majesty's Government, and

* Not printed.

he is being instructed to present to Chinese Government at once the statement contained in letter dated 11th ultimo from India Office to Foreign Office, sent to India with letter dated 12th ultimo from Secretary, Political Department, India Office. Words from "Chinese sovereignty" to "do not admit" have been omitted from statement, the first two clauses being amalgamated. The matter being now urgent, I have acquiesced reluctantly in this omission; I hope, however, that another opportunity of denying sovereignty of China in formal manner may be found.

I shall be glad if you will consider whether, in the event of Chinese persisting in sending expeditions to Lhassa, it would be advantageous to occupy the Chumbi Valley. Please telegraph at once, as it is possible that Chinese might be deterred by threat of occupation.

[34795] No. 184.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th instant relative to the future control of the north-east frontier of India, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he concurs in the enclosed draft telegram to the Government of India sanctioning the proposal to construct a properly bridged track from Sadiya to the frontier in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35450] No. 185.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

August 21, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEE my telegram dated the 15th instant regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated 20th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"An order from Lhassa, dated the 16th instant, has been received by Thibetan trade agent, informing him officially of conclusion of peace between Thibetans and Chinese. The only details at present available are that arms and ammunition are to be handed over by Chinese, and will be locked up under seal of Nepaulese representative as well as of the two parties; and that all Chinese modern-drilled troops are to leave about the 12th proximo, and to travel viâ Ralung, Nyeru, Kangma, and India to China. It does not appear that any other Chinese are to go."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[35582] No. 186.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence with India on the subject of the status of the Maharajah of Bhutan.

India Office, August 22, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 186.

India Office to Government of India.

My dear McMahon, *India Office, June* 21, 1912.

PLEASE see Bell's report on Bhutan for 1911–12, paragraph 2. Is the statement that the Maharajah "paid his homage to the King-Emperor with the other ruling chiefs" to be taken literally? It would be convenient to know if he has in this way definitely marked his position. What is the Bhutanese for "homage," and what the exact idea that it conveys.

Yours sincerely,
J. E. FERARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 186.

Government of India to India Office.

My dear Sir, *Simla, July* 22, 1912.

IN reply to your letter dated the 21st June, 1912, I am desired to say that the statement in Bell's report on Bhutan for 1911–12, that the Maharajah "paid his homage to the King-Emperor with the other ruling chiefs" may be taken literally, and that his Highness in this way has definitely marked his position. The Maharajah knew and accepted the fact that none but feudatory chiefs in India were to participate in the Durbar, and that, if he attended, he would be required to perform a similar act of homage as other chiefs entitled to an equal salute. The placing of a scarf on the ground and leaving it there was considered the most suitable form of obeisance for the Maharajah.

Yours sincerely,
A. H. GRANT.

Enclosure 3 in No. 186.

Government of India to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 13, 1911.

INVITATION to Delhi Durbar of Maharajah of Bhutan.

Please refer to your letter dated the 18th February.

It is desirable that you should know before definite orders are passed inviting Maharajah that none but feudatory chiefs in India will participate in forthcoming Durbar. If, therefore, Maharajah is invited he will be required to perform similar act of homage as other chiefs entitled to equal salute, and will be accorded the same treatment.

Please telegraph whether you see any objection to this. It will be impossible to arrange for Maharajah to come to Calcutta during King's visit in the event of his not coming to Delhi.

Enclosure 4 in No. 186.

Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 15, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 13th instant.

What is the act of homage the Maharajah of Bhutan will be required to perform should accept an invitation of the Delhi Durbar?

Enclosure 5 in No. 186.

Government of India to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 18, 1911.

DELHI Coronation Durbar.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 15th March.

If Maharajah of Bhutan attends Durbar he will be presented to His Majesty the King, and will be expected to make obeisance to the Sovereign like other chiefs. It may also be necessary for his Highness to present "nazar" at his formal visit to His Majesty, as he did in 1905 when he exchanged visits with his Excellency the Viceroy.

Enclosure 6 in No. 186.

Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 25, 1911.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 19th instant.

No objections to the treatment mentioned in the above telegram will be raised by His Highness the Maharajah of Bhutan.

[34668]

No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 173 of 16th August.

Yuan Shih-kai's disclaimer is satisfactory as far as it goes. You should tell him that you have communicated it to His Majesty's Government, who, while thanking him for it, have instructed you to repeat the warning in your telegram No. 171 of 14th August as coming from themselves, and to say that any step in the nature of an advance into Thibet would bring the Chinese Government into direct conflict with them. There is, of course, less pretext than ever for such a measure now in view of the information in Government of India's telegram of 21st August.

[35729]

No. 188.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd August, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 23, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 188.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 23, 1912.

SEE my telegram dated 21st instant regarding Thibet.

Two telegrams to the following effect have been received from the trade agent, Gyantse :—

First telegram, dated 21st instant :—

"Writing on the 19th instant from Samding, the Dalai Lama's professor-doctor, Lamen Kempo reports the commencement of negotiations on 12th instant, and the conclusion of the following terms after three conferences with the Chinese :—

"(i.) Return viâ India to China of Chinese military officers and soldiers (whether all soldiers are meant, or only modern-drilled troops, is not clear) ;

"(ii.) Arms and ammunition to be locked up as reported by me in my telegram of yesterday's date ;

"(iii.) Chinese to be provided with food and transport free of cost on their way to India.

"It is further stated by Lamen Kempo that an order has been issued by Dalai Lama to the effect that fighting will be resumed if conditions laid down are not fulfilled by Chinese. It does not appear that for the present Dalai Lama has any intention of leaving Samding."

Second telegram, also dated 21st instant :—

"Signature of treaty on 14th instant is reported by Lal Bahadur in a telegram dated Lhasa the 18th instant and sent to Nepal from Gyantse on the evening of the 21st instant. Representatives of Nepal, Dalai Lama, and Chinese intended to proceed to Trapchi, to supervise storage of Chinese arms, on the 18th instant."

This news might, it is suggested, be formally notified to Chinese Government, and it might be pointed out to them that there now remains no excuse whatever for expedition from Szechuan, and that steps should be taken to recall it at once if it has already started.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[35793] No. 189.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 23, 1912.

SEE my telegram of to-day's date regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect dated yesterday received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"National Assembly have instructed local authorities at Gyantse to provide Chinese officers and soldiers, on their journey to India, with 1,500 transport animals

and 1,500 riding animals. It is stated that departure of Chinese from Lhasa will take place in three contingents, each consisting of about 500 men. First contingent will probably leave early in September, but date is not quite certain. Permission to stay in the country will, it is understood, be given to all Chinese born in Thibet."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[36054] No. 190.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st August, 1912, regarding the north-east frontier of India.

India Office, August 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 190.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 21, 1912.

I APPROVE proposals regarding north-east frontier submitted in your telegram dated the 7th August.

[36338] No. 191.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 28, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 20, 1912.

THIBET.

See your telegram dated the 17th instant.

For reasons stated in note dated the 13th March, 1908, by Major O'Connor, copy of which was enclosed in demi-official letter, dated 30th April, 1908, from Secretary, Foreign Department, it has always appeared to us desirable to occupy Chumbi Valley. But we are unable for the following reasons to recommend occupation at the present juncture :—

1. It is too late in the season : before advance could begin passes will be partially blocked.

2. In view of Anglo-Russian Agreement, concurrence of Russia, which might involve demands of embarrassing nature, would have to be obtained.

3. Relations with Thibetans themselves would be impaired, as occupation would be resented by them, even if they were persuaded to accept it.

4. As Chinese expedition would disregard even orders of Central Government, we should probably not stop it by occupying Chumbi Valley.

5. Cost of occupation would be in excess of its value, unless we occupy permanently.

6. Unless we are prepared to carry it into execution, use of threat, which would probably now be ineffective, is impolitic.

[36457] No. 192.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th August, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, August 29, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 192.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 28, 1912.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CHUNG LING and Lien Yu, Chinese Minister at Lhassa, have sent me a telegram, dispatched 27th instant from Gyantse, to following effect:—

"Peace has been restored in Thibet, which was in trouble. Our troops will go back through India; their guns, arms, ammunition, &c., have been deposited at Lhassa. If instructions to afford any facilities that may be necessary were given to the British authorities on the road, we should be most grateful to your Lordship."

Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, late military attaché at Peking, who is here, and whose deputation Chinese Government should fully appreciate, as he is acquainted with Yuan Shih-kai personally, knows Chinese, and understands Chinese troops, is being sent by me to meet the Chinese troops on their return, and to assist in arranging for their journey. It is suggested that we should bring our good offices in this matter formally to notice of Chinese Government at Peking, with a view to using them, in connection with discussions regarding Thibet, to greatest possible political advantage. Chinese Government will, it is presumed, meet cost of transport to China of returning Chinese troops. Manner of transporting them is under consideration.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[36929] No. 193.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 349.)

Sir, *Peking, August* 17, 1912.

IN my telegram No. 171 of the 14th instant I had the honour to inform you that Dr. W. W. Yen, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, had stated to me, under instructions from the President of the Republic, that in view of the perilous position of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa, Yuan Shih-kai had decided to sanction the immediate advance into Thibet of the combined military expedition fitted out in Szechuan and Yünnan, and now operating in the Szechuan marches. Dr. Yen had prefaced this statement by reminding me that the President had promised to inform me of any measures contemplated against Thibet. I reported to you fully by telegraph the language I held to the Vice-Minister in reply. It was evident that this was the first step in the process of again bringing the country entirely under the control of Chinese officialdom, and I had no hesitation in expressing the most unqualified objection to a line of conduct which was not only designed to bring about a political situation which would be a contravention of solemn treaty engagements, but could not fail to plunge Thibet again into turmoil and disorder. The only reason given me, namely, the necessity for rescuing the Chinese garrison, was no justification, for their withdrawal could be arranged for, as the President knew. I asked Dr. Yen to convey my reply to Yuan Shih-kai, and to say that I should be glad to see his Excellency before I left for a short holiday on the 17th August.

I called on the President yesterday by appointment, and to my amazement he said that he had not authorised the Vice-Minister to make the statement he had delivered to me. All that he had authorised him to say was that although the Chinese Government did not interpret the treaties as prohibiting an advance into Thibet, no such advance was contemplated. How the misunderstanding arose I cannot say. Yuan Shih-kai professed to be almost as much perplexed as I was, and there may be something in his suggestion that the Vice-Minister had confused his instructions with the views held by the Wai-chiao Pu. Even so, it is still difficult to account for the President's action in deliberately sending an official to deliver such a message, which either was meaningless or, if intended to provoke a discussion, could have only drawn from me a repetition of our objections to anything in the nature of a military expedition entering Thibet.

However this may be, the President assured me yesterday more than once in the clearest possible terms that there was no intention whatever of ordering the troops to advance into Thibet. Several of the provincial generals had pressed him for permission to lead their men across the frontier, but he had telegraphed his entire disapproval of all such proposals. The operations, he told me, would be confined to the borders of Szechuan in the neighbourhood of Litang, Batang, and Tachienlu. His Excellency went even further and spontaneously assured me that there was no intention of incorporating Thibet in the provinces of China. He added that the natural authority over Thibet was vested in the Dalai Lama, and that he would much prefer to arrange matters by amicable agreement with him. I had the honour of telegraphing the gist of this conversation to you last night in my telegram No. 173.

Although the result of this exchange of views was to place a different complexion on the present state of affairs, I did not consider it desirable to suggest to you that the communication which you authorised me by your telegram No. 128 of the 15th instant to make to the Chinese Government should be deferred. I have therefore to-day addressed to the Wai-chiao Pu the memorandum of which I have the honour to enclose copy. After reminding the Chinese Government of the verbal assurances which, in spite of the presidential order of the 21st April, I have now on two separate occasions received from the President himself, I have indicated in the terms of your instructions the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Thibetan question. At the conclusion of my interview yesterday I told Yuan Shi-kai that this communication might be expected, and I asked him to be good enough to give his personal attention to it. The attitude which it embodied was, I said, eminently reasonable and fair, and it was hoped that the policy now laid down by His Majesty's Government in clear and definite terms would conduce to a more satisfactory state of things, and would meet with an equally frank and friendly response from the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Minister),
ERNEST SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-chiao Pu by Sir J. Jordan.

IN a conversation with his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai on the 23rd June, His Britannic Majesty's Minister referred to the Chinese military expedition which was being organised against Thibet, and gave his Excellency clearly to understand that the Thibetan question could be easily settled by friendly negotiation at a later date, but that the use of force at that time would seriously prejudice an amicable arrangement. His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai assured Sir John Jordan that there was no intention of incorporating Thibet in China, and that the treaties would be scrupulously observed.

On the 29th June His Majesty's Minister informed Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate any attempt to reduce Thibet, who had independent treaty relations with Great Britain, to the condition of a province of China, and he warned the Chinese Government that grave complications might ensue if the Chinese expedition crossed the frontier into Thibet.

In consequence of a visit paid to him a few days previously by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's Minister again saw his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai on the 16th instant, and, in reply to his enquiry, received the most emphatic

assurances that there was no intention either of ordering the expedition to cross the frontier into Thibet or of incorporating that country in the Provinces of China. These assurances have been noted and duly reported to His Majesty's Government, who will doubtless welcome them as indicating China's intention scrupulously to observe treaty engagements. At the same time His Majesty's Government consider it to be in the interest of harmonious relations that they should now state clearly their policy in regard to Thibet. His Majesty's Minister had the honour to inform his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai that a communication in this respect would shortly be submitted to the Chinese Government, and he now begs, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to make following definite statement of that policy:—

1. His Majesty's Government, while they have formally recognised the "suzerain rights" of China in Thibet, have never recognised, and are not prepared to recognise, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Thibet, which should remain, as contemplated by the treaties, in the hands of the Thibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under article 1 of the Convention of the 27th April, 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of treaty stipulations.

2. On these grounds His Majesty's Government must demur altogether to the conduct of the Chinese officers in Thibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country, and to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's presidental order of the 21st April, 1912, that Thibet is to be "regarded as on an equal footing with the provinces of China proper," and that "all administrative matters" connected with that country "will come within the sphere of internal administration."

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Thibet, and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

3. While the right of China to station a representative, with a suitable escort, at Lhassa, with authority to advise the Thibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhassa or in Thibet generally.

4. His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.

5. In the meantime all communication with Thibet viâ India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese, and will only be reopened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

This does not apply to the withdrawal of the present Chinese garrison at Lhassa, who, as Yuan Shih-kai has already been informed, are at liberty to return to China viâ India if they wish to do so.

Sir John Jordan has the honour to request the Wai-chiao Pu to favour him with a reply to this memorandum.

J. N. JORDAN.

Peking, August 17, 1912.

[36999] No. 194.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from Viceroy, dated 31st August, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, September 2, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 194.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 31, 1912.

TELEGRAM to following effect, dated 29th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"Thibetan authorities at Samding say that Dorjieff will leave not later than the 6th proximo for Mongolia. He is reported on good authority to be now staying, ostensibly as a pilgrim, at Gaden Monastery, and to be spending a large sum on religious ceremonies."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[40292] No. 195.

Extract from Mr. Gregory's Memorandum of September 2, 1912.

AS regards Thibet, Dr. Morrison said that he did not think we were going to have much difficulty with China. China really recognised that Thibet was all-important to us, and must fall under our influence. I said we should be bound to take steps sooner or later to consolidate our position in that country, and it seemed to me that he was prepared to take this line with the Chinese and smooth the way for a forward British policy. I may be mistaken in this, but the impression he made on me was that it would be here that his British sympathies would play the largest part and where he might find it difficult to reconcile his dual obligations.

He made a point, however, of our not insisting on the acceptance by China of our recent declaration about Thibet as a condition of recognition. He thinks that the Chinese Government ought to be recognised as soon as possible, and that delay will block her reorganisation. I said that in the first place the Chinese Government must apply for recognition, and this cannot be done until the Provisional Government is replaced by one duly elected and established. It will be time enough then to consider definitely the conditions we shall attach.

Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.

[37226] No. 196.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd September, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, September 3, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 196.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 3, 1912.

SEE my telegram, dated the 28th ultimo regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated the 31st ultimo, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"I am informed by Lamen Kempo, confidential adviser of Dalai Lama, that following is purport of agreement dated the 12th ultimo :—

"*Article* 1.—All arms and ammunition belonging to Chinese to be stored under charge of representatives of Nepalese and of both parties.

"*Article* 2.—Chinese officials and soldiers to return viâ India to China immediately on fulfiment of provisions of article 1, and to be provided with food, &c., on the way to India by the people of Thibet.

"*Article* 3.—Provided they behave and observe the laws of Thibet, traders and others claiming to be Chinese to be protected by Thibetans.

"Lamen Kempo states, however, that Chinese have been slow to fulfil above conditions. They demanded, first before parting with arms, that Thibetans should hand over Wang Kong Thal, one of the officers who had surrendered to them. On responsibility for Wang's safety being undertaken by Nepalese representative, Thibetans finally agreed to hand him over. Ninety sealed boxes, together with 4 Maxim guns, 90 jingals, 160 prong guns, and 840 magazine rifles, were deposited by Chinese on the 23rd August. Most of boxes were said to contain ammunition, but Thibetan authorities were not allowed by Chinese to examine their contents. Surrender of pistols and bolts of rifles was also refused. In addition to this, the retention of thirty rifles each for their respective guards was demanded by Chung and Len. Thibetans acceded to this demand, but many more than the stipulated number of rifles were, it is suspected, retained by both officers. Demand was next made by the Chinese, when date of departure was under discussion on the 21st and 22nd August, that all recently constructed fortifications should first be razed by Thibetans, and also that 800 maunds of grain should be moved to southern part of the city where Len is living from Trapchi barracks.

"Irritation and some alarm is being caused to Thibetan Government by dilatory obstructive tactics of Chinese."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[37369] No. 197.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 4.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 3, 1912.

IN continuation of previous correspondence regarding the situation in Thibet, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 28th August, 1912, as to the repatriation of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa, and to say that, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Crewe proposes to approve the action of the Government of India in deputing Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, late military attaché at Peking, to meet the Chinese troops on their return and to assist in making arrangements for their journey.

His Lordship also agrees with the Government of India as to the desirability of formally bringing our good offices in this matter to the notice of the Chinese Government, and he would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that instructions in this sense should be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[37371] No. 198.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th September, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, September 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 198.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 4, 1912.

A SMALL mission of Mongolian lamas, sent by Yuan Shih-kai to announce and explain the republic and to ask for its acceptance by Thibet, has arrived at Darjeeling under a Chinese official named Yangfen. Real head of the mission is Tanghita Lama Gaupo, who visited Darjeeling in 1910 as one of the Chinese Mission which tried to induce Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, but did not succeed in their object.

Pending orders (see your telegram dated the 10th July, 1912), we have instructed deputy commissioner of Darjeeling to prevent mission from crossing the frontier. It might be advantageous for Thibetans to negotiate with Chinese at present juncture, and we would be glad to agree, subject to your approval and to Sir J. Jordan seeing no objection, to special exception being made in this mission's favour and permission to cross frontier being accorded them.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[37496] No. 199.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th September, 1912, regarding the North-East Frontier.

India Office, September 5, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 4, 1912.

SEE papers forwarded with letter dated the 18th July last from Secretary, Foreign Department, regarding North-East Frontier. Following proposals made by Assam Government have our support:—

Western Section of Frontier.

No survey or exploration to be undertaken on this section next season on any extensive scale; but as a preliminary to subsequent survey and exploration, political officer in charge should by means of promenades establish relations with, and increase our knowledge of, tribes west of Siyom–Subansiri divide.

Eastern Section of Frontier.

1. As already sanctioned in your telegram of the 21st ultimo, properly bridged tracks to be constructed from Sadiya to frontier near Menilkrai.

2. Military police post of 100 rifles—actual site of which must be decided later—to be established in vicinity of Menilkrai. As there is no probability of actual hostilities with Chinese, military authorities consider that 100 rifles will be sufficient for advanced post. Following intermediate posts (sites not to be finally settled pending construction of road) to be established:—Post of 100 rifles at Buruphu, with track, if feasible, up Delei River to G'lei Dakhru Pass, and a third post of twenty-five rifles on the Digaru River, with track up to Painlon Pass.

3. For construction of above roads and posts, two companies of sappers and miners and two double companies of pioneers, with complete transport, to be employed, under major of Royal Engineers.

4. Light telegraph line, with offices at intermediate posts, to be constructed from Sadiya to advanced post.

5. Bridle track to be constructed up left bank of Dibong to confluence of Dibong and Dri Rivers; for this track additional company of sappers and miners to be employed, as well as additional double company of pioneers, with full transport.

6. Valley of Dibong to be surveyed, in continuation of last season's work, Local Government providing escort and coolie transport.

Central Section of Frontier.

1. Posts established at Pasighat, Balek, and Kobo to be retained.

2. Trading post, to be held by guard of 100 rifles for several months each year, to be established near Kebang. This would be a means of keeping in touch with tribesmen and maintaining political position in country which we obtained at considerable expense last season; it would also be a valuable civilising asset. Establishment of trading post would be welcomed by Pangis and northern tribes, who petitioned General Bower and Mr. Dundas orally on the subject.

3. Despatch to head waters of Sigon and Siyom Rivers, and to Doshung Pass, of exploring and surveying parties, with escorts of sufficient strength to overcome all possible opposition.

General.

Local Government's proposals as to allotment of duties, and appointment of officers, medical officers, &c., also have our concurrence. We agree to following arrangements in regard to police:—

1. Present Lakhimpur battalion of military police to be removed to Sadiya from Dibrugarh, and to be accommodated in temporary quarters in former place pending decision as to its permanent location.

2. Second battalion of Lakhimpur military police, 750 strong, to be recruited immediately at Dibrugarh.

3. Military authorities have agreed to place half a battalion of Indian infantry temporarily at disposal of Assam, as no portion of Dacca battalion of police can at present be transferred to the province.

4. Coolie corps of 600 men, with sardars, &c., to be maintained permanently at Sadiya.

Cost of proposals—so far as particulars are available—is estimated roughly at 23,93,500 rupees (including 5,54,000 rupees recurring), made up as follows:—

1. Civil establishments (see Statement I, attached to letter from Assam Government), 2,65,000 rupees recurring.

2. Permanent civil buildings (see Statement VII), 1,01,500 rupees initial.

3. Temporary civil buildings (see Statement VIII), 20,000 rupees initial.

4. Military police: see Statement III. There will be initial expenditure of 72,600 rupees when present Lakhimpur battalion is stationed at Sadiya; recurring expenditure will be 60,000 rupees per annum, *i.e.*, increased cost of having existing battalion at Sadiya.

5. See Statement VI. Extra expenditure of 82,900 rupees initial, and 2,29,000 rupees recurring, will be involved in raising new battalion at Dibrugarh, the Silchar and Garho Hills detachments being taken as nucleus.

6. See Statement VIII. 55,000 rupees initial for temporary military police buildings.

7. 8,00,000 rupees initial for employing sappers and miners on roads along Dibong and Lohit Valleys.

8. See Statement IV. Further sum of 7,07,500 rupees will eventually be required for initial expenditure on permanent buildings, when location of Sadiya battalion of military police is decided.

Early telegraphic orders are solicited, as matter is urgent. Details of various proposals will be carefully worked out, on receipt of general sanction, and will in due course be submitted, where necessary, for your approval.

[37369] No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 28th August: Thibet.

You should, unless you see any objection, act on the suggestion in the last paragraph, and bring the good offices of His Majesty's Government formally to the notice of the Chinese Government.

[37371] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 4th September: Chinese mission to Thibet.

It seems undesirable to permit this mission to enter Thibet, where we should have no control over their action, and no certain means of ascertaining its results. Any relaxation of rule laid down in your note of the 17th August might be interpreted as weakness, and any admissions or concessions which the mission might extract from Dalai Lama might subsequently be used against us in negotiations for new Thibetan agreement, while it appears improbable that Thibetans would derive any tangible advantage.

I am also disinclined to encourage direct negotiations between Thibetans and Chinese until our position and rights with regard to Thibet have been placed upon a proper basis, and an agreement has been concluded.

I should, however, be ready to give due consideration to any argument in favour of the suggestion made by the Government of India should you wish to support it. Please telegraph your views.

[37369] No. 202.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant relative to the arrangements for the repatriation of the Chinese garrison at Lhassa, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he concurs in the proposal to depute Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby to meet the Chinese troops and to assist in making arrangements for their journey.

Sir E. Grey has further, in accordance with Lord Crewe's suggestion, addressed a telegram,* copy of which is enclosed, to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, instructing instructing him, should he see no objection, to bring the good offices of the Government of India in this matter to the notice of the Chinese Government.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[38049] No. 203.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, September* 9, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India telegram of 28th August, last sentence.

Chinese Government state that Mashihchou [? Ma Chi Fu], formerly Chinese superintendent at Yatung, now in Calcutta, has certain Government funds in his possession, and they desire that cost of repatriation of Chinese soldiers from Thibet shall be defrayed from this source as far as possible.

(Sent to India.)

* No. 200.

[38175]] No. 204.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, September* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 7th September: Chinese mission to Thibet.

I entirely agree.

Acting Foreign Minister sent me a message urging that mission should be allowed to proceed, and Yuan Shih-kai has expressed desire to see me. I intend to tell them both that it would have been simple courtesy to consult us before sending such a mission, and that they gained nothing by trying to settle matters without us.

(Sent to India.)

[38194] No. 205.

Sir J Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 357.)
Sir, *Peking, August* 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 130 of the 23rd instant, instructing me to repeat to the President, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and as coming from themselves, the warning as to the consequences which would result from a disregard of our advice in the matter of the Thibetan expedition.

In my absence at the seaside Mr. Scott asked the President to be good enough to appoint an hour at which he could receive him, but his Excellency explained that for various reasons he was unable at the present time to grant an interview, and the message was therefore delivered to-day to the President through one of his private secretaries. In order that there might be no mistake it was put in writing, but it was explained verbally to Captain Tsai Ting-kan beforehand that it was to be regarded as a verbal communication. It took the following form :—

"*Verbal communication.*

"His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai's disclaimer that there is any intention of sanctioning an advance of the military expedition into Thibet was telegraphed to London. While thanking his Excellency for this assurance, His Majesty's Government have instructed Sir John Jordan to repeat, as coming from themselves, the warning he has already conveyed, and to say that any step in the nature of an advance into Thibet would bring the Chinese Government into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government."

In the circumstances there could be no discussion, but the movements of the expedition will be carefully watched and renewed representations will, if necessary, be made on the subject.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of His Majesty's Minister),
ERNEST SCOTT.

[38175] No. 206.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1912.

ON receipt of your letter of the 4th September, enclosing a copy of a telegram of the same date from the Viceroy of India, relative to the Chinese mission at present waiting at Darjiling for permission to enter Thibet, a telegram (of which a copy is enclosed) was sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking pointing out the objections to allowing this mission to proceed and requesting his views as to the action to be taken.*

* No. 201.

I am now directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith Sir J. Jordan's reply, which is to the effect that he agrees with the views expressed in this communication.*

Sir E. Grey accordingly proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, to send the enclosed telegram to Sir J. Jordan approving the language which he intends to hold to Yuan Shih-kai and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and authorising him to add, if he sees fit, a declaration to the effect that His Majesty's Government intend to adhere to the rule laid down in the statement on the subject communicated to the Chinese Government in the note of the 17th August (a copy of which was sent to you in the letter from this department of the 5th September).†

Sir E. Grey would further suggest that the Government of India should be requested to inform the mission that they cannot be permitted to enter Thibet.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[36589]

No. 207.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, September 12, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th August on the subject of the communication to the Chinese Government regarding the political status of Thibet.

Sir E. Grey appreciates the reasons given by the Secretary of State for India for deprecating the modification of the first two paragraphs of this statement, and concurs in the opinion expressed in the last paragraph of the above-mentioned letter that it would be advisable to take an opportunity of stating formally in writing the position of His Majesty's Government.

He therefore proposes, subject to Lord Crewe's concurrence, to send the enclosed draft telegraphic instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.‡

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[38535]

No. 208.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th September, 1912, regarding the situation in Kashgar.

India Office, September 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 208.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

September 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

KASHGAR.

See your telegram dated 5th instant.

We submit the following as our views after full consideration of your letter to Foreign Office dated the 15th August. There are serious objections on political grounds, which must not be overlooked or underestimated, to occupation of New Dominion and Kashgar by Russia, even though such occupation may be inevitable and may entail no specific military danger. Russia would be brought thereby within

* No. 204. † See No. 217. ‡ No. 218.

300 miles of Simla and 150 miles of Srinagar, and new and undesirable political conditions would inevitably be introduced by this propinquity in spite of difficulties of intervening country. Russian occupation, moreover, would stifle our trade on this side, which, though small, is increasing with improvements in trade route; white our trade with Thibet will be decreased if old route into that country viâ Khotan is reopened by Russia. Further, suzerainty over Hunza-Nagar is claimed by China; the claim is harmless in Chinese hands, but it will prove embarrassing if transferred to Russia. We deprecate on these grounds any diplomatic action calculated to facilitate occupation by Russia.

But first essential, in the event of this being forced upon us, is to demand that a boundary line placing Raskam, Aksai Chin, Shahidulla, and Taghdumbash inside our territory, and outside that of Russia, should be recognised as a preliminary to negotiations. This object will be obtained by line similar to that which was proposed in 1897 by Sir John Ardagh, see Government of India's letter of 23rd December, 1897. Reference is invited to map prepared by survey of India in 1891 to illustrate explorations of Captain Younghusband. The following would be a good line:—

From Baiyik peak, where line would start, eastwards to Chang pass, Dehda and Taghdumbash being left on our side; thence through Sargon pass along crest of range, and so to crest of Kuen Lun range north of Raskam after crossing Yarkand river; thence along crest of Kuen Lun range to Sanju or Grim pass viâ the passes named in the map of 1891, viz.:—

Kukahang, Dozakh, Yargi, and Kilik; thence along Kuen Lun watershed to frontier of Thibet crossing Karakash river, the plain of Aksai Chin being left on our side of the frontier.

With regard to possibility that compensation might be found in Thibet, we are generally of opinion that entanglement in Thibetan affairs should as far as possible be avoided. Renunciation by Russia of all interest in Thibet, subject to our recognition of religious connection between Thibetan Lamas and Russian Buddhists, and to guarantee on our part not to violate integrity of Thibet, except possibly by occupying Chumbi valley, should this be forced on us for maintenance of order and protection of our interests, would be the ideal compensation.

If this concession cannot be obtained, following points should, in our opinion, be pressed for:—

(1) Exclusive right, which we should not exercise unless circumstances compelled us, to have an agent at Lhassa; also the right (2) of direct communication with Thibetan authorities, if the view that we are at present debarred from this is still maintained by His Majesty's Government, and (3) of occupying the Chumbi valley in the above-mentioned circumstances; (4) Nepal's right to exact redress, even to extent of rectifying boundary, for losses in the past.

But we consider that the disadvantages of occupation of New Dominion by Russia outweigh these concessions, even if they are obtained in full, and that we should contend, if we are forced to accept occupation, that a balance to be settled elsewhere remains to our credit.

[38564] No. 209.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, September* 13, 1912.

MY telegram No. 180 of 10th September: Mission to Thibet.

Foreign Minister again asked me to-day to allow mission to proceed, but I declined to apply for facilities for this or any similar mission until the Chinese Government recognised our position and rights with regard to Thibet as defined in my memorandum of 17th August.

I had previously been informed that it was intended to send a mission viâ India to invest Dalai Lama with a new title.

[38627] No. 210.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 14.)

(No. 279.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, September* 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" published yesterday an article on the recent action of His Majesty's Government in regard to Thibet, of which it may be of some interest to give the following résumé :—

After reviewing the history of the 1904 treaty and the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, the article states that the repudiation of the former by the Foreign Office was based on grounds of sound common sense, partly because there was no need of a formal treaty to guarantee a protectorate over Thibet, and partly because such a treaty would have created difficulties with China, who had undoubtedly suzerain rights over Thibet, and with Russia, who was interested in securing a certain degree of political independence for the spiritual head of the Russian Buddhists. As regards the present demand made by the British Government for the final recognition of Thibetan autonomy and the withdrawal of Chinese troops, the journal quotes article 2 of the 1906 convention as proof of the uncertainty in regard to the juridical position of Thibet. To prove the autonomy of Thibet, which is not mentioned in the above convention, it is necessary to adopt the somewhat pedantic line of reasoning that as China admitted in 1906 the possibility of a treaty between England and Thibet, therefore China recognised the latter as not being an ordinary province, since international treaties are not made with provinces. Such is the position of Thibet from a juridical point of view, but politically autonomy for Thibet is as necessary to Great Britain as that of Mongolia is to Russia. Consequently England, being fully aware that China is not at present in a position to defend her interests, in a practical and cold-blooded manner has informed China that, until she recognises Thibetan autonomy, England will not recognise the Chinese Republic.

The article concludes by stating it would be absurd to blame Great Britain for taking this line, and Russia would do well to imitate it in regard to the autonomy of Mongolia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[38583] No. 211.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 11th September, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, September 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 211.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 11, 1912.

SEE your telegram, dated the 28th ultimo, regarding Thibet.

I approve your action in sending Willoughby.

Instructions were sent on the 5th instant to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to call attention of Chinese Government, if he sees no objection to so doing, to good offices of British Government.

[38709] No. 212

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, relative to China and Thibet.

India Office, September 14, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 212.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 13, 1912.

SEE your telegram, dated 11th instant, regarding Thibet. It is probable that Chinese troops from Lhassa, who are now on their way to India in several batches, will all be concentrated at Darjeeling, and that they will then be sent on in convenient-sized batches to Calcutta, and shipped by direct weekly steamer to Wusung. British trade agent at Yatung has received information from Thibetan Ministers to the effect that Chung, the Chinese general, left Lhassa on the 8th instant, and that visit to Phari and Yatung will also be paid by Amban Lien Yu, who will then either go back to Lhassa or remain under British protection on the frontier. Ministers think it desirable that Lien Yu should be expelled from Thibet, as they believe him to be the cause of all present troubles.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[38577] No. 213.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, 1912, regarding Kashgar.

India Office, September 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 213.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 13, 1912.

KASHGAR.

In the event of our acquiescing in Russian occupation, an endeavour should be made, with a view to minimising injury to our trade, to obtain recognition of our trade interests and consular rights in Chinese Turkestan. This point was omitted from my telegram of yesterday, of which this telegram is a continuation.

[38988] No. 214.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 16.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 14, 1912.

IN reply to your letter of the 11th September, 1912, as to the Chinese Mission at present waiting at Darjeeling for permission to enter Thibet, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the terms of the instructions which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to send to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject.

Copy of a telegram dated the 14th September, 1912, which his Lordship has addressed to the Government of India is enclosed herewith for Sir E. Grey's information.

I have, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 214.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 14, 1912.

CHINESE Mission to Thibet.

See your telegram dated the 4th instant. After consulting Sir J. Jordan, His Majesty's Government do not think it desirable that permission to enter Thibet should be given to mission. Intimation should be made to mission to this effect. It is proposed by Foreign Office that language held by Sir J. Jordan, as reported in his telegram dated the 10th instant, should be approved, and that his Excellency should be authorised, if question of mission is pressed by Chinese Government, to inform them that rule laid down in note of 17th ultimo is adhered to by His Majesty's Government, and that no exceptions to it can be permitted. Papers are being sent by mail.

[38997] No. 215.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 16.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 16, 1912.

IN reply to your letter of the 12th September, 1912, as to the statement made to the Chinese Government regarding the political status of Thibet, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the terms of the proposed instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I am, &c.
J. E. FERARD.

[39182] No. 216.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 17.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter of the 21st August, 1912, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 4th September, 1912, submitting proposals for the future control of the north-east frontier of India, and to enclose the draft of a telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to address to the Government of India in reply.

With regard to the eastern, or Mishmi, section, which is the portion of the frontier to which, by reason of its proximity to the Chinese outposts at Rima and Chikung, special attention has been drawn by Sir E. Grey, it will be seen that, in accordance with the policy advocated in your letters of the 6th November, 1911, and the 24th February, 1912, it is proposed to establish a permanent military police post of 100 rifles near Menilkrai, in the vicinity of the frontier, with connecting posts in the Mishmi country lower down the Lohit valley. The actual site of the frontier post is reserved for future consideration. But it will be observed from paragraph 8 of the Assam Government's letter of the 7th July, 1912, that the most suitable position for the post would appear to be at Walong, which has hitherto been generally regarded as lying beyond the Mishmi border. No decision will be arrived at on this point without previous reference to Sir E. Grey.

The favour of a very early reply is solicited.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 216.

Draft Telegram from the Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Secret.)

NORTH-EAST frontier. Your telegram dated the 4th September.

Your proposals are generally approved. I appreciate the advantages of maintaining the trading facilities which the Abors seek in British India, and provision for this purpose of a trading post near Kebang for some months in each year. This is in no sense an administrative or political step, and I sanction it with the proposed guard of 100 rifles on the clear understanding that they are there only when the trading post is open, and that their sole duty is to keep the road open and undisturbed. Site of post near Menilkrai will require careful consideration in view of advantage of locating it within limits of Mishmi territory. I desire to be consulted before decision is arrived at on this point.

[38988] No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 180 of 10th September: Mission to Thibet.

I approve the language which you propose to hold to Yuan Shih-kai and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Should they continue to urge that the mission should be allowed to proceed, you may, if you see fit, inform them that His Majesty's Government adhere to the rule laid down on this subject in your note of 17th August, and cannot permit any exceptions to be made to it.

[38997] No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1912.

THIBET.

Your despatch No. 349 and your private letter of 16th August.

You may, if you see fit, take a suitable opportunity for again stating formally in writing to the Chinese Government the position of His Majesty's Government with regard to Thibet, adding any explanations which may seem necessary as to the exact meaning attached by them to the term "suzerainty." In so doing you should make clear the distinction between suzerainty, which we acknowledge, and sovereignty, which we have never admitted.

[39346] No. 219.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 340.)
(Extract.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 18, 1912.

FROM a conversation which I had last night with the Minister for Foreign Affairs I gather that his Excellency may speak to you of Thibet and Mongolia. After asking me what we proposed doing in the former country, he gave me to understand that we might have a free hand there so far as Russia was concerned. I replied that the policy of His Majesty's Government was clearly laid down in the memorandum communicated to Russian Embassy, and that we had no ulterior views whatever. As regards Mongolia his Excellency told me that he had heard that China proposed sending an expedition to Kobdo, and that if she did so Russia might be forced to intervene. I enquired whether by this he meant that she would send troops there. His Excellency replied that Russian consul had asked for an increase of military guard, but that he had not as yet complied with this request, as he rather doubted whether Chinese were capable of organising transport service for so distant an expedition.

[39596] No. 220.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 21.)

India Office, September 20, 1912.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 18th September, 1912, as to the proposed Chinese Mission to the Dalai Lama, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to approve the language held by His Majesty's Minister at Peking to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in his Excellency's telegram No. 184, dated the 13th instant.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[39709] No. 221.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th September, relative to affairs in Thibet.

India Office, September 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 221.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 20, 1912.

SEE my telegram, dated 13th instant, regarding Thibet. Telegram to following effect, dated 17th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse :—

"I am informed by Dalai Lama that Tung Tung-ling has been directed by Chinese Government to stay at Lhassa, while Len Amban has received instructions to return to China. Dalai Lama, while he suggests no means of securing Tung Tung-ling's removal, considers that as Tung is a military officer provisions of agreement will be violated by his remaining in Thibet.

"A letter dated the 4th instant, but giving no indication of place of writing, has been received from Dorjieff, who has left Samding. He states that he will arrive in January or February next in 'his own country,' to which he is positively on his way

back; but he goes on to say that 'Buddha's Temple, St. Petersburgh,' will be his address. I have reason to believe that Dorjieff can understand and also write English. I have not succeeded in ascertaining what overtures, if any, have been made by him to the Dalai Lama."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[39596] No. 222.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 184 of 13th September: Chinese mission to Thibet.
Your language approved.

[40012] No. 223.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, September* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 150 of 17th September: Thibet.
Until official Chinese reply has been received I think it will be better to refrain from discussion as to definition of the term "suzerainty."
(Sent to India.)

[40167] No. 224.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd September, relative to the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Thibet.

India Office, September 24, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 224.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 23, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram, dated the 13th instant, regarding withdrawal of Chinese troops from Thibet.

Pending receipt of written authority from Chinese general, which is not expected for some time, three batches of troops which have arrived at Yatung refuse to cross the frontier. It was not until the 19th September that Central Government's message authorising withdrawal was dispatched from Gyantse to Lhassa. Great inconvenience, particularly in the matter of retaining transport, is being caused by delay; during forthcoming Poojah festivities transport may not be available, and in that case it will be necessary to postpone troops' entry into Sikkim until about the 26th of next month. It is suggested in these circumstances that request should be made to Sir J. Jordan to approach Chinese Government with a view to instructions to expedite troops' departure from Yatung being issued immediately to Chinese officials, including, in order to save time, Ma Chih Chow. Request for issue of necessary orders is also being made by us at the same time to the Chinese general and Amban with reference to their request for facilities; see my telegram, dated the 28th ultimo.
(Repeated to Peking.)

[40167] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1912.

TERAI.

Government of India's telegram of 23rd September: Chinese troops.

You should take action suggested by Government of India.

[40435] No. 226.

Note on the Question of Thibet.

I EXPLAINED to M. Sazonof why a Chinese invasion of Thibet would disturb us by probably causing war between Nepal and the Chinese. We had, I hoped, averted a Chinese invasion by diplomatic representations at Peking, and we hoped Thibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty would be preserved. If so we desired nothing except the commercial treaty that we already had with Thibet. But unforeseen trouble might arise that might make it desirable for us to send some agent to Lhassa to keep us informed. I had no proposal to make at the moment, but a contingency might arise in which we should have to ask Russia for some relaxation on our side of the agreement about Thibet. M. Sazonof said he would be ready to listen to this, but he would require some *quid pro quo* for Russia. Mongolia was outside the Anglo-Russian agreement, and he could not regard that as in *pari materia* with Thibet. He assured me that Dorjief had no mission from Russia and was in Thibet on his own adventure.

E. G.

September 24, 1912.

[40012] No. 227.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th instant, expressing the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India in the draft telegraphic instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking with regard to a further statement to the Chinese Government on the subject of the political status of Thibet, which were proposed in the letter of the 12th instant from this department, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram which has now been received from Sir J. Jordan,* expressing the opinion that it will be better to refrain from discussion as to the definition of the term "suzerainty" until an official reply has been received from the Chinese Government to the British note of the 17th August.

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to Lord Crewe's concurrence, to approve the views expressed by Sir J. Jordan.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[40585] No. 228.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 26th September, 1912, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, September 27, 1912.

* No. 223.

Enclosure 1 in No. 228.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 26, 1912.

CHINESE mission to Thibet. See your telegram, dated the 14th instant.

In view of Chinese officers' refusal to leave Thibet without superior orders and consequent prolonged delay in departure of Chinese troops from Chumbi Valley, we have directed deputy commissioner, Darjeeling, to inform mission that question of its proceeding cannot be decided until troops have been withdrawn from Thibet and a settlement arrived at of certain questions now under discussion with Chinese Government at Peking.

This course may assist in expediting both settlement and withdrawal, while it leaves it open to us, in view of desire expressed by Yuan Shih-kai to work through Dalai Lama (see telegram, dated the 16th ultimo, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking), to permit mission to proceed later, should it be thought desirable to do so.

This interpretation of your orders will, we trust, meet with your approval.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 228.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 26, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram, dated the 23rd instant.

Political officer, Sikkim, telegraphed the 22nd September that he had received a letter, dated the 14th instant, from Dalai Lama, stating that agreement recently concluded between Thibetans and Chinese had already been broken by the latter in various ways, and that his Holiness had been informed in writing by Len Amban and General Tung that they had received a telegram from Viceroy of Szechuan announcing dispatch by him of 20,000 Chinese troops to Thibet. Dalai Lama added that British Government was only hope of Thibet, there being no hope of continuance of relationship formerly existing between Thibet and China.

His Holiness asks that matter may be discussed by us with Chinese, and that British representative may be sent to Lhassa. He apprehends that attempt may be made by Chinese soldiers who have left Lhassa to stay at Gyantse or in Chumbi Valley, and that if they do this he will have no alternative but to send Thibetan troops to expel them. As fighting may result, Dalai Lama asked political officer that instructions to tell Chinese to leave Thibet at earliest possible date should be sent to British trade agent; political officer was further requested to ask Government of India to forbid dispatch of fresh Chinese troops into Thibet.

No action has been taken by us on Mr. Bell's telegram.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 228.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 26, 1912.

SEE my telegram of to-day's date regarding Thibet.

Telegram to following effect, dated 24th instant, received from trade agent, Gyantse:—

"The following Thibetan troops, in addition to 50 armed monks, have arrived at Gyantse: From Lhassa, 200; from Shigatse and other places, 300. They are under orders from the chief Ministers to ensure departure of Chinese from Chumbi Valley, and to offer resistance if Chinese attempt to return or refuse to leave within reasonable time. A further force of 100 men has been sent for the same purpose from Shigatse to Phari by a route west of Gyantse. Lhassa fortifications are being strengthened by Thibetans."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[41188] No. 229.

Extract from Note of Conversation between the Marquess of Crewe and M. Sazonof at Crewe Hall, September 29, 1912.

AS to Thibet, about which Sir Edward Grey had already spoken, I said that we had no wish to enter it, but quite the contrary, and that in my view, the posting at Lhasa of a British officer as agent would be not worth the risk. But India must regard with concern any Chinese encroachment in Thibet, and we had told the Chinese Government so in terms undiplomatically frank. It might therefore be necessary to know what is going on in Thibet from a source on which we could rely. M. Sazonof said that if any definite change were made in the convention which would appear to be to our sole advantage, he would be seriously attacked at home. He hoped we should be willing, therefore, to obtain our information privately. I asked whether, if Chinese aggression caused us to take action apparently contrary to the convention, public opinion in Russia would not be more excited than if it were modified in cold blood to a slight extent. M. Sazonof emphatically disputed this, and said that, for example, our recent warning to China was now well known in Russia, and if as a sequel to a Chinese advance we were to occupy the Chumbi valley, he did not believe that a word would be said. When I mentioned some rectification of the Nepal frontier, he said that this would be on a different footing, because it affected the subject-matter about which the convention was framed. On the whole, however, he thought it better to deal with any matter affecting Thibet as it naturally arose, and not to attempt a formal revision of any points. At the same time, if we were able to give material assistance in smoothing things with Afghanistan, he would be able to face opinion in Russia more easily in connection with other questions.

[40885] No. 230.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 368.)

Sir, *Peking, September 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 322 of the 2nd August, I have the honour to report that I have received further despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu with regard to the progress of the Chinese expedition against Thibet.

The expeditionary force is said to consist of ten battalions of infantry, one company of artillery, and one company of engineers. Yün Ch'ang-hêng, Military Governor of Szechuan and commander-in-chief of the expedition, arrived at Tachienlu on the 29th July. At that time there were 2,000 Chinese troops at Ho-k'ou, on the Tachienlu–Litang–Bat'ang road, at the point where it crosses the Yalung River, while several hundreds were extended along the centre of the line of communications between Ho-k'ou and Tachienlu. Further, the Chinese occupied the road leading north from Tachienlu to Chiamdo as far as Tao-wu (Dawo), which was held in force.

The Thibetans were in a strong natural position at Makaichung, some 10 miles to the west of Ho-k'ou.

A mutiny, accompanied by arson and looting, at Yachow on the 6th August, and the uncertainty of the political situation at Chengtu, prevented Yün from making an immediate advance.

On the 11th August, however, he received a telegram from General Chu Tun-wu at Ho-k'ou to the effect that his advanced guard had dislodged the Thibetans from Makaichung, and was in occupation of strategic positions in the neighbourhood. The Thibetans, he added, had scattered in confusion. A further message reached Chengtu on the 15th August that General Chu's forces had recovered two other places, and were pressing on towards Litang. A fortnight later the Thibetans appear to have suffered another defeat and to have fallen back on Litang, where they were strongly entrenched. The latest news, dated Tachienlu, the 3rd September, is to the effect that General Chu's troops, numbering 2,000, are surrounded by a strong force of Thibetans, and that 500 of the late Viceroy Chao's veterans have been sent to their aid.

Meanwhile, Yün dispatched five battalions under Liu Jui-lin by a détour through Dawo to clear the north road. This is reported to have been successfully done by the end of August to a point beyond Derge, in the extreme north-west of Szechuan. Liu's orders were then to work his way round to Bat'ang, relieve the Chinese garrison which

is being hard pressed, and push on through Derge to Chiamdo (in the Thibetan province of Kham), while the main force took the south road from Ho-k'ou through Litang and Bat'ang. The Yünnan contingent is also believed to be advancing on Bat'ang through Lo-tsao on the Salween River. Bat'ang once attained, a column was to be detached to attack Hsiang-cheng, on the Lamaya River to the south-east, where the Thibetans are said to be strongly entrenched, while the remainder would continue to march westward and north to join with Liu at Chiamdo.

Yün Tu-tu declares that Chinese victories must be promptly followed by efforts at conciliation. There must be no burning of homesteads and no looting. He has sent letters in all directions proclaiming the clemency of the republic, and has had interviews with the local lamas. He is convinced that the Marches and Thibet form a very rich country, and that, so far from needing a subsidy, they will within ten years be supplying funds for China proper. He himself proposes, after Chiamdo is taken, to go to Lhassa and win at once the mastery of Thibet and the hearts of the Thibetan people. He has proposed to the Central Government that all the country east of Chiamdo should be administered as a province.

Lieutenant-Colonel Pereira, formerly military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, who has been travelling for some months from Kashgar through Kansu to Chengtu, has left the latter place to proceed to Yünnan-fu by way of the Chien-ch'ang Valley. His route as far as Ch'ing-chi Hsien, south of Yachow, was that taken by the expedition. He therefore had a good opportunity of observing them, and states that he has formed no very high idea of their discipline.

It remains to be seen how far the prospects of the expedition and the aspirations of Yün Tu-tu will be affected by the news of the conclusion of peace at Lhassa and the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

[41015] No. 231.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th September, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, September 30, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 231.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September 28, 1912.*

MY telegram dated 26th instant regarding Thibet.

Trade agent, Gyantse, has addressed two telegrams to us to the following effect, dated respectively 26th and 27th instant:—

1. "Fifty more armed Thibetans arrived at Gyantse on 25th instant, bringing the number there to about 600. I am informed by Thibetan trade agent, Gyantse, that Lien Yu Amban, under pretence of illness, is halted three short marches north-east of Gyantse at Rong. One camp behind him there are 100 well-armed monks. It is anticipated by trade agent that Lien will halt several days on arrival at Gyantse, and that permission to occupy rest-house there will be requested by him. I propose to refuse my consent in the event of such a request being made, quoting, if necessary, precedent of other Chinese officers with previous batches, as bungalow at Gyantse was not occupied by any of them, though they have occupied other bungalows between Phari and here. The Thibetan commander, Chensanamgam, will, it is believed, follow Lien Yu to Phari, leaving Misuding on 28th instant with 500 infantry and 300 mounted troops. Unequivocal orders have been issued by Thibetan authorities that force is to be used to compel Lien Yu or Chinese troops to proceed on their journey, should they refuse to do so."

2. "From a Thibetan source in which reliance can usually be placed, I learn that, as soon as they are rid of the amban and the Chinese troops now in the Chumbi valley, Thibetan authorities contemplate compelling General Chung to return to China, as they regard his continued residence at Lhassa as a violation of the treaty."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[39182] No. 232.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant and to express his concurrence in the terms of the telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes to address to the Government of India, on the understanding that an effective force is to be maintained at the post which it is intended to establish near Menilkrai, sufficiently strong to meet the contingency of a Chinese attack.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[41156] No. 233.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 1.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 30, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th September, 1912, as to a proposed further statement to the Chinese Government on the subject of the political status of Thibet, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to approve the view expressed by His Majesty's Minister at Peking that it is desirable to await the official reply of the Chinese Government to the British note of the 17th August last before raising the question of the definition of Chinese "suzerainty" in Thibet.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[41145] No. 234.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 1.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 30, 1912.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter of the 26th September, 1912, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's three telegrams of the 26th September, 1912, as to the delay of the Chinese in evacuating Thibet, and to enclose the draft of a telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to address to the Government of India in reply.

Lord Crewe would remark that as the Chinese troops now in the Chumbi Valley are understood to have surrendered their arms before leaving Lhassa, it seems improbable that they could offer any effective resistance to the Thibetan force which is stated to have been sent to secure their withdrawal, but it appears desirable on every ground that a conflict should if possible be avoided, and that the Chinese should be induced to leave Thibet with as little delay as possible.

The favour of a very early reply is solicited.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[41321] No. 235

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 369.)

Sir, *Peking, September 12, 1912.*

AS instructed in your telegram No. 137 of the 5th instant, I duly brought to the notice of the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an interview which I had with him on the 6th instant, the great courtesy and consideration which the Government of India had shown in the arrangements which they had made for the repatriation of the Chinese troops in Thibet. The contents of the Government of India's telegram of the 28th August were translated to Dr. Yen, and emphasis was laid on the terms in which the Amban Lien Yu and Lieutenant-General Chung Yin-chi had acknowledgd the good offices of his Excellency the Viceroy in restoring peace and order in Thibet.

Dr. Yen, who is in charge of the Foreign Office during the prolonged illness of the Minister, received the statement with comparative indifference, merely remarking that he hoped the Amban was not leaving Thibet, as his departure would seriously impair Chinese authority in the country. Dr. Yen is a prominent member of the Young China party, which is bitterly opposed to our Thibetan policy as tending to thwart the legitimate pretensions of the republic. The views of this party are faithfully reflected in a series of articles which have recently appeared in the local organ of the Government, and copies of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.* There is little hope of reasoning with people who have the assurance to publish to the world that if we interfere with their colonising projects in their frontier dominions, they may be obliged to turn their attention to Australia and convert it into an outlet for their surplus millions.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

[41288] No. 236.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th September, 1912, relative to Ladakhis at Lhassa.

India Office, October 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 236.

British Trade Agent at Gyantse to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, May 1, 1912.*

FAZALULLA, Ladakhi trader, reports that the Chinese have burnt the shop of his father, Haji Ghulam Mohammed, and other Ladakhis at Lhassa, and looted all kinds of goods valued at 8 lakhs. Killed Abadshah and wounded Mahaddin. They claim to be British subjects. Should we take any action in this matter?

(Addressed to political, Sikkim; repeated to Foreign, Simla.)

* Not printed

Enclosure 2 in No. 236.

Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Gangtok, May* 17, 1912.

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information and orders of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the British trade agent at Gyantse to my address regarding the complaint of certain Ladakhi traders who have suffered loss of life and property in the recent disturbance at Lhassa.

2. I agree with the British trade agent at Gyantse that the Chinese Government are responsible for the acts of their mutinous soldiers.

Enclosure 3 in No. 236.

British Trade Agent at Gyantse to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Confidential.) *Gyantse, May* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your telegram dated the 6th May, 1912, regarding certain Ladakhi traders who have suffered loss of life and property in the course of the recent disturbances in Lhassa.

2. The following account of recent events at Lhassa, so far as they have affected the Ladakhi traders, is based on an interview which I have had with Fazalulla, whose father, Haji Ghulam Mohammed, is the principal Ladakhi trader in Lhassa. The account is confirmed by the Nepalese representative in Lhassa, who left Lhassa a month ago, and is now in Gyantse, and by more recent evidence (including that of the Eastern Jongpen of Gyantse), the truth of which there appears to be no reason to doubt.

3. The Ladakhi traders now in or near Lhassa number some 160, including women and children. The value of their property, situated in the east portion of Lhassa city, at a distance of about 1 mile from the Potala, amounted, before the recent outbreak of hostilities between the Chinese and Thibetans in Lhassa, to not less than 8,00,000 rupees (Indian). The Thibetans are not accused of having caused any wilful damage to their property at any time, and when fighting first took place between the Chinese and Thibetans, on or about the 23rd March, 1912, the acting Chinese Amban, Tung Tungling, did his best to protect the Ladakhis, and ordered them to fly a white flag on their houses to show that they were neutral.

The next day, however, the Chinese soldiers rebelled against their officers, and attacked the Ladakhis. They killed Abadshah, wounded Mahaddin, and pillaged the property of the Ladakhis, who took refuge in their mosque. Twelve days later the Chinese repeated similar excesses, but caused no loss of life. The following day, about the 4th April, the majority of the Ladakhis, some 150 in number, including women and children, fled from the city, and encamped in a garden about a mile south of the Potala. There they have been content to remain ever since in comparative safety.

Ghulam Mohammed, however, with about a dozen companions and servants, remained in the mosque, either to safeguard the building or with the intention of mediating between the Chinese and Thibetans, with the help of the Nepalese representative at Lhassa. Since the latter officer left Lhassa a month ago, the Chinese soldiers have found Ghulam Mohammed indispensable as an intermediary between themselves, the ex-Amban Len, the officiating Amban, whom they have deposed, and the Thibetans. He has therefore remained practically a prisoner, hemmed in by the Chinese, who, although they have gradually been driven out of the central parts of the city towards the east, still hold some houses to the west of the mosque, and the gardens to the east of the city. Meanwhile Ghulam Mohammed and his companions are short of provisions, and when they leave the mosque to obtain food, they do so at the risk of their lives, since both the Chinese and Thibetans attack all who appear in the streets. Ghulam Mohammed and his followers therefore wish to escape from the mosque, and to join their fellow-countrymen to the south of the city, or preferably to effect their escape to Chusul, some 20 miles south of Lhassa, where they own considerable property. The Thibetans are said to be willing that they should do so, but the Chinese are not.

4. Fasalulla represents that all the Ladakhis claim to be treated as British subjects because they are subjects of the Maharaja of Jammu and Cashmere. He states that, of those now in Lhassa, his father, Haji Ghulam Mahommed, and Amir Din, a connection of the former, are pure Ladakhis, while five others at least, Sonam Tsering, Yishay, Lobsang, Tsewang Tenpa, and Yishay Tsering, who are partly of Thibetan descent, were born in the territories of the Maharaja of Cashmere, and are also Cashmere subjects. The majority of the other Ladakhis now in or near Lhassa were born in Thibet, but Fazalulla states that they have throughout been treated by the Chinese and Thibetan officials as Cashmere subjects, and not as Thibetan subjects, and that they are exempt from the usual taxation and other liabilities imposed on Thibetan subjects.

5. The presence of these Ladakhi traders in Thibet is recognised under regulation 9 of the Thibet Trade Regulations, dated the 20th April, 1908, and it appears from Fazalulla's statement that trade relations existed between the Government of Cashmere and the Government of Thibet at a date previous to the control of the foreign relations of Cashmere by the British Government.

6. It would therefore appear that the Chinese and the Thibetan Governments are under an obligation to the British Government to protect the lives and the property of the Ladakhi traders in Lhassa, and that the Chinese Government is ultimately responsible for the acts of their mutinous soldiers. The question of immediate practical importance is, however, whether anything can be done to enable the Ladakhis in the mosque to withdraw to a position of safety. So far as the Chinese soldiers are concerned, the answer is in the negative, since they are under no discipline or control. The Thibetans, on the other hand, are said by Fazalulla to be friendly to the Ladakhis. The latest reports say that the Thibetans are gradually driving the Chinese out of the city, and, as soon as they gain possession of the houses near the mosque, Ghulam Mohammed and his companions will be in safety.

7. A rough sketch map of the situation in Lhassa according to Fazalulla's account is enclosed.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 236.

British Trade Agent at Gyantse to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, August* 31, 1912.

DURING the last nine months the Ladakhis in Lhassa have, I am informed by Haji Ghulam Mohammed, suffered losses to the extent of 7 lakhs Chinese rupees, and that the loss of other Indian traders has been 1 lakh. Of this missing property a considerable amount consisted of money and of jewels, which may be recoverable, as they were hidden away in their houses. It is their wish now to revisit their houses, which are situate in south-east part of city, but not only do the Thibetans refuse to allow them to do this, but, so far from recognising the value of efforts that Haji Ghulam has continuously made to secure settlement of the dispute with the Chinese advantageous to Thibetans, they are treating with marked unfriendliness Haji Ghulam and his fellow-countrymen. An appeal for help has therefore been made to me by the Haji.

2. If you see no objection, I propose to write to the Dalai Lama, pointing out that these other Indian traders and the Ladakhis are British subjects, who, owing to the disturbances at Lhassa, have lost much; that doubtless his Holiness is considering in what manner they may, for their recent sufferings and loss of property, be most suitably compensated, and that the least his Holiness can do now is, without delay, to issue strict orders that their neutrality be respected, and that they be permitted to go about their business without hindrance, and to go to their residences.

3. Nepalese representative abstains from any further communications (?) demanding, in respect of property lost by Nepalese, full compensation.

(Addressed to the political officer in Sikkim, with reference to my letter dated the 8th May and subsequent correspondence, and repeated to Foreign.)

* Not reproduced.

Enclosure 5 in No. 236.

Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Yatung, September* 2, 1912.

LADAKHIS in Lhassa.

I would invite your attention to Gould's confidential telegram dated the 31st ultimo.

I am of opinion that there is no objection to his writing to ask Dalai Lama to allow Ladakhis, now that fighting is understood to be ended, to revisit their houses. Until he has been furnished with details and authenticated lists of the losses, and until it has been decided how far Thibetan Government and how far Chinese Government is to be held responsible for the same, it would possibly be best not to raise the question of compensation. Reasons should be ascertained by Mr. Gould, informally, for Thibetans' unfriendly attitude towards Ladakhis which Haji Ghulam Mohammed complains of.

(Repeated to British trade agent, Gyantse.)

Enclosure 6 in No. 236.

Government of India to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, September* 4, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram regarding Ladakhis dated the 2nd instant, we concur in the views therein expressed. You should issue necessary instructions to Gyantse trade agent.

[41295] No. 237.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th September, 1912, relative to Chinese mission to Thibet.

India Office, October 1, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 237.

Copy of paragraph 7 of Confidential Letter, dated the 2nd September, from the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, to the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division.

7. MR. YANG-FEN, described on his visiting card as Yin-Tsun-Chang-Chihli, N.C., arrived in Darjeeling on 25th August with five *soi-disant* Mongolian Lamas. He himself passed as a Lama under a Mongolian name. Only on 1st September was his identity suspected, and on being challenged admitted the Chinese name of Yang-Fen.

He informs me that he has come with sealed despatches to the Dalai Lama and Tashai Lama from the President of the Chinese Republic, Yuan-Shi-kai, in order to announce to them the new republic, and to explain the change in the constitution. If the new republican Government is accepted in Thibet, the Chinese troops, he says, will be withdrawn. Yang-Fen appears a young man of about 30. The elder of the party is described as his brother, Yang-Fon. He is a Lama with Mongolian name, Tanjhita, and states that he was one of a Chinese mission from Thibet to the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling, about 1910, who attempted to induce him to return to

Lhassa. When this mission failed he went on to Peking. He now returns with the message from the President as head of the Thibet-Mongol departments [? Colonial Office] of Government. They are anxious to cross the frontier into Thibet, and ask for passes. But under orders from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, I have withheld them pending further instructions.

The Mongol names of the party are—

1. Ped-You-Tho (Yang-Fen).
2. Tanjhita, or Tayzin (Yang-Fon).
3. Tashi-Pin-Chog.
4. Sonam-Tashi.
5. Tashi-Wang-Chuk.
6. Gong-Phek.

Their baggage, including the despatches, has been sent by goods train and carried direct to Kalimpong, and they are anxious to get it. It is worthy of remark that three Mongols, believed to be a Lama with two servants from Peking, obtained passes last week at Darjeeling, and were at Pedong on the 29th August prior to entering Sikkim, *en route* for Lhassa, Mr. Yang-Fen denies that he or his companions have any connection with them. But it seems to me doubtful. Their names are Pog-Lama I, Pog-Lama II, and Chingzin.

Enclosure 2 in No. 237.

Mr. J. Lang, Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Darjeeling, September* 2, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram dated the 29th August, I have the honour to forward the post copy of a telegram dispatched this morning to your address, regarding Yang Fen and a party of five Mongolian Lamas who have arrived at Darjeeling on a mission to the Dalai and Tashai Lamas, from the President of the Chinese Republic.

2. I have had these men under observation at Darjeeling since the date of their arrival, viz., on the 25th August, but it was only yesterday, on being challenged by my agent, that one of the party disclosed his identity as Yang Fen. I thereupon engaged the party in interview. Yang Fen, who knows very little English, gave me to understand that he had hitherto been giving us the Mongol name of Ped-You-Tho for fear lest, in the present unsettled state of Thibet, a Chinese name might endanger his personal safety. He is anxious that I should grant him the passes which will enable him to cross the frontier line into Thibet. He asserts that he is quite unaware of any proposal that the Chinese forces in Thibet should return viâ India to China immediately. He says that he quitted Peking about one month ago, and arrived in Calcutta viâ Hong Kong and Penang.

3. As instructed in your telegram, I am awaiting further orders in regard to the grant of the frontier passes for which they have applied.

I have, &c.
J. LANG.

[41156] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 194 of 23rd September: Definition of Chinese "suzerainty" in Thibet.

I approve.

[41603] No. 239.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd October, 1912, regarding the Chinese troops in Thibet.

India Office, October 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 239.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 3, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram, dated the 28th ultimo.

Departure from Yatung for India of Chinese troops in Chumbi Valley will take place in three batches, leaving respectively on the 5th, 8th, and 11th instant.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[41145] No. 240.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo enclosing the draft of a telegram which the Secretary of State for India proposes to send to the Government of India with regard to the delay of the Chinese troops in evacuating Thibet and to the Chinese expedition from Szechuan.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the first portion of this telegram which approves the action already taken with regard to the Chinese mission at present detained at Darjeeling and authorising the communication to the Chinese troops that they will not be allowed to cross the Indian frontier unless they do so within a reasonable time.

The communication to the Dalai Lama suggested in the last sentence of this telegram, however, appears to Sir E. Grey to be open to objection on the ground that, while there is no suspicion that the President of the Chinese Republic has not been honest in his assurances to Sir J. Jordan, his control over the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Yünnan is known to be very slight, and, from the most recent despatches which have been received from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, it is apparent that the expedition is still advancing.

Sir E. Grey would therefore prefer that the last sentence of this telegram from "Bell" to "Thibet" should be omitted.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[41881] No. 241.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 7.)

(No. 379.)

Sir, *Peking, September* 21, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 368 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, reporting the proposal of the acting military governor of Szechuan for the formation of a new province of "Hsi-k'ang," with the object of asserting more effectively the authority of the Chinese Government over the Thibetan marches and province of Kham.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 241.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Chengtu, September 4, 1912.*

ON the 24th August Hu Ching-i, acting military governor *ad interim* of Szechuan, sent a very urgent telegram to the Central Government strongly advocating treatment of Thibet Proper, distinctive from that which should be applied to the marches ("pien-ti").

By the "marches" he understands the territory known to the Han and T'ang dynasties (206 B.C.—906 A.D.) as K'ang, which is very much what European atlases describe as Kham. He speaks with approval of the proposal made to the late Imperial Government by Chao Erh-feng; the erection into a province, to be styled the province of Hsi-K'ang, of all the country between the pass of Choto, just west of Tachienlu and the colony of Tan-ta, on the high road between Chamdo and Lhassa; and he gives four reasons why this policy should be adopted by the republic.

I have more than once had occasion to refer to the map prepared (from the French charts of M. Dubreuil du Rhyns) at St. Petersburgh by Hu Wei-teh, a copy of which I appended to my despatch No. 43 of the 21st April. This map is evidently the one on which Szechuan politicians rely; and I have very little doubt that Hu Ching-i's present proposal is for the absorption into China proper of the whole country up to the eastern boundary of the district therein marked as ("ch-ien-tsang-wei"), "anterior Thibet," since the col of Tan-ta is traversed by this boundary.

The reasons he gives for advocating this policy are:—

1. Neighbouring States, even now, whenever they cherish crafty designs do not describe Thibet as an appurtenance of China; nor will they so describe the marches, unless we draw a clear distinction between these and Thibet, and, by adopting the term "province of Hsi-k'ang," confirm our possession and prepare for further advance.

2. The Thibetans claim that Thibet should extend as far eastward as Ch'iung Chou (58 miles by road west of Chengtu), and, unless there is a strong garrison in the marches, China could not ensure the tranquillity of Thibet. In the summer of 1911, it was only with the help of the Frontier Force that the rising in Pomed (Kham) was suppressed. Convert the marches into a province, and not only will you hold Kham and guard Szechuan, but you will control Thibet and the Thibetans.

3. The proposed new province would extend for over 3,000 *li* (say, 1,000 miles) east and west from Tachienlu to the snowy range of Tan-ta, and for over 4,000 *li* (1,300 miles) from Wei-hsi and Chung-tien in Yünnan, northwards to Hsi-ning (Kokonor) and Kansu. Such an area would need eighty or ninety counties ("chou" and "hsien"), and, unless it was provided with the regular machinery of a province, would be unworkable. The natives would submit whenever an expedition was sent against them, but revolt again as soon as the Chinese troops retired.

4. The country is really fertile, a paradise not yet exploited. If we establish county organisation and settle the land with colonists, in a few years' time the land and other taxes will suffice to pay all expenses of administration and of military occupation.

There can, I think, be little doubt that this telegram was motived by some communication that has been received at Chengtu from the Central Government. Reuter's Agency telegraphed from Shanghai on the 30th August stating that you have presented a memorandum to that Government reviewing the situation in Thibet and China's avowed intention, in accordance with the manifesto of the 21st April, to incorporate Thibet in the Chinese Republic as a province.

The memorandum contends that the Thibetans ought to be allowed to manage their own internal affairs without any Chinese interference. China should station a representative in Lhassa, who would be empowered to advise the Thibetans on all matters relating to foreign affairs only. This representative should be allowed to have his bodyguard, but China ought not to station an unlimited number of troops in Thibet. Also the expedition now proceeding to Thibet should proceed no further. It suggests that China should not use India at present as a highway to Thibet, and

concludes by recommending that a new Anglo-Chinese Thibetan agreement should be made, which will have to precede the recognition of the Chinese Republic by Great Britain.

Among the subscribers to Reuter at Chengtu are several of the native newspapers, and my colleagues express some apprehension as to the effect which would be produced by the publication of this telegram. It did not appear in the vernacular press till the 3rd instant, when, in one instance at least (the Kuo-min Kung-pao), it was most ingeniously mis-translated. The "representative at Lhassa" is, according to this version, to be "solely concerned with the conduct of all foreign relations." In other words, he will have control of those relations, and not merely act as an adviser. The last sentence of the telegram is softened down, so that the conclusion of a new Thibetan treaty does not appear as a condition precedent to the recognition of the republic. The really important change made by the Kuo-min's translator is in the passage relating to the expedition, the sense of which has been exactly reversed. In its Chinese dress it reads: "The present western punitive expedition ('hsi-cheng-chün') will be allowed as before to continue its advance."

Two other papers, the "Wan Pao" and the "Min-i Pao," made no attempt to slur over what may prove the hardest condition of all for the Szechuan army to swallow. The former translates "at the point which the expedition has now reached it must stop, and may not advance further." The latter uses practically identical language. (I enclose cuttings from all three journals.)

On the 4th instant the Kuo-min Pao stated on the authority of a new Reuter's telegram, that the Ministers of other Powers and the Chinese official class are agreed that the object of Great Britain is to abolish the suzerainty ("chu-ch'üan") of China over Thibet, in direct contravention of the treaty of 1906, this course being dictated by fear of trouble on the Indian frontier. "The recall of the expedition cannot yet be settled, for there has been no reply from the Central Government." To-morrow's papers will doubtless translate the Reuter's telegram that has just reached us affirming, on the strength of a report from the Peking correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," that the Central Government has refused its assent to the memorandum.

My Tachienlu correspondent, Mr. Cunningham, writing on the 26th August, said:—

"There is a tremendous rush on yesterday and to-day, and troops are leaving by hundreds along the Batang road. General Chu Tun-wu has wired the tutu from Litang that a large force of Yünnan troops is nearing Batang. The tutu has asked General Chu to proceed with all haste to Batang, and avert complications similar to those of last year in the Salt Wells district. If the Yünnan soldiers arrive first, there is sure to be a collision between the troops of the two provinces.

"Authentic news to hand to-day says that the large Lamasery at Litang is deserted. The 3,000 lamas have gone, it is supposed, into the interior of Thibet. It is absolutely true that the Lamasery is empty. The lay population of Litang has also disappeared. The tutu is somewhat afraid to advance beyond Tachienlu, as he has no great confidence in those he has left behind. He is working with great secrecy, and reliable news is hard to get. He has his own special telegraph officers, who give no information whatever.

"False impressions are being sent to the native press at Chengtu and to Peking."

On the 30th August Yün tutu telegraphed from Tachienlu to the Chengtu Government, requesting them to pass on the news to the President at Peking, the National Assembly, and the military governors of all provinces:—

"The magistrate at Hok'ou has just telegraphed that the "t'u-ssu" (native chiefs) of Ch'ung-hsi, Mao-ya, and Ch'ü-Teng, north-west of Lit'ang, have given in their allegiance, and furnished several hundred bags of corn. Our troops advanced at dawn this morning. The rebels, to the number of some myriads, have fallen back on Lit'ang, where they have erected very strong stockades. Steps are being taken to increase our forces, and the attack will be pressed with vigour, though pacific overtures will also be made.

"The North road is clear to beyond Derge. Discipline is well maintained, and the natives are grateful. We should take advantage of this opportunity to settle things once for all, and the country eastward from Chamdo should be placed on the same footing as China Proper, paying similar taxes. Prefects and Magistrates have already been sent thither."

It would seem, then, that Lit'ang, *pace* Mr. Cunningham, had not been recaptured by the 30th August. The "Hsi-fang Pao" published an extra yesterday, stating that the town was taken by the Chinese on the 1st September, and "the native rebels were summarily executed;" but so far there has been no confirmation of this news.

That Lit'ang, and indeed the whole of the marches, will eventually be recovered by the Chinese there can be little doubt, unless there is effectual interposition on the part of the British Government, or internal dissensions at Chengtu induce Yün tutu to return. (I may here mention that the Central Government has just rescinded its appointment of Yang Wei to independent command of an army division.) If His Majesty's Government is interposing on behalf of the Thibetans, the question, I imagine, will be one of boundaries. The restoration of the old boundary line a little west of Bat'ang (the line which Sir A. Hosie in 1904 was prevented by a Thibetan guard from overstepping, "Journey," p. 49) would, I presume, satisfy the Thibetans; but it will not be accepted by the present Szechuan Government without, at any rate, strong protest.

There would be less reluctance to agree upon the western boundary of Kham; but if the whole of the Khameba is to be incorporated into China, difficulties will arise in regard to the northern frontier of Assam and the unadministered portion of Upper Burmah. Whatever solution may be contemplated by His Majesty's Government, I would venture to again suggest that the Government of China should be warned that we consider the whole basin of the Irrawaddy north of Manung Pum to be British territory.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

[42139] No. 242.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd October, 1912, regarding the north-east frontier.

India Office, October 7, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 242.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 3, 1912.

SEE your telegram, dated the 4th ultimo, regarding north-east frontier.

I generally approve your proposals. Advantages of maintaining trading facilities which are sought by Abors in British India, and of providing a trading post near Kebong for some months in each year for this porpose, are appreciated by me. This step is not in any sense one of a political or administrative character, and I sanction it, with guard of 100 rifles as proposed, on the clear understanding that sole duty of guard is to keep the road open and undisturbed, and that they are only there while the trading post is open.

I desire to be consulted before decision is arrived at as to site of post near Menilkrai. In view of advantage of locating it within Mishmi limits, it will be necessary to consider this point carefully. Attention is drawn by Foreign Office to necessity that effective force of sufficient strength to meet contingency of Chinese attack should be maintained at this post.

[42222] No. 243.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th October, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, October 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 243.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 7, 1912.*

TELEGRAM to following effect, dated the 4th instant, received from trade agent, Yatung:—

"My news-writer informs me in a letter, dated the 23rd ultimo, from Lhassa, that all large houses in the city have been occupied by Thibetan soldiers, while the Yamen, the Tengye-ling monastery, and the Prime Minister's house are in the occupation of the Chinese. Chinese were requested by Thibetans to return to China, but without Chinese Government's orders the general refused to do so. Surrender of ringleaders was also demanded by Thibetans from monks of Tengye-ling monastery, but was refused by the latter. Monastery was thereupon attacked by Thibetans on the 23rd ultimo. Chinese casualties were about fifteen killed, while Thibetans lost fourteen wounded and thirty killed. The latter are now preparing to attack Tengye-ling monastery and Amban's yemen; they have already burnt two Chinese temples at Lhassa. Loss of life and property will, it is feared, be heavy. Nepalese are powerless to help in maintaining order, the Thibetan soldiers having got out of hand. Number of Chinese (local born) now in Lhassa is 400; that of Thibetan soldiers is 5,000."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[40435] No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 337. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

I EXPLAINED to M. Sazonof on the 24th September why a Chinese invasion of Thibet would disturb us, by probably causing war between Nepal and the Chinese.

We had, I hoped, averted a Chinese invasion by diplomatic representations at Peking, and we trusted that Thibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty would be preserved. If this proved to be the case, we desired nothing except the commercial treaty which we already had with Thibet.

Unforeseen trouble might, however, arise which might make it desirable for the Government of India to send some agent to Lhassa to keep them informed as to the course of events.

I told him that I had no proposal to make at the moment, but that a contingency might arise in which His Majesty's Government would have to ask Russia for some relaxation of their obligations under the agreement about Thibet.

M. Sazonof said that he would be ready to listen to this, but that he would require some *quid pro quo* for Russia.

Mongolia was outside the Anglo-Russian agreement, and he could not regard that as *in pari materiâ* with Thibet.

He assured me that Dorjief had no mission from Russia, and was in Thibet on his own adventure.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42287] No. 245

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th October, 1912, regarding the Chinese mission to Thibet.

India Office, October 8, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 245.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 7, 1912.

I APPROVE your action in regard to Chinese mission to Thibet, as reported in your telegram, dated the 26th ultimo.

[43154] No. 246.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 165.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1912.

THE Japanese Ambassador asked me to-day what I could tell him about M. Sazonof's visit.

I said that no new agreement had been made. We had discussed how to strengthen the personnel of the Central Government in Persia, and to get a loan for Persia from independent financiers. The loan was the greatest difficulty. M. Sazonof had been more sanguine than I as to the possibility of arranging for one, and I was waiting till he returned to St. Petersburgh, after his visit to Paris, in order to learn whether the consultations which he had had with financiers in the latter place had modified his views.

I told the Ambassador that M. Sazonof had spoken of agreements with China and the Mongolian khans to prevent a military occupation by China and that, in reply to a question from me, he had said that these agreements applied only to Outer Mongolia.

The Ambassador remarked that M. Sazonof had told the Japanese Ambassador in St. Petersburgh that he was not likely to object to anything which we wished to do in Thibet, provided that he had a free hand in Outer Mongolia.

I read to the Ambassador the record of my conversation with M. Sazonof as to Thibet, which was not quite in the same sense.

M. Sazonof had also spoken of co-operation between Russian and Afghan frontier officials to settle irrigation questions and matters of detail of that sort along the Russo-Afghan frontier. This was in accordance with our existing agreement as to Afghanistan.

He had naturally been much occupied with the Balkan question, but had not mentioned the opening of the Straits, and had seemed entirely absorbed in the desire to secure peace, and to prevent the *status quo* from being disturbed.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[42819] No. 247.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 24th September: Chinese troops in Thibet.

Representations made accordingly 25th September.

Wai-chiao Pu have now replied expressing gratitude for our services in the matter

of repatriation, and requesting me to forward to India, for transmission to Chinese general at Yatung, telegram from Cabinet ordering immediate start of troops, and strict discipline on the journey.

I have forwarded telegram accordingly to-day.

(Sent to India.)

[43632] No. 248.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

IN reply to his enquiry of last week, I to-day let the Japanese Ambassador read the enclosed statement about the "status" of Nepal.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 248.

Memorandum respecting the Status of Nepal.

SINCE 1816, Nepal has enjoyed intimate treaty relations with the Government of India, which are best described by the assurances given to the Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal on the 1st May, 1911.

In this communication, in addition to various assurances as to the reception which would be accorded to the representatives of Nepal, and as to the import of arms from India, &c., the Government of India stated that they had "no desire whatever to interfere with the independent position which the State of Nepal has hitherto enjoyed," and reiterated the assurances previously given to the Prime Minister "that the British Government will support and protect Nepal in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter; and that so long as the Prime Minister consults the British Government and follows their advice when given, and preserves the correct and friendly attitude which has marked his Excellency's administration, His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Thibet."

To these assurances the Prime Minister replied on the 3rd May, expressing his thanks and those of the Durbar for this renewed expression of goodwill, and stating that he had never doubted that there could be anything but a relation of friendship and mutual confidence between the two Governments which were so closely knit together by the treaty of 1816.

He added that the "assurance that the great British Government would come to Nepal's help in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter bears an emphatic testimony to the goodwill of the British Government towards Nepal," and that he was "sure that she will only be too glad to ask for and avail herself of such kind and beneovlent help and advice if ever she stands in need of it."

The Chinese Government have from time to time advanced claims to suzerainty over Nepal, but were finally informed on the 10th May, 1911, that "His Majesty's Government are unable to recognise such claims, and that they will be bound to resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to impose their authority on or in any way to interfere in Nepal."

Foreign Office, October 14, 1912.

[43633] No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 169.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

I INFORMED the Japanese Ambassador to-day that China had not replied to our representation about Thibet.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43284] No. 250.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 26th September, 1912, relative to the Pomed country.

India Office, October 14, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 250.

British Trade Agent at Gyantse to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Confidential.) *Camp Saugong, September* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward an account of events in the Pomed country during the year 1911, according to the narrative of Major Liu Yun U, the officer in charge of the first batch of the Chinese troops who are now on the way to India. My informant was an eye-witness of most of the events which he described.

2. A copy of this account is being forwarded to the Foreign Department and to the British trade agent, Yatung.

Enclosure 2 in No. 250.

Account of Events in the Pomed Country during 1911.

Authority.—U-Yuan Liu Yun U. He accompanied General Lo Chan Chi from Lhassa to the Pomed country in September 1911. He commanded 150 mounted infantry and a detachment of 200 gunners. He was recalled to Lhassa in December 1911.

Reasons for Undertaking Operations in the Pomed Country.—Late in 1910 or early in 1911, a party of men from the Pomed country treacherously murdered a Chinese civil official from Chiamdo at Kongbo, and looted his property. A small party of Chinese was dispatched to investigate the circumstances of this outrage, and was cut up.

Dispatch of General Tung Tungling.—In May 1911 the amban at Lhassa dispatched General Tung Tungling, with 300 men, to punish the Popas. The task was beyond the powers of so small a force; the general had to admit failure, and was recalled to Lhassa in August.

Dispatch of General Lo Chan Chi.—Amban Len decided that a resolute attempt must be made to subdue the Popas. He therefore lost no time in sending General Lo Chan Chi, an officer with a good military reputation, into the field, with 1,000 of the best troops at Lhassa, and arranged for the simultaneous dispatch of a similar force from Chiambo. Lo Chan Chi left Lhassa in August.

Progress of Lo Chan Chi's Force.—It appears that the force from Lhassa struck the Tsang Po in the neighbourhood of Chethang, marching thence first eastwards, then north-eastwards along the left bank of the river. The major described how in the course of the journey five tributaries of the Tsang Po were passed at intervals of two to five days—these are presumably the five right bank tributaries shown on the map. Ten days after passing the last of these five tributaries an attempt was made to cross from the left to the right bank, at a place where the river makes a sharp bend in a south-easterly direction, but the attempt failed. Lo Chan Chi then left the river, and struck straight eastwards into Pomed.

Operations in Pomed.—Lo Chan Chi succeeded in joining hands with the force from Chiamdo; but the country was such that his large force was hardly more effective than Tung Tungling's small one. Food was unobtainable, and the troops had to live on "tsampa" (parched barley flour), of which each man carried his own supply. The country was an impassable jungle of large trees and thick undergrowth. Rain fell continuously, and good water was often unprocurable. Continued hardships

told on the health of the men, and they suffered severely from dysentery and fever. To make matters worse, the doctors (civilians), who should have accompanied the force, deserted.

The Popas suited their tactics to the nature of their country. Skilled in the art of taking cover, they seldom faced the Chinese by day, except when they encountered a few stragglers, when they would use their heavy long swords with effect. They relied principally on their poisoned arrows, which they shot from thick cover, without being seen, and on surprise attacks at night or at dawn. The further the Chinese advanced the more serious was the opposition they encountered, as advance parties of Popas fell back on the main body, which occupied successive fortified positions at intervals along the jungle track, which was the only semblance of a road in the country; and while one party held the Chinese in front, other parties would creep up unobserved in the thick undergrowth on either side of the track.

Result of the Operations.—In the face of all these difficulties Lo Chan Chi failed to make any considerable progress. His troops served him well for a time, but were discouraged by want of success, and possibly, also, by the fact that they had received no pay for several months. They also felt that they had come from China to safeguard the amban in Lhassa, not to engage in savage warfare.

About the end of November Len recalled his troops to Lhassa. On the way back, at Kongbo, a number of the troops turned against their taskmaster, compelled Lo Chan Chi to perform menial services, and, finally, put him to death.

The 900 who remained out of the 1,000 who had left Lhassa in the autumn reached Lhassa again in January of this year, to find their compatriots involved in what appeared to be a wholly unnecessary quarrel. My informant told me that, before the return of the troops from the Pomed country, there were only 300 Chinese soldiers in Lhassa; this, however, is probably an under-statement.

About 200 Chinese troops remained in Pomed when the two main forces withdrew; it is not known how those that stayed behind have fared.

Major Liu Yun U's Journey down the Tsang Po.—About October 1911 Major Liu Yun U travelled to Pemakoichen, and down the left bank of the Tsang Po. About seven days' journey below Pemakoichen he arrived at a place where the river becomes narrow and full of whirlpools and rapids. A little further on there is an abrupt waterfall of immense volume and height, the bottom of which is invisible from the top on account of the spray which is thrown up.

The major journeyed on for a month from this place, through densely wooded country, very wet, and full of bamboos, until he arrived at a country of almost naked people, who told him that the English had organised an expedition into the country, and were in force on the other side of the river.

From this point the major returned. He did not cross the river, and did not himself see anything of the English.

He said that he had done a lot of fighting on the borders of Szechuan, but had never even imagined a country so difficult to fight in as Pomed.

[43329] No. 251.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 26th September, 1912, relative to Thibet.

India Office, October 14, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 251.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp, Kala, September* 21, 1912.

THE report which was recently published by Reuter's News Agency that a special commissioner will be sent by Chinese Government to discuss with the Dalai Lama China's future policy as regards Thibet has been confirmed by a telegram

which Mr. Haichu has received from Chinese Government. With reference to this gentleman please see my telegram No. 521, dated 18th instant. Haichu states that it is practically settled that Chinese Government will adopt a conciliatory policy in its dealings with Thibetans; further, that the poor class of Thibetans who sustained losses during the recent fighting in Thibet will be compensated by Chinese Government. Haichu also informed me that Society of Thibetans and Mongolians in Peking are sending Mr. Yang Feng to explain to the people of Thibet the general principles of the Chinese Republic. Yang Feng is a non-official Chinese and is now at Darjeeling.

Len Amban and Chinese general officer commanding in Thibet have been asked by their Government by telegram for their opinion regarding a proposed restoration of his former Chinese title to the Dalai Lama, which he was deprived of by Chinese Government in March of year before last, and proposed grant to him of some new Chinese title. It is not clear whether Chinese Government intended recognising Dalai Lama's temporal power in addition to his spiritual sway. Definite appointment has been made by Chinese Government of Tung Tungling to succeed as amban to Len.

(Addressed to political officer, Sikkim, and repeated to Foreign Office, resident in Nepal, and British trade agent, Yatung.)

[31836] No. 252.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th July last relative to the interpretation of article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 with regard to direct communication with the Dalai Lama.

I am to point out that the letter of the 10th July from this department merely expressed Sir E. Grey's opinion as to the interpretation of the various agreements and conventions as they at present exist.

Sir E. Grey is in entire agreement with Lord Crewe as to the inconvenience which might arise in certain circumstances from the strict interpretation of the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government in article 2 of the 1907 Convention "à ne traiter avec le Thibet que par l'entremise du Gouvernement chinois." He is, however, of opinion that this possible inconvenience does not absolve His Majesty's Government from continuing to observe the undertaking.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[43679] No. 253.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 17.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to previous correspondence as to the dispatch of a Chinese expedition to Thibet, I am directed to refer to Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 368, dated the 12th September, 1912, and to enquire whether any recent news regarding the progress of the Chinese expedition has reached the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Marquess of Crewe's attention has been drawn to a statement contained in a Reuter telegram from Shanghai, published in the "Times" of the 9th October, 1912, to the effect that the Chinese are now "practically in command of Eastern Thibet." His Lordship is doubtful how much credence should be placed in this statement, which appears to have originated with a Tachien-lu correspondent of the "North China Daily News." But in any case he regards it as essential, if effective action is to be taken to prevent an advance on Lhassa, that His Majesty's Government should be

kept as promptly informed as possible of the movements of the Chinese force. He would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, the advisability of sending telegraphic instructions in this sense to His Majesty's Minister at Peking and His Majesty's consuls-general at Chengtu and Yünnan-fu.

There is a further point to which Lord Crewe desires to advert, viz., the situation that will arise if the expedition persists in advancing into Thibet, in spite of the warning conveyed to the Chinese Government by His Majesty's Minister at Peking, that such a step would bring them "into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government." It seems desirable to consider carefully the best means of giving practical effect to Sir J. Jordan's warning, should such a course become necessary. Lord Crewe would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on this point.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[44107] No. 254.

Question asked in the House of Commons, October 17, 1912.

Colonel Yate,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the Russian Buriat Dorjieff has returned to Lhassa; and whether a British agent can now be sent to Lhassa to see that treaty engagements regarding Thibet are duly observed.

Answer.

According to the information which has been received by His Majesty's Government through the British trade agent at Gyantse, Dorjieff was recently at the Monastery of Samding, near Lhassa, but was not there as a Russian agent, and left this place on the 4th September to return to his own country. With regard to the second part of the question, I would refer the hon. and gallant member to article 3 of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

[43864] No. 255.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th October, 1912, regarding the Chinese troops in Thibet.

India Office, October 18, 1812.

Enclosure in No. 255.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 17, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram, dated the 3rd instant, regarding Thibet. Some 200 modern-drilled Chinese troops still remain at Lhassa with General Chung Yin, who says that he has been appointed amban in Lien Yu's place, and therefore refuses to leave. Besides these, Lien Yu, who is unable on account of ill-health to leave for India, has about 100 troops with him at Rong. Other Chinese troops have now arrived in India.

[43884] No. 256.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 18.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 18, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 519 of 2nd September.

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs called to-day to notify me that, according to Chinese reports from India, General Chung Yin, who had been appointed amban, and his guard were being closely besieged by Thibetans in Lhassa, and that the Dalai Lama was organising a rising of the population against them. Chinese Government regard this as a violation of agreement of 12th August, and, in view of our warning that no relief expedition must be sent to Lhassa, they enquire what suggestions His Majesty's Government have to offer to meet the situation.

Could I be furnished with a copy of agreement of 12th August?

(Sent to India.)

[43679] No. 257.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1912.

THIBET.

"Times" of 9th October published a Reuter message from Shanghai to the effect that the Chinese were now "practically in command of Eastern Thibet."

[The] India Office regard it as essential, if effective action is to be taken to prevent an advance on Lhassa, that His Majesty's Government should be kept promptly informed of movements of Chinese force. Please act accordingly, and instruct His Majesty's consuls-general at Chengtu and Yünnan-fu in same sense All telegrams should be repeated to India.

India Office are also considering best means of giving practical effect to warning reported in your despatch No. 357 of 27th August, as to which I should be glad of your considered views in due course.

(Repeated to India.)

[44556] No. 258.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 3rd October, 1912, relative to Thibet.

India Office, October 21, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 258.

Political Officer in Sikkim to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Gangtok, September* 19, 1912.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 19th September, 1912, I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a letter from the chief Ministers to the Dalai Lama to my address.

2. The Thibetan feeling against Len Amban is one of over-mastering indignation. His departure from Thibet is very greatly to be desired.

Enclosure 2 in No. 258.

Chief Ministers to Dalai Lama to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Translation.)
(Confidential.)

THE kind letter which you sent to us reached here on the 15th (the 27th August, 1912), and immediately we reported the contents to his Holiness the Dalai Lama, who was very much pleased to hear that you have already reported to his Excellency the Viceroy the proposal to send some boys of the respectable families of Thibet to London for education. His Holiness has directed us to depute the boys after the departure of the Chinese troops (to China).

As regards the quarrel between the Chinese and Thibetans. Although the dispute has been already settled on three articles as stated before, the Chinese officials, being very cunning, used deceitful means and did not observe the agreement by taking away the dangerous arms and all the bolts of the rifles, saying that it is the custom and rules to return them to their country (Government). They did not hand over the dangerous arms and bolts of the rifles. Although it was settled that the Chinese troops should buy their eatables on their way at the halting places and stages, &c., they brought in many new subjects daily about the large quantity of grains that were stored at Trap-chi (Chinese camp), and delayed the day of their departure. However, they are starting (from Lhassa) on the 18th (the 30th August, 1912) in six batches, 500 riding and transport animals being in each batch. It has been decided that General Tung and his military officer should leave Lhassa with one of the six batches. As they are not reliable men, we have doubt as to what they may do at any moment.

Len Amban has written a letter to the Regent (Ti-Rimpoche), saying that he intends to go to the Chumbi valley, Phari, and Gyantse to see the boundaries and to discuss matters about trade marts, and will return to Lhassa, and asked the Regent to repair his residence. There is a rumour that, on his arrival at Gyantse, he will seek for protection of the British Government and ask the Chinese Government to send Chinese troops to Thibet as soon as possible. We do not know how far this information is correct. It is known to you that Len Amban is the cause of introducing unlawful acts, which we never heard of before in Thibet, and putting the Thibetans from being friends to the British by not observing the treaties. Therefore it is essential that we should turn this brute (Len Amban) out of Thibet. Will you very kindly consider the matter and let us know your opinion early, for which we shall be thankful to you?

Submitted with a scarf of greeting on the 21st of the 7th month (the 2nd September, 1912).

Seal of Lonchens.

Enclosure 3 in No. 258.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Political Officer in Sikkim.

(Confidential.) *Gyantse, September* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram dated the 16th September, 1912, I have the honour to forward—

(1.) Photograph of the Chinese version of the agreement between the Chinese and the Thibetans at Lhassa on the 12th August, 1912.
(2.) Copy and translation of the Thibetan version of the agreement.
(3.) Copy and translation of the Nepali version of the agreement.

I hope that I shall shortly be able to send a photograph also of the Thibetan version.

The negative of the Chinese version is being sent to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, in order that, if necessary, an enlarged photograph may be produced. I am also forwarding to the Foreign Department and to the British trade agent, Yatung, the documents specified in (1) (2), and (3) above.

2. The photograph and the copies have been taken from the originals which are in possession of Major Jit Bahadur, Nepalese representative at Lhassa, who is now returning to Nepal.

The agreement was executed in quadruplicate, one copy of each being kept by the Thibetans, Amban Len, General Chung Yin (Tung Tungling), and the Nepalese representative.

Enclosure 4 in No. 258.

Thibetan Version of the Agreement between the Chinese and the Thibetans, dated August 12, 1912.

[Except for differences of idiom the Nepali version is identical with the Thibetan version. A separate translation of the Nepali version has therefore not been made.]

(Translation.)

The representatives of the Chinese and the Thibetans met together in presence of the Nepali major-captain and others, as witnesses, and discussed matters, and finally decided the following:—

1. The Dalai Lama, in his answer to the letters submitted by Amban Len and Chung, has consented and agreed to the three articles. Accordingly, the representatives and witnesses immediately consented to observe them without alteration.

2. According to the three articles the representatives discussed all the subjects which have been written down by the witnesses, the Nepali major-captain. The main subjects discussed are in accordance with the purport of the letter submitted by Len and Chung, dated the 29th of the 6th month (11th August, 1912). On the 30th (12th August, 1912), the parties met and carefully discussed the matter, and decided that the subjects in question should be written out in Chinese, Thibetan, and Nepalese, which should be signed and sealed by the parties.

3. That all the arms and equipment, including field guns and Maxim guns, in possession of the Chinese at Lhassa, Trap-chi, and Tse-cho-ling will be kept in Doring house. Discussions will be held when it is found necessary to keep the powder and bullets separately. The real intention is that all the arms and equipments (without leaving one with the Chinese) shall be sealed in the presence of the two representatives and witnesses, and the Thibetan Government will guard them. After the completion of the discussion by both the parties before the departure of the Chinese officials and soldiers, all the arms and equipment shall be removed to Yapshi house within fifteen days. The powder and bullets shall be collected and deposited in Doring house (the door of) which will be sealed by the representatives and the witnesses, and by the witnessing Nepali officials, who will arrange to guard the house. Neither Chinese nor Thibetans shall take them by force. When the above-mentioned days are over, the above-mentioned arms and equipments shall be removed to Doring house without deceit.

4. The Chinese officials and soldiers shall be sent back within fifteen days. According to their dates given by them for their departure, the Thibetans will depute an official to accompany the different parties and will arrange to supply really necessary transport and riding ponies. The Thibetans will supply on proper payment rice, flour, meat, butter, and tea at halting places and stages to the Chinese on their way, through the Thibetan officials accompanying the parties, up to the frontier, and will take payment for the supplies according to the rates existing in the country. There shall not be any delay with imperfect excuses in supplying riding ponies and transport animals on the way. And the Chinese shall not take by force any riding ponies nor transport animals beyond the frontier.

5. Both the representatives will remove all the Chinese officials and soldiers from Yapshi house and the Thibetan soldiers from Doring house to-morrow in order to keep the arms and ammunition in the above two houses.

6. About the collection and storing of arms. According to the letter, dated the 29th of the 6th month (11th August, 1912), from Len and Chung, all the arms, equipments, field-guns, Maxim-guns, &c., belonging to the Chinese in Lhassa, Trap-chi, and Tse-cho-ling and those in possession of the Chinese Government or private merchants shall be produced before the two representatives and the witnesses on the 1st of the 7th month (13th August, 1912), together with a list, without throwing

or giving away or concealing or selling any of the arms. As suggested by the witnesses the retention of sixty rifles and ammunition by Len Amban and Chung for their protection will be allowed. Besides these all the arms and equipment shall be kept in Doring and Yapshi houses (the door of) which shall be sealed by the two representatives and by the witnesses who will arrange to place guards as stated above.

7. After all the arms, equipments, field-guns, Maxim-guns from Lhassa, Trap-chi, Tse-cho-ling and from the Chinese Government and private merchants have been collected, they shall be deposited without leaving a single weapon with the Chinese. After they have been deposited, a list will be made out of the arms belonging to the private Chinese merchants, and the two representatives and the witnesses will discuss matters about their return to them.

8. *Reason.*—This is signed and sealed by the three parties to-day. Should anyone disregard the above articles with imperfect excuses, the agreement will be considered to be null and void.

The joint seal of the Dalai Lama's representative Ser-tsha Kri-trul and his assistant Tse-tron Ten-Gyal.

The seals of Amban Len's and Chung's representatives—

Lu-u Chang-Tang Lung-sin.
Yul-chi Lu-U Le-Tin.
U-Yon Te-Pu-He Tu-u.
Te-Pu Wang-Chi-u Jing-Tung Ti-Ku Bu-u-He.
Ta-u Pun.
Lu-Du Kuwn-Kuwn.
Ten-Pa-u.

Witnesses:

(*Five Sris.*) The seal of the representative of the Nepal Durbar—Major-Captain Jit Bahadur Kha-Tri-Chrati.

The seal of the Lieutenant Lal Bahadur Kshi-Ta Chatri—Lal Bahadur Basnyat Kshettri—29–4–69.

The seal of Did-Ta Kula Persad Upadiya.

The mark of the Subedar Ratha Gambir Singh Kha-Tri Cha-tri.

Dated the 30th of the 6th month of the Water Water-Mouse Year (*August* 12, 1912).

[44620] No. 259.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 218.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 19th October.

Chinese expeditionary force from 3,600 to 4,000 is now operating in two columns from base at Tachienlu.

Southern column, moving on main road from Tachienlu, recovered Litang 3rd September. Northern column, about 1,000, moved on north road from Tachienlu towards Kanze. Its present position is uncertain, though commander of expedition reports that it recovered Chiamdo 4th September, Draya 13th September, and Olochiao, two days' march west of Chiamdo, 16th September. British consul at Chengtu reports recovery of Chiamdo 9th September.

Force 1,500 was sent 27th July from Yünnan-fu towards Batang viâ Atuntsu.

(Sent to India.)

[43884] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 213 of 18th October.

You should reply that we understand Thibetans to contend that Chinese Government have broken the agreement of 12th August by ordering Tung and 200 troops to remain at Lhassa, and that we cannot accept any responsibility for agreement and its interpretation. You should add that, whatever may happen in the present emergency, His Majesty's Government will expect an understanding with China as to the permanent status of Thibet on the lines of the memorandum communicated by you to Wai-chiao Pu on 17th August.

It seems useless to press for recall of the expedition, which is probably beyond control of the Central Government, nor could we press for it at moment when Chinese left at Lhassa are possibly in danger of massacre.

[43679] No. 261.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Marquess of Crewe, that on receipt of your letter of the 16th instant His Majesty's Minister at Peking was informed by telegraph of the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to being kept promptly informed of the movements of the Chinese force operating on the borders of Thibet if effective action was to be taken to prevent an advance on Lhassa, and he was requested to instruct His Majesty's consuls-general at Chengtu and Yünnan-fu in that sense. Sir J. Jordan was at the same time informed that your department were considering the best means of giving practical effect, should such a course become necessary, to the warning given to the Chinese Government that an advance into Thibet would bring them into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government. Sir J. Jordan was asked to report his considered views on this point in due course.

Meanwhile, a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister (No. 213 of the 18th October) with the news of the perilous position of the Chinese General Chungijm, now appointed Amban, and of his guard in Lhassa. The Chinese Government contended that the Thibetan Government had violated the agreement of the 12th August, and, in view of the warning given to them that no relief expedition should be sent to Lhassa, wished to know what suggestions His Majesty's Government could offer to meet the situation. A further telegram from Peking (No. 218 of the 22nd October) reporting the movements of the Chinese expeditionary force made it clear that the expedition was well on its way into Thibet.

As a result of verbal communications which passed between Sir E. Grey and the Marquess of Crewe at this Office on the 23rd instant, Sir J. Jordan (No. 170 of the 23rd October) was instructed by telegraph to inform the Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government understood the Thibetans to contend that the Chinese themselves had broken the agreement of the 12th August, and that His Majesty's Government could not accept any responsibility for that agreement or its interpretation. Sir J. Jordan was to add that whatever might happen in the present emergency, His Majesty's Governmen t would expect an understanding with China as to the permanent status of Thibet on the lines of the memorandum communicated by His Majesty's Minister to the Wai-chiao Pu on the 17th August last. It seemed useless to press for the recall of the expedition, which was probably beyond the control of the Central Government, nor could His Majesty's Governmeni press for it at the moment when the Chinese left at Lhassa were possibly in danger of being massacred.

On the day following the dispatch of that telegram, telegram No. 223 of the 24th October was received from Sir J. Jordan, forwarding the information telegraphed by the acting consul-general at Chengtu as to the disposition of the expeditionary

force, and containing the information that the commander-in-chief at Tachien-lu had received instructions from Peking that the expedition should proceed no further, and that the coming winter would probably put a stop to all the operations.

It is hoped that confirmation of the news contained in this last telegram may obviate for the moment the necessity for taking further action in the matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[44886] No. 262.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 24, 1912.

MY telegram No. 218 of 22nd October.

Acting consul-general at Chengtu telegraphs that present position is as follows:—

Tachienlu, 1,500 men under the commander-in-chief; Litang, 1,000 men southern column; Batang, 300 men of original garrison; Derge, 800 men of the northern column; Chiamdo, 200 men northern column and 300 men of the original garrison.

Chinese are planning concerted attack on Thibetans at Hsiangchengtu and making serious efforts to subjugate marches, which they consider to extend to and include Chiamdo district.

Commander-in-chief at Tachienlu states he has received instructions from Peking that expedition should proceed no farther.

Winter setting in will probably put a stop to all operations.

(Sent to India.)

[45320] No. 263.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 23rd October, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, October 25, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 263.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 23, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to Foreign Office telegram to His Majesty's Minister, Peking, dated 19th instant, No. 167, and to your telegram of 23rd March last.

Have you any addition to make to the latter?

[45341] No. 264.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 26.)

Sir, *India Office, October 26, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th instant, enclosing copy of telegram No. 213, dated the 18th instant, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 25th October, 1912, from the Government of India regarding the situation at Lhassa.

The instructions conveyed to Sir J. Jordan in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 170, dated the 23rd instant, seem to render a spontaneous communication to the Chinese Government unnecessary, if not undesirable. But if the Wai-chiao Pu recur to the subject, his Excellency might reply in the sense of the Government of India's telegram, adding that, neither as regards Tung nor as regards the ex-Amban Lien, can His Majesty's Government keep open indefinitely their offer to allow withdrawal through India, and that if they wish to avail themselves of it their orders should therefore be unequivocal.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 264.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 25, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 17th instant.

On the 19th instant the trade agent, Gyantse, was informed by the confidential adviser to the Dalai Lama that orders to quit Rong and proceed to India forthwith had been sent to the ex-Amban Lien Yu by the Thibetan authorities. The attitude of the present amban, General Chung, is undoubtedly the cause of the hostilities which have recently broken out afresh at Lhassa, and as there is no prospect of peace so long as he remains, and as his remaining is looked upon by the Thibetans as a breach of the agreement of the 12th August, 1912, it seems to us desirable to press the Chinese Government to issue orders that he be withdrawn from Thibet. For a translation of the Thibetan version of the agreement, please see my Foreign Secretary's letter of the 3rd October. Another copy, together with a photographic copy of the Chinese version, was sent on the 22nd October to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[45341] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.*

THIBET.

My telegram No. 170 of 23rd October and Government of India's telegram of 25th October.

We consider further spontaneous communication to the Chinese Government unnecessary, if not undesirable, but if they recur to the subject you might reply in the sense of the Government of India's telegram, adding that, neither as regards Tung nor as regards the ex-Amban Len, can His Majesty's Government keep open indefinitely their offer to allow withdrawal through India, and that, if they wish to avail themselves of it, their orders should therefore be unequivocal.

Please repeat my telegram No. 170 to India.

[45850] No. 266.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 227.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, October* 29, 1912.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 167 and 170 of 23rd October, last paragraphs.

If it is still intended to give practical effect to intimation reported in my despatch No. 357 military action of some kind seems indicated. Placing of a force on the frontier between Sadiya and Rima, sufficiently strong to serve as a warning against a further Chinese advance into Thibet would probably have effect, as Chinese appear to be showing great hesitation about advancing further. If this is insufficient advance to Rima or beyond might be necessary; [? at any rate] measures of this kind once commenced should be continued until a permanent settlement is obtained. This may be considerable time, as President is unlikely to take any definite decision until he is elected by popular vote.

As an entirely separate issue, a forward movement in the disputed area on the Burmah-Yünnan frontier would strengthen effect of above measures.

(Sent to India.)

[45851] No. 267.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 29, 1912.

PRESIDENTIAL order published in Gazette restores his former title to Dalai Lama, and expresses the hope that he will assist republic and cultivate peaceful relations with China.

He is represented as having addressed communication to director of department of Mongolia and Thibet, praying that President should be moved to take measures for protecting church in Thibet.

(Sent to India.)

[45877] No. 268.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 413.)
Sir, *Peking, October* 14, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 211 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that on receipt of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 156 of the 24th September, I addressed to the Wai-chiao Pu the memorandum copy of which is enclosed, requesting that telegraphic instructions be sent to the Chinese officials in Thibet to expedite the departure through India of the Chinese troops assembled at Yatung.

In their reply dated the 11th October, copy of which I have also the honour to enclose, the Chinese Government expressed their gratitude for the friendly attitude of the Government of India in this matter, and enclosed a telegram addressed to the Chinese general officer at Yatung ordering the immediate return of the troops assembled on the frontier, and recommending that strict discipline be observed on the journey. Translation of this telegram is enclosed herewith.

As requested by the Wai-chiao Pu, I forwarded the message by telegraph to his Excellency the Viceroy of India on the 12th instant, in the ordinary Chinese code, for transmission to Yatung.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 268.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-chiao Pu by Sir J. Jordan.

WITH reference to the communication addressed to the Government of India on the 27th ultimo by the Chinese amban and general at Lhassa asking that facilities might be granted for the passage through British territory of the Chinese troops returning to China from Thibet, of which I informed the Ministry verbally on the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I am now in receipt of a further telegram from the Government of India to the effect that three batches of Chinese troops have already arrived at Yatung from Lhassa, but they refuse to cross the frontier pending the receipt of written instructions from the Chinese general.

This delay is causing great inconvenience, especially in retaining the large quantity of transport arranged for the journey, which, if not made use of now, may not be available again before the end of October.

The Government of India have accordingly requested the Chinese amban and general to issue the necessary orders to expedite the departure of the troops, and I am directed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to ask that the Chinese Government will also issue telegraphic instructions to the Chinese officials in Thibet and to Mr. Ma-shih Chou in the same sense.

J. N. JORDAN.

Peking, September 25, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 268.

Wai-chiao Pu to Sir J. Jordan

Sir, *October* 11, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter stating that three batches of Chinese troops returning from Thibet have arrived at Yatung, but they refuse to cross the frontier pending the receipt of instructions from the general. Your Excellency requested the issue of telegraphic instructions to expedite their departure.

It has been agreed that the expenses of the journey by land and water of the Chinese troops from Yatung will be advanced by the Indian Government, who will depute Colonel Willoughby to escort them and look after them. We are deeply grateful for this signal mark of friendliness.

We now beg to enclose a telegram to Yatung for the general officer in command of the forces in Thibet, ordering him to start immediately, and to request your Excellency to forward it on our behalf, to prevent delay.

We avail, &c.

WAI-CHIAO PU.

Enclosure 3 in No. 268.

Telegram addressed to the General Officer in Command of the Forces in Thibet, Yatung.

(Translation.) *October* 9, 1912.

THE following orders have been received from the President:—

"The period of service of the troops in Thibet having now expired, they shall return forthwith to China viâ India. The Wai-chiao Pu has made an amicable arrangement with the British Minister, whereby, from the time of their departure from Yatung, land and sea transport and ponies will be provided for them, and all expenses temporarily advanced by the Indian Government. The British Legation is also specially sending one of its staff, Colonel Willoughby, who knows Chinese, to look after them and arrange everything satisfactorily. We are deeply grateful for this neighbourly regard.

"The troops in question have long been stationed on the distant frontier, and have undergone grievous hardships. On this their return home we hope that they will, and it is of great importance that they should, observe strict discipline and conduct themselves in an orderly manner.—CABINET."

Forwarded by favour of His Majesty's Legation.

[45952]. No. 269.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th October, 1912, relative to Chinese-Thibetan campaign.

India Office, October 29, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 269.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Viceroy of India.

Chengtu, August 2, 1912.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch, which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, on the subject of the Chinese-Thibetan campaign.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 269.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

Chengtu, August 2, 1912.

Sir,

NEWS from the Marches comes in but slowly. This (it is perhaps hardly necessary to add) does not prevent the native press from supplying it, and (it is also superfluous to remark) of such a nature as will commend itself to the native reader.

The "Wan Pao" ("Evening Paper") of the 20th July prints a telegram from Ch'ing-Ch'i (still the furthest station opened on the line) dated the 18th, stating that a letter from Li Tao, "weiyuan" (political officer) at T'ung-p'u, near Derge, reports that the North Road is everywhere undisturbed; while a letter from Tachienlu (undated) affirms that since the Chinese victory at Ho-K'ou, the rebel tribesmen have gone into hiding and Hu and Ch'en have advanced to Huo-chu-k'a, some score of *li* only from Lit'ang. An attack by the Thibetans on Bat'ang was repulsed by Ku Chanwen, commandant of that town.

The "Hsifang Pao" the organ of Huang Hsi-ling, quondam director of the Ch'ou-pien Chu (Office for Frontier Arrangements) and now conciliator ("hsüan-wei-shih") for the Marches, has a special war correspondent of its own, who writes (or is supposed to write) from Tachienlu, and would seem to be a person of very vivid imagination. His descriptions (or intelligent anticipations) of events need not be recorded.

The Chinese postal clerk at Tachienlu wrote on the 18th July to M. von Kompolthy (I translate from the original):—

"I engaged a man to take a service note to Bat'ang. He started (from Tachienlu) on the 7th, and on the 18th returned to Tachienlu. He reports that he reached Ho-k'ou on the 12th, and crossing the river (Yalung) went to Ma-kai-chung, 10 *li* from Ho-k'ou. There were "luchün" (regulars) at Ho-k'ou and at Ma-kai-chung, but they are unable to advance. At the present time there are no travellers on the road west of Ma-kai-chung. The Mantzu warriors are everywhere throughout the district of Lit'ang, while Kantze (on the north road) is lost to us. For this reason they do not dare to go forward."

In other words, on the 12th July, the further Chinese outpost was at Ma-kai-chung, only a short distance west of Ho-k'ou. On that date Lit'ang had certainly not been recovered, while the fate of Bat'ang was (as it still is at Chengtu) unknown. The latest authentic news from Bat'ang is a letter, dated the 15th June, received from the Catholic mission here. This states that Pères Grandjean and Neusbaum were preparing to leave, but that the Chinese officials wished to detain them. The "Hsingchun Pao" of yesterday publishes a Shanghai telegram of the 31st July stating that "Ts'ai Tutu of Yünnan had telegraphed to the Central Government that the Ts'an-jen have invaded Kiangka (Gartok) and have taken Yenching (Yerkalo). The Ts'an of Ch'i-ling-k'ang-shan, 100 *li* from Bat'ang, have also revolted."

Mr. O'Brien-Butler has repeated to me his telegram to you of the 27th, embodying telegram No. 20 to you from Mr. Smith at Tengyueh. The latter gives the news at Atuntzu up to the 20th June; but except for the assurance that all was then quiet at Atuntzu, it adds little to our knowledge of events in those regions. Mr. O'Brien-Butler's addendum ("1,500 men left Yünnan-fu the 27th July, viâ Tali and Lichiang, for Atuntzu and Bat'ang, and a like number is to leave in a few days; General Yin Ch'eng-hsien is in command") confirms a telegram from Yünnan, the 23rd July, published in the "Wan Pao" of the 31st July:—

"We are sending one 'lien' of infantry, forming the——Kan" (a character has dropped out) "Mixed Detachment ('hung-ch'eng chih-tai'), under command of Yin Ch'eng-hsien, viâ Chungtien and Weihsi to crush the rebellious Thibetans. They are to start on the 24th."

Yün tutu on the 18th July gave a feast at Yachow to his officers and men, to the extent (writes Dr. Humphreys, the 23rd July) of two hundred tables. A "table" in this connection means eight persons—which confirms the rough estimate of Yün's immediate command as consisting of some 1,800 men. "Everybody," says Dr. Humphreys, "from the tutu and the fu (prefect) down to the soldiers, sat and ate their food from bowls placed on the ground. It was quite a democratic affair, for no distinctions were made."

On the 19th Yün tutu held manœuvres in the open country; on the 20th he left for Ch'ing-ch'i. From Ch'ing-ch'i he started for Tachienlu on the 25th July. While at Ch'ing-ch'i he telegraphed to the Szechuan Government (the telegram, the authenticity of which there is no reason to doubt, appears in the "Hsing-chün Pao" of the 28th July):—

"Alarming news from the Marches continues to arrive. According to a report from Colonel Chu (Tun-wu) the rebel tribes have raided the country up to Ho-k'ou and Ma-kai-chung and are displaying great audacity. The colonel and others occupy Tachienlu and Ho-k'ou, but cannot risk an advance owing to shortage of rice rations for the troops. The longer an advance is delayed, the bolder will the Thibetans become.

"Whatever arrangements are being made by the lines of communication, it is earnestly hoped that Deputy Superintendent Chi will be instructed to expedite transport to Tachienlu, so as to facilitate an advance.

"The first division has sent up mountain guns, and T'ang has gone to Chengtu. The Lit'ang insurgents occupy a lamasery with solid walls which cannot easily be assaulted without artillery. It is hoped that General Staff Officer Lan Yuan will be directed to bring a battery, by forced marches, westward. Please telegraph the date of his departure."

The "Hsifang Pao" of yesterday states that Lan Yung-chiu, on the 29th July, left Chengtu with one battery ("tui") of artillery, and one company of the Guards. These last had been unable to start at the same time as Yün tutu, as their quota of rifles was then incomplete. The men's appearance, says the paper was admirable, an improvement even on the earlier details. Like these last, they were given a great send-off from the Wu-hou Tz'u, ouside the South Gate.

Chiang Feng-ch'i, the evasive intelligence officer sent to interrogate our Mishmi Mission, whose disappearance was referred to in my despatch No. 67 of the 20th ultimo, appears to have found his way to Lichiang in Yünnan. Thence, at all events, has come a telegram in his name, which is published in the "Hsifang Pao" of the 30th July:—

"All west from Gartok is in turmoil; Bat'ang and Yenching are in sore peril. We hear that a grand army is to go out from Tachienlu. Ask the Chien-ch'ang

(authorities) to send a flying column through Mu-li to occupy Kung (ku) ling, and telegraph to the Yünnan contingent to hold Shengshui over the Yünnan border. Then the siege of Bat'ang and Yenching may be raised."

The "Kuo-min Pao" of the 29th July constains a long letter from a correspondent of Tachienlu, which gives a detailed, and I am inclined to think a truthful, account of the situation in the Marches, particularly along the North Road, from Tachienlu through Dawo and Kantze to Derge. Of this letter I beg to append my translation.

According to the "Kunglun Pao" of to-day the President is much concerned at the little progress made in suppressing the Thibetan revolt, and has telegraphed to the Vice-President at Wuchang (General Li . Yuan-hung) asking him to send a contingent of Hupei troops.

The Vice-President is said to be of opinion that the affair should be treated as national rather than provincial. Yun Ch'ang-heng can make no progress with his feeble and unsupported army, while the increase of "foreign forces" in Thibet may lead to some very serious disaster. The Vice-President suggests six courses to pursue: the two first of which are:—

1. Chinese speaking Thibetan well should be sent to secretly explain the principles of republicanism, the union of the five races, and the advantages of progress. The Thibetans, thus enlightened, would cease to be deluded by foreigners ("foreigner" in this connection always means a British subject).

2. As the Thibetans' supply of gunpowder is not great, we ought to post men in ambush everywhere. who would lie quiet during the day, and come out at night to draw the enemy's fire.

Whether these or other ingenuous measures would bring success to the Chinese arms, I am not prepared to say. I append, instead, the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Pereira, who has been good enough to draw up for me a summary of the Thibetan situation.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 269.

Extract from the "Kuo-min Pao," of July 29, 1912.

(Letter from correspondent at Tachienlu)

I REACHED Tachienlu on the 13th July, and then learnt that most of the troops were at Ho-k'ou and Sha-hsi. The 2nd battalion (of the 3rd division) arrived here on the evening of the 9th. On the 10th July (? 4th July) the rebellious tribesmen attacked Ho-k'ou. The commandant of the 2nd battalion of Hsünfang, Hu Shou-ch'uan (Hu Kuo-ch'ing) led out his men to meet them. Killed, a dozen Mantzu; captured, great quantities of rifles and cartridges. Two of our men wounded.

As the main expedition is not yet ready, our men still keep at Ho-k'ou. It is said there that had it not been for the 2nd battalion (of the hsünfang), Ho-k'ou would have shared the fate of Lit'ang.

A friend at Kantze writes: "Speaking of Commandant Niu Yunlung of the 5th battalion (of hsünfang) on the North Road: he sent a lieutenant, Ch'en Shao-t'ang, to Bat'ang to ask for supplies. When the lieutenant reached Pai-yü he met Mr. Chou Fut'ien, the political officer ('wei-yuan' appointed under the ch'ing) who was sending men to carry provisions to Bat'ang in aid of the commissariat; Lieutenant Ch'en accordingly went with them. When they got to Kai-yü, in Pai-yü district, they learnt that the road ahead was held by the natives of the seven villages of Mao-chi and neighbouring tribes. These seven villages were those chastised a few years ago (in 1905) by Ma Wei-ch'i. No letters, not even army despatches, could get through. The provisions to be transported were stored at Kai-yü, as the natives would not supply 'ulag'; but Lieutenant Ch'en, in view of the urgent necessities of his battalion, pressed on in spite of danger."

When he got to Cha-ma (also in Pai-yü district) he met Mr. Fan Lang-t'ing,

political officer in San-ngai, in flight, and learnt that San-ngai was lost on the 18th June, and the whole garrison slain. Mr. Fan alone escaped, which was lucky for him.

Lieutenant Ch'en accordingly led back his command, accompanied by Mr. Fan. When they reached Kai-yü the natives had risen in force. Lieutenant Ch'en headed his men in attacking them; and alternately fighting and marching they got to Pai-yü.

At Pai-yü they were besieged. Ch'ou wei-yuan, after consulting with Lieutenant Ch'en, offered a large reward to any soldiers who would escort into safety the Thibetan rupees, several thousand; and on the 1st July they started from Pai-yü. The natives continually attacked them and did not desist till they got to Sha-po, 100 *li* away. Nowhere along the route would the inhabitants do corvée, so the political officers, Ch'ou and Fan and Lieutenant Ch'en, all had to walk, and were obliged to abandon their baggage.

He also said that the natives round Pai-yü were boasting that the seven villages of Mao-ch'i, and the tribesmen of Hsiang-Ch'eng, Taopa, San-ngai, Chama, Sanpa, Draya, and Chiangka (Gartok) had agreed to attack on the 2nd July Bat'ang from both directions. The road is now blocked and despatches cannot pass, so that is not known what is happening at Bat'ang.

Alas! The whole of the marches, twenty-five or twenty-six departments or districts, is in absolute turmoil. There only remain Bat'ang, Taowu (Dawo), Kantze, Derge, and Luhot'un. Yet the troops that have come to Tachienlu dawdle there, and are not distributed along the north road to occupy Dawo, Kantze, Derge, and other places. There will be no stop until the whole of the marches are cut up. I hear that So-and-so has on many occasions asked the officers at Tachienlu to send troops along the north road, but they have no idea of doing what he says.

A letter received in June from the political officer at Derge, Mr. Chiang Li-shan, in reference to the country along the north road, says that, in consequence of the fall of Lit'ang, the natives everywhere rose. One after the other, Gonjoh, San-ngai, Pai-yü, Draya, Gartok, and Sanpa were lost during June. The whereabouts is unknown of Shan-Jung-chou, political officer at Gonjok, Ch'iao Shaoling, political officer Draya, and Tuan P'eng-jui, political officer at Gyangka. The political officer at Sanpa, Li Yao-ch'ing, fled back to Bat'ang; those at Sangai and Pai-yü respectively, Fan Lang-t'ing and Ch'ou Fu-t'ien, have taken refuge at Kantze.

It also says that the native at Sanpa, Hsiang-Ch'eng, Taopa, Pai-yü, and San-ngai have agreed to divide their forces and advance on Bat'ang from two directions. Meanwhile the native of Gonjoh, Draya, and Gartok will attack Chamdo. The two towns (Bat'ang and Chamdo) are, therefore, in great peril, and their fate is still unknown.

The political officer at T'ung pu, Chang Tzu-ch'eng is holding out to the death, and has sent letters everywhere asking urgently for assistance. Money and provisions, however, are both exhausted and he cannot keep up much longer.

It also says that the two chiefs of Derge have returned to the Marches from Thibet, and the other day issued an order, in Thibetan, to Chiang weiyuan to vacate the official post where they themselves would reside; otherwise he would be expelled by force. Chiang weiyuan, having no troops, summoned the natives and ordered them to produce 300 cavalry and infantry as a guard. The two chiefs of Derge had treated their people with extraordinary harshness, and their tyranny had lasted long; hence Mr. Chiang's idea of availing himself of this circumstance for his own protection. Still the disposition of the tribesmen is that of dogs and goats, and whether they can be relied upon is doubtful. All the same he had no choice.

I see by his letter that his little son is dead; that is one anxiety the less, but the pity of it is past all words.

It says too that the Government's attitude towards affairs in the Marches is, to-day an order, to-morrow a despatch; but never a soldier or a cent of pay. There will be no stopping till all the Marches are in turmoil; more's the pity.

It further states that previous to the 23rd July, as the main army did not come, they could not guarantee the safety of Derge.

What the idea is of the gentlemen of the Western Punitive Expedition in loitering on the road, I certainly do not know.

I hear that So-and-so says:—

"We came last February to Szechuan to negotiate and had interviews with the two tutus and the office for frontier arrangements. We asked them to send troops and pay within five days; but all of them maintained that there was no trouble in

the Marches or Thibet, and declared that we were inventing tales to scare our hearers. If we brought them alarming reports from the Marches or Thibet, they said that these were concocted by ourselves, and they kept them dark and did not publish them. So now all classes beyond the barrier (west of Tachienlu) are united to make it hard for us, saying that we, their delegates, are no use at negotiating. And this is the result. One of the delegates is so angry that he has no wish to live. Alas, whose blame is this!"

Translated August 1, 1912.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 4 in No. 269.

Summary of Thibetan Situation.

THE country between the Min River on the east the Tachin River on the west, from Tachienlu to the south up to half-way between Sungp'an T'ing, and Mao Chou to the north is inhabited by the eighteen tribes, a mixture of Thibetan and aborigines the former element predominating. The most prominent of the chiefs are So T'u-ssu (t'u ssu="local chief") ruling over the Wassu tribe (west of Wen-Ch'uan Hsien) who has always shown himself very friendly to foreigners, and the chief of the Cha-la tribe, known as the Min-chen-Ssu, who used to live at Tachienlu. The Chinese have made the former responsible for the tribes east of the Tachin River, whilst the latter exercises an influence over the Hor-ba States, and the Thibetans up to Bat'ang with the exception of the State of Chan-tui or Niarong, which has always remained directly under Lhassa.

Further north are the Goloks or Hgoloks, the best known of the Thibetan robber tribes, the Po-lo-tzu and other Thibetans whose country extends from the eighteen tribes to Sungp'an T'ing. North of them are the Thibeten tribes who pay tribute to the Prince of Cho-ni in Kan-su.

Sungp'an T'ang was captured by the Goloks, egged on by Chinese brigands, on the 13th February, 1912. The object of the attack was apparently plunder, and the place appears to have been given up by the Thibetans with little or no fighting, the Chinese say on the 1st June, but as I only heard of its reoccupation when I reached Mao Chou on the 15th July, I expect it was really a month later.

Luckily for the Chinese the northern Thibetans and the eighteen tribes (with the exception of the Cha-las) have taken no part in the revolt of the Thibetans of the Marches (the country between the Thibet frontier and Tachienlu).

The outbreak started at Lhassa and spread eastwards to the border; the Chinese garrisons at Chiamdo and Bat'ang have been surrounded, and other towns, Kantze, Lit'ang, and Yenching, have been captured. The fate of Bat'ang, where there are two French missionaries, is still unknown. The Thibetans pushed eastward till stopped by the Yalung at Hok'ou. This swift-flowing river is crossed by boats or coracles, but the Chinese have engaged a French engineer (M. Kerihuel) and his French foreman to throw an iron bridge across. The latter remained at Ho-k'ou, whilst the former has returned to Tachienlu, where the following foreigners still remain: Mr. Cunningham, of the China Inland Mission; M. Giraudeau, several of his missionaries and some French nursing sisters. The Chinese advance guard appears to be 3 or 4 miles west of the Yalung.

When the trouble first arose, the Chinese appear to have moved with their usual dilatoriness; insufficient troops were sent up, and precious time was lost. However, at the beginning of July, Yuan Chang-heng, the Governor (tutu) of Szechuan, and a man of undoubted energy, decided to go to the front, and he has probably now reached Tachienlu. He took three regiments (apparently infantry) of Lu-chün, besides artillery train, and probably some engineers. Cavalry would be quite unsuited for the mountainous nature of the country, traversed by narrow paths, liable to landslides, and often running between precipices. The Thibetans are reported (very probably untrue) to be assisted by Gurkhas, and the Chinese at present appear to have a strong feeling of distrust of the British, believing or pretending to believe that they are aiding the Thibetans. Perhaps for this reason they opposed my request for permission to go to Tachienlu.

The lu-chün of Szechuan have greatly deteriorated in the last two years, and are now, mostly, composed of immature youths, quite unsuited for the severities of a

Thibetan campaign. In addition, the lu-chün have not the fighting spirit of the old provincial troops (Hsun-fang-tui). The men of the latter are taken from the old soldier class, and only require training, discipline, and good treatment to make excellent soldiers—an opinion I first formed when attached to the Chinese regiment at Wei-hai Wei in 1899–1900. The lu-chün, on the other hand, are taken chiefly from the farmer and student class, and are devoid of any martial instincts. Chao-Erh-feng, killed by the republicans in December 1911, was one of the few capable military men China has produced in recent years, and as long as he was warden of the Marches with his well-trained provincial soldiers he kept the Thibetans in complete subjection; but as soon as his strong hand was removed, and his soldiers allowed to deteriorate, the Thibetans for once united amongst themselves and plucked up courage to turn upon their oppressors. Not having personally visited the frontier or seen the Thibetan army, it is difficult to gauge the situation, and much will depend on whether China is torn by further dissensions. A struggle between Chinese and Mohammedans in Kansu might give an opportunity for the Thibetans of the north to join the present revolt, and the eighteen tribes might also take part in the movement. Under normal conditions the Chinese with their old prestige of superiority, besides being better armed, trained, and probably numerically stronger, should be able to drive the Thibetans back beyond Bat'ang, and probably up to Garthok and Chiamdo, but I shall be surprised if their puerile warriors are able to stand the Arctic severities of inner Thibet, especially in the ensuing winter (by which time they may have reached the border), and I am therefore very sceptical about their capacity ever to recover Lhassa and the adjacent country.

Weakened as they are, and appear likely to remain for some years, by internal dissensions, their best line of policy would be to come to terms with the Thibetans and frankly recognize their independence.

GEORGE PEREIRA.

Chengtu Fu, August 3, 1912.

Enclosure 5 in No. 269.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Viceroy of India.

My Lord, *Chengtu, August* 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the Thibetan expeditionary force, its present position and plans; a military outbreak at Yachow is also noted.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 6 in No. 269.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

Sir, *Chengtu, August* 9, 1912.

MY correspondent at Tachienlu, writing on the 31st July, reports that Yün Ch'ang-heng ("tutu," or military governor, of Szechuan and commander-in-chief of the Thibetan expeditionary force) arrived there on the 29th, and "hopes to remain a month."

Two thousand Chinese troops are now at Ho-k'ou, on the left bank of the Yalung, while several hundreds are extended along the line of communications between Ho-k'ou and Tachienlu. General Chu Tun-wu with 1,000 men was to leave Tachienlu for Ho-k'ou in a few days.

The Thibetans were holding Ma-kai-chang, 30 *li* (some 10 miles) west of Ho-k'ou. It is a very strong position, capable of being held by a few hundred against an army, and it cannot be reached by artillery fire. (See "Hosie's Journey," pp. 34–35.)

The north road from Tachienlu to Chamdo is occupied in force by the Chinese up to Tao-wu (Dawo), which has been strongly reinforced. The Chinese have decided

on a flank movement from Dawo through the Chantui district to Litang, whence they will be able to take the enemy in the rear,

The Thibetans, Mr. Cunningham observes, have behaved outrageously, and are much in need of a severe lesson, which the energetic Yün tutu is likely to teach them. The present attitude of the Thibetan chiefs is the same as in the time of the late Chao Erh-feng.

None of the eastern tribes have joined the movement, whilst the King of Chala, who did revolt, has been replaced by a native headman.

(The "King of Chala" has, I have just learnt, returned to Tachienlu and made his submission to the Chinese.)

The "Kuomin Pao" of the 7th August publishes an urgent telegram, dated the 2nd August, sent (through Wa-ssu-kou, now telegraph head) by Yün, Ch'ang-heng to Ts'ai Nge, tutu of Yünnan, announcing his (Yün's) intention to advance in two columns, one through Ho-k'ou to reconnoitre Bat'ang and one along the North Road direct to Chamdo. When quiet has been somewhat restored in the marches he will proceed to invest Lhassa. So far the expeditionary force consists of—

Ten ying (battalions) of infantry.
One tui (company) of artillery.
One tui of engineers.

There still remain ten ying of the Fang-chün (the old garrison). (The present equations are, for all arms except cavalry, 1 ying = 4 tui = 12 p'eng = 504 men. This does not include officers and non-combatants.)

Chinese prestige, says the telegram, is high, and subjugation should be easy. Ts'ai tutu's plan of an advance (of the Yünnan contingent) through Lo-tsao is commended, and it is asked that Yün may be kept constantly informed by telegraph of its progress.

Huang Liu-ch'ing, former director of the Office for Frontier Arrangements, and now conciliator ("hsuan-wei-shih") for the Marches, arrived at Tachienlu on the 25th July. According to the "Kuomin Pao" of the 7th August the news he then received of conditions along the North Road was extremely grave, and he had ordered Ku Fu-ch'ing to retrieve the disgrace of his loss of Litang by hurrying from Ho-k'ou with the 11th battalion of the Hsun-fang (the fang chun of Yün's telegram) to the relief of Derge. Unfortunately the men under Ku's command are recruits of last year, chiefly disappointed gold-miners. "Their discipline is all to seek, and their insolence excessive."

Meanwhile, Haung was sending, since the South Road is blocked, a messenger round by Pai-yü (south of Derge) to Bat'ang to keep up the spirits of the beleaguered garrison.

On the 6th instant Dr. Humphreys, of the American Mission, telegraphed to say that some 500 men of the 14th Regiment ("piao"), which forms part of the 4th division, had mutinied, pillaged the city, and left by rafts down the river towards Chiating. The cause of trouble was, according to Dr. Humphreys, dissatisfaction at receiving payment in paper money and the low rates of exchange when converting that money into copper cash. The few foreigners at Yachow (himself and his wife and Père Gire) had not been molested.

An urgent telegram was sent the same day from the corporations ("fa-t'uan") of Yachow to the Provincial Assembly, stating that at 2 A.M. of the 6th there was a fusillade followed by rioting and arson. Men's lives are in danger, and Chengtu is implored to come to the rescue. The Assembly interrogated Hu Chingyi, acting tutu *ad interim*, and commander-in-chief of the forces in Szechuan proper. Hu replied that the disturbance was the work of a comparatively small body of soldiers. Some thirty of the rioters had been arrested, and he had telegraphed orders for their prompt execution, whereupon quiet had been restored.

The 2nd battalion of this same 14th regiment had shown itself insubordinate even in the presence of Yün tutu. The latter held a review at Yachow on the 18th July preparatory to night manœuvres. While the commander-in-chief was inspecting the troops. the men of the 2nd battalion began to stamp and call out for their supper. Yün tutu broke up the review and was for executing the ringleader. In the end he fined the whole battalion a month's pay, and entered a black mark against them. In strict accord with the best exemplars of Chinese authority, he also blacklisted himself, and mulcted his privy purse of a month's salary—100 dollars.

As far as I can ascertain, the 14th regiment forms part of the Thibetan expeditionary force, and is not merely stationed at Yachow in garrison. If any considerable portion of it remains disaffected, the conduct of the campaign may therefore be embarrassed, since Yachow is a most important stage in the lines of communication.

I take this opportunity to note that Liu Su-ch'eng, the Chinese aviator at Shanghai, has telegraphed to Yün tutu offering, should the President approve, to bring his aeroplane to the assistance of the expedition. Yün tutu telegraphed in hot haste, on the 1st instant, requesting Chang P'ei-chuo, assistant military governor, and Hu Ching-i to apply by telegram for the President's assent, and, that obtained, to expedite the transport of the aeroplane. The only comment I need make is that the col above Ma-kai-chung, the Thibetan first line of defence, is 15,000 feet above sea level, and that between it and Lhassa are a score of passes equally lofty, where icy gales blow perpetually.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

P.S. *August* 10.—I have just received from Dr. Humphreys a detailed account of the riot, confirming my suspicion that the chief actors were the men of the 2nd battalion of the 14th regiment. Of this account I have the honour to append a copy.
W. H. W.

Enclosure 7 in No. 269.

Dr. Humphreys to Consul-General Wilkinson.

My dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Yachow, August* 7, 1912.

THE telegram I sent you yesterday was not entirely accurate, but it was the best information at hand.

The story is as follows: At 3 A.M. on the 6th, we were awakened by the sound of shooting in a temple, the back of which is within 50 yards of our property. This was followed by shots in different parts of the city. We saw bands of soldiers, in mufti, marching past. Between 4 and 4·30 a fire was blazing on the main business street. It was at first reported that only a few hundred men had taken part. Less than 300 took rafts for Kiating. To-day it is said that practically the whole 14th "piao" took part. Hsiang, the officer in charge ("piao-chang") is freely alleged to have planned the affair. A number of companies were prevented by their officers from taking a hand in the business. One man, the officer in charge of the 2nd "ying" of the 14th "piao," caught red-handed, was executed.

It is also said that nearly all the men concerned were old soldiers of Chao Erh-feng's and most of them have not cut their queues. The man executed was one of his head gunners, and Hsiang is said to be an old T'ung-chih Hui man; you know this city stood out against this "hui" last year and was responsible for its downfall; there may be something more than the paper money trouble behind the affair.

Nineteen houses and shops were burnt down. Total loss, from fire and looting, estimated at 400,000 taels. Nine people were killed. The soldiers would not allow the people to take part in the looting, and this was responsible for some of the casualties. The fact that so few had left the city gave rise to the report that only a small number were implicated, but to-day a large number, burdened with loot, left for Tachienlu.

The city is now quiet and the rest of the "piao" leaves in a few days.

HUMPHREYS.

Enclosure 8 in No. 269.

Resident, Nepal, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Nepal, October* 8, 1912.

A STRONGLY worded remonstrance has been telegraphed by Prime Minister, Nepal, to Dalai Lama regarding action of Thibetans in firing on Chinese when Nepalese representatives were with them and, at the request of Thibetans, conducting negotiations.

Enclosure 9 in No. 269.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, October* 7, 1912.

MY confidential telegram of the 6th October. I received three letters yesterday from General Chung Yin, dated on or about the 28th September, in Thibetan, Chinese, and French. Chinese version, which cannot be translated here, has been posted to you in original. Translation of the Thibetan version and a copy of the French version have also been dispatched to you, Foreign Department, and Macdonald. Thibetan version is as follows :—

"1. I (Chung Yin) received on the 5th September orders from China appointing me to be changkir. I was therefore unable to carry out my previous intention of leaving Lhassa on the 9th September with the luchun. Thibetans, to whom my appointment to this post had been previously intimated, now say that it was a breach of the agreement for me to remain at Lhassa, and do not understand when I say that I must stay here in accordance with previous customs and tradition. Thibetans are moreover incapable of managing their country.

Second section.—"2. On prolonging the arrangements Thibetans suddenly attacked Chinese, who lost 100 killed and wounded, and set fire to and looted our property. Our lives are now in danger. Thibetans have thus violated treaty, which is accordingly null and void. Therefore Nepalese representative ought now to give back to us our rifles and our field guns, but I cannot communicate with him because he is detained by Thibetans. I intend to recall my troops who have left Lhassa and to recommence fighting properly.

"3. Will you therefore kindly deliver enclosed letter to Immocoalebau-i (probably Mr. B. Wood). Letter directs him to enquire from the Maharaja of Nepal how I should now act. Maharaja's advice will make it possible to expedite either departure from Thibet or the return to Lhassa of the luchun. Please forward to U (? Wood) if he has left Gyantse. I hope that my inability to order return of luchun to China will not displease British Government."

N.B.—Letter addressed to Mr. Wood has been forwarded to the British trade agent, Yatung, and I have desired him to await your instructions before delivering it. It will reach him afternoon, the 8th October.

Third Section.—French version of letter from Binge (?). This appears more confidential than the Thibetan version. Paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 closely resemble some places of latter, but thereafter it continues as follows :—

"Please explain to Mr. Ou (Wood) my letter, and request him to dispatch the three telegrams : one to Peking, suggesting that the Dalai Lama be ordered to adopt reasonable attitude; second to Peking, asking that the arrival of the relief force may be expedited; third to Maharaja of Nepal, asking whether the Chinese soldiers should leave Thibet. If Ou is not at Gyantse, will you please yourself act as I have asked him (?), C(hung) adding that he repents having participated in allowing his soldiers to leave Lhassa."

I propose to take no action in connection with the main course of the requests.

Fourth Section.—I also received letter yesterday from Lamenkempo, Dalai Lama's confidential adviser, dated the 4th October, translation of which has been posted to you, Yatung, and Foreign Department. It purport is as follows :—

"Chung refused to accompany departing luchun, on the pretext that he has been appointed amban; he has, moreover, retained many rifles, field guns, and Maxims, and also 300 good and 200 ordinary soldiers, whom he keeps in Tengyeling, yamên, and other places. Fighting has broken out as a result of these actions, which constitute breaches of the agreement. On the 24th September, Thibetans reconnoitred Tengyeling, but were repulsed on the 25th September. They attacked new Chinese barracks and yamên on the 26th September and lost forty men. Chinese lost thirty. On the 28th September, Thibetans made an indecisive night attack. Thibetans are now thoroughly incensed, but the Dalai Lama has given orders that Chung must not be killed."

"2. Len is still in Rong, where he is safe. We will provide him with transport, so that he may depart from Thibet as soon as Chinese leave Chumbi Valley. His Holiness will leave Samding on the 19th October for monastery, 2 miles north Chaksam, and will remain there for some days."

Letter ends with request that British Government will prevent dispatch of any Chinese troops to Thibet. I learn that Thibetan Government are intentionally preventing Len from proceeding to Chumbi Valley to join Chinese [following not repeated to resident in Nepal], and that Maharaja of Nepal has advised Delai Lama not to object to Chung remaining in Lhassa.

(Addressed political officer; repeated to Yatung and Foreign.)

Enclosure 10 in No. 269.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Sikkim, October* 8, 1912.

WITH reference to General Chung's letter, purport of which was given in trade Gyantse's confidential telegram of the 7th October, I will forward the Chinese version and translation of the Thibetan version as soon as they reach me.

2. There is no doubt that the Chinese have violated agreement concluded at Lhassa in many ways, while the Thibetans have observed it, and the latter are displaying great moderation in their dealings with Len Amban and the various batches of Chinese soldiers that have left Lhassa, though naturally incensed at these repeated breaches of faith.

3. In my opinion, trade agent, Yatung, should not deliver the letter to Mr. Wood, as this would conduce to preventing Chinese from crossing the frontier. The letter should be returned to General Chung, with the intimation that our neutral position prevents us delivering letters for him. It is no part of our duty as neutrals to transmit messages from one Chinese official to another. We have not performed such services for the Thibetans.

4. With reference to section 3 of trade agent's, Gyantse, telegram, I agree that he should reply to General Chung that he regrets that his neutral position precludes him from taking action asked for.

(Addressed to Foreign, Simla; repeated to Foreign with Viceroy, and trade agent, Gyantse and Yatung.)

Enclosure 11 in No. 269.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Sikkim, October* 9, 1912.

LETTERS have been received by trade agent at Gyantse and myself from Thibetan chief Ministers, under date the 30th September, giving details of the breaches of the recent agreement between the Chinese and Thibetans at Lhassa committed by the former. A translation of the letter has been submitted direct to you by the trade agent. Following are the breaches complained of:—

1. That the Chinese have again collected troops and occupied certain houses.

2. That although General Chung promised before the Nepalese to return to China, he now refuses to do so.

3. That Chinese have sold at Lhassa most of the things which were looted by them from the Thibetans and the Nepalese.

4. That in spite of their promise to surrender all arms, Chinese have kept all their pistols and bolts of all their rifles, and have hidden several rifles and have given to the Tangyeling monks field guns, Maxims, and rifles, to enable them to oppose the Thibetan Government.

5. That thirty Chinese soldiers entered into the house in which the arms were stored, with the intention of taking away the arms and ammunition.

6. That the Thibetans, though they asked through the Nepalese witness, to be allowed to examine the contents of 50 boxes deposited by Chinese, and alleged to contain ammunition, were refused permission.

7. That Chinese soldiers did not leave Lhassa till thirteen days after the date agreed upon.

In conclusion, Thibetans maintain that they have done their best to observe the agreement, while the Chinese have observed neither their written nor verbal promises. They ask that the British Government should enter into discussion with the Chinese, and endeavour to secure observance of the recent agreement, made in the presence of the Nepal representative, and enforce the immediate return to China of Len and Chung, with all the Chinese soldiers and officers.

[45900] No. 270.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 229.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, October* 30, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul at [?] Yünnan-fu, 29th October :—

"I learn that Yünnan contingent of 3,000 men now occupies Atuntsu, Yenching, Weisi, and Chung-tien, and that Tsai has ordered them not to enter Thibet, but merely to guard Yünnan frontier.

"(Sent to India.)"

[46156] No. 271.

Question asked in the House of Commons, October 30, 1912.

Sir J. D. Rees,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will state what is the position in Thibet as regards the practical maintenance of Chinese suzerainty.

Answer by the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. Harold Baker).

The present position appears to be that the ex-Amban Len is on his way from Lhassa to India, and that the Chinese Government have appointed the general officer commanding their troops at Lhassa to be amban in his place. The general, with a portion of his troops, has accordingly declined to leave Lhassa under the agreement recently concluded with the Thibetan Government whereby all Chinese officials and soldiers were to leave Thibet at once; and the Thibetans, regarding this refusal as a breach of the agreement, are holding him besieged in the Tengyeling Monastery.

[46510] No. 272.

Question asked in the House of Commons, October 30, 1912.

Sir Hildred Carlile,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the Chinese Government has forwarded any reply to the recent British memorandum regarding Thibet; and, if so, whether he will communicate its nature to the House.

Answer by Mr. Acland (for Sir E. Grey).

The answer is in the negative.

[45850] No. 273.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 24th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* giving his views upon the best means of giving practical effect, if this should become necessary, to the warning given to the Chinese Government that an advance into Thibet would bring them into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished with any observations which Lord Crewe may desire to offer upon Sir J. Jordan's suggestions.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[46282] No. 274.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 417.)

Sir, *Peking, October* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 379 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the Intelligence Report for the September quarter, compiled by the acting British consul-general at Chengtu, dealing with the progress of the Chinese expedition against Thibet.

In later despatches Mr. Louis King adds that, according to telegraphic information received from Yin Tutu, the northern force operating under General Liu recovered Chamdo on the 4th September, Draya on the 13th September, and O-lo-chiao (two days' march on the Lhassa road, west of Chamdo) on the 16th September.

Yin Tutu has established the pacific administration of the marches and Thibet, with head-quarters temporarily at Tachienlu, as from the 1st October.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 274.

Extract from Chengtu Intelligence Report for September Quarter.

Thibet.—The Expedition.

THE Thibetan struggle for independence commenced soon after the news of the revolution in China filtered through to Lhassa. Concerted action was, for once, taken by the Thibetans, and the various Chinese garrisons in Thibet found themselves cut off and besieged.

Towards the end of May the Thibetans began to carry the war into the enemy's country, and on the 15th June they captured Litang, which lies well within the Chinese territory known as the marches. At this date the fate of the Chinese garrisons at Lhassa, Chamdo, Draya, Gonjok, Gartok, and Batang was unknown; Litang, Kantze, and Yerkalo (Yenching) were in the hands of the rebels.

On the 4th July the Chinese, who had retreated across the Yalung to Hokou, checked the Thibetan advance at that place.

It began to dawn on the Szechuan Government that the matter was serious, and energetic measures were at once taken to put an army into the field. Yin, the military governor, started in person on the 10th July from Chengtu with a force of 4,000 men (infantry, artillery, and engineers), and reached Tachienlu on the 29th July.

Working from Tachienlu as his base, he sent out two columns, one 2,000 strong along the main road, and one about 1,000 strong along the north road.

* No. 266.

The military governor of Yünnan also sent out a column towards Batang, viâ Atuntze and Yerkalo. The Szechuan Government views this Yünnan contingent with extreme disfavour. It is considered that the settlement of the Thibetan affair belongs to this province alone. The proposal of the Vice-President Li, of Wuchang, to send 20,000 Hupei troops to Thibet, viâ Szechuan and Yünnan, raised a very strong protest from the Local Government. The officials and people of Szechuan view with consternation the prospect of 10,000 Hupei troops marching through their territory. The trouble of getting rid of the Yünnan troops last winter is still fresh in people's minds.

On the 3rd September, after continuous fighting, and after at one time being nearly overwhelmed in an ambush near Hsi-o-Lo, the main road force reached and recovered Litang.

On the 8th September Yin telegraphed that the north road had been cleared to Chamdo, and that the recovery of Draya and Gartok was merely a matter of a few days ; he further reported that the road to Batang was open. It is doubtful whether reliance can be placed on these reports. As far as can be judged, the present position is this : The main body of the expedition is at Tachienlu with Yin ; the column operating on the main road is in Litang ; of the column operating on the north road information is very unreliable. This column was originally sent to make a flank movement viâ Dawo on to the Thibetan position at Makaichung. Yin states it remained on the north road, and has reached Chamdo. It is, however, not unlikely that the two columns joined forces at Makaichung as originally intended, and marched on Litang together. It is difficult to say whether the north road is open farther than Kantze. The Yünnan contingent is apparently between Yerkalo and Batang.

Though the Chinese have reached Litang, the country off the main road between Litang and Tachienlu is by no means resubjugated. The Thibetans are assembling in force in the Hsiang Ch'eng district.

The winter is coming on rapidly and will put an end to the expedition, which has achieved very little beyond impressing upon the Thibetans that the Chinese are not so much occupied with their internal affairs as to be unable to attend to their dependencies.

The Proposed New Province.

The attempt of the Thibetans to throw off the Chinese suzerainty has brought home to the Szechuan and Peking Governments the unsatisfactory nature of their administration of this great dependency.

Thibet proper has always been governed by the various lamas, some of them independent, but the majority directly responsible to the lamas at Lhassa, who are themselves answerable in a way to the Chinese resident there. The country known as the marches, which extends from Tachienlu to Batang, and which forms a buffer district between Szechuan and Thibet proper, is administered by native chieftains directly responsible to the various Chinese officials stationed at Batang, Litang, Tachienlu, &c.

The Thibetan-Chinese frontier is entirely undefined. The boundaries of the marches are vague in the extreme. The Government of Szechuan intends to alter this. It is proposed to form out of the marches and Eastern Thibet a new province, called Hsi-Kang, which shall extend east and west from Tachienlu to Lali, and north and south from Kokonor to Yünnan and Burmah. This province is to be administered from Chamdo by a pacificator, a title which is practically equivalent to governor and commander-in-chief ; the province is to consist of the marches and the vague districts of Tachienlu, Batang, Litang, Chamdo, Derge, Shihbado, Tanta, and Lali. In practice, this means that the military administrators will be stationed at each of these places, and they will endeavour to make as many chiefs as they can reach own allegiance to them.

If this project is carried out—and the official seals for the pacificator and the administrators are now being made here—it will mean an effective occupation by the Chinese of the marches and of more than half of Thibet.

It would appear extremely improbable that the Chinese will be capable of putting into effective operation a scheme such as this ; still, China is the land of surprises.

[46307] No. 275.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st October, 1912, regarding the Chinese soldiers from Thibet.

India Office, November 1, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 275.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 31, 1912.

THIBET. See my telegram of the 17th instant. The departure from Calcutta of the first batch of Chinese troops, numbering 370, in the steam-ship "Japan" took place on the 18th October; they are due at Wu Sung about the 5th November. On the 1st November a second batch, numbering 468, leaves Calcutta in the steam-ship "Nam," which is due about the 18th November at Wu Sung.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[46224] No. 276.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 231.)

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, November* 1, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Chengtu:—

"My despatches Nos. 29 and 30.

"To-day's newspaper announces that Tsayu has been made into a district, and that magistrate has taken up his duties."

"Tsayu" is the Chinese name for Zayul.

(Sent to India.)

[46224] No. 277.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 4, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* reporting that Zayul, in Eastern Thibet, has been formed into a Chinese district and that a Chinese magistrate has taken up his duties there.

Sir E. Grey is not aware that the Government at Lhassa have ever exercised any authority over the region of Zayul, and he is, therefore, doubtful whether the step now taken by the Chinese Government can be regarded as a serious encroachment on Thibetan territory. He would, however, be glad to receive any observations on the report which the Marquess of Crewe may desire to offer.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

* No. 276.

[46574] No. 278.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 232.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, November 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 218 of 22nd October.

Conflict with 3,000 Thibetans, 40 miles west of Litang, has resulted in a reverse for southern column.

(Sent to India.)

[47178] No. 279.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 422.)
Sir, *Peking, October 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 417 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches from the acting British consul-general at Chengtu, reporting the proposal to form a new province out of the Marches and the eastern portion of the Thibetan province of Kham.

The new province seems roughly to comprise the area subjugated by Chao Erh-feng under the late régime, and so long as the republic confines itself to the demarcation of the Marches laid down by Chao, there would appear to be no legitimate ground for protest on our part. But any attempt to extend Chinese jurisdiction beyond those limits would, I submit, constitute a disturbance of the *status quo* and justify such action as we might consider necessary to uphold the principles contained in our memorandum of the 17th August last.

Mr. King thinks it unlikely that the scheme will ever materialise, but it has at all events reached a stage which makes it necessary that we should scrutinise subsequent developments very closely.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 279.

Acting Consul-General King to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Chengtu, September 17, 1912.*

THE project for converting the Marches and a portion of Thibet into a new Chinese province seems to be gradually taking more definite shape.

Yin, the military governor of Szechuan, at present at Tachienlu in command of the Thibetan expedition, telegraphed on the 10th September to the Provincial Government at Chengtu, calling for the immediate casting of a gold seal to bear the words: "The Seal of the Resident Pacificator of the Marches and Thibet." He further ordered eight lesser seals for the following prefectures he proposes to establish :—

K'ang Ting-fu,	formerly	Tachienlu.
Li Hua-fu,	,,	Litang.
Pa An-fu,	,,	Batang.
Ch'ang Tu-fu,	,,	Chamdo.
Teng K'o-fu,	,,	Derge.
Shih Tu-fu,	,,	Shihbado.
T'ai Chao-fu,	,,	Tanta.
Chia Li-fu,	,,	Lali.

Yin proposes that the pacificator shall reside at Chamdo, which thus becomes the capital of the new province, which is to be named Hsi-Kang, and is to be composed of the above prefectures.

I have the honour to enclose a rough sketch-map to show the approximate position of the new province.*

This picturesque scheme is palpably put forward by the military governor for the purpose of securing the attention and the good-will of the Szechuanese; there is no reason to believe that it will ever materialise.

I have, &c.
LOUIS KING.

Enclosure 2 in No. 279.

Acting Consul-General King to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 86.)

Sir, *Chengtu, October* 5, 1912.

YUAN SHIH-KAI has sent telegraphic instructions under date of the 1st October to the civil and military governors of Szechuan, Chang, and Yin on the subject of the new province scheme, which I reported in my despatch No. 82.

The President considers that the Marches extend to and include the Chamdo district, and approves of Shihbado (map in No. 82) being made a prefecture, as he maintains that it is in this district.

As for Lali and Chiang Ta (west of Lali, on the Lhassa road), he is of the opinion that the marking out of the Szechuan–Thibetan frontier must precede and decide whether they are in Szechuan or in Thibet. Therefore he gives orders that the officials it is proposed to send to these two places should have the same status of commissariat officers as their predecessors of Chao Erh-feng's days.

It would seem that Chao's demarcation of the Marches is upheld by the republic.

The Marches, as shown by the old maps, extend scarcely further than Batang. To extend them to Chamdo would seem to be an encroachment on Thibetan territory. By no possible contention can they be made to include Tan Ta, Lali, and Chiang Ta.

I have, &c.
LOUIS KING.

[47086] No. 280.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd November, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, November 5, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 280.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 2, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to the telegram of the 29th October, No. 227, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

In view of the information that instructions have been given to both the Yünnan

* Not reproduced.

and the Szechuan expeditions that Thibet proper is not to be entered, it may be unnecessary for us to take further action. Your reply, however, to my telegram of the 23rd October is awaited; I shall also be glad of any remarks you may have to offer upon the present suggestions of Minister at Peking. With reference to my telegram of 3rd ultimo, please telegraph also when the road is likely to reach Menilkrai and what is actually being done in the Mishmi country.

[47088] No. 281.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th November, 1912, regarding the Chinese repatriated from Thibet.

India Office, November 5, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 281.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912*

THIBET.

My telegram of 31st October.

Strength of batch which left in "Namsingh" is 436 officers and men and 24 women and children. Due at Shanghai about 25th November next, and not 18th, as already reported.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[47090] No. 282.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th November, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, November 5, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 282.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November 5, 1912.*

IN continuation of my telegram of 25th October. According to a telegram dispatched on 23rd October by the trade agent at Gyantse, fighting was still taking place at Lhassa, and the Shito monastery near Jokung had been burned by the Chinese.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[47579] No. 283.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams dated the 5th and 7th November, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, November 8, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 283.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November 5, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to the telegram of the 1st November from His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Is it your opinion that His Majesty's Government could object now to the conversion of Zayal into a Chinese civil district as constituting a serious encroachment upon the territory of Thibet? From the report by Captain Bailey, I am led to suppose that when he was there conversion was practically an accomplished fact. I am awaiting your proposals as to the site for a post near Menilkrai; would this be the moment for endeavouring to obtain a suitable one?

Enclosure 2 in No. 283.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November 7, 1912.*

THIBET.

Please refer to your telegram of the 23rd ultimo.

Since my telegram of the 23rd March, the question has undergone considerable development. It appears evident (1) that to effect a settlement of the Thibet question the conditions upon which the new Chinese Government is to be recognised will not be sufficient; and (2) that, although by reason of winter, there may at present be a temporary suspension of the Chinese advance into Thibet, it is certain that it will be pushed forward next spring unless threats of a very vigorous nature are employed by us. The threat that is best calculated to prove effective is that in the event of an entry by China into Thibet, the agreement we have made with the former on the subject of Thibet will cease to hold good, and we will actively assist the opposition of that country to China's advance and in the establishment and maintenance of the independence of Thibet. Moreover, we will, in accordance with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian convention, invite Russian assistance in the form of joint action.

It is impossible for me to resist the conclusion that threats of this nature would prove to be effective with China, and would also tend to remove what, to judge from M. Sazonof's conversations appears, so far as Thibet is concerned, to amount to an *impasse* between Russia and ourselves.

[48167] No. 284.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of two enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 24th October, 1912, relative to Thibet.

India Office, November 11, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

Gyantse, October 6, 1912.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to forward the following documents :—

(*a*.) Letter from General Chung Yin, Chinese general officer commanding at Lhassa, dated the 28th September, 1912, addressed to myself in Thibetan, French, and Chinese :—

(1.) Translation of the Thibetan version of the letter.
(2.) Copy of French version.

The Chinese version is being forwarded in original to the political officer in Sikkim.

(*b*.) Translation of a letter, dated the 4th October, 1912, from Lamen Kempo, confidential adviser to the Dalai Lama, addressed to Mr. Laden La.

2. Copies of (*a*) (1) and (2) and of (*b*) are being forwarded to the political officer in Sikkim and to the British trade agent, Yatung.

Enclosure 2 in No. 284.

Chinese General Officer Commanding, Lhassa, to British Trade Agent, Gyantse.

[Not dated.]

(Translation.)

YOUR kind letter reached me on the 28th September. I am very glad to be informed of the kindly thought shown by the (British) Government for the other (Chinese) Government. It is not known to the people of the outside country what troubles we have had recently at Lhassa, so I am compelled to inform you of the recent course of affairs. During the time of fighting between the Chinese and Thibetans the Nepalese Government especially deputed their officers to Lhassa to negotiate. The late Amban Len and I feel pity for the ignorant Thibetans, who do not understand the necessary consequence of their actions and who have suffered such severe troubles; hence we came to terms with the enemies (Thibetans) and made peace. We were under the honest impression that the peace was made with their (Thibetans') honest intention, and therefore surrendered the arms and withdrew the (Chinese) troops.

At that time I was a "tungling" (general), and therefore it was finally decided that I should leave Lhassa with the last batch of the Chinese "luchun" (troops) on the 9th September; but on the 5th September I received orders from Da-Tsung-Tung (Chinese Central Government) appointing me Chang-Kwan of Thibet, to manage the usual work here. It can be seen from the records (that the Thibetans) had already received intimation about my appointment beforehand. Len, Minister, has already made over charge of his office and seal to me, so I, Chang-Kwan, must manage the

usual work of Thibet. It is known to you that the Thibetans cannot independently manage their country. The Thibetans have strongly urged me to leave Lhassa, as they say I have violated the agreement by staying in Thibet. I explained to them the previous customs and rules, but they do not understand me, and, moreover, they do not respect me.

On the 24th September, at sheep time (evening), the Thibetans unexpectedly attacked the Chinese, who were not at all prepared to defend themselves, and in the fight 100 Chinese were killed or wounded. They (Thibetans) destroyed by fire and dismantled four houses, the Chinese temples, and the Li-si-kwom office. They also looted innumerable properties (belonging to the Chinese). They persuaded by deceitful means the Nepalese officer, who was a witness, and the Thibetans would not listen to any advice. They urged me to leave the country day and night, and fired their guns like thunder. They are putting our lives in danger. We never thought that the Thibetans would do such an act after we had surrendered our "luchun" (soldiers) and arms. Now the agreement is void, as the Thibetans have violated it. This being so, the witness ought to return back our arms and field-guns complete. Although I intend to call back all the troops and recommence fighting properly with the Thibetans, the Thibetans will not allow the witness to see me. I cannot, therefore, discuss matters with him. Therefore I am sending you this letter. Will you kindly deliver it to U-Bau-I, the Chinese official? After seeing the letter he will send a telegram to Tung Yang Tinpu recommending that the Dalai Lama be ordered not to do such evil deeds, and requesting that (the march of) the troops who are on their way to Thibet may be expedited. He (U-Bau-I) should also send a telegram to the Nepal maharajah asking him how I shall act in this matter now, and he will thus facilitate the departure of "luchuns" from Thibet or their return to Lhassa. It is very difficult for me to order the return of the officers and soldiers to China at present, and I trust that your Government will not be annoyed. If U-Bau-I is not at Gyantse, please send this letter on to India. As your Government is on good terms with us I hope you will kindly forward it without detaining it, as it is an urgent letter. I feel sure that the letter will not be lost by you.

Submitted by Chang-Kwan Chung Yin with compliments. Further, as most of our English Thibetan-knowing men have been killed by Thibetans, I am writing to you in three languages—Chinese, French, and Thibetan. Kindly treat the Chinese letter as correct, and if you do not understand it, please ask U-Bau-I to translate it. Kindly know this.

(Seal of Chung Yin.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 284.

Chinese General Officer Commanding, Lhassa, to British Trade Agent, Gyantse.

M. le Directeur, *Thibet, le 28 septembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre aimable lettre le 28 du mois courant, tout le monde ignore la condition du Thibet de ces derniers temps. Permettez moi de vous en donner quelques détails, la paix s'établie entre les Chinois et les Thibétains par l'entremise du délégué envoyé par le Roi de Kourka, son Excellence Mr. Lien et moi nous voyons l'ignorance des Thibétains est bien digne de pitié, je me donne alors beaucoup de peine pour montrer une preuve sincère d'établir la paix, d'évacuer les soldats et de conserver les fusils, dans ce moment j'étais à la place du commandant je comptais partir le 9 septembre avec mes soldats, je n'attendais de recevoir l'ordre de notre Président le 5 septembre dans lequel il m'a nommé résident à Thibet, son Excellence Mr. Lien a quitté sa place et moi qui le remplace, je n'ose pas quitter le Thibet sans l'ordre, les Thibétains prennent ce prétexte pour refuser le traité et m'accusent de violer le traité, ils m'excitent plusieurs fois de partir, en profitant que les Chinois n'ont aucune préparations ils tirent des canons et des fusils contre nous, juste dans un délai que la paix a eu lieu, ils ont tué les Chinois au nombre d'une centaine, et brûlent trois temples, un bureau de Lichefou, ils attaquent des Chinois d'une richesse innombrable. Il est évident qu'ils méprisent le traité, par tromperie ils gardent l'entermédiaire chez eux, à présent ils nous attaquent jour et nuit avec tout leurs efforts, le bruit de canons et de fusils comme des tonnaires, je suis dans une situation dangereuse, je ne m'attend pas de cette condition barbare lorsque nos soldats sont partis et que nos fusils et nos

canons sont donnés. Je décide de reprendre mes fusils donnés en garde, et de faire venir mes soldats, je ne puis pas déclarer ma idée à personne parceque l'enter-médiaire est gardé chez eux, je vous prie de faire lire ma lettre à Mr. Ou et lui dire d'envoyer le plutôt possible un télégramme à Pékin pour ordonner le Talai de ne pas se conduire si stupite, et un autre télégramme de faire venir les soldats envoyés comme secours, un troisième télégramme demander une décision au Roi de Kourka: "Les soldats chinois, partiront-ils ou rentront-ils?" Maintenant je regrette beaucoup de faire partir mes soldats, je n'ai pas moyen de les exciter de partir. Si Mr. Ou n'est pas à Kinze, M. le directeur, je vous prie de faire ce que je prie de Mr. Ou.

Veuillez, &c.

(Seal of Chung Yin.)

N.B.—Mr. Ou = Mr. "B. Wood" (probably).
Kinze = Gyantse.
Bureau de Lichefou = ?

The punctuation, &c., of the above letter is exactly in accordance with the original.

B. J. GOULD,
British Trade Agent, Gyantse.

October 6, 1912.

Enclosure 4 in No. 284.

Lamen Kempo, Doctor, Professor, and Confidential Adviser to the Dalai Lama.

(Translation.) *October* 4, 1912.

To the all-knowing Depon Mr. Laden La:

MANY thanks for your kind letter, dated the 21st of the 8th month (2nd October, 1912), and for the newspaper, which reached me safely. I intended to send you the news of Lhassa, but no reliable reports were received from there, hence the delay. As regards the fighting at Lhassa from the 13th (24th September, 1912) to the 18th (29th September, 1912), it was decided in the recent agreement that Chung being the general of the "luchun" (soldiers) should return to China with all the Chinese officers and soldiers, but Chung says that he has been appointed Amban of Thibet by the Republic Government and is staying in Lhassa. He did not deliver all the arms according to the agreement, but retained for himself all the best arms, two or three Maxim guns, and some of the best field guns. Instead of sending back all the soldiers, he retained 300 strong soldiers and 200 ordinary soldiers, and kept them in Tengyeling monastery, the yamên, and other strong houses, and equipped them with arms He did not observe his verbal promise, nor the written agreement, and acted unlawfully. Therefore, on the 13th (24th September, 1912), the Thibetan soldiers by force entered Tengyeling to see whether there were Chinese soldiers and arms there, and when they (Thibetan soldiers) reached the courtyard the Tengyeling monks and Chinese soldiers threw stones at them and then they retaliated. After a small fight the Thibetan soldiers bolted back to their camp, and, as they were retiring, the Chinese fired two or three times and killed three Thibetan soldiers. Nothing more happened that day.

On the 14th and 15th (25th and 26th September, 1912), they (Thibetans) stopped traffic in the southern section of the city and fought with the Chinese at the yamên, at the new Chinese barracks, and at a house called Nor-dzin ga-tsal, and both sides burnt many houses. The Chinese lost about thirty and the Thibetans lost about forty men in these engagements.

On the 17th (28th September, 1912), the Thibetans attacked the Chinese during the night. The Chinese fired their three Maxim guns from Tengyeling and the yamên. The casualties on both sides were not much, although fighting continued until midnight.

Chung says in his letter that he will not, in any circumstances, return to China, and unjustly blames the Thibetans for violating the agreement. He said he would not return to China even if death were the alternative. On hearing this, all the people of Thibet got very angry, and we do not know what will happen. It is the fault of the Chinese and the monks of Tengyeling for their excesses. When the Chinese

were defeated and asked for protection, His Holiness the Dalai Lama felt pity on them and made an agreement in three articles, but they violated the agreement. Although the Chinese have gone against the orders of the Dalai Lama, yet the Thibetans carefully refrained from retaliating, for they were afraid lest His Holiness might get angry. Now he (Chung) is not going back to China. In his letter he blamed His Holiness, and says that both the British and Russians wanted to take possession of Thibet, but at the time the Chinese helped the Thibetans and saved them.

The cause of the present friction is Chung himself, who is the general of the "luchun" (troops), and this fact is known by all the Thibetans, and they have decided to take final action even if it takes a long time to do so. For this reason there has been fighting between the Thibetans and Chinese, but both parties are equal so far.

I hope your messenger will explain everything to you fully.

Len Amban is still at Rong. The Thibetans provided him with necessary supplies and he is quite quiet there. After the departure of the Chinese troops from Tromo (Chumbi Valley), he will be provided with the necessary transport when it returns from Chumbi Valley and he will leave Rong.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama will leave Samding on the 29th (9th October, 1912) and will halt for a few days at Chokor Yangtse (monastery), 2 miles north of Chaksam ferry. His Holiness and the Ministers have been using their influence with the Thibetan people, in order to send them (the Chinese) back. They have also ordered their people to see that Chung is not killed. Chung does not keep to his promise for a day, and is as if some evil spirits had entered his mind. So it is difficult to say what will happen. I shall let you know the news as soon as received. Will you very kindly report these matters to the British Government as usual, and request them to see that, according to the promise made by the Chinese, no Chinese troops come into Thibet. Should the British Government discuss the matter again with the Chinese to prevent their troops coming into Thibet, it will be a great benefit in future both to the British and to the Thibetans. Will you kindly remember this. With a scarf of greeting on the 23rd of the 8th month (4th October, 1912).

(Seal of Lamen Kempo.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 284.

Officiating Resident in Nepal to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Nepal, October* 9, 1912.

IN continuation of correspondence ending with my letter No. 123, dated the 6th October, 1912, on the subject of affairs in Thibet, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Prime Minister of Nepal, in which his Excellency describes an interview between Major Jit Bahadur, who, as the Government know, is on his way back to Nepal, and the Dalai Lama's Ministers at the Samding monastery.

2. With regard to the concluding remark in the Prime Minister's letter, I would enquire whether there is any communication that Government would wish me to make to him on the subject of the alleged proposal to locate a British representative at Lhassa.

3. The Prime Minister further informs me in another letter that he learns from a belated telegram from Lieutenant Lal Bahadur, dated Lhassa, the 26th September, that the recent fighting there began at 2 P.M. on the 24th September. Some Thibetans seem to have struck and injured one or two Chinese, who retaliated, and fighting became general. The Thibetans, from the Kazis of the Kasyal downwards, are, it is stated, unanimous in their resolve to either expel General Tung Thonlin from Lhassa or kill him.

Enclosure 6 in No. 284.

Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal to Officiating Resident in Nepal.

October 8, 1912.

I HAVE heard that Major Jit Bahadur, while passing through Nagartse on his way back from Lhassa, gave a call at the Samding monastery to see the Dalia Lama there. You will be interested to hear that, in the interview which he had on that

occasion with the Bara Kazis Sathay and Sokhang, the latter, after giving a summary of the course of events which led to the recent troubles in Thibet, spoke bitterly against the conduct of the Chinese in connection with the line of policy followed by them with a view to bring the country completely under subjugation in spite of the avowals they had made to the contrary, and the acts of sacrilege committed by them in Eastern Thibet, as well as the troubles given by them on various occasions. The Kazis were loud in their praise of the high-souled magnanimity of the British Government which had given them an asylum and treated them with every consideration, contrary to what they had expected in view of the strained relation which they had not very long ago with that Government. Referring to the question of the stay of Tung Thonlin at Lhassa as the Amban, about which they had just then received an intimation, they went on complaining against the infringement by the Chinese of the terms of the agreement recently come to in Lhassa, and expressed a determination to oppose to the last any such wanton transgression on the part of the Chinese. The British, they said, would have come forward to back the Thibetans in the matter, but were precluded from doing so by their own treaties, which they were faithfully observing. Still they have been giving all possible assistance to them, and would do so in the future too. The Kazis also expressed a strong hope that Nepal too would back them, and talked of the establishment of a British representative in Thibet. From the manner in which they talked on the last subject, Major Jit Bahadur seems to have got an impression that a proposal on the subject has been made by the British authorities to them. But I am not inclined to take it as correct, as I would surely have heard from you if it were so.

Enclosure 7 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, October* 14, 1912.

BRITISH trade agent, Yatung, has returned to me the letter addressed by General Chung to U-Bau-I, *vide* paragraph 3 of my telegram of the 17th October. Shall I return it to General Chung? *Vide* paragraph 3 your telegram of the 8th October.

(Addressed to political officer, Sikkim; repeated to Foreign.)

Enclosure 8 in No. 284.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Sikkim, October* 14, 1912.

TELEGRAM of the 14th October from Trade, Gyantse.

Orders are solicited regarding letter from General Chung.

(Repeated Foreign with Viceroy.)

Enclosure 9 in No. 284.

Government of India to Political Officer, Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of the 8th, 9th, and 14th October.

Please instruct trade agent, Gyantse, to politely return General Chung's letter, and to inform him that, owing to his position as a neutral, he cannot send it or the telegrams.

No answers should be sent at present to the letters from the Dalai Lama's Ministers to trade agent and yourself.

(Repeated to British trade agent at Gyantse.)

Enclosure 10 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, October* 17, 1912.

LETTER from the Thibetan National Assembly to his Excellency the Viceroy, with a covering letter for you, has been delivered to me. I will open and translate it unless orders to the contrary reach me by the 17th October, 6 P.M.

(Addressed political officer; repeated Foreign Office, Simla.)

Enclosure 11 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, October* 19, 1912.

WRITING on the 14th October, Chief Ministers state that stout resistance of Chinese remnant in Lhassa lends colour to rumour that Chinese force is advancing from Kham side.

Paragraph 2.—Ministers also forward a letter addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 1st October, which is sealed by National Assembly and by Ganden Sera and Drepung monasteries. The letter from Assembly after a recital of acts of aggression on part of Chinese concludes by stating that the Thibetan authorities have decided to separate entirely from China. They, therefore, request that British Government, in whom alone they rely, will be pleased to ensure that all Chinese officials and troops shall withdraw from Thibet, to send to Lhassa a British representative, and to aid Thibet in securing her autonomy for the future.

Paragraph 3.—Of both the letters, I am sending original to you, and translations of both to Foreign Secretary with Viceroy, and to Foreign Department of the Government of India.

Paragraph 4.—Haji Ghulam Muhammad reports that at Lhassa fighting was proceeding up to the 10th October, decided advantages do not appear to have been gained by either side.

(Addressed to political officer. Repeated to Foreign, Simla, and Foreign with Viceroy.)

Enclosure 12 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Yatung, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Yatung, October* 20, 1912.

I HAVE received information that Dorjieff left Lhassa about a month ago for Mongolia. Fighting at Lhassa still continues. Chinese have looted and burnt several houses at Chamdo in Eastern Thibet and killed several monks.

(Addressed political officer in Sikkim. Repeated to trade agent, Gyantse, Foreign and Foreign with Viceroy.)

Enclosure 13 in No. 284.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gyantse, October* 16, 1912.

MESSENGER with cypher message from Chinese Government to Chung contained in your telegram of the 15th October, started from here this morning. 18th October is probable date of his arrival at Lhassa.

(Addressed to Foreign; repeated to political officer, Sikkim.)

Enclosure 14 in No. 284.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Sikkim, October* 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram, dated 15th, received to-day (16th), regarding disposal of Thibetans who are unwilling to proceed to China. When I met Willoughby at Gnatong on the 13th ultimo, I informed him that these Thibetans would be unwilling to go to China. I think that they should be allowed to remain in British territory. After Thibet mission of 1904, we had similar influx into Darjeeling district and Sikkim of Thibetans, who, having helped us, feared anger of their countrymen. It is probable that most of them will return to Thibet later on, when the present feeling there against them subsides.

(Addressed Foreign, Simla; repeated Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's camp.)

Enclosure 15 in No. 284.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Sikkim, October* 16, 1912.

LAST batch of Chinese crossed Sikkim-Darjeeling border to-day (16th). I am now discharging Sikkim transport.

(Addressed Foreign, Simla; repeated Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's camp.)

Enclosure 16 in No. 284.

Government of India to Political Officer, Sikkim.

(Telegraphic.) *October* 17, 1912.

MY telegram of the 15th October.

Thibetans who are unwilling to proceed China may be allowed to remain in British territory.

(Addressed Colonel Willoughby; repeated political officer, Sikkim, Foreign with Viceroy and Chief Secretary, Bengal.)

Enclosure 17 in No. 284.

Administrative Staff Officer of the Brigade, Calcutta, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, October* 17, 1912.

FIRST batch Chinese embarked this morning on steam-ship "Japan." All correct. "Japan" sails to-morrow early. Needham proceeds Simla.

(Addressed station staff officer, Darjeeling; deputy commissioner and Foreign; repeated Willoughby.)

[48911] No. 285.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 16, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to the letter from the India Office of the 15th August, and telegram from the Viceroy of India of the 7th November.

An opportunity of negotiating a revision of our Thibetan arrangement with Russia would seem to be presented by the conclusion of the recent Russo-Mongolian Agreement, which has caused much perturbation in China.

Chinese Turkestan, however, should be treated as an entirely separate question. It is a settled Province of China and all the odium attaching to a policy of dismemberment could not fail to react unfavourably upon our other interests in China were we associated in any way with Russia in its alienation.

I share the view expressed by the Viceroy that we should be justified in opposing any Chinese advance into Thibet, and I am of opinion that the threat suggested would probably prove effective; but I deprecate inviting the co-operation of Russia as attaching undue importance to her interests in Thibet. By the arrangement of 1907, Russia recognised our special interest in the maintenance of the Thibetan *status quo*, and can therefore not object to such measures as may become necessary to uphold it.

There seems a chance that China may endeavour to replace the Russo-Mongolian Agreement by a direct agreement between herself and Russia, recognising her suzerainty. Should this occur, we might with reason claim the freedom to enter upon a similar arrangement with China, on the basis of the memorandum of the 17th August last, with regard to Thibet.

[48999] No. 286.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 424.)

Sir, *Peking, October* 28, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 422 of the 23rd October, I have the honour to enclose copies of two despatches from the acting British consul-general at Chengtu,* in which some distrust is expressed in regard to the reported successes of the expeditionary force entrusted with the task of reasserting Chinese control in the Thibetan marches. Mr. King is of opinion that the force has done little fighting, but that it is acting in a conciliatory manner towards the tribal princes, and has re-established the Chinese position at least as far west as Litang.

Subsequent telegrams from Chengtu, dated the 22nd and 23rd October, appear to indicate a greater confidence in the optimistic bulletins published by the Chinese commanders, and report the reopening to caravans of the northern and southern roads as far west as Chamdo and Batang, both of which are believed to have been recaptured by the Chinese. From these apparently conflicting reports it is not easy to judge of the exact position on the Thibetan border, but it appears to be not unlikely that the garrisons established at Chamdo, Batang, and Derge by Chao Ehr-feng may have been enabled to reassert themselves in consequence of the advance of the relieving force, and that the Thibetans may actually have made terms with them at the big centres rather than face the prospect of a heavy retribution on the arrival of superior forces. Such a position would be entirely consistent with the history of Chinese advances into the tribal region, where prestige and diplomacy have seldom failed to establish the Chinese power more effectively than force of arms.

The return of two battalions of troops in the direction of Chengtu, consequent on the setting in of winter, may indicate an abatement of activity during the cold weather, but a report that the commander-in-chief had proceeded westward on the 26th October at the instigation of the Central Government appears to show that they have no intention of abandoning the campaign, and that its movements are still well under control from Peking.

It will be remembered that the Chinese have once accomplished the military feat of transporting a force of 1,000 men from Szechuan to Lhassa during the coldest months of the year, and, if the more recent reports from the expeditionary force should prove to be correct, it may be necessary to contemplate the possibility of a similar march during the coming winter.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

* Not printed.

[49006] No. 287.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 432.)

Sir, *Peking, October 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 424 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to enclose an extract from the "Gazette" of the 27th October appointing Mr. Fu Shih-yen a "commissioner for investigation" in Thibet. Mr. Fu is referred to as a graduate of the Academy of Frontier Affairs and, in addition to a knowledge of the Thibetan language, he has volunteered to pay the expenses of his journey. He is directed to select a number of suitable travelling companions and to conduct his investigations in a conciliatory spirit.

I am requesting the acting British consul-general at Chengtu to keep in touch with the movements of Mr. Fu so far as may be possible, and to report to me the direction of his journey.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 287.

Commission issued by "Department for Mongolia and Thibet" to Fu Shih-yen.

(Translation.)

MR. FU SHIH-YEN, a graduate of the Academy of Frontier Affairs, has made known to us his desire to find companions similarly minded to himself and proceed at his own expense into the heart of Thibet on a mission of investigation. Thibet is a secluded territory on our western frontier; it is regarded as a mysterious land, and up to the present it has been difficult to get information respecting it. Naturally at this time, when the country is in the throes of an armed insurrection, it is less easy than ever to bring to light the hidden ways of the natives.

This department has general control of all frontier affairs, and the advancement of prosperity and the removal of abuses in the borders are its special concern. It is highly important that efficient officers should be dispatched to make personal observations on the spot, so as to afford a basis for future calculations, and as the graduate in question has studied Thibetan affairs for some years, and knows both the written and spoken languages, this department is of opinion that his request to be allowed to proceed to Thibet at his own expense on a mission of investigation—a request which shows a most laudable zeal—should be sanctioned, and that he should be appointed commissioner for investigation in Thibet.

We have instructed the Tutu of Szechuan and the Commissioner for the Pacification of the Szechuan Marches to give orders to their subordinates to afford him every protection; we have further issued him a passport, and we hereby formally commission the aforesaid Fu Shih-yen. He should choose companions like-minded with himself and proceed throughout Thibet making a thorough investigation on every kind of question. He should pay special attention to any distress or trouble he may find among the natives of the frontier, and should furnish reports to this department as occasion may require that the latter may take counsel thereon. He must treat frontier questions sympathetically and devote himself whole-heartedly to his enquiries, so as to comply with the terms of this commission.

[49010] No. 288.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 437.)

Sir, *Peking, November 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a presidential order published in the "Gazette" of the 28th October, by which the titles of the Dalai Lama are formally restored to him, ostensibly in response to a loyal petition from the Thibetan dignitary. This concession on the part of Yuan Shih-kai is the most definite step of a conciliatory

nature which has marked the Chinese attitude in regard to recent events in Thibet, and it may be evidence of a new phase in the development of a campaign, the pursuit of which is entailing some anxiety and embarrassment for the Chinese.

The progress of Chinese ambitions in the marches and in Thibet proper is to some extent influenced by distinct and even conflicting factors; the administration of the former is traditionally a matter for the frontier provinces of Szechuan and Yünnan; the latter has always formed part of a scheme of Imperial aggrandisement, and as such it falls within the province of the Central Government. The President is now clearly conscious of an urgent need for consolidation in the frontier provinces, and of the desirability of preventing further friction with the Lama Church, and, whilst he is anxious to ensure the pacification of the marches, I am of opinion that it is his aim and policy at the present juncture to encourage no further advance towards the west than is consonant with the demands of public opinion.

There is reason to believe that the expeditionary force operating in the marches is now severely hampered by lack of funds, and that the Szechuanese authorities are realising the financial impossibility of any further advance this season. The troops are disaffected in consequence of arrears of pay and the heavy depreciation of their paper currency; the scattered garrisons of the march towns are holding their own with the greatest difficulty; the newly-enrolled men of the fighting force are of poorer physique than the veterans of Chao Erh-feng's guard, and are correspondingly less effective in maintaining Chinese prestige or in withstanding the rigours of a winter campaign; the long-standing provincial jealousies in regard to the administration of the marches have found a vent in the recent conflict between the Szechuan and Yünnan contingents; whilst the powerful lamaseries and the scattered tribesmen are better armed than formerly, and are showing an unexpected power of co-operation which will seriously increase the difficulty of their final subjugation.

In these circumstances the Chinese are naturally anxious to replace military measures by a policy of conciliation wherever the change can be effected without prejudice to their dignity. The appointment of Yin Chang-heng, the military governor of Szechuan, as the new warden of the marches, has reasserted the importance of that post, whilst the reinstatement of the Dalai Lama and the conciliatory overtures which have been made to the tribal princes are likely to strengthen the diplomatic position of the Chinese, and to open the way for at least a temporary restriction in the scope of their military operations.

I am by no means convinced, however, of any real change of policy on the part of the Chinese in regard to their relations with Lhassa and the people of Thibet. At a moment when the Chinese position in the border country is still anxious and unsettled, and when the inauguration of a conciliatory policy has been evidenced by such incidents as the reinstatement of the head of the Lama Church, it is interesting to learn of the creation of an administrative district and the appointment of a Chinese magistrate in the Zayul district of Thibet, in immediate proximity to our Assamese frontier. Such an appointment can only be regarded as the latest evidence of that peaceful penetration and persistency of purpose which has marked every incident of the Chinese campaign against Thibet, and which is unlikely to be abandoned until they have reached the line at which their neighbours are prepared to check their advance by physical or moral pressure.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 288.

Extract from the "Gazette" of October 28, 1912.

PRESIDENTIAL ORDER.

(Translation.)

THE former Dalai Lama, A-wang-lo-pu-tsang-t'u-pu-tan-chia-ts'o-chi-sai-wang-ch'ü-chüeh-lo-lang-chieh, has addressed a communication to Kung-sang-no-erh-pu, the director of the Department of Mongolia and Thibet, in which he states that after his return from Peking to Thibet in connection with religious matters, he took an active interest in the fortunes of Thibet, and strained every nerve to put the country's affairs in order; later on, being deprived of his rank, he resided for a time at Darjiling, but, inasmuch as Thibet had remained in a state of constant unrest ever

since the disturbances in Szechuan last winter, he is anxious to protect the Buddhist Church. and prays that the president may be recommended to take satisfactory measures to this end.

Now that the republic has been established, and the five races are united in one family, the former Dalai Lama is moved with a feeling of deep attachment to the mother country. Under these circumstances his former errors should be overlooked, and I hereby restore to him his title of Ch'eng-shun-ts'an-hua-hsi-t'ien-ta-shan-tzu-tsai Buddha, in the hope that he may strengthen the Yellow Church, assist the republic, and remain on peaceful terms with us.

[49827] No. 289.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st November, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, November 22, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 289.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 21, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 5th November. We have derived the following information from a letter from Haji Ghulam Muhammad, a leading Ladakhi merchant, dated the 14th November at Lhassa. From the 5th to the 10th instant there was fighting daily. It recommenced on the 14th. The results varied. There is now a scarcity of provisions among the Chinese. The Maharaja of Nepal has received a letter from General Chung Yin, requesting that he will cause a fresh settlement with the Thibetans to be brought about. The general has also written to the Dalai Lama requesting permission to leave Thibet with his troops. In Ghulam Muhammad's opinion, Chung wants to leave, but his wishes are opposed by the monks of the Teng-yeling monastery. He believes that in any case, either by the Chinese surrendering or being annihilated, or as the result of an agreement, there will shortly be an end to the fighting.

[50473] No. 290.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 243.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, November* 26, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Chengtu, 25th November :—

" By post to-day Tachenlu reports 18th November districts south of Litang still greatly disturbed. Fighting proceeding along Yang-tsze beyond Hsiangcheng. A week's journey west of Batang Thibetans assembled in strong force, and the districts of Draya and Chiangka (Gartok) now in open rebellion, involving the whole of the country north of Burmah and Assam. Rope bridges across Mekong and Salween destroyed. Pomed expected to [group omitted : ? rise]. Batang, Chiamdo, Derge quiet.

" Yin now several days west of Litang."

(Sent to India.)

[50702] No. 291.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, November 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 184 of 13th September, last paragraph, and your telegram No. 153 of 21st September.

Wai-chiao Pu have again approached me with verbal request to allow special mission to proceed from Peking to Lhassa viâ India to invest Dalai Lama with his newly-restored titles.

Mission would consist of Machifu and a military member of the President's staff, with interpreters and servants—eleven persons in all.

I have replied that no exceptions can be made to rule laid down in my memorandum of 17th August.

(Sent to India.)

[50702] No. 292.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 244 of 28th November.

I approve.

[51459] No. 293.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 247.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, December 2, 1912.*

THIBET.

In a note dated 30th November Wai-chiao Pu state that they are in receipt of intelligence indicating that Government of India propose to send 2,500 engineers to repair road from Gyantse to Lhassa, and they request me to ascertain by telegraph if the report is true.

I would propose, subject to your approval, to answer that we cannot take notice of newspaper rumours or discuss matters connected with Thibet until they have accepted our memorandum of 17th August.

It is just possible that this movement may be intended to draw us into a discussion regarding Thibet as providing a precedent for a settlement with Russia over Mongolia.

(Sent to India.)

[51580] No. 294.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th November, 1912, relative to Chinese mission to Thibet.

India Office, December 2, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 294.

Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *October* 21, 1912.

REFERENCE yours of 26th September.

Last batch Chinese troops have reached Darjeeling. May Yang-fen's mission now proceed?

Enclosure 2 in No. 294.

Government of India to Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, October* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 21st October.

Yang-fen's mission cannot be allowed to proceed at present.

Enclosure 3 in No. 294.

British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 8, 1912.

Phari, November 7.—A telegram was dispatched from Kalimpong by one Yang-fen on the 4th November, and will have been delivered to-day to local authorities at Gyantse. It was addressed to the Dalai Lama, and states that at the time of the inauguration of the Chinese Republic excesses were committed both in China and in her "outlying dependencies" by lawless Chinese soldiers. Tranquillity having now been re-established by the Central Government, the Cabinet and the "Society for Administration of Reforms in Mongolia and Thibet" have proposed, with approval of President of the Republic, that Yang-fen and Lama Lopadingll be delegated to discuss matters generally with the Dalai Lama, and to make enquiries into the losses suffered as a consequence of the recent "lawlessness and mutiny" of the Chinese soldiers in Thibet by his Holiness and by Thibetans. The agreement of his Holiness to this proposal is solicited.

(Addressed Political Officer, Sikkim; repeated Foreign and Foreign with Viceroy.)

[51590] No. 295.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th November, 1912, relative to Thibet.

India Office, December 2, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 295.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Darjeeling, November* 8, 1912.

TELEGRAM of the 22nd October from Ambassador, Peking, forwarded to me with your letter of 24th October. The using of the term "the marches" to designate that part of Thibet adjoining China, and extending for a breadth of 200 to 300 miles into Thibet, by our consular officers and others in China is apt to cause confusion. Secular administration in Litang and Batang is under China, while the religious administration is under Thibet. In Clochiao, Draya, and Chamdo the entire administration is under Thibet. In all five places the people and country are Thibetan.

2. The despatch of these Chinese troops, therefore, most clearly contravene the statement of His Majesty's Government to the Chinese Government referred to in the telegram of the 17th August, 1912, from the Secretary of State to his Excellency the Viceroy, and is a striking commentary on repeated declarations made by Yuan Shih-kai to Ambassador that there was no intention of sending Chinese troops to Thibet—see *inter alia* Ambassador's letter to Secretary of State dated the 2nd August, 1912.

3. Chinese troops can march to Lhassa from Chamdo during the winter. They did so during the winter of 1909–10, leaving Chamdo in November 1909 and arriving in February 1910. This caused the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhassa.

(Addressed to Foreign; repeated Foreign with Viceroy.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 295.

Political Officer, Sikkim, to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Darjeeling, November* 10, 1912.

PLEASE refer to last paragraph of telegram No. 170, dated the 23rd October, from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador, Peking. I would venture to point out that Chinese in Lhassa are not necessarily in danger of being massacred; they have caused renewal of fighting by breaking their agreement with Thibetans in remaining in Lhassa, and can even now stop fighting by agreeing to quit Thibet. None of the batches of Chinese troops who surrendered were massacred, because the Dalai Lama and his Ministers are aware of the danger of the complications which would have followed.

Chinese will probably advance to Lhassa unless steps are taken to arrest expedition, and the situation in Thibet may not improbably be worse than in 1910 after the Dalai Lama's flight. In view of his Excellency the Viceroy's farewell message to the Dalai Lama when he left Kalimpong for Thibet, the Thibetan Government will expect substantial support from us at this stage.

(Addressed to Foreign; repeated Foreign with Viceroy.)

[51749] No. 296.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 4.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to the telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking of the the 16th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to offer the following observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:—

2. It appears to the Marquess of Crewe that advantage should be taken of the lull in hostilities in Eastern Thibet to bring the Chinese Government to a definite settlement on the lines of the memorandum of the 17th August. His Lordship apprehends that, if this is not done, hostilities will be resumed after the winter and the Chinese advance continued into Thibet. A situation of "direct conflict" between the Chinese Government and His Majesty's Government will then have arisen which it is desirable to avoid, and the difficulty of securing a settlement will be much greater.

3. Lord Crewe agrees with Sir J. Jordan that it is not advisable to invoke the co-operation of Russia in this matter. Such co-operation could only take the form of diplomatic pressure at Peking, which would be likely to be both expensive and ineffectual. If the refusal to recognise the Chinese Republic should (as the Government of India apprehend) prove to be an insufficient threat to the Chinese Government, I am to suggest that Sir J. Jordan should be instructed to inform them that, unless they are prepared to negotiate on the lines indicated, and to carry the negotiations through within three months, His Majesty's Government will regard the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 as no longer holding good, and will hold themselves free to enter into direct negotiations with Thibet. Moreover, should Chinese troops enter Thibet, they will be prepared to give active assistance to the Thibetans in resisting their advance and in establishing and maintaining Thibetan independence.

4. It seems probable that the prospect of direct negotiations with Thibet would affect the Chinese more powerfully than a simple threat that we should give the Thibetans active assistance in opposing their advance. At the same time we should be in the advantageous position of having offered to make a friendly agreement with the Chinese themselves, and of being refused, before transferring our friendship to another quarter.

5. In this connection I am to observe that the memorandum of the 17th August will need elaboration in one important respect if it is to form the basis of a new convention—that is to say, that it must contain some definition of the limits of Thibet within which Chinese troops are not to be stationed. Lord Crewe is in communication with the Government of India on this point, and will address Sir E. Grey again on receipt of their reply. As at present advised, he would rather favour a definition which, while leaving Zayul to Thibet, would leave to China the districts the conquest of which she has shown herself able effectively to maintain, *i.e.*, substantially Derge and Chiamdo. This definition would have the advantage of corresponding with the views of the President, as described in Mr. Acting Consul-General King's despatch No. 86 of the 5th October last to Sir J. Jordan. North of Derge the definition presents great difficulties, and will require careful consideration.

6. If it is decided to proceed at once on these lines, it is obvious that, even if Russian co-operation is not sought, the acquiescence of the Russian Government must be obtained in the measures contemplated. Sir J. Jordan, it is observed, favours the idea (advocated in this Office letter of the 15th August) of a fresh agreement with them on the subject of Thibet, although (in common with the Government of India) he is averse to including Chinese Turkestan. In spite of the somewhat discouraging nature of M. Sazonof's language on the occasion of his recent visit, Lord Crewe is not without hope that some new agreement may be practicable. He would not press the question of Chinese Turkestan (especially as M. Sazonof disclaimed designs upon it); but he would support the suggestion of Sir J. Jordan that Russian action in Mongolia might form the basis of a transaction. M. Sazonof would doubtless repeat that Thibet and Mongolia are not *in pari materia*, and that is obviously true, so far as the one is the subject of a convention with this country and the other is not. But the fact remains that the Russo-Mongolian agreement, by declaring the autonomy of Mongolia, has altered the status of an integral part of the Chinese Republic with which this country stands in treaty relations, and His Majesty's Government may fairly claim that their acquiescence in it cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, the object which his Majesty's Government are pursuing in Thibet is one to which the Russian Government could not in good faith take exception; for it is not the extension of British influence, but simply the restoration of the *status quo* recognised by the Anglo-Russian Convention, and its maintenance by more effective means than are admitted by that instrument. For this purpose what is required is a modification of the arrangement of 1907 in the direction of allowing Great Britain to enter into negotiations with Thibet, and to send a representative to Lhassa when the relations between Great Britain and Thibet render such a course necessary.

7. But if Sir E. Grey thinks that no such modification is practicable, it only remains to apprise the Russian Government in due course of the action which His Majesty's Government propose to take in present circumstances. It might at the same time be desirable to sound them as to their attitude in the event of it appearing advisable, for the purpose of assisting the Thibetans against Chinese aggression, to lend them money, arms, and (temporarily) British officers for the organisation of their army.

8. In his despatch No. 79 of the 4th September last, Mr. Consul-General Wilkinson suggests that the Chinese Government should again be warned that we consider the whole basin of the Irrawaddy north of Manang Pum to be British territory. The desirability of repeating this intimation is emphasised by the recent Chinese expedition against the Lishus on the Salween and the threat of an advance to Hkamti, as well as by the restoration of the notoriously anti-British Li-ken Yuan to authority in Yünnan. Lord Crewe would therefore suggest that the opportunity of a settlement with regard to Thibet should be taken to settle the Burmah–China frontier also upon the basis of Sir E. Satow's note of the 1st May, 1906, subject to any minor rectifications or adjustments which the further investigation now being made into Chinese claims may show to be equitable.

9. To sum up, I am to suggest that Sir J. Jordan should now be instructed to press for an immediate reply to the memorandum of the 17th August, taking as his excuse the reported conversion of Zayal into a Chinese civil district (as to which please

see enclosed copy of the telegram from the Government of India), and explaining that His Majesty's Government regard this as an aggression upon undoubted Thibetan territory, in which they cannot possibly acquiesce. Should the Chinese reply to the memorandum be delayed for more than a fortnight, or prove unfavourable, he should then convey a warning in the sense of paragraph 3 above; and should that warning produce no effect before the end of the year, it would be for consideration whether negotiations with Lhassa should not at once be opened. Sir E. Grey will doubtless judge at what time and in what manner the views and wishes of His Majesty's Government should be made known to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 296.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 26, 1912.

THIBET.

Please refer to your telegrams dated the 2nd and 5th instant, and to mine of the 7th and 15th, which deal with parts of yours of the 2nd.

There is now some doubt as to the truth of the report that Zayal has been converted into a Chinese district, for recently reports have been received that Thibetans massacred the small Chinese garrison at Rima in September. But if the conversion proves to have been made, as first reported, it constitutes, in our opinion, a serious encroachment on Thibet, demanding a strong protest from us—firstly, because there is no doubt that, until the Chinese recently infringed the *status quo*, Zayal was an integral portion of Thibet; and secondly, because the close proximity of Chinese to the Assam boundary is in every way undesirable. If the suggested general warning to China contained in my telegram of the 7th November is approved, I would suggest that a specific mention of Zayal should be included in it; if it is not approved, it seems that a separate protest should be made about this matter.

Please refer to telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking dated the 29th October.

The advance to Rima (which is in Zayal) suggested in that telegram may be found to be politic, but it cannot be effected before the completion of the road to Menilkrai; this will not be till next spring, and consequently an immediate decision is not necessary. His Majesty's Minister made other suggestions, but in our opinion no action beyond that already taken is required, as there is a force between Sadiya and Menilkrai working on the road connecting these two places, and an advance into the disputed districts on the Yünnan–Burmah frontier is being included in the programme of operations sanctioned by you for this season.

A further communication will shortly be made to you on the subject of a post at Menilkrai or in its neighbourhood.

[51831] No. 297.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd December, 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, December 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 297.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 3, 1912.

WE have received the telegram given below from British trade agent at Gyantse dated 29th ultimo:—

"I give below the gist of a telegram sent to the Dalai Lama from the Bureau of Mongolia and Thibetan Affairs. It is dated 27th November from Peking, and was received on 28th at Gyantse. I am sending a copy of the telegram by post:

"'We have appointed Chung King Yin to be Amban of Thibet, with instructions to explain to your Holiness that we attribute wholly to the unwise policy of the late Ching dynasty the recent disturbances in Thibet and the preceding troubles in Szechuan. Your loyalty to the Chinese Republic is known, and the Republican Government offers complete freedom in religion. You went to live at Darjeeling for a time, moved thereto by your deprivation of your titles. Since then, however, Prince Kala Chin has received a letter from you in which, professing your loyalty to the republic, you stated your desire that through you peace and order might be re-established in Thibet. In order, therefore, that the Buddhist religion may be maintained through your agency in Thibet, and that the establishment of the republic, a participant of which you are privileged to be, may receive your help, and you are hereby restored to your former titles.'"

(Repeated to Peking.)

[51459] No. 298.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 247 of 2nd December: Thibet.

I approve proposed reply.

[52953] No. 299.

Question asked in the House of Commons, December 5, 1912.

Sir J. D. Rees,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Chinese have formed a new province of Eastern Thibet to the west of Szechuan; whether such province includes a portion of South-Eastern Thibet; and, if so, whether any objection has been raised on behalf of Great Britain.

Answer.

Proposals have been put forward by the Governor-General of Szechuan for the formation of a new province, with the object of asserting more effectively the authority of the Chinese Government over the Thibetan Marches and portions of Eastern Thibet. His Majesty's Government are watching developments with a due regard for British interests and treaty rights.

[52131] No. 300.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 6.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 5, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of telegrams that have been received from the Government of India regarding a request made by the Chinese General at Lhassa and the Thibetan Government for the intervention of His Majesty's Government in order to secure the withdrawal of the former from Thibet.

With Sir E. Grey's concurrence the Marquess of Crewe proposes to approve the instructions which the Government of India desire to issue to the trade agent at Gyantse.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 300.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 29, 1912.

THE British trade agent at Gyantse has addressed us with two telegrams (of which the gist is given below) dated respectively the 27th and 28th November regarding the situation in Thibet.

1. "A letter has been sent by Chung to the Viceroy in which he thanks him for the proof he has given in connection with the question of the evacuation of Thibet by his troops, of the cordiality existing between the Governments of Great Britain and China. The letter adds that the Thibetans having found new ground for quarrel, are making attacks on him day and night. This being the situation, he is anxious to retreat to China taking his force with him, but is unable to do so in the absence of orders from his Government. A further hindrance is his fear that the Thibetans will not act faithfully by him. Further, he suggests with, he alleges, the Dalai Lama's concurrence, that in the absence of the representative of Nepal I should be deputed by His Majesty's Government to visit Lhassa for the purpose of fixing the terms on which his withdrawal is to be arranged. A cypher telegram which is to be forwarded to the Government of China is enclosed in his letter."

2. "The Chief Ministers of the Dalai Lama have asked me in a letter dated the 20th instant to go at once to Lhassa. My deputation is made a condition by both Thibetans and Chinese of their agreeing to come to an arrangement regarding the complete withdrawal of the Chinese troops now in Lhassa from Thibet."

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 300.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 3, 1912.

IN continuation of our telegram of the 29th ultimo regarding Thibet, very serious objections must, in our opinion, be raised against yielding to the Thibetans and General Chung's joint request that the British trade agent should be deputed to go to Lhassa and arrange the conditions on which Chung is to withdraw himself and his force. For (1) it involves violating the Anglo-Russian Convention to send a British officer there; (2) Chung has admitted that in the absence of orders from his Government he cannot withdraw from Lhassa. Probably, therefore, he is only making the request so that, with his safety secured by a British officer's presence, he may continue at Lhassa till a favourable arrangement is effected at Peking, as he hopes; (3) we should be committed to carry through any political arrangement made by our agent. A preferable course we think is to obtain if possible the assistance of the representative of Nepal in settling the matter. This has been suggested to the Prime Minister of Nepal, but the present representative no longer commands the confidence of either party, and is only waiting the arrival of his successor. No assistance from that quarter, therefore, can be expected for some time. But the probability is that in the interval Chung will have to withdraw after accepting the conditions offered by Thibet.

This seems to us the best way out of the difficulty, and we suggest that our trade agent should be instructed to give the general an answer on the following lines:—We cannot in face of treaty obligations send an officer to Lhassa, but have proposed to Prime Minister of Nepal that the representative of that State should give his help in arranging terms; the Government of India trust that an arrangement will soon be amicably effected, and that the general with his force will retire. The agent might add that if he retires reasonably soon, permission to return by way of India will be granted, and his journey from the frontier to China will be facilitated in every way, but that permission to travel through India depends upon his return being made without

delay. To the Thibetans, the agent, we suggest, should send an answer in same sense as far as treaty obligations are concerned, going on to advise the Dalai Lama to expedite the amicable arrangement which the Government of India hope soon to see concerted, by pledging himself to provide the troops with transport to the frontier and security for their persons.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[52754] No. 301.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 21st November, 1912, relative to the marches of Eastern Thibet (one copy only of map and accompanying letter).

India Office, December 9, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 301.

Memorandum on the Situation in the Marches of Eastern Thibet.

(Confidential.)

THE country between the Min River and the Tachin River from about Tachienlu to about Mao chou is inhabited by the eighteen tribes (a mixture of Thibetans and aborigines). These tribes and the Chalas to the south have for a considerable time been under the influence of the Chinese. North of these again are the Goloks and the Po lo tzu, and still further north are the Northern Thibetans who pay tribute to the Prince of Choni in Kansu.

West of the Yalung are the Mantzu tribes, who are more or less independent. Most of these were brought under subjection by Chao Erh Feng in 1909.

2. Briefly, the following are the outlines of the Thibetan revolt :—

Sun pan ting was captured by the Goloks in February 1912, and was retaken by the Chinese in June. This appears to have had no connection with the main revolt of the Thibetans, and to have been prompted by Chinese brigands.

The eighteen tribes and the Northern Thibetans have taken no part in the revolt, but all the tribes west of the Yalung appear to have risen. The Chalas also revolted, but their chief has since made submission to the Chinese.

The outbreak started at Lhassa and spread eastwards to the border, and the tribes in the marches appear to have risen some time in April or May. The Thibetans are supposed to have a large force of well-armed, mounted men, controlled from Lhassa, fighting in the marches. The Thibetans pushed eastwards until stopped by the Yalung River. It is estimated that a force of 40,000 Khamba fighting men can be put into the field at any time. Nothing has been heard of their supply arrangements, but doubtless the Dalai Lama, who is supposed to directing the revolt, is astute enough to have done something in this direction.

The Szechuan–Thibet border is shown on the sketch map.*

3. The Chinese had garrisons at the following places in the marches :—

On the north road—Taowu, Kantse, Derge.

On the south road—Tachienlu, Hokou, Litang, Sanpa, *Batang*, Draya, Gartok, Gonjob, Chiamdo.

Other parts—Yakalo (Yenching), San-ngai, Paiyu, T'ung pu' (not traceable), Luhotou (not traceable), *Hsiang Cheng*, Taopa, and in Chantui.

At those places in *italics* there were strong garrisons with some of Chao Erh Feng's old officers still in command.

* Not reproduced.

The following posts were captured by the Thibetans in June :—

Hsiang-cheng, San-ngai, Gonjoh, Paiyu, Draya, Sanpa, Kantse, Litang.

The fate of Chiamdo, Batang, Derge, Luhotou, T'ung pu' is unknown. Batang and Yakalo are reported to have fallen.

Chinese troops are said to have been entirely withdrawn from Derge, San-ngai and Chantui.

Further to the west the Thibetans disarmed 100 Chinese soldiers at Shobando in May or June, and allowed them to return to China. In April a body of 150 Chinese soldiers who were returning to Lhassa from Pemakoi were annihilated in Kongbu.

At Atuntzu all was reported quiet on the 20th June.

Early in July Hokou was threatened on both banks of the Yalung, and 300 Thibetans made an attack on the place but were repulsed.

4. *Chinese Action.*—Until May the Chinese in Szechuan seem to have been taken up with provincial quarrels, but in June the province woke up to the seriousness of the situation, and set about organising a force to cope with the Thibetan revolt.

The object of the exhibition was stated to be "to force Thibet to enter the Chinese confederacy, to safeguard the frontier of Szechuan, and convince foreigners that the Chinese army is not to be despised."

Protests by the British Minister at Peking forced the Central Government to declare that the expedition would not advance into Thibet proper, and that its operations would be confined to the pacification of the marches. It remains to be seen whether the Central Government can control the provincial authorities.

5. *The Expeditionary Force.*—The first detachment, 600 men, left Chengtu on the 16th June, and reached Tachienlu on the 4th July. A second detachment reached Yachou in three bodies on the 29th June, 1st and 2nd July. The third detachment, 1,800 men, left Chengtu on the 10th July under Yun Ch'ang-heng, military governor of Szechuan, an able and energetic man of 26 years of age.

The total strength of the expedition according to one report was 8,000 men, of which at least 10 per cent. were non-combatants. Other and probably more reliable reports put it at 4,000 effectives.

A Yünnan contingent of 3,000 men was to march viâ Talifu, Lichiang, and Atuntzu and join the Szechuan contingent at Batang for a combined advance on Lhassa. 1,500 men of the Yünnan contingent left Yünnan-fu on the 27th July ; the remainder did not start owing to troubles in Yünnan.

The Chinese advanced guard (first detachment) moved to Hokou, and relieved the pressure there, but (the 12th July) were unable to advance beyond a point 4 miles west of Hokou. The Thibetans were holding Ma kai chung, 10 miles west of Hokou, a very strong position at an altitude of 15,000 feet, capable of being held by a few hundred men against an army. It is said that artillery fire cannot be utilised against this position.

The other detachments made slow progress, and shortage of rations was reported on the 25th July. A considerable number of posts had to be established on the line of communications.

6. *Situation on the 1st August* was as follows :—

2,000 Chinese troops at Hokou.

1,000 more were to leave Tachienlu in the first week of August.

The north road was occupied by the Chinese in force up to Tao-wu.

The Thibetans were still holding Ma kai chung. No news has been received of the movements of the Yünnan contingent.

The 1st battalion 14th Regiment, which is part of the expeditionary force, mutinied at Yachow on the 6th August (mostly Chao Erh Feng's men), and a considerable number are said to have deserted. The 2nd battalion is also disaffected.

Yun's intentions are said to be (the 7th August) to advance in two columns, one by the north road viâ Derge to Chiamdo, the other on Batang. He had decided on a flank movement from Tao-wu on Litang through the Chantui district.

7.—*Distances.*—

	Miles.
Chengtu–Yachow	90
Yachow–Tachienlu	104
Tachienlu–Hokou	72
Tachienlu–Tao-wu	116
Hokou–Litang	61
Tao-wu–Litang	105
Litang–Batang	100
Tao-wu–Derge	about 175
Batang–Chiamdo	266
Derge–Chiamdo	110
Derge–Lhassa by northern road	585
Chiamdo–Lhassa by southern road	500
Chengtu–Hokou	266
Chengtu–Tao-wu	310

Thus Tachienlu to Lhassa by the northern road is 867 miles, and by the southern road 1,000 miles.

	Miles.
Yünnan-fu–Lichiang viâ Talifu	290
Lichiang–Atuntzu viâ Weihsi	190
Lichiang–Atuntzu viâ Chungtien	160
Atuntzu–Batang	177

Therefore Yünnan-fu to Batang is 657 or 627 miles.

8. *Reports from Lhassa.*—With regard to the report (11th October) by the British trade agent, Gyantse, of the receipt by the Thibetan ministers of the following letters which have been issued by Chinese officials to indicate China's policy :—

(1.) Pim, a Chinese official of Chiamdo, has informed the principal Thibetan official of the Kham province that Thibet will shortly be invaded by a large force of Chinese.

(2.) Chungyin (?) has written that Thibet's sole chance of retaining autonomy is adherence to China, as both Great Britain and Russia covet the country.

(3.) The governor of Szechuan informed the Jongpen of Lhojong that he would shortly lead a large punitive expedition into Thibet.

These rumours have evidently been spread by the Chinese to create "alarm and despondency" among the Thibetans and encourage the Chinese in Lhassa.

With regard to the statements of the Thibetan ministers that, "in fulfilment of these threats, the Chinese looted the monasteries of Chiamdo and burnt houses in the beginning of July, and that, further, the Chinese have now occupied Chiamdo, there are 1,500 Chinese soldiers at Derge, many more are coming from Hsiling* and Yünnan, and it is rumoured that the Governor of Szechuan has started for Nagchuka (10 days north of Lhassa)." It is difficult to discover the truth of these statements, and they may be merely intelligent anticipations of events.

9. *Possible Chinese achievements.*—The Chinese had not advanced beyond Hokou and Tao-wu on the 7th August.

Chiamdo is distant 427 and 285 miles respectively from these two places.

The Chinese advance from Chengtu has been carried out so far at the rate of about 10 miles a day. Allowing for the continuance of this rate and for their meeting little opposition, the following achievements would have been feasible for the Szechuan contingent if they advanced from Hokou and Tao-wu on the 8th August.

Litang might have been recaptured by means of the flank march about the 20th August.

Chiamdo might have been reached viâ the north road and Derge about the 10th September.

Batang, on the south road, might have been reached about the 1st September, and Chiamdo by this route about the 1st October.

Turning to the Yünnan contingent, it has to cover 627 to 675 miles from Yünnan-fu to Batang, mostly on bad roads.

Marching at the rate of 15 miles a day, and without encountering opposition, it would be possible to reach Batang in 44 days, *i.e.*, about the 10th September.

It is improbable, however, that such a rate of marching could be achieved except for the first 100 miles between Yünnan-fu and Tali-fu. For the remainder of the route 10 miles a day would probably be a fair rate of speed. In this case it would take the

* Hsiling not traceable ; it may be Si-ling, in Kueichow province.

contingent about two months to reach Batang or Gartok, and it might arrive at either of those places at the end of September or beginning of October.

As Chiamdo was reported to have fallen to the Thibetans in June it is improbable that it was looted by the Chinese in July.

10. *Conclusions regarding Chinese advance on Lhassa.*—In spite of the telegrams and orders from Peking as to the Szechuan expedition pushing on to Lhassa, it is improbable that it can penetrate much further west than Chiamdo at this season. These telegrams and orders were probably issued with a view to placating the public in China and encouraging the Chinese in Lhassa.

The numbers of the expedition, stated therein, must be greatly exaggerated. Though a force of 14,000 to 20,000 may eventually be employed, our information to date gives the total at from 4,000 to 8,000. The line of communications must absorb a large proportion of any force engaged, and the supply question is so difficult that it is doubtful whether the force that could be pushed on to Lhassa could exceed 2,000 to 4,000 men.

(Chao Erh Feng's force which entered Lhassa in 1910, numbered 1,700. The Chinese garrisons in Thibet eventually totalled about 4,000.)

In the marches the Chinese appear to be following the strategy of turning positions on south road (where the opposition is greatest) by operating south-west from the direction of the north road. Assuming opposition to an advance on Lhassa to be confined mainly to the regions* bordering the south road, it is probable that they would continue their advance by the north road.

The season appears to be unfavourable for such a movement, however. The distance from Derge to Lhassa by this road is 585 miles. There are about 16 high passes to be crossed in this distance, four of which are known to be over 16,000 feet, one over 17,000 feet, and one nearly 18,000 feet. The road, though good and easy, traverses a country lying for a great part at an altitude of over 13,000 feet.

The advance from Chiamdo on Lhassa would be feasible. The distance is about 500 miles, and there are 10 or 12 high passes to negotiate, two of them being about 18,000 feet.

H. R. S.

October 20, 1912.

11. *Chinese recovery of the Marches.*—The above was written on the 20th October, 1912. Since that date the following further information has been received:—

The Southern Column.—(Strength about 2,000.) The advanced guard captured the Ma-kai-chung position, west of Hokou, on the 11th August and pressed on to Litang, the Thibetans everywhere giving way before them. The Thibetans were again defeated at Po lang Kung.

Litang was recaptured on the 3rd September.

The Northern Column.—(Strength about 1,000.)

The Thibetans evacuated the greater portion of the north road, thereby enabling this column to advance rapidly and facilitating flanking movements from that direction.

Chiamdo was recovered on the 9th September, Draya on the 13th September, and the bridge over the river at Elochiao, two days west of Chiamdo, on 16th September.

The telegraph was in working order as far as Hokou before the end of August.

Yun tutu† was at Tachienlu. He states that his "methods of clemency" have had an excellent effect on the Thibetans, who provide transport with alacrity.

12. *Situation at end of October.*—In a telegram from the British Minister, Peking, dated the 24th October, the distribution of the force was given as under:—

Tachienlu	1,500 men under Yun tutu.
Litang	1,000 men of southern column.
Batang	300 men of original garrison.
Derge	800 men of northern column.
Chiamdo	300 men of original garrison. 200 men of northern column.

Apparently, therefore, the northern column, after recovering Draya and Chiamdo in September, has returned to Derge, leaving an increased garrison at Chiamdo.

The previous report of the fall of Chiamdo was evidently untrue. Batang also appears to have made a successful resistance. It is reported that after a series of

* The best fighting tribes among the Thibetans are located in these regions.

† Military governor.

desperate attacks between the 28th June and 3rd July, the Thibetans asked for an armistice, which was granted, and the "assailants" then made their submission.

The situation of Batang was most perilous, provisions being exhausted.

The Chinese were endeavouring to subjugate the marches, which are now considered part of the Chiamdo district, and premeditating an attack on Hsiang cheng, where the Thibetans were in force and well armed.

Yun had received orders from Peking to advance no further than Thibet.

The Yünnan contingent of 3,000 men was reported, in a telegram from the consul, Yünnan, dated the 29th October, to be occupying Chungtien, Atuntzu, Yenching, and Weh-hsi. The military governor of Yünnan had ordered them merely to guard the Yünnan frontier and not to enter Thibet.

(Previous reports gave the strength of the contingent that had actually started as only 1,500 men. The remainder were withheld owing to troubles in Yünnan.)

A rumour from Peking states that an army of 20,000 Hupeh troops is to go to Thibet, one half passing through Chengtu, the other traversing Kueichow. Yun deprecates their dispatch owing to lack of supplies and funds, and would prefer a contribution towards the latter. He is said to have over 10,000 men under his command, including the old frontier garrisons. Major Pereira, late military attaché, Peking, who travelled with the troops as far as Yachow, estimates the strength of the expeditionary force at some 3,600 men.

13. *Comments.*—The following points in the above reports rather tend to show that a further advance westward in not contemplated, at any rate for the present:—

(1.) The return of the northern column to Derge, after the recapture of Chiamdo and Draya. (Unless the intention is to advance from Derge along the north road, leaving the south road clear for the southern column. The proposed action of the latter, however, does not support this supposition.)

(2.) The intention to subjugate the marches and the movement of the southern column southwards to attack Hsiang cheng.

(3.) The fact that the Yünnan contingent has halted. (The probability is that this contingent will be diverted to assist in the subjugation of the Lisus in the Salween valley below Chamutong, attacking them from the north.)

(4.) Yun tutu has himself halted for a considerable time at Tachienlu. He appears to be apprehensive of intrigues in the Szechuan provincial assembly, and in his desire to uphold his influence there probably does not want to move too far west.

It must, however, be remembered that, in their advance to Lhassa in 1910, the Chinese reached that place in February, having crossed all the passes in winter. The force that arrived at Lhassa numbered 1,700 men. Chao Erh Feng had been engaged in the subjugation of the marches for two years previous to this.

H. R. STOCKLEY.

November 2, 1912.

[52131] No 302.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant enclosing telegrams of the 29th ultimo and 3rd instant from the Government of India reporting the request of the Chinese general at Lhassa and of the Thibetan authorities for British intervention and suggesting a reply.

Sir E. Grey concurs in Lord Crewe's proposal to approve this answer.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

[51749] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1912.

YOUR telegrams No. 237 of the 16th November and No. 255 of the 11th December.

The present partial cessation of hostilities in Eastern Thibet offers, in our opinion, a good opportunity of inducing the Chinese Government to come to a definite settlement in regard to Thibet, and we consider that the lines on which such a settlement should be made should be those of the memorandum of the 17th August. If a settlement is not reached now, we fear that a situation, which we are anxious to avoid, will arise between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government which would put still greater difficulties in the way of a settlement, since we fear that after the winter the Chinese may renew hostilities and continue their advance into Thibet.

In consequence, consideration is being given to the following course of action, viz. :—

That you should at once approach the Chinese Government and explain that you have received a report that the province of Zayul has been converted into a civil district of China (see your telegram No. 231 of the 1st November), and then proceed to say that this action is regarded by His Majesty's Government as an aggression upon the territory of Thibet. You should then press the Chinese Government to give a reply to the memorandum above mentioned without delay. If no favourable answer be given to your request, or should the Chinese Government not reply within a fortnight, we propose that instructions should be sent to you to acquaint them that, in the event of their being unwilling to negotiate upon the lines proposed, His Majesty's Government will consider themselves free to enter into direct negotiations with Thibet, as they would not regard themselves bound any longer by the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. You would be further instructed to inform them that His Majesty's Government will be ready to help the Thibetans actively in securing and maintaining the independence of their country and n offering resistance to Chinese troops should they advance into Thibet.

Please telegraph your views upon this suggested course of action as soon as possible.

If a further fortnight elapsed without any effect being produced by this warning, we should then have to consider whether negotiations should not be opened with Lhassa immediately. This course of action would, we think, put us in an advantageous position; it would appear that we had desired to reach a friendly settlement with the Chinese Government, and that it was only their refusal of our advances which induced us to transfer our friendship elsewhere. A simple threat of rendering active assistance to the Thibetans in opposing their advance would, we imagine, have a less powerful effect upon the Chinese than the prospect of our opening direct negotiations with Thibet.

It is further suggested by the India Office that we might, when effecting a settlement of the Thibetan question, endeavour at the same time to induce the Chinese Government to accept your note of the 10th April, 1911, as the basis of an agreement in regard to the frontier between Burmah and China.

We concur in what you say as to the undesirability of seeking the Russian Government's co-operation in this matter, but since the Convention of 1907 would be violated by the action now proposed, we consider that we should make it clear to the Russian Government, before informing the Chinese Government of our intention to proceed to active measures consequent upon their failure to pay attention to our warning, that our intention is simply to show China that treaty engagements cannot be violated by her with impunity, to maintain conditions of peace and quiet upon the borders of British India, and to meet the demands of a situation of great difficulty, and that the measures which we are obliged to take with this object must not be considered as permanent.

I desire to have your opinion upon these proposals while they are yet under consideration here, but I must explain that, even if you concur entirely in the course suggested, it will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to go into the question most carefully before coming to a decision.

[53252] No. 304*.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, December* 13, 1912.

I AM in general agreement with the course of action proposed in your telegram No. 198 of yesterday to secure a settlement with the Chinese Government in regard to Thibet. I would, however, venture to deprecate the concurrent negotiation of the question of the Burma-China frontier, although I agree that the Thibet question should be used as much as possible to bring pressure to bear in connection with the frontier. From my telegram No. 248 of the 2nd December you will have perceived that the Chinese will probably raise the question of the frontier before long.

I concur in your view that the Chinese will be more impressed by the prospect of His Majesty's Government opening up direct negotiations with Thibet than by a threat of our affording Thibet active assistance.

The Chinese appear to have had from 1,500 to 2,000 troops in Thibet under the old régime, and a return to the *status quo* generally is sure to be demanded by them as a minimum. I suppose that our memorandum of the 17th August must eventually be expanded by a definite statement as to what we consider the limits of Thibet and the number of Chinese troops to be allowed there.

In demanding an immediate answer to the memorandum, I should like to lay stress on the recent Chinese aggressions on Thibetan territory and on Chinese action at Zayul, but as the question of Thibet has been raised by the Chinese themselves, no excuse for approaching the subject, such as interference with Zayul, appears necessary.

[53222] No. 304.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th December. 1912, regarding Thibet.

India Office, December 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 304.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 12, 1912.

THE political officer in Sikkim telegraphed as below on the 11th December :—

"The Len Amban to-day crossed the frontier into Sikkim and reached Gnatong. To-morrow (12th December) he will resume his journey."

[53278] No. 305.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th December, regarding Thibet.

India Office, December 13, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 305.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 13, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram, dated the 3rd instant, regarding Thibet.

Telegram, of which purport is given below, was received the 7th December from resident in Nepal :—

"On the 24th November Lieutenant Lal Bahadur telegraphed to the Nepalese Prime Minister that Hyapsi House, where the surrendered weapons are deposited, has been taken possession of by the Chinese. It seems that some 400 or 500 Thibetans had been stationed near the house on purpose to protect it, but fled as soon as the Chinese drew near. The lieutenant added that he had been requested by both Chinese and Thibetans to attend a conference at which the conditions of peace were to be arranged, and that he was about to comply. The Prime Minister raises no objection to this action, which secures the attainment of the object towards which your telegram of the 28th ultimo was directed."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[53850] No. 306.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, December 16, 1912.*

THIBET.

In the absence of Minister, owing to indisposition, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs received me 14th December.

He produced memorandum of 17th August and explained that he wished to have a friendly exchange of views on various points before making a formal reply :—

1. Great Britain had engaged by article 2 of 1906 convention not to interfere in administration of Thibet. China had undertaken not to permit any other foreign State to interfere in its administration, but had never undertaken not to interfere herself. It did not follow that she intended to exercise this right, but she was free to do so under treaty.

I replied that Thibet had always been an autonomous country, that China had never had any right of active intervention in its internal administration, and that claim now put forward was entirely inconsistent with the treaty pledges given both verbally and in writing by the late régime, whose engagements the republic had undertaken to carry out.

2. It was not accurate to say that Chinese officers had assumed all administrative power in Thibet, and as regards presidential order Chinese Government were prepared to renew in most formal manner President's assurance that there was no intention of incorporating Thibet as a province.

I retorted that presidential order was a direct violation of pledges given to us, and that it had already been translated into action by conversion of a portion of Thibet into a Chinese province. No mere assurances could cancel plain language of the order or undo action that had been taken upon it. Only a formal agreement would meet the case.

3. The word "unlimited" was hardly applicable to the Chinese forces in Thibet, which amounted in normal times to about 2,000 men—not an unreasonable number in view of obligations imposed upon China by 1906 convention and trade regulations.

I said that Chinese military activities in Thibet in recent years necessitated limitation, but that exact number would be a matter for negotiation.

4. Chinese Government considered existing treaties sufficient, and saw no reason for entering into a new agreement at a time when they were still unrecognised. They proposed to answer memorandum in this sense.

I warned them against perfunctory treatment of a grave question. Although republic had announced intention of observing all existing agreements, one of its first acts had been to proclaim incorporation of Thibet as a Chinese province in defiance of former engagements to us. For this and its subsequent action it would be held responsible.

5. China thought that route through India might have been allowed as an act of friendly consideration.

I replied that we had already shown extreme consideration in allowing garrisons to pass through India, but that sentiment could hardly be invoked to assist in conquest of a country with which we were in treaty relations.

In conclusion, I said that the terms of the memorandum, which had been drawn up at a time when there was still some Chinese authority in Thibet, were far more favourable than China had now any right to expect, and I strongly urged their acceptance while the offer was still open. Their rejection would leave His Majesty's Government free to take whatever course might seem necessary for protection of their interests.

I should explain that I did not consider that I was authorised to act on instructions contained in your telegram No. 198 of 12th December at this interview.

(Sent to India.)

[53945] No. 307.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, December 17, 1912.*

THIBET.

Your telegram No. 198 of 12th December.

In framing our programme we should, I think, endeavour to avoid as far as possible any appearance of imitating Russian policy regarding Mongolia, which has evoked general indignation and resulted in attempts to boycott Russian trade. The extent of our commercial interests makes us especially vulnerable to such an attack.

(Sent to India.)

[53850] No. 308.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 260 of 16th December: Thibet.

Your action approved.

You were right not to act on my telegram No. 198 of 12th December, as the course there discussed involves a serious departure in policy, which must be settled by Cabinet here before His Majesty's Government are committed to it.

[54315] No. 309.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 21st November, 1912, relative to north-east frontier.

India Office, December 19, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 309.

Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to Government of India.

Shillong, November 2, 1912.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th October, 1912, sanctioning certain measures in regard to the policy to be followed in future on the north-east frontier, and to say that steps will be taken to give effect to the orders of the Government of India with the least possible delay.

2. As regards the survey operations outlined in paragraph 2 of your letter, I am to report, for the information of the Government of India, the steps which the chief commissioner is taking to carry these out. Detailed instructions have been given by the surveyor-general to the survey officers who have been selected, and the chief commissioner is concerned only with providing escorts and transport, and has impressed on all his officers that the claims of the survey department are paramount. He ventures to think that the programme is too extensive to be carried out in the one working season, but he can assure the Government of India that no efforts will be spared to accomplish as much as possible. For the Abor survey party a chain of posts will be established and escorts furnished by the Assam military police. I am to annex a copy of the scheme which will be followed. This was prepared by Major Wilson, at present commanding the 1st Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles, and to that officer the chief commissioner desires to express his acknowledgments. It has been accepted by Colonel Hodgson of the Survey department, and by Captain Trenchard

who will be in charge of the Dihong party, and in the opinion of the chief commissioner affords the best and safest means of carrying out as much of the survey programme outlined as the time available will permit. The military police will be commanded by Captain Dunbar, commandant of the Lakhimpur Battalion, and Mr. Dundas and Mr. Furze will accompany the force as political officers, while Captain Hore, whose services have been lent to the chief commissioner, will act as intelligence officer.

Similar arrangements, but on a somewhat smaller scale, have been made for the survey of the Mishmi country. For escorts and the establishment of posts it is estimated that a force of 300 rifles will be required, and this also will be found by Assam military police. They will be commanded by Major Bliss, commandant of the Naga Hills Battalion, and Captain Nevill will accompany the force as political officer, while Captain Bailey, whose services have been lent to the chief commissioner, will go as intelligence officer. The Government of India have sanctioned the appointment of Captain Nevill to be in political charge of the western section of the north-east frontier; but, in view of the urgency of the survey operations, and of the fact that no other trained officers are available, the chief commissioner has been compelled to utilise the services of Captain Nevill in the first instance with the Dibang survey party. Another consideration which has influenced Sir Archdale Earle is the fact that, when escorts for the two parties have been found by the military police, it will not be possible at present to find a standing escort for the officer in charge of the western section, and this notwithstanding that the Government of India have lent four companies of the 1st Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles, to the local administration. It is hoped that later in the season Captain Nevill will be free to tour in the area of which he will ultimately hold political charge, and that it will then be found possible to give him the escort which he will require.

3. Detailed estimates of the cost of the operations will be submitted to the Government of India as soon as possible. These, however, cannot be prepared until the chief commissioner is informed whether he will be given the mule corps and the half company of sappers and miners that he asked for in connection with the Abor survey, and whether both the Abor and the Mishmi survey parties are to be rationed by the supply and transport department. As stated in paragraph 22 of my letter dated the 7th July, 1912, the chief commissioner is assured that the cost of purely frontier operations involving more than provincial interest will not be allowed to fall on provincial revenues. He has, therefore, in anticipation of the orders of the Government of India sanctioned such charges as, having due regard to economy, have had to be met to enable the operations to be started.

4. I am to annex, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the instructions which have been given to the political officers with the two survey parties.

Enclosure 2 in No. 309.

Scheme prepared by Major Wilson for Survey Operations on the North-East Frontier.

TO make any exploration a success the first thing necessary is to ensure that it is sufficiently escorted so as to remove any temptation to attack it, or turn it back, the next to ensure its being fed so that it can keep the field till its task is accomplished. Small flying columns with a limited supply of rations cannot ensure this. For example, 250 coolies can carry rations for themselves and 150 men for ten days. It was estimated that Geku hill would take five or six days to clear. It actually took over three weeks with 150 men and coolies on it every day, and Aste hill took the same. Skilled labour to a certain extent (some sappers with dynamite) being employed on them also. Therefore, a column strength as above mentioned would not have accomplished either hill, supposing they had started from Rotung with sufficient tools, as they would have run out of rations.

One may presume that the Panggi people will be friendly and would help with coolies, so long as they realised the party was strong enough to do more than hold its own if necessary. Opinion is distinctly divided as to what the attitude of Shimong would be, while nothing is known of the Karko, Bomo, and Janbo, people.

The maximum force to ensure the exploration party being fed, and provide it with a sufficient escort is 735 rifles and 1,800 coolies. Some of the coolies could probably be dispensed with when Abors supplied the labour. There are no local

supplies obtainable except a little meat, and as rice is exchanged in equal quantities for salt at Riga, and as salt is cheaper, while rice is dearer above that point, it would be simpler to carry the rice, and use salt for paying Abor labour.

This force is distributed as follows:—

		Rifles.	Coolies.
1.	Rotung	40	150
	„ in reserve 50 rifles.		
2.	Panging	40	150
3.	Sibbum	40	143
4.	Geku	40	137
5.	Shimong	40	127
6.	Gette	40	118
7.	Pugging	40	110
	Bridge below it	40	
8.	Rikor	40	102
9.	Paling	40	97
10.	Singing	40	90
11.	Camp A	40	85
12.	Camp B	40	40

At this point two marches further than was reached this year, in addition to the garrison, are needed—

60 rifles escort to 200 coolies to run out rations to survey party and escort, strength
100 rifles with 250 coolies (survey party 50 souls).

(735 rifles; 1,800 coolies.)

The exploration would thus be able to start off from camp B in any direction with ten or eleven days' supplies. If it wanted more rations it would send back coolies under escort, and the 200 coolies at head of the line could carry out seven days' supplies four marches from the head of the line to meet them.

Requirements to feed all at the head of the line and beyond thirty-four loads daily.

Should it be necessary to work up the right bank, it will be seen that by rolling up the line beyond Pugging and transferring it to the right bank, the exploration could go five marches up the right bank and start off from there for work in a similar manner.

The minimum force to work the same scheme is arrived at by reducing the escort to—

	Rifles.
Exploration	50
The convoy escort	30
All posts to 30	390
Total	470

which would reduce the coolies to about 1,200.

I consider ten men to look after each post with ten men out on convoy escort on both sides the minimum one could employ.

The ration calculations were made by Captain W. B. Dunlop, Supply and Transport Corps, who was with the expedition in 1912.

A. WILSON.

August 8, 1912.

Enclosure 3 in No. 309.

Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to Political Officer in Charge Central and Eastern Sections, North-East Frontier.

Shillong, November 2, 1912.

I AM directed to enclose an extract (paragraph 2) from letter, Confidential, dated the 16th October, 1912, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and to say that the chief commissioner has appointed you to be in charge of the survey party that will work in the Abor country, and to vest you with full political control. Mr. Furze will accompany you as assistant political officer. The escorts will be commanded by Captain Dunbar.

2. It must be clearly understood that the objects of the operations are survey and exploration, and that, subject to considerations of safety, the survey officers who

accompany the party must decide as to the country to be visited. The general scheme of operations will be that outlined by Major Wilson, 1st Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles, a copy of which is in your possession. The chief commissioner trusts that the escorts for which this scheme provides are strong enough to ensure that no opposition will be encountered, but should any village give trouble it must be firmly dealt with. Subject to the survey officers being given every facility for carrying out their programme, you and the assistant political officer should visit as many as possible of the villages in the area over which a loose political control will now be exercised.

Enclosure 4 in No. 309.

Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to Superintendent of Police.

Shillong, November 2, 1912.

I AM directed to enclose an extract (paragraph 2) from letter, Confidential, dated the 16th October, 1912, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and to say that the chief commissioner has appointed you to be in charge of the survey party that will work in the Mishmi country, and to vest you with full political control. The necessary escorts will be furnished by a force of 300 military police, commanded by Major Bliss.

2. It must be clearly understood that the objects of the operations are survey and exploration, and that, subject to considerations of safety, the survey officers who accompany the party must decide as to the country to be visited. The chief commissioner trusts that escorts will be strong enough to ensure that no opposition will be encountered, but should any village give trouble it must be firmly dealt with. An extract (paragraphs 3 and 4) of the instructions issued by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief to the officer commanding the technical troops detailed for work in the Dibang Valley is appended, and the inspector-general of police has been instructed to bring these to the notice of Major Bliss.

Subject to the survey officers being given every facility for carrying out their programme, you should visit as many as possible of the villages in the area over which loose political control will now be exercised.

3. Captain F. M. Bailey will accompany the party as intelligence officer, and it is the desire of the Government of India that he should be allowed as much scope as possible for the exercise of his talents as regards exploration.

Enclosure 5 in No. 309.

Instructions by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief to the Officer Commanding the Technical Troops detailed for Work in the Dibang Valley during the Cold Season of 1912–13.

* * * * * *

3. Your relations with the inhabitants of the country will be governed by the instructions you will receive from time to time from the Assam Government through the local political officers. From the experience of the Mishmi mission last cold weather, the local tribes may be expected to be entirely friendly, and great care must be taken to avoid any friction with them. Should, however, any overt act of hostilities occur or seem probable, you will take such military measures as you may consider necessary for the safety of your command.

4. In addition to the party under your command for road-making purposes, survey parties for work at the head of the Dibang Valley will be employed under the orders of the Assam Government. These survey parties will be provided with escorts of military police, who will arrange for their protection and supply, for which under normal circumstances your command will not be responsible. In the event of hostilities however, these parties and their escorts will come under your orders in regard to such military measures as may be necessary to ensure the safety of all detachments employed in the area in question.

Enclosure 6 in No. 309.

Government of India to Chief Commissioner of Assam.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, November* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd October and subsequent telegrams. Supply of extra military assistance required has been arranged by military authorities, and Viceroy trusts that there will be no delay in now carrying out the whole programme.

[54589] No. 310.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th December, 1912, regarding the Chinese troops in Thibet.

India Office, December 21, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 310.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 20, 1912.

FOLLOWING telegram received the 18th December from British Trade Agent, Gyantse, regarding situation in Thibet :—

"The chief Ministers have informed Thibetan trade agent, Gyantse, that, assisted by Lieutenant Lal Bahadur, the National Assembly and General Chung have arrived at a settlement under which Chung will probably start for India about the 18th instant. Ministers have instructed trade agent to keep 1,700 baggage and riding animals ready."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[53850] No. 311.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 21, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, containing proposals as to the future policy to be adopted by His Majesty's Government with regard to Thibet.

You will have observed from telegram No. 202 of the 18th instant to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, copies of which were sent to you on the same day, that Sir E. Grey does not propose to take any further action in the matter until the Cabinet has come to a decision.

As, however, it would seem advisable to take active measures with as little delay as possible, should it eventually be decided to adopt this policy, Sir E. Grey would suggest that the future course of action of His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* the Russian Government should be at once taken into consideration.

Sir E. Grey would deprecate any attempt at the present moment to obtain a permanent modification of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, as the necessary negotiations would entail considerable delay, and would probably involve a demand for a *quid pro quo* on the part of the Russian Government.

On the other hand, it appears to Sir E. Grey that it would be insufficient merely to inform the Russian Government of the action contemplated by His Majesty's Government, as they might point out that one party to a convention cannot go beyond and behind its provisions without previous consultation with the other party, whose concurrence should properly be solicited. The Russian Government might also question the fact that no extension of British influence is intended to, or will, take place.

Sir E. Grey would therefore suggest that the best course would be to explain to

the Russian Government that the measures which His Majesty's Government may be compelled to take are not of a permanent character but are designed to meet the exigencies of a difficult and complicated situation, which circumstances beyond their control have originated, and that, though they admit that in taking these measures they are departing from the letter of the 1907 convention, His Majesty's Government trust that the Russian Government will not take exception to them, as they are necessitated by the paramount importance of maintaining, as far as possible, peace and tranquillity on the borders of India, and also in order to show China that she cannot violate treaty engagements with impunity.

Sir E. Grey further suggests that this communication might contain a reference to the action of the Russian Government in Mongolia, where the situation has closely resembled the state of affairs with which His Majesty's Government have to deal in Thibet.

I am to ask that the Secretary of State may be favoured with the observations of the Marquess of Crewe at his Lordship's early convenience.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[54747] No 312.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 477.)

Sir, *Peking, December 5, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 437 of the 4th November, I have the honour to enclose copies of three further reports from the acting British consul-general at Chengtu relating to the progress of the Chinese advance into the March country between Szechuan and Thibet.*

Of the two columns of the expeditionary force which advanced from Tachienlu during the summer, the northern one of 1,000 men under General Liu has succeeded in reaching and relieving Chambo, after it had undergone a rigorous siege of over two months, and the northern road to that city has been effectively opened by the Chinese.

The column operating on the southern or main road between Tachienlu and Batang is commanded by General Chu, and it has been in constant conflict with the Thibetans, succeeding after some difficulty in recapturing Litang early in November, but failing to make any definite progress beyond that point. Yin Tutu followed General Chu to Litang, and is to-day reported to have reached Batang and to be contemplating a further advance with a small and likely-equipped force to Chamdo by the main road, relying on the good offices of the King of Chala to secure a safe passage and to make his peace with the native chiefs and lamaseries.

Such an attempt would appear to offer little prospect of success, for the State of Sanai, in the neighbourhood of Batang, is reported to be hostile; but Yin Tutu may have determined on this enterprise of diplomacy and conciliation as a measure of despair, and its fulfilment will certainly require considerable courage in the present unsettled state of the Marches.

In the meanwhile the Thibetans are concentrating in force in the neighbourhood of Hsiang-cheng, a rich agricultural district to the south of the Litang–Batang road, along which they have succeeded for some months in cutting off all communications. There are indications that General Chu is preparing to take the offensive against this force. The districts to the west of Batang are also up in arms, and, with the setting-in of the winter, the position of the scattered Chinese forces is not encouraging. They are continually harried by the Thibetans, and they are discontented and prone to mutiny in consequence of the shortage of their pay and supplies. It is believed that Yuan Shih-kai would gladly put an end to any further advance for the present, and that he has urged the advisability of reducing the strength of the expeditionary force. Yin Tutu's political position, however, has been considerably weakened during his absence from Cheng-tu, and he may decide to retain his army and establish for himself some definite position in the Marches rather than return to a post where he would probably be unwelcome.

In the inauguration of the new administration at Tachienlu, Yin Tutu has evidently determined to follow the precedent set by Chao Erh-feng by extending the

* Not printed.

March province at least as far west as Chamdo, in spite of the fact that the Szechuan–Thibet boundary has been traditionally recognised since the year 1727 as lying within a few miles of Batang.

Whilst the administrative expansion of the Chinese in this area can have but a distant and indirect interest for us so long as it is confined to the limit of Chamdo, we cannot be indifferent to such far-reaching experiments as the extension of the Marches to include Zayul, to the formation of a Chinese administrative district there, and to the appointment of a Chinese magistrate as reported in the first enclosure to this despatch.* A Chinese garrison was established in Chikung in 1910, and the appointment of an administrative officer appears to indicate that they have retained their hold throughout the recent crisis at Lhasa. The colonisation scheme of Chao Erh-feng failed in the Batang uplands in consequence of the inability of the Chinese cultivators to grapple with the severe climatic conditions. In the Zayul country, however, at an altitude of from 4,000 to 5,000 feet rice can be grown, and the prospects of attracting settlers are therefore more hopeful, for the country is known to be fertile and thinly populated.

In the event of any discussion as to the right of the Chinese to establish centres of colonisation or administration in the Thibetan territories, it may be well to raise the question of the occupation of Zayul, and to define the western and southern limits of Chinese expansion. Should they once be allowed to establish themselves without question in this district of Thibet, we may be faced with the accomplished fact of a Chinese colony, administered and garrisoned by Chinese officers, in immediate proximity to our Assam frontier.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

[54750] No. 313.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 480.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of the note from the Wai-chiao Pu the gist of which I telegraphed to you on the 2nd instant in my telegram No. 247.

The report that the Government of India proposed to dispatch engineers to repair the Gyantse–Lhassa road appeared in the vernacular press on the 29th November. Apart from the fact that this request from the Wai-chiao Pu to verify newspaper reports appeared to me unprecedented, I was not in any case disposed to enter upon a discussion of any subsidiary questions affecting Thibet so long as the Chinese Government persisted in ignoring the main issues raised in our memorandum of the 17th August.

You were good enough to express approval of these views in your telegram No. 193 of 4th December, and I accordingly sent the enclosed reply to the Chinese Government, informing them that we could not take official notice of rumours circulated in the press nor consent to discuss questions connected with Thibet until they had accepted the terms of our memorandum of the 17th August.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 313.

Wai-chiao Pu to Sir J. Jordan.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Peking, November* 30, 1912.

WE are in receipt of intelligence reports to the effect that the Government of India propose to dispatch 2,500 engineer troops to put in thorough repair the Gyantse to Lhassa roadway.

The dispatch of soldiers to repair roads being contrary to treaty provisions, if this be true, it should of course be stopped.

I have the honour, therefore, to move your Excellency to telegraph to the Government of India to ascertain and to favour me with a reply.

I avail, &c.
(Seal of the Wai-chiao Pu.)

* Not printed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 313.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-chiao Pu by Sir J. Jordan.

IN the note which the Wai-chiao Pu addressed to him on the 30th November, Sir John Jordan was informed that the Board was in receipt of intelligence reports to the effect that the Government of India proposed to send 2,500 engineers to repair the road from Gyantse to Lhassa, and he was requested to telegraph and ascertain if the report was true.

Sir John Jordan has duly telegraphed, as requested, to His Majesty's Government on the subject, and is instructed to inform the Wai-chiao Pu that they cannot take official notice of rumours circulated in the vernacular press in China nor consent to discuss questions connected with Thibet until the Chinese Government have accepted the terms of the memorandum of the 17th August.

Sir John Jordan avails, &c.

Peking, December 5, 1912.

[55092] No. 314.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, December* 26, 1912.

THIBET.

In a memorandum dated 23rd December Chinese Government have answered our memorandum of 17th August on lines indicated in my telegram No. 260 of 16th December. Following are the only material alterations and additions :—

Clause 1. Reference is made to our note of 17th January, 1911 (see my despatch No. 28 of 18th January), and from statement that His Majesty's Government recognised interests of China in Thibet, and were unwilling to embarrass her in her action there so long as she adhered to her pledges, the inference is that China has full administrative powers in Thibet without any treaty restrictions.

Clause 2. After repeating President's assurance that China has no intention of converting Thibet into a province, the memorandum adds that the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the future administrative system of Thibet is to be gathered from provisional constitution of Chinese Republic, from the abdication edict of the late Emperor, from the oath of the President, and from the order of 28th October restoring his titles to the Dalai Lama. The object is to complete the union in one family of the five races, and maintenance throughout of the *status quo* is in harmony with the view of His Majesty's Government.

Clause 5. Closing of communications is a measure resorted to only in case of war, and China earnestly looks for its early discontinuance.

Memorandum concludes by expressing the hope that Great Britain, as the Power with longest intercourse with China, will take the lead in recognising the republic.

(Sent to India.)

[55070] No. 315.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 271. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Peking, December* 26, 1912.

THIBET.

Russian Minister enquired to-day if I had received Chinese reply to memorandum of 17th August, and if it was satisfactory. I said that I had, and that it seemed very unsatisfactory. He added that he had heard that we were going to follow Russian example and to come to an arrangement with Thibet. I said that I had no information.

(Sent to India.)

[55420] No. 316.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 28.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 27, 1912.

IN reply to your letter of the 21st December, 1912, as to the future policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Thibet, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs generally in the terms of the communication which it is proposed to make to the Russian Government in the event of His Majesty's Government deciding to take action on the lines indicated in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 198, dated the 12th December, 1912, to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

With regard, however, to the suggestion made in the seventh paragraph of your letter, Lord Crewe is of opinion that, while reference may suitably be made to the similarity in the situations created in Thibet and Mongolia, respectively, by the policy of the Chinese Government, it will be preferable for the present, at all events, to avoid drawing any analogy between the action contemplated by His Majesty's Government in Thibet and that recently taken by Russia in respect of Mongolia. His Lordship would further suggest that the reply of the Russian Government to the proposed communication should be awaited before His Majesty's Government commit themselves in any way to approval of the recently signed Russo-Mongolian agreement, for which M. Sazonof, in the *aide-mémoire* communicated by him to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the 7th November, 1912, solicits an *accueil favorable* on the part of Great Britain.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[55585] No. 317.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 489.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 14, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 437 of the 4th November, I have the honour to enclose a report from the acting British consul-general at Chengtu, communicating a telegram quoted in the native press in which Yuan Shih-kai informs the Dalai Lama that he is reinvested with his former rank and titles. The President states incidentally that the Amban Lien Yu has been dismissed and, although the "Gazette" has made no mention of his deposition, the new title of "Government agent in Thibet" was bestowed last May upon General Chung Ling, who is still holding out with a handful of men in Lhassa, and it is entirely consistent with Chinese policy that the Amban Lien should be made the scapegoat for the disasters which have overtaken the Chinese during the recent crisis.

Another point of interest in the presidential message is a reference to "the old procedure settled with previous Dalai Lamas." There can be no doubt that the prestige of the ambans and consequently of the Peking Government showed a marked decline in the period between the accession of the present Dalai Lama and the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1906. At his inauguration ceremonies the amban was for the first time induced to forego the suzerain privilege of casting the final lot in the selection of the new head of the Church; he is the first incarnation for several generations who has been allowed to attain his majority and so to replace a succession of manageable regents by a definite personality; and he has shown an independence of character which cannot have failed to restrict the powers of patronage which added greatly to the prestige of the Chinest resident. For a period of sixteen years he succeeded in exercising a personal sway over a considerable portion of Thibet, and the Chinese were obviously alarmed at his growing independence when the success of Chao Ehr-feng's campaign and the Lama's flight in 1910 provided an opportunity for re-establishing the Chinese position in a way which could scarcely have been combated but for the outbreak of the revolution and the ensuing break in the continuity of China's forward policy.

I have been unable to ascertain definitely whether the President's telegram to the Dalai Lama is authentic, but it will be noticed that it bears a certain resemblance to the message sent viâ Gyangtse a month later by the bureau of Mongolian and Thibetan affairs, as reported in the Government of India's telegram of the 3rd instant.

I am informed that at the end of September last this bureau received a telegram from India recommending the restoration of the Dalai Lama's titles, and a reply was dispatched by the head of the bureau, Mr. Yao Hsi-kuang to the address "India"—this being the only word used by the sender, who may possibly have been a member of the Chinese mission detained at Darjeeling. In consequence of this address the telegram was delivered to the Governor of Bengal, who, being unable to decipher the Chinese code, telegraphed to me for information on the 9th October. Enquiries instituted here eventually elicited the above explanation, and I learned that the sense of Mr. Yao's reply was to the effect that the President had already consented to the restoration of his titles to the Dalai Lama, who would moreover be permitted to visit Peking and receive considerate treatment.

I also take this opportunity to enclose the translation of an order which appeared in the "Official Gazette" of the 15th ultimo, directing Mr. Fu Shih-yen to proceed on a mission of enquiry in Thibet.

I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 317.

Acting Consul-General King to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 92.)

Sir, *Chengtu, October* 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy and translation of an extract from to-day's "Kuo Min Pao," publishing a telegram addressed by Yuan Shih-kai to the Dalai Lama, and sent to the Chengtu Government for transmission to its destination.

It would appear from this telegram that the Dalai Lama has made overtures to the Republic through a Lama of Karachin, with the result that the President now fully reinstates him. A return to the *status quo* that obtained in the reigns of previous Dalai Lamas is the President's avowed aim.

I have, &c.
LOUIS KING.

Enclosure 2 in No. 317.

Extract from the "Kuo Min Pao" of October 29, 1912.

RESTORATION OF HIS RANK AND TITLES TO THE DALAI LAMA.

(Translation.)

A TELEGRAM addressed to the Dalai Lama by the President has been received by the Chengtu Government for transmission to Yin Tutu, who is to discover the Dalai Lama's whereabouts and to arrange for the delivery of the message to him. The telegram is as follows:—

"To the Faithful, Civilisation-aiding, Perfect, Incarnate Buddha of the West, greeting. In the five years which have elapsed since we met, my thoughts have been with you across the distant Kunlun mountains. The Republic has now been established; out of the five races we have created a new State. The late Manchu Government having treated you shamefully in depriving you of your title, I, the President, have for some time past been anxious to restore this to you, in order to display my desire to further the welfare of the Yellow Church, and to do honour to the law of the Buddha. But so great a distance separates us that your present abode has been unknown to me to my sincere regret. I have now received a letter sent by you to Prince Kalachin, in which you say that Lien-yü falsely impeached you and brought you the sorrow of deposition; that the Szechuan soldiers stirred up strife in Thibet, strife which has lasted to this day; you state your desire to confer with the Central Government with a view to a return to the old procedure settled with previous Dalai Lamas; and you request your correspondent to approach me in the matter.

"From this I see that you are favourably disposed towards this Government and support the Republic, and that you wish an end to strife and disorder. I am gratified and moved to admiration. It is my duty to reinstate you in your former rank and

titles, and to request you to resume your headship of the Yellow Church, and co-operate in achieving the blessings of peace.

"Lien-yü, whose administration of Thibetan affairs was unsatisfactory, has already been dismissed and will be dealt with; the troops who created disturbance are being disbanded. As to how a return is to be made to the system originally in force in Thibet, I am sending officials to confer with you.

"The conflict which has taken place between Chinese and Thibetans, since the mutiny of the soldiers, and the enormous damage to private property which has resulted, has roused in me anxiety and compassion. As Defender of the law of the Buddha, you are doubtless in a position to come to the people's rescue and to put a stop to the evils of war. I earnestly hope that you will order all within your jurisdiction to renew towards the officials, soldiers, and citizens of China now in Thibet the attitude of former years. Those Thibetan priests and laymen who have accepted the Republic should also, in conformity with the precepts of your religion and with the dictates of humanity, be protected from harm and loss.

"My object being to be benevolent towards the people of the five races, I earnestly hope that eternal peace may reign between China and Thibet, and I shall certainly not allow myself to be swayed by partiality to either side.

"I trust that you will keep me continually informed of the true state of affairs in Thibet, so that I may be in a position to benefit its people.

"YUAN SHIH-KAI.

"*October* 26, 1912."

Enclosure 3 in No. 317.

Department of Mongolia and Thibet to Mr. Fu Shih-yen.

(Translation.)

IN view of the gradual restoration of order in Szechuan, Yunnan, the Marches, and Thibet, this department has from time to time sent officers to investigate conditions in those districts. Now Posterior Thibet, which is conterminous with British India, is yet more distant and desolate than K'ang Wei (Kham, or Anterior Thibet). There are numerous trade marts there, where Chinese and foreigners dwell together, but since the outbreak of the revolution all communication has been cut off, and we have no means of ascertaining what is actually happening there. Raising my eyes to the west, I feel that there is good reason for anxiety, and it is essential, therefore, that some suitable person be sent to make personal investigation on the spot, to provide a basis for our future counsels.

Mr. Fu Shih-yen, having already been appointed by this department commissioner for investigation in Thibet, is hereby ordered to go forward at his discretion and penetrate into Posterior Thibet, making a thorough investigation and enquiry, and reporting the facts to this department for their consideration.

[55587] No. 318.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 491.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to the reports recently received by the Government of India regarding the present condition of the Chinese garrison in Lhassa, I have the honour to forward herewith, in translation, an extract from a native newspaper published in Peking on the 11th instant, purporting to contain the text of a telegraphic message addressed by the Chinese resident, General Chung Ying, to the Cabinet.

The "Ping Pao" is believed to enjoy some measure of official support, so the message may well be authentic. If so, the statement therein, that "the Thibetans object to the republic," is of interest, in view of the repeated Chinese official declarations that the Dalai Lama is anxious to return to his allegiance.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 318.

Extract from "Ping Pao" of December 11, 1912.

(Translation.)

CHUNG YING telegraphs from Lhassa :—

"I have had no reply to the telegram regarding the besieging of the Chinese by Thibetans. There is no news of our reinforcements. Our arms and provisions are exhausted ; both physically and mentally we are in grave distress. Misery meets the eye in every direction ; the roads are blocked with the corpses of men dead of starvation. The official who offered his services as mediator prefers to resume an attitude of indifference. I agreed to the Dalai asking for the good services of British officials in the hope of staving off the evil day, but know not if this plan will succeed. Please telegraph to the Dalai to stop the Thibetans from lawless behaviour and bid the relief force press on day and night. In that case there may be some hope for the Chinese. In short, the Thibetans object to the republic and do not recognise me as resident-general. Please send me orders."

This is the first message which has come through to the Cabinet.

[55588] No. 319.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 492.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 16, 1912.

AS the mail leaves to-day, time does not permit me to send you a full account of an interview which I had on the evening of the 14th instant with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Thibet, but the accompaning memorandum, prepared by the Chinese Secretary, Mr. Barton, gives a very accurate summary of the conversation between Dr. Yen and myself, the gist of which I had the honour of telegraphing to you this morning. The interview took place at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was unfortunately prevented by indisposition from attending.

It is not quite clear why the Chinese Government after a silence of four months have voluntarily invited a discussion of the memorandum of the 17th August, but my impression is that the step is not unconnected with the Mongolian question, which has possibly taught them the danger of leaving such matters unnoticed. They probably anticipitate that further procrastination may lead to results in the Thibetan case similar to those which have already attended the Mongolian affairs, and they have, at least, convinced themselves that it is wiser to discuss than wholly to ignore such incidents. But whether they are prepared to go further than engage us in a mere discussion which will gain time and tide over the interval before the elections seems to me very doubtful, and if Dr. Yen's attitude correctly reflects that of his Government, I confess that I see little prospect of an amicable solution on the general lines of our memorandum.

At this interview I did not consider that I was authorised to act upon the instructions contained in your telegram No. 198 of the 12th instant, but I warned the Vice-Minister in the gravest terms against the danger of the course they proposed to adopt in declining to enter into any fresh agreement. It is possible that a threat to transfer our friendship elsewhere and negotiate directly with the Dalai-Lama might induce the Chinese to reconsider their attitude; but the adoption of this course is attended with risks to our trade, which it is very desirable, if possible, to avert. The analogy between Thibetan and Mongolian questions is so striking as to justify the belief that they are both capable of solution on the same lines. For us the important difference lies in the fact that our immense trade interests render us much more vulnerable to attack than Russia is, and on that account we should exercise special care to see that our action is justified.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 319.

Memorandum respecting Conversation between Dr. Yen and Sir J. Jordan on December 14, 1912.

SIR JOHN JORDAN, accompanied by Mr. Barton, called at the Wai-chiao Pu by appointment, at 4 P.M., and was received by Dr. W. W. Yen the vice-Minister with whom was Dr. Y. C. Chang.

Dr. Yen apologised for the absence of the Minister Mr. Lu, who being detained at his house through indisposition had requested him to keep the appointment with Sir John Jordan. Mr. Lu had prepared some notes embodying the views of the Chinese Government on Sir John Jordan's memorandum of the 17th August relating to Thibet, which he proposed to go through.

Clause 1.—In this clause His Majesty's Government referred to article 1 of the 1906 convention. The Chinese Government, however, relied on article 2 of that convention as reserving to them the right to intervene in the internal administration of Thibet. China undertook not to permit any other State to intervene, but never undertook not to intervene herself. It did not necessarily follow that China intended to exercise this right, but she claimed that it existed under the treaties.

Sir John Jordan replied that His Majesty's Government could never accept this interpretation, which was, moreover, entirely inconsistent with the repeated pledges given both verbally and in writing by the late régime that China had no intention of altering the *status quo* in Thibet. Historically, China had never possessed the right of active intervention in the internal administration of the country, and His Majesty's Government could not agree to any solution of the present situation which left a loop-hole for the exercise of such right in the future.

Clause 2.—The description of the conduct of the Chinese officers in Thibet during the last two years to which exception was taken was not entirely accurate, and with regard to the presidential order of the 21st April, 1912, the Chinese Government were prepared to renew in the most formal manner the assurances already given by the President that there was no intention of incorporating Thibet as a province of China.

Sir John Jordan replied that he was prepared to substantiate fully every statement contained in the memorandum which had been drawn up with the greatest care, while in view of the fact that the presidential order had already been translated into action by the carving of a large province out of Thibetan territory, mere assurances were inadequate to meet the case.

Clause 3.—The word "unlimited" appeared hardly applicable to the Chinese forces in Thibet; some 2,000 troops which was all China had in the country was not an unreasonable number, in view of the many obligations imposed on her by the 1906 convention and the trade regulations.

Sir John Jordan replied that the clause must be read as a whole and the limitation of troops considered, together with the reference to the Chinese representative's escort; Chinese military activities in Thibet rendered some limitation necessary, and the number of troops would be a matter for consideration in the event of China consenting to negotiate on the basis of the memorandum.

Clause 4.—The Chinese Government considered that as satisfactory treaties already existed in regard to Thibet to which they were prepared to adhere, there was no necessity to enter into any new agreement, more especially at the present time when the Government was still unrecognised, and with regard to the last portion of this clause China had hoped that Great Britain, with whom her relations were the oldest, would have been the first to afford recognition to the new Government instead of being the first to set the example of making what should be only a formal act a conditional one.

Sir John Jordan asked if it was intended to return a formal reply to the memorandum in this sense and refusing a new agreement, as in this case the discussion would appear to be waste of time.

Dr. Yen replied that this was the intention, but the Government's answer would also explain the reason, and would offer to clear up the misunderstandings which appeared to exist owing to the diversity of interpretation of the existing treaties by the two countries.

Sir John Jordan said he must warn the Chinese Government most solemnly against any such method of dealing with this serious question. Although the republic had announced its intention of observing all existing treaties, its first act

with regard to Thibet had been to proclaim to all the world the incorporation of this country as Chinese territory, and this had been followed by the dispatch of an expedition of conquest. Great Britain could not acquiesce in the absorption of a country with which she had treaty relations, and consequently the conclusion of a new agreement by China was essential if a peaceful solution was to be found.

Clause 5.—With regard to the use of the Indian route to Thibet, it was thought that this might have been allowed out of friendly consideration for China.

Sir John Jordan replied that our friendly consideration could hardly be invoked in order to assist in the conquest of the country. We had already shown extreme consideration in allowing the Chinese garrisons in Thibet to pass through India.

Dr. Yen said that the above represented the Chinese attitude towards the points raised in the memorandum, but Mr. Lu desired to have a friendly exchange of views before making a formal reply.

Sir John Jordan observed that he viewed this attitude with great regret, for he feared that the Chinese Government did not appreciate the gravity of the question at issue. His Majesty's Government were most anxious to arrive at a friendly solution, and, although four months had been allowed to elapse before any notice was taken of the memorandum, and he was awaiting further instructions, still he had no reason to think that an acceptance of its terms at the present time would not suffice to enable an agreement to be reached. Some points were no doubt susceptible of elaboration, but the main principles laid down represented the minimum with which His Majesty's Government would be satisfied. These principles were scrupulously fair, and even advantageous to China if viewed in the light of the actual situation in Thibet, where she had now not a vestige of authority left.

Dr. Yen asked in what respect the existing treaties were considered so unsatisfactory as to require the substitution of a new agreement.

Sir John Jordan replied that this was not a question for discussion, the recent acts of the Chinese Government had thrown the Indian frontier into a state of turmoil, and their policy of aggression, which impaired the integrity of a country which had independent treaty relations with Great Britain, could no longer be tolerated.

Dr. Yen maintained that the policy was not one of aggression but of defence of China's own frontiers and of discharge of her treaty obligations, as the recent restoration of the Dalai Lama by China showed, and in any case the treaty of 1904 was *ultra vires* on the part of Thibet and was subsidiary to the convention of 1906. The action of Chao Ehr-feng in 1910 had been explained to His Majesty's Government at the time, and the note addressed to the Wai-wu Pu on the 17th January, 1911, was regarded as tantamount to the grant of a free hand to China in Thibet in exchange for the position assumed toward Nepal and Bhutan. Great Britain's interests in Thibet, he added, were merely commercial, and as such would be adequately safeguarded by the existing treaties.

Sir John Jordan refuted all these contentions, pointing out that Chao Ehr-feng's campaigns had been ones of conquest accompanied by much bloodshed, and China's frontier was defined by historical boundary stones very far short of Chamdo and other places then attacked; the treaty of 1904 was in no sense *ultra vires* and was in full force—the Chinese Government having, at the time it was made, repeatedly expressed their inability to control the Thibetans; the pledges given to His Majesty's Government in 1910 had been broken, and the construction placed on the note of January 1911 was too incomprehensible to require denial.

Again, Dr. Yen urged that the Chinese *status quo* in Thibet had varied—like the boundaries of the country—at different periods, and the historical records would have to be referred to in order to define the points.

Sir John Jordan replied that His Majesty's Government were supplied with the fullest information of the historical and actual conditions of the country, while he himself had a personal knowledge of the treaties and archives relating to Thibet from 1888 and onwards. The whole question had been gone into with the greatest care, and he again begged Dr. Yen not to imagine that any amount of explanation of existing treaties or of assurances would suffice to procure a settlement. The conclusion of a new agreement on the lines of the memorandum was the only solution which could be accepted, and he earnestly hoped that China would not neglect the opportunity thus offered, as a refusal to negotiate would leave His Majesty Government free to take whatever course might seem necessary for the protection of the interests involved.

Dr. Yen promised to inform Mr. Lu accordingly.

[55589] No. 320.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 493.)

Sir, *Peking, December* 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a memorandum from the acting consul-general at Chengtu which gives a clear account of the ebb and flow of Chinese administration in the marches of Tibet between the period of the British expedition to Llassa and the fall of the Manchu dynasty.

Prior to the revolution a certain administrative control appears to have been created by Chao Erh-feng as far west as the State, but not the city, of Chamdo, and thus to have re-established the frontiers of the early Manchu Emperors, which were advanced a few miles beyond Batang in 1723.

With the outbreak of the revolution, however, and the ensuing death of Chao Erh-feng, the administrative fabric completely collapsed, and the Chinese frontier was once more pressed back to Tachienlu, thus reverting to the conditions prevailing before the Younghusband expedition. The recent movements of the Chinese expeditionary force are summarised in the second enclosure to this despatch, and there appears to be little evidence of a successful recovery by the republican arms of any effective position in the debatable territories of the Thibetan marches.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 320.

Consul-General Porter to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 99.)

Sir, *Chengtu, November* 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which I have drawn up on the subject of the limit of Chao Erh-feng's effective administration in the marches of Eastern Thibet between the years 1906 and 1911.

I have relied for my facts chiefly on the archives of this consulate-general, but a book which is now being published locally, entitled, "The Record of the Establishment of the Province of Western Kham," by the ex-warden of the marshes, Fu Sung-mu, has proved useful in supplementing the consulate records which are necessarily less complete than the official records of the warden himself.

In addition to the facts with regard to administration which have been embodied in the memorandum, the author makes some statements with regard to the Szechuan-Thibetan boundary which seem worth transcribing as showing the process by which the boundary has gradually been pushed further west during the past seven years.

"Prior to the year 1904," the author states, "the boundary between Thibet and Szechuan was situated at Ning Ching Shan, close to Pang Mu Tang, three and a half days' journey west of Batang. A stone pillar was erected at this spot in the reign of the Emperor Yung Cheng (1723–1736)."

This is evidently the stone seen by Sir Alexander Hosie the same year (journey to the eastern frontier of Thibet, p. 49).

Continuing, the author states: "In the autumn of 1906 Chao Erh-feng was appointed warden of the marches of Szechuan and Yünnan. At that date the boundaries of the marches extended from Tachienlu in the province of Szechuan on the east to Chiamdo on the west, and from Yünnan on the south to Kokonor and Kansu on the north."

Later, after describing Chao's successes in the marches, the author states: "Since the ancient boundary between Thibet and Kham was at the col of Tanta, the latter was therefore made the boundary of the marches in the west." And proceeds: "In the spring of 1911 Chao Erh-feng submitted a memorial requesting that the Thibetan boundary should be shifted to Kiangta."

Finally, the author states: "In the autumn of 1911 Fu Sung-mu, acting warden of the marches, submitted a further memorial requesting the formation of the

province of Western Kham, but, the revolution intervening, the project was not realised."

The elasticity of the western boundary of the marches is the most remarkable thing about the ex-warden's statements. From a comparatively circumscribed area in 1904, a few military successes seem to have been taken as a justification for the inclusion of a territory far beyond the scope of any expedition, comprising a large section of what has always been looked upon as Thibet proper. Whatever may be the facts about the ancient boundary of Thibet and the Thibetan State of Kham, it has yet to be shown that China is entitled to consider the latter a part of her own territory, while the extension of the boundary to Kiangta, a few days short only of Lhassa and well within anterior Thibet, would seem to be indefensible on any ground but that of conquest, and therefore decidedly premature.

A list giving the Chinese characters of the places mentioned in the memorandum and the Thibetan equivalents, where known, is appended, together with a sketch map showing approximately the positions of the various places.

I have, &c.
HAROLD PORTER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 320.

Memorandum respecting Limits of Chao Erh-feng's effective Administration in Eastern Thibet.

ALTHOUGH Chinese suzerainty over Thibet, including the border districts, dates from the year 1720, when Lhassa was first occupied, and guards stationed at all the principal places along the main road from Tachienlu to keep the lines of communication open, no attempt to administer any of the territory was made until after the British expedition to Lhassa in 1903 had given China cause to fear the possibility of losing her paramount position in Thibet.

The first move in the direction of strengthening her hold on the frontier districts was made in 1904, when the territory of the King of Chala, of which Tachienlu, a town occupied by a Chinese garrison since 1700, was the capital, was incorporated into the province of Szechuan.

In the year 1905 the tribes in the marches revolted, and Feng Ch'uan, the new assistant amban, on his way to Thibet, was killed at Batang. His murder was due to the resentment that he had aroused among the lamas and tribesmen by the drastic measures of reform which he sought to impose, with a view to reducing the powers of the lamas and native chiefs and increasing Chinese authority in the tribal districts.

Hsi-Liang, Viceroy of Szechuan, dispatched a punitive expedition under General Ma Wei-chi and Taotais Chao Erh-feng and Ch'ien Hsi-pao, which succeeded in its object.

In the autumn of 1906 Chao Erh-feng was appointed warden of the marches of Szechuan and Yünnan, and the boundaries of his district were stated to extend from Tachienlu in the province of Szechuan on the east to Chiamdo on the west, from Yünnan on the south to Kokonor and Kansu on the north.

Chao proceeded to bring a large part of this area into subjection during his three years' campaigning from 1906 to 1909, and established Chinese administration in exchange for the former rule of the native chiefs in the following fourteen places :—

1. K'ang T'ing Fu : Formerly called Tachienlu, and the seat of the Ming Cheng T'u-ssu (King of Chala).

This district was formally made a part of the marches under Chinese jurisdiction in 1904.

2. Li Hua T'ing : Formerly called Litang, and the seat of the Litan T'u-ssu. It wae incorporated into the marches in 1904. In 1906 the territory was taken out of the jurisdiction of the T'u-ssu and regular Chinese official jurisdiction substituted.

3. Ho K'ou Hsien : Formerly the area intervening between the territories of the Litang and Chala T'u-ssu. Chinese official jurisdiction substituted in 1906, and district created a " Hsien " in 1908.

In the summer of 1911 this district was given jurisdiction over part of the territories of the Ch'ung Hsi and Chala T'u-ssu.

4. T'ing Hsiang Hsien: Formerly under the jurisdiction of the Litang T'u-ssu. The old name of the territory was Hsiang Ch'eng, and it was under the independent jurisdiction of a T'u-ssu, who refused allegiance. Chinese jurisdiction was substituted in 1906 and the name changed to T'ing Hsiang Hsien. In 1907 the district paid land tax.

5. Tao Ch'eng Hsien: Formerly Tao Pa under the Litang T'u-ssu. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction in 1906 and land tax collected in 1907.

6. Kung Ka Ling: A sub-district. Formerly under the Litang T'u-ssu. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction in 1906 and made a sub-district of Tao Ch'eng Hsien.

7. Pa An Fu: Formerly Batang under the Batang T'u-ssu. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction in 1906 and land tax collected.

8. San Pa T'ing: Formerly territory lying between Litang and Batang districts. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction in 1906. Was given jurisdiction over Mao-ya and Ch'u-teng in 1908.

9. Yen Ching Hsien: Formerly under the Batang T'u-ssu. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction and paid land tax in 1906. Name changed to Yen Ching Hsien in 1908.

10. T'eng K'o Fu. Formerly in Derge jurisdiction. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction in 1909 and paid land tax. Given joint jurisdiction over territory of Ch'ung K'o, and a partial jurisdiction over territories of Kao-jih and Ling Tsung T'u-ssu.

11. Te Hau Chou: Formerly formed the central portion of Derge territory. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction and paid land tax in 1909.

12. Shih Ch'u Hsien: Formerly formed the northern part of Derge territory. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction and paid land tax in 1909. Has also partial jurisdiction over territory of Kao-jih. The remaining portion adjoins the Hsining district of Kansu province.

13. T'ung P'u Hsien: Formerly formed the western section of the Derge territory. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction and paid land tax in 1909. In 1911 given partial jurisdiction over territory of the Chiamdo Hutukhtu and over Na To territory.

14. Pai Yu Chou: Formerly also Derge territory. Placed under Chinese jurisdiction and paid land tax in 1909.

There seems to be no doubt that Chinese jurisdiction was established in these places on the different dates mentioned. The only doubtful point is as to how far that administration was effective.

With the exception of the Derge territory, which accounts for the last five out of fourteen administrative centres, and was only taken over in the year 1909, in exchange for a substantial pecuniary solatium to the chief, the remaining districts all date from 1906, except Tachienlu, which dates from 1904. Contemporary reports bear out the supposition that effective administration was exercised in the majority of these districts. In Batang and Litang, for instance, where the T'u-ssu or chiefs were actually executed for complicity in the murder of Feng Ch'un, the resulting anarchy made immediate Chinese administration essential. This was rendered all the easier, as Chao made Batang his head-quarters for some time.

The upholding of Chinese administration in the marches was, as after events proved, entirely dependent upon the maintenance of adequate armed forces in the subdued districts. In all probability beyond diligently collecting the land taxes in their respective districts the Chinese civil officials did not make any great parade of their powers outside their immediate stations and the lines of the main roads.

There is one noticeable exception in the list of administrative centres given above and that is Chiamdo. Although Chiamdo is named as the western boundary of the marches under Chao's wardenship, no attempt seems to have been made by Chao himself to place it under Chinese administration. A portion of its territory was placed under the control of T'ung P'u Hsien in 1911, but no mention is made of the main centre, and the presumption is that Chiamdo never was placed under Chinese effective administration in Chao's time or subsequently.

This conviction is strengthened when the dates are examined. Although the majority of districts were taken over in 1906, the Derge territory, far the largest and adjoining Chiamdo on the east, was not taken over till 1909, and then only upon payment of compensation to its chief.

It seems, therefore, probable that the absorption of Chiamdo, admittedly one of the most powerful and independent lamasseries in Eastern Thibet, was indefinitely

postponed by Chao pending a favourable opportunity of gaining his end by some such means as proved effective in Derge.

With the withdrawal of the greater part of the garrison of the marches in the autumn in 1911 to Tachienlu, on the outbreak of the revolution, the slender hold of the Chinese on the marches at once became apparent. The tribesmen, led by the dispossessed lamas, revolted, and the Chinese Government are now engaged in recovering lost ground and trying to build up again by means of a second costly expedition the structure of effective administrative control which it took Chao Erh-feng five years to erect and the tribesmen as many weeks to destroy.

The limit of Chao Erh-feng's sphere of effective administration must, therefore, be said to have stopped short between Derge and Chiamdo and the whole structure to have been in any case an artificial one depending for stability upon Chinese military occupation and timely subsidies, the failure of which at any time would suffice to plunge the whole territory of the marches into rebellion and anarchy.

Chinese colonisation which Chao himself saw was the proper remedy and the only hope of retaining a permanent hold on the territory or of reaping any profit out of the enterprise proved a failure, even under the heavy pecuniary inducements offered. The respectable Szechuan farmer refused to leave his fertile plain and equable climate for the rigours of the Thibetan uplands, and those that did go, beggars and jail birds, either died on the way, deserted, or proved a miserable failure, eking out a scanty existence on the only land they could find not already farmed by the natives.

Enclosure 3 in No. 320.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 100.)

Sir, *Chengtu, November* 28, 1912.

MY telegrams Nos. 49, 51, 53, 54, and 55 will have kept you informed as to the recent progress of the Chinese expeditionary force in the Thibetan Marches.


Yin Tutu's arrival at Litang on the 7th instant marks a distinctly forward move on the part of the hitherto dilatory general. His somewhat boastful telegram announcing his arrival, the submission of the natives, and his intention of proceeding to an immediate advance against the main body of the enemy at Hsiang Ch'eng, was evidently intended to create the impression that the end of the campaign was now in sight. A further object was, no doubt, to afford some justification for his continued demands for more money and supplies, which are becoming a serious drain on the provincial resources, notwithstanding the diversion to the purposes of the campaign of the whole of the large indemnity recently extracted from the Mantzu tribes as compensation for the destruction of the town of Sung Pan T'ing, the unfortunate inhabitants of which have so far not received a cent for their losses.

A letter from Mr. Cunningham, dated Tachienlu the 18th instant, of which I have the honour to enclose copy, gives a much more pessimistic view of the situation than that apparently held by the Chinese authorities themselves.

According to Mr. Cunningham, the disaffection among the Thibetans, far from subsiding, is spreading, and involving all the districts to the west and south of Batang as far as the Indian frontier. The Chinese expedition has only achieved the clearing of the main roads to Batang and Chiamdo, and only hold the roads subject to the continued presence of the troops.

Discipline is almost at an end among Yin Tutu's troops. The Chinese postal inspector at Tachienlu, writing recently, states that an outbreak was daily expected during the latter part of October, and that the danger only passed with the departure of Yin and his troops at the end of the month. Yachow has already been completely gutted, and, according to a local newspaper, the troops at Litang broke loose on the 13th November and sacked a wealthy lamassery and temple, conduct which has roused Thibetan feeling to fever pitch, and for which the Chinese may yet pay dearly.

Altogether, the outlook from the Chinese point of view is not a hopeful one. Provided that Yin Tutu is able to inflict a decisive defeat on the Thibetans at Hsiang Ch'eng, there is some prospect of restoring order in the area previously subdued by Chao Erh-feng, but any attempt to penetrate further west into the confines of the State of Khan must necessarily mean a greatly increased force, and the problem of


SKETCH MAP SHOWING APPROXIMATELY CHAO ERH-FENG'S 14 ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES, NUMBERED IN RED, BOUNDARIES OF MARCHES, KHAM AND THIBET, PRINCIPAL PLACES AND RIVERS.
KOKONOR
HORBA STATES
DERGE (13)
SHIH CHÚ (12)
TUNG PU ?
TRIBES
TENG KO (10)
LING TSÚNG
CHAMDO
CHANTUI
CHAMDO
GONJOK
TEHUA (11)
YANGTSE RIVER
CHENGTU
TANTA
PAIYU (14)
ANTERIOR
DRAYA
CH'ALA
KHAM
SANGAI
LITANG (2)
YACHOW
KIANGTA
BATANG (7)
HOKOU (3)
TACHIENLU (1)
SANPA (8)
LHASSA
RIVER SALWEEN
RIVER MEKONG
PANGMUTANG
GARTOK
TAO PA (5)
HSIANG CHENG (4)
THIBET
ZAYUL
YENGCHING (9)
KUNGALING (6)
ATUNTSE
BURMA
ASSAM
YUNNAN
SZECHUAN

maintaining open lines of communications and furnishing the troops with regular supplies will be no easy one to solve.

I have, &c.
HAROLD PORTER.

Enclosure 4 in No. 320.

Mr. Cunningham to Consul-General Porter.

Dear Mr. Porter, *Tachienlu, November* 18, 1912.

THE situation is still far from bright in the Thibetan marches. There are still thousands of rebellious armed Thibetans south of Litang, but at present not on the main road. To the south of Hsiang Cheng, along the Yang-tsze Valley, there is a lot of fighting.

To the west of the Yang-tsze, and about seven or eight days from Batang, the Thibetans are in very strong numbers. The districts of Draya and Dranka have now openly rebelled. Trouble in these districts affects all the country north of Burmah and Assam. All the rope bridges along the route which Captain Bailey travelled last year have been cut by the Thibetans, across the Mekong and Salween.

The district of Bo-me will certainly fight up for the outrageous destruction of twenty-seven temples by his Excellency Chao's soldiers three years ago.

Batang, Derge, and Chiamdo are still quiet. Yuin Tutu is now several days west of Litang. The Thibetan forces who held Lamaya have retired south. We have no direct communication yet with Batang.

Yang Sao-chuen arrived here on Friday, the 15th. You may know he is to act as Yuin Tutu's foreign adviser. There is also an English interpreter with him. I wonder if they fear any complications. In spite of all that has been said, I would not be surprised if Yuin Tutu secretly works his expedition on to Lhassa. He told me a few days before he left he only intended to go as far as Batang and Chiamdo. Once he gets to Chiamdo, twenty days east of Lhassa, he may want, out of pure "political" interest, to see the sacred city of Lhassa. I think the sending of a few hundred troops back to Yachow was a mere bluff, and may have eased Yuan Shih-kai's conscience when he replied to Sir John Jordan's request for the return of the present military expedition.

I believe the name of the expedition is now being changed. Have you heard that?

Winter is now in the marches and most of the passes are snowed up. Mr. Kerihuel will tell you about the rumours at Hokeo. There are no rumours in this city.

We have little authentic news from Lhassa; reports say that Chung Ku-ming is still there but has no power whatever.

ROBT. CUNNINGHAM.

[55709] No. 321.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th December, 1912, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, December 30, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 321.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 28, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 20th instant. Under date the 26th December the British trade agent, Gyantse, has sent the following confidential telegram :—

"Chung King Yin left Lhasa on the 19th instant, having surrendered ammunition and arms on the 16th. A Nepalese officer and 16 men accompanied the party, which was composed of some 800 Chinese, women and children included. He intends to halt four days at Nagartse Jong, where he arrived on the 24th instant. About the 30th December he proposes to visit Gyantse, but whether this will be permitted by the Thibetan authorities is uncertain. It is apparently his wish to see me. If he cannot come here my proposal is to meet him about the 30th December at Kangma. The Chinese are travelling independently from Nagartse Jong, and probably, on account of lack of transport, they will be in two or three batches; on the 28th December, the first of these should reach Kangma viâ Ralung. A careful enumeration will then be made of the parties and their transport. The arms which Chung King Yin has now surrendered have been stored, under Nepalese guard, near Potala, together with those which Len has surrendered previously. Chung King Yin is believed to have agreed to authorise the handing over of all these arms to the Thibetans, as soon as he reaches Chumbi.

(Repeated to Peking.)

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